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Summary 
Th i s study i s an attempt t o describe how a number of t h i n k e r s 
from t h e seventeenth t o nineteenth centuries approached the problem 
of theodicy i n r e l a t i o n t o p h y s i c a l e v i l . Most of those studied 
also concerned themselves w i t h t h e n a t u r a l sciences, aspects o f which 
they sought t o r e l a t e t o t h e i r theology. I t was sometimes d i f f i c u l t 
f o r them t o w r i t e p ublishable theology, which would n o t incur the 
censure of the a u t h o r i t i e s , so various devices were employed. This 
means t h a t some of the work under discussion has t o be approached 
h i s t o r i c a l l y ±a order t o a s c e r t a i n the author»s meaning. ' 
The study f a l l s i n t o t h r ee sections. Each of the f i r s t two 
f o l l o w s the same p a t t e r n . Three preliminary i n v e s t i g a t i o n s lead 
t o one s u b s t a n t i a l chapter, i n v o l v i n g reference t o t h e e a r l i e r 
m a t e r i a l of t h e s e c t i o n . Thus the analysis of Bayle, Leibniz and 
Hume r e l a t e s t o t h e chapter on Kaiit, and t h a t of Mai t h u s , Erasmus 
Darwin and Paley, t o the chapter on Coleridge. The two sections are 
r e l a t e d t o one another i n t h a t Mal^hus, Erasmus Darwin and Paley were 
a l l I n t h e i r own ways r e a c t i n g t o Hume, and Coleridge was r e a c t i n g t o 
the work of h i s immediate predecessors i n t h i s country and also t o the 
w r i t i n g s of ILeibniz arid Kant,. The t h i r d section contains one main 
chapter, together w i t h an extended summary of the study. I T i s 
r e l a t e d t o the previous two sectioixs Jjn t h a t i;u attempts t o pursue 
the coneem w i t h theodicy i n t h e w r i t i n g s of those mentioned f o r the 
f i r s t t i m e , i n t h e l i g h t of t h e i r possible awareness of w r i t e r s 
discussed e a i ' l i e r . 
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I n proper names and a l l t e c h n i c a l terma standard modern s p e l l i n g 
i s used, except i n quotations where t h e form used i s as i n t h e 
source qiioted. 
Introcluctioii 
When A.C. Bradley gave a series of G i f f o r d Lectures i n 1907 
e n t i t l e d I d e a l s of R e l i g i o n , he presented the press w i t h a summary 
which Was p r i n t e d as t h e " I n t r o d u c t i o n " . I n t h i s sunimary he asked 
t h e question, "Do we r e a l i s e how u t t e r l y d i f f e r e n t from the p i c t u r e 
o f t h e world which would have been sanctioned by an orthodox theologian 
a humdi-ed years ago, i s t h e p i c t u r e h a b i t u a l l y presented t o and a c t i v e 
ijn t h e average c u l t i v a t e d European mind of today j.n regard t o t h e 
beginning an.d h i s t o r y of the e a r t h and man, or t h e i r possible or 
probable f u t u r e , or the causation o f events, whether usual or unusual, 
t h a t happens here o r anywhere i n the Universe?"' This study i s 
concerned w i t h c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of t h a t "orthodox" p i c t u r e before 
and a f t e r Darwjji published The O r i g i n of Species, ana w i t h t h e impact 
t h a t woik made on t h e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g . The p a r t i c u l a r t o p i c w i t h i n 
t h e general f i e l d which i s of s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t here i s t h a t laiown as 
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"theodicy", a term probably invented by Leibniz. i t s meaning may 
be b r i e f l y defined as the "problem" of how t o j i i s t i f y Gtod i n h i s deal-
ings wi-ch man and w i t h h i s c r e a t i o n , given tha. claim t h a t t h e r e i s a 
d i v i n e l y good, wise and powerful Creator, and thoJi t h i s i s compatible 
w i t h t h e presence of e v i l i n the w o r l d , supposing e v i l t o be t h a t 
which God d e t e s t s . a i e t o p i c of r e l a t e d i n t e r e s t has been excluded 
from the discussion, so f a r as pos s i b l e , namely, the t o p i c of whether 
i t i s meaningful t o a s s e r t b e l i e f i n a creator who possesses a w i l l 
which h i s c r e a t u r e s n o t o n l y can but do disobey. "Theodicy" i s i n t e g r a l l y 
r e l a t e d t o t h a t area of " n a t u r a l " theology which may be r e f e r r e d t o as 
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"design" theology. This l a t t e r area, which was concerned t o derive 
a k i n d of theology from n a t u r e , was s u b s t a n t i a l l y undermined q u i t e 
indepoidently of the t r a d i t i o n of n a t u r a l philosophy represented by 
Darwin, by t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n represented b^ J Hume. By 
paying care and a t t e n t i o n t o the w r i t i n g s of some of the c e n t r a l 
f i g u r e s i n v o lved i n the xmdermiriiiig i t ma.y be possible t o discover 
what i t was t h a t so deeply concerned theta about t h i s k i n d of theology, 
and t h e theodicy a p p r o p r i a t e t o i t . . 
Whether o r n o t theodicy i s a proper concern f o r a Q i r i s t i a n 
t h e o l o g i a n depends upon what one t h i n k s the tasks of such a theologian 
are t o be. "Any attempts t o defend God, any k i n d of theodicy i s 
wh o l l y a l i e n t o C l i r i s t i a n f a i t h ; a god v/hom man has t o t r y t o defend 
i s no longer God." T h i s may or may not be the case, but there i s no 
attempt i n t h i s study t o discuss t h i s question. Rather, I i n t e n d t o 
l o o k a t the work of some who have thought theodicy t o be a proper 
t o p i c f o r a C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g i a n , even though some of those t o whom 
reference w i l l be made represent p o i n t s of view c r i t i c a l of and o f t e n 
h o s t i l e t o those of the so- c a l l e d "orthodox" theologians of t h e i r 
p e r i o d . 
I t may be t h a t theodicy i s an attempt t o answer questions t h a t 
have no answer, and i n t h i s case theologians may w e l l be g r a t e f u l 
t o those who enable the t r u t h o f t h i s t o be seen. But i t w i l l n ot 
do i n i t i a l l y t o accept "impenetrable mystery" as the re p l y t o t h e 
question being r a i s e d . As Plev/ says, "the p o i n t has been put t h a t 
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the kno\vn and undisputed f a c t s d e c i s i v e l y f a l s i f y the fundamental 
t h e i s t claim, t h a t , in t h e f u l l but basic sense s p e c i f i e d , God 
e x i s t s . " To escape the charge o f w i l f u l s e l f - d e l u s i o n , he goes on, 
th e b e l i e v e r should show how and why t h i s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y so 
since God i s so defined i n t h e C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n as having "a 
set o f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s vthich one might'uninstntctedly have thought, 
mu.st make i t . impossible t o i squai'e an existence c l a i m w i t h some of 
the most obvious f a c t s of the world around us." 
I f the w o r l d - p i c t u r e has changed, i t may be t h a t the discussion 
of theodicy can be no more than an h i s t o r i c a l exercise f o r a 
th e o l o g i a n , who would then be attempting t o assess t h e "performance 
v a l u e " which a c l u s t e r of ideas once had, and the confidence they 
engendered, a confidence which would have t o be sought from new 
sources once t h e ideas were d i s c r e d i t e d . However, i t might also 
be the case t h a t from the a n a l y s i s h i n t s mig^it be discerned as t o 
how t o set. about c o n s t r u c t i n g a '^theology of nature", or a t any r a t e 
t o jnake some minor c o n t r i b u t i o n t o such a c o n s t r u c t i o n . A theology 
r e l a t e d t o nature would be a p a r t i c u l a r area of C h r i s t i a n theology 
which might be r e l a t e d t o "scien.ce". As W.A. Whitehouse put i t , 
w r i t i n g of t h e C h r i s t i a n i n t e r e s t i n "science", "the fundamental 
concern i s t o promote and deepen a t r u e understanding i n man of h i s 
place i n the order of time and nature, and t o c l a r i f y the question 
about a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h God •which w i l l govern imagination, 
a s p i r a t i o n , and a c t i o n a l l the dealings men have w i t h t h e i r f e l l o v / s , 
With t h e t h i n g s about them, and w i t h the tasks of ciillture and p o l i t i c s . " 
4 -
And w i t h theology and nature i n mind, one may u s e f u l l y adopt h i s 
employment of t t e word '"nature" t o mean "a conventional way of 
r e f e r r i i i g t o the environraen,t w i t h i n which I have emerged, w i t h 
other beings some of whom I recognize as my f e l l o w men, an 
environment which provides vast f i e l d s of possible experience." 
F i n a l l y one may note t h a t l a t e r on i n h i s book he w r i t e s t h a t 
another aspect of the C h r i s t i a n ' s concern " i s t o a n t i c i p a t e any 
10 ' 
i l l - c o n c e i v e d r e l i g i o u s commitments" ^ and i t might be the case 
t h a t i a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s area of r e l i g i o u s commitment as i t has been 
seen i n the past might a t the very l e a s t provide oie w i t h information 
about how n o t t o r e l a t e theology and "ecology" together i n a naive 
way. 
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Section I : Bayle t o ./(d.»it 
A. Ba,yle 
One po i n t t l i a t a r i s e s immediately when lookijag a t the w r i t i n g s 
of those who have concerned themselves w i t h theodicy i s t h a t the 
t o p i c i s one of those t h a t has sometimes been t r e a t e d so seriously 
t h a t those who deviated from what was commonly taken t o be the 
"orthodox" p o s i t i o n found themselves a t l e a s t embarassed s o c i a l l y , 
o r put i n a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n , i f not a c t u a l l y persecuted, because 
of t h e i r arguments o r c o n v i c t i o n s . A theodicy was meant>to provide 
an expression of a guarariteeing by God of the n a t u r a l order vihich 
corresponded t o God»s a t t r i b u t e s . To c r i t i c i s e orthodox contemporary 
o p i n i o n about theodicy i t was sometimes necessary t o adopt various 
kinds of l i t e r a r y t a c t i c s , e i t h e r t o make t l i e w r i t i n g s seem t o be 
what they were n o t , or t o make i t impossible t o discern the views 
t o which the w r i t e r was unquestionably committed without somehow 
being"in the know" about h i s t m e opinions. F a i l i n g subterfuge, 
or even combined w i t h i t , one might publish anonymously, (though 
t h i s was sometimes done even w i t h non-controversial m a t e r i a l ) , o r 
ari'ange f o r posthumous f / u b l i c a t i o n . Some i n t e r e s t i n g comments on 
t h i s s i t u a t i o n are t o be found i n Leo Strauss*s Persecution and t h e 
i • a r t o f w r i t i n g . The i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h i s book discusses the 
d i f f e r e n c e between the status of philosophy i n Christendom and t h a t 
I n Judaism and Islam. Philosophy became in. C h r i s t i a n i t y p a r t of the 
t r a i n i n g of t h e exi^onent of sacred d o c t r i j i e . C e r t a i n l y t h i s meaiit t h a t 
f o r a time philosophy was subject t o e c c l e s i a s t i c a l supervision, but 
i t a lso guaranteed t h a t i t flourished'. Philosophy i n Islam and 
Judaism was " p r i v a t e " , not subject t o supervision, and t h e r e f o r e , 
says Strauss, t r a n s p o l i t i c a l , as i n c l a s s i c a l Greece. "Even the 
p h i l o s o p h i c schools were founded by men w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y , by 
p r i v a t e men. The I s l a m i c and Jewish philosophers recognized the 
s i m i l a r i t y between t h i s s t a t e of t h i n g s and the one p r e v a i l i n g i n 
t h e i r oWn t i m e . E l a b o r a t i n g on some remarks of A r i s t o t l e , they 
compared the p h i l o s o p h i c l i f e t o the l i f e of a hermit." Strauss 
goes on i n h i s f i r s t chapter t o discuss the a r t of independent 
t h i n k i n g and the p u b l i c a t i o n of 'Hnaorthodox" views i n a s o c i a l 
context which i s unfavourable t o them, e i t h e r because of powerful 
supervision of v/hat i s taken t o be a p u b l i c l y important a c t i v i t y , 
as i n t h e case of the church, or p u b l i c opposition by the " a u t h o r i t i e s " 
t o what i s taken t o be a p r i v a t e and dangerous a c t i v i t y . Strauss i s 
discussing p o l i t i c a l philosophy p r i m a r i l y , not always so d i s t i n c t 
from theology as i t i s now, perhaps, and includes both Bayle and 
Kant i n h i s discussion. What he says i s also very appropriate t o the 
w r i t i n g of some of the o t h e r t h i n k e r s w i t h vhom t h i s study i s 
concerned, and perhaps helps t o e x p l a i n the manner of t h e i r 
p u b l i c a t i o n o f some of t h e i r works i n some instsinces. Strauss 
w r i t e s , f o r example, t h a t a man can t a l k t o h i s t r u s t w o r t h y f r i e n d s , 
and can ' t i t t e r h i s views i n p u b l i c and remain unharmed, provided he 
moves w i t h circumspection. He can even u t t e r them i n p r i n t w ithout 
i n c u r r i n g any danger, provided he i s capable of w r i t i n g between the 
l i n e s . " What i s meant by t h i s metaphoric expression i s a p a r t i c u l a r 
teclinique of w r i t i n g and t h e r e f o r e a p a r t i c u l a r type of l i t e r a t u r e , 
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addressed t o the reader who i s s p e c i a l l y i n t e l l i g e n t and c a r e f u l . 
Some of these readers might denounce the w r i t e r t o the a u t h o r i t i e s 
who may not have spotted the w r i t e r ' s t r u e meaning, but then the 
burden of proof l i e s w i t h the a u t h o r i t i e s , so l o n g , as Strauss 
p o i n t s o u t , as the whole a f f a i r remains w i t h i n the bounds of l e g a l 
4 
procedure. This k i n d of l i t e r a t u r e "has a l l the advantages of 
p r i v a t e communication wi t h o u t having i t s gi'eatest disadvantage -
t h a t i t reaches only the w r i t e r *s acquaintances. I t has a l l the 
advantages o f p u b l i c communication without having i t s g reatest 
disadvantage - c a p i t a l punishment f o r tlie author."' The t r u t h i s 
discussed i n such a way as not t o endanger "orthodox" o p i n i o n , vitiich 
i s taken t o be v i t a l t o t h a t s o c i e t y at t h a t time. Heading between 
the l i n e s must begin from an exact consideration of the e x p l i c i t 
statements of tlse author, considering the context, the l i t e r a r y 
chairacter of the work, and i t s p l a n . I t i s o f course important 
t o consider " a l l reasonable p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f understanding the 
passage as i t si^ands - one of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s being t h a t the 
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passage i s i r o n i c . " Or as B a s i l Willey put i t i n another connection; 
"Why should anyone ever w r i t e i r o n i c a l l y instead of s t a t i n g h i s 
case i n p l a i n terms? Surely f o r sheer i n t e l l e c t u a l pleasure, 
the Joy of c r e a t i o n ; and because the! oblique method, being a more 
su b t l e and c o n t r o l l e d form of r h e t o r i c i s f a r more persuasive than 
7 
undisgsiised anger or z e a l . " W r i t e r s of o r i g i n a l i t y w i t h a 
passionate concern t o look a t the t r u t h r a t h e r than t o maintain 
received opinion may w e l l be f o r c e d t o adopt some subterfuge when 
proceeding t o erode received opinions, and the w r i t i n g s of P i e r r e 
^ 9 -
Bayle serve us as an i n i t i a l example both of a w r i t e r concerned w i t h 
t h e o d i c y , and of one w i t i n g \mder considerable t h r e a t o f persecution 
and censorship, 
Bayle's handling o f the t o p i c of theodicy i s found i n h i o 
I}ioti6rina,ire Historictue et C r i t i q u e o f 1697 which contained a munbor 
8 
o f what were t o become n o t o r i o u s a r t i c l e s . Some of thesoj and 
9 
th e a r t i c l e on "Rorarius", prompted the discussion w i t h Leibniz which 
10 
was t o lead t o the l a t t e r ' s Theodicy* Leibniz was t o f i n d more 
t o discuss i n Bayle*s Reppnse aux i ^ e s t i o n s d'un F r o v i n o i a l , and 
they b o t h had a look at W i l l i a m King's An Essay on the O r i ^ n of 
11 
E v i l o f 1702. Bayle was already notorious by the time the 
— 1 0 
M c t i o n a r y came out , and h i s work had established some features 
which "were t y p i c a l o f h i s approach - h i s honesty i n t r y i n g t o take 
a l l t h e evidence i n t o account, and h i s determination not t o isay more 
than t h e evidence warranted, which was not unooimeoted w i t h h i s 
susp i c i o n of systemization.''^ Another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c was h i s hatred. 
of dogmatism and o f the c r u e l t i e s o f dogmatic men expressed i n h i s 
Commentaire Riilosophique on Ik Ug^i'''^ o f 1^86, some of the points 
of which appear i n h i s D i c t i o n a r y a r t i c l e "PauliciArt^". Certainj.y 
Bayle was aware t h a t any nev/ work he produced would be thoroughly 
15 
s c r u t i n i s e d , because J u r i e u , who had become h i s major enemy, was 
w e l l aware t h a t Bayle's "scepticism" about c e r t a i n matters was 
damaging t o h i s own "orthodojcy"• I t i s time t h a t i n Holland there 
was no major d i f f i c u l t y , so f a r as the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s were 
concerned, i n g e t t i n g work published, though they isight take o b j e c t i o n 
t o p o l i t i c a l l y dangerous books once these were on the open market« 
Even then, the a c t i o n they took was against the p r i n t e r and boo k s e l l e r , 
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r a t l i e r than again.st t h e author. With seven semi-autonomous s t a t e s , 
i t was d i f f i c u l t t o suppress a book. A book m i ^ t be condemned i n t l i e 
c i t y o f i t s o r i g i n w i t h o u t any a c t i o n being taken about i t anywhere 
el s e . The r e a c t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r Church was another matter, though 
the u l t i m a t e sanction \\4iich could be i n f l i c t e d on a r e c a l c i t r a n t 
i n d i v i d t u a l seems t o have been excommunication. I f Bayle load been 
w i l l i n g t o abandon h i s r e l i g i o u s orthodoxy e n t i r e l y , he would 
probably have been f r e e t o w r i t e e x a c t l y wliat he l i k e d on r e l i g i o u s 
. t o p i c s , and i t i s u s e f u l t o bear h i s f i d e l i t y t o h i s r e l i g i o u s 
t r a d i t i o n i n mind. 
I n 1693, J u r i e u urged the Flemish consistory t o dismiss Bayle 
from h i s teaching p o s i t i o n a t the Protestant Academy ija Rotterdam, 
u s i n g m a t e r i a l c u l l e d from the Pensees Diverses t o support a charge 
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of atheism. Here J u r i e u seems t o have liad some support from t h e 
c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s because of what he was able t o i n t e r p r e t as Bayle «s 
dangerous p o l i t i c a l ideas. The consistory a t -tJiis time contained 
more members than f o r m e r l y who were favourable t o the house of Orange. 
J u r i e u was busy promoting the imag'e of W i l l i a m of Orange as a second 
David, so t o a t t a c k J u r i e u miglit conceivably become a p o l i t i c a l 
matter." Bayle was no longer allowed t o give even p r i v a t e i n s t r u c t i o n , 
but he had enough t o l i v e on and was not w i t h o u t f r i e n d s . One t h i n g 
a t l e a s t t h e c o n s i s t o r y learned from t h i s controversy: the next time 
Bayle was accused they i n s i s t e d on t r y i n g t o examine the whole of one 
19 
of Bayle«s works, i n s t e a d of e x t r a c t s chosen by h i s enemies. What 
was a t issue was t h a t Bayle and h i s f r i e n d s saw Jurieu as the prime 
11 
destroyer of the d i s t i n c t i v e character and achievement of 17th 
Century French Calvinism. Bex w r i t e s of the French C a l v i n i s t s , 
t h a t they h e l d t o a f i r m b e l i e f t h a t being one of God's e l e c t 
never excused crime i n any circumstances and they were i n c r e a s i n g l y 
attached t o the r e l i g i o u s p a c i f i s m of the S p i r i t of the Gospel."' 
J u r i e u was n o t t o be allowed to. maintain t h a t e v i l was n o t e v i l , 
t h a t b r u t a l i t y was allowable i f committed by I s r a e l i t e s , t h a t i t 
was p o s s i b l e t o hate one's neighbours f o r the greater g l o r y of God, 
and t h a t wars of r e l i g i o n could be supported by O.T. theology. 
Therefore t h e a r t i c l e i n Bayle's DictioiiLa.ry on "David" i s important 
i n assessing wliat Bayle says about God's goodness and the discussion 
of t heodicy elsewhere i n t l i a t work, because h i s p o i n t i s simply 
t h a t i t i s "of great concern t o t r u e i - e l i g i o n t h a t the l i v e s of the 
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pii;hodox be judged by the general concepts of r i g h t and oi-der." 
Considering t h a t t h i s i s one of its.most important p r i n c i p l e s , i t 
now seems s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h i s i s one of the a r t i c l e s t h e V/alloon 
Consistory wais t o ask Bayle t o r e - w r i t e . But the reason f o r t h a t 
seems t o have been t h a t although the D i c t i o n a r y had not been planned 
as an instrument of controversy, such an instrument i t had become 
I n t h e course o f w r i t i n g . I n Bayle»s preliminary sketch of the work 
th e r e was n o U i i n g on "David", the "Manichecwtj", "Pa.ulici4ns", o r "Pyrrho", 
but J u r i e u «s a t t a c k s made such a d i f f e r e n c e t o him t h a t i t "removed 
h i s previous relitctance t o w r i t e against a f e l l o w Protestant, and 
coloured h i s judgement t o t h e p o i n t t l r n t he c a r r i e s h i s personal 
22 
and d o c t r i n a l c o i a i t e r - a t t a c k i n t o the D i c t i o n n a i r e . " Evidence 
a l s o appears i n other a r t i c l e s concerned w i t h the discussion on 
e v i l , since Bayle wanted t o take every o p p o r t u j i i t y t o exiioss t h e 
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bankruptcy of Jurieu«s p o s i t i o n . The Walloon Consistory might 
w e l l be concerned about the p u b l i c display of an ijtitra-confessional 
argument. The c o n s i s t o r y wanted the a r t i c l e s on a l l the above-
mentioned subjects r e v i s e d , but Bayle maintained t h a t h i s subscribers 
would n o t buy t h e second e d i t i o n unless they could have t h e o r i g i n a l 
a r t i c l e s , and the o n l y major concession he made was t o cut the 
a r t i c l e on "David" and t o add f o u r c l a r i f i c a t o r y a r t i c l e s t o the 
second e d i t i o n . One o f these c l a r i f i c a t i o n s was concerned w i t h the 
subject of the "Manicheowi" where he p a r t i c u l a r l y displayed h i s 
24 
o r i g i n a l i t y . 
V o l t a i r e provided perhaps the shrewdest comments on h i s work, 
wheal he stated t h a t '^ no one could prove t h a t he was a n t i - r e l i g i o u s 
but he ttcrned people away from r e l i g i o n by s e t t i n g f o r t h the o b j e c t i o n s 
t o our dogmas so c l e a r l y t h a t a lukewarm f a i t h could n o t but be shaken; 
25 
and u n f o r t u n a t e l y most of h i s readers possess only a lukev/arm f a i t h . " ' 
And, "Would t o God t h a t Bayle had been drowned along w i t h t h e r e s t 
of the h e r e t i c a l lJutch. . He sets f o r t h thijngs w i t h such an odious 
accuracy, and puts the arguments f o r botn sides before us w i t h such 
shocking i m p a r t i a l i t y and i s so i n t o l e r a b l y i n t e l l i g i b l e t h a t he 
puts even those of the most meagre understandijig i n a p o s i t i o n t o 
26 
judge and even t o doubt what i s t o l d them." Nevertheless, Bayle»s 
work needs c a r e f u l reading, p r e c i s e l y because of the way i n which he 
• 27 
presented t h e issues. Having selected h i s t o p i c , h i s method i s t o 
present the reader w i t h a i i a i j i a r - t i c l e on t h a t t o p i c , w i t h extensive 
f o o t n o t e s t o provide support f o r the t e x t , and employing many cross-
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references whioli have t o be taken i n t o account t o a r r i v e a t h i s 
meaning. 15, Labrousse provides an anatomy of t h i s anatomist. 
Bayle's o b j e c t i s aieticulous d i s s e c t i o n , not coherence. He i s not 
an. eagle t o gaze over t h e p l a i n , b u t i s more l i k e a sparrow who 
hops, p i c k s and peels t h e husks o f f . A t t e n t i v e readers he knew 
he would have, both tlaose who were genuinely i n t e r e s t e d i n anything 
he wrote, and the church censors, the "erudite theologians v/ho had 
had years of t r a i n i n g scenting heresies i n l a r g e volumes, had been 
nourislied a l l t h e i r l i v e s upon l o n g footnotes and commentaries on 
29 
t h e t e x t , and, moreover, took t h e i r task very s e r i o u s l y . " His 
method would a t the very l e a s t b a f f l e h i s enemies i n i t i a l l y as v/ell 
as ^ l a b l i n g h i s f r i e n d s t o plead f o r time f o r a l l concerned t o examine 
the whole of h i s work. His i s "a l i f e - l o n g h a b i t of approaching 
serious subjects i n an i n d i r e c t and devious manner. His cimning 
interweaving of t r a d i t i o n a l and conventional opinions on dangerous 
subjects Dade the reading of Bayle's a r t i c l e s f a s c i n a t i n g r i d d l e s t o 
h i s contemporaries. The p o p u l a r i t y of t h i s p u r s u i t was not u n l i k e 
t h e passion f o r d e t e c t i v e s t o r i e s today, and, then as now, the 
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p e r s i s t e n t reader was sure t o discover the murderer i n the end." 
A number of p o i n t s may, w i t h c a u t i o n , be e x t r a c t e d from t h e 
Dictionai-y t o reveal Bayle*s problem w i t h theodicy. 
As has already been i n d i c a t e d , Bayle»s a r t i c l e on "David" 
denied t h a t p a r t i c u l a r j j n d i v i d u a l s were exempt from c r i t i c i s m i n 
terms of the concepts o f goodness and wickedness as commonly understood-
F u r t h e r t o t h i s p o i n t , but now a p p l i e d to the d e i t y , jjn "Pyrrho" 
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'he w r i t e s : 
our theologians t e l l us t l i a t God, liaving t o choose between a 
w o r l d p e r f e c t l y regulated, adorned w i t h evefy v i r t u e , and a 
w o r l d l i k e ours, where s i n and disorder predominate, 
p r e f e r r e d ours t o the other as s u i t i n g b e t t e r the i n t e r e s t 
of h i s g l o r y . You are going t o t e l l ine t h a t the d u t i e s of 
t h e creator, should n o t be measured by our standards. But, 
i f you do t h i s , you f a l l i n t o the nets of your adversaries. 
T h i s i s where they want you. The i r major aim i s t o prove 
t h a t t h e absolute nature of thijngs i s unknown t o us and t h a t 
we can know them only r e l a t i v e l y . We do not know, they say, 
i f sugar i s sweet i n i t s e l f . We know only t h a t i t appears 
sweet when i t i s placed on our tongues. We do n o t know i f 
a c e r t a i n a c t i o n i s righ t e o u s i n i t s e l f and by i t s nature. 
We only b e l i e v e t h a t w i t h regard t o such a person, w i t h 
respect t o c e r t a i n circumstances, i t has the appearance of 
righteousness. But i t i s something i n other respects and 
o t h e r r e l a t i o n s . 3 ^ 
There i s , however, a problem i n b e l i e v i n g t l i a t God detests what man 
de t e s t s , and t h a t God i s good as man understands'^-the word, and t h i s 
i s what lends s t r e n g t h t o the Manichean p o s i t i o n , as Bayie describes 
i t i n h i s a r t i c l e , "Manicheans". The "orthodox." p o s i t i o n i s t h a t 
'The most c e r t a i J i and the c l e a r e s t ideas of order teach us t h a t a 
Being who e x i s t s by himself, who i s necessary, who i s e t e r n a l , must 
be one, i n f i n i t e , a l l - p o w e r f u l , and endowed w i t h every k i n d of 
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p e r f e c t i o n . " One p o i n t r e l a t e d t o t h i s t h a t one may pick up from 
"P a u l i c i i H i s " i s t h a t "since God gave being t o h i s creatures a s an 
e f f e c t of h i s goodness, he a l s o gave them, i n h i s r o l e as a 
beneficent cause, a l l the p e r f e c t i o n s proper t o each species." 
I f t h a t v/ere t r u e , as he j j i d i c a t e s i n "Manlcheans", the f a c t t h a t 
t h e r e i s o p p o s i t i o n among the e n t i t i e s of the world " f o r t i f i e d as 
much as one l i k e s by what are c a l l e d v a r i a t i o n s , d i s o r d e r s , 
i r r e g u l a r i t i e s o f nature, cannot make h a l f an o b j e c t i o n against 
34 
the u n i t y , s i m p l i c i t y , and i m m u t a b i l i t y o f God." The created 
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' 35 order declares the g l o r y , the power and the u n i t y of Ciod. But 
Manicheism derives from what Bayle c a l l s a deep medfetion on the 
36 37 s t a t e of man. Physical e v i l could be described as the r e s u l t 
of man's s i n , as tlie punishment of moral e v i l , a punishment which, 
" f a r from being incompatible w i t h the supremely good p r i n c i p l e , 
n e c e s s a r i l y flows from one of God»s a t t r i b u t e s , I mean t h a t of 
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j u s t i c e , vJtiich i s no l e s s e s s e n t i a l t o mein than God^s goodness." 
I t was because of man's s i n h:e suggested i n '»Paulicians",that God-
prepared " a l l the misfortunes t h a t can be conceived f o r the human 
race i n t h i s l i f e t i m e - plague, war, famine, p a i i i , t r o u b l e - and 
a f t e r t h i s l i f e a h e l l i n which almost a i l men w i l l be e t e r n a l l y 
tormented i n such a way t h a t jiakes our h a i r stand on end when we 
read d e s c r i p t i o n s of i t . " But man himself, according t o orthodox 
r e l i g i o n , i s "the product of an i n f i n i t e l y holy and i n f i n i t e l y 
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powerful being." There seems f o r Bayle, t o be no r a t i o n a l l y 
s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation of why he should s i n , or of why h i s s i n 
should involve such consequences as extreme phys i c a l p a i n . The 
p e r p l e x i t y ijnto which we may be driven i n considering these problems 
has l e d some t o propose two p r i n c i p l e s . These 
have made an agreement t h a t r e c i p r o c a l l y l i m i t s t h e i r 
operations. The good one cannot do us a l l the good t h a t 
i t wishes t o . I t was necessary t h a t i n order t o do us 
much good, i t consented t h a t i t s adversary do us as much 
harm; f o r w i t h o u t t h i s agreement chaos would always 
have remained chaos, and no creature would ever have 
experienced what i s good. Thus the supreme goodness, 
f i n d i n g a b e t t e r means of s a t i s f y i n g i t s e l f i n seeing 
the world sometimes happy sind sometimes unhappy than i n 
never seeing i t happy, made an agi'eement t h a t produced 
t h e mixture of good and e v i l t h a t we f i n d i n the human 
world.41 
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So he a r r i v e s a t h i s conclusion about the f a t e of reason w i t h 
regard t o h i s discussion: ''Behold t h a t here the mnicheans, w i t h 
a completely absurd and c o n t r a d i c t o r y hypothesis, explaiJi exper-
iences a hundred times b e t t e r than do the orthodox, w i t h t h e i r 
supposition so j u s t , so necessary, and so very t r u e of an I n f i n i t e l y 
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good and a l l - p e r f e c t f i r s t p r i n c i p l e . " Their "explanation" of 
experience i s " b e t t e r " i n the sense t l i a t they are n o t compelled as 
t h e orthodox seem t o be,to compare God e i t h e r " t o a f a t h e r who 
al l o w s h i s c i i i l d r e n t o break t h e i r l e g s so t h a t he can show everyone 
h i s great s k i l l i n mending t h e i r broken bones, or t o a ki n g who 
al l o w s s e d i t i o n s and d i s o r d e r s t o develop through h i s kingdom so 
t h a t he can. g-ain g l o r y by overcomjjig them." The major issue i s 
c l e a r : "The conduct "of 111 i s f a t h e r and t h i s monarch i s so contrary 
t o t h e c l e a r and d i s t i n c t ideas by >yhich we judge goodness azid 
wisdom and i n general a l l t h e duties of a f a t h e r and a ki n g , t i i a t 
our reason cannot conceive how God could act i n feis way.'* 'To say 
4.3 
"the ways of God are n o t our ways" ' may be h e l p f u l i n s o f a r as i t 
d i r e c t s our a t t e n t i o n t o the f a c t t h a t reason alone i n r e l a t i o n t o 
experieiTce cannot cope w i t h the lfaniche*rtS. Nor can Scri p t u r e i n 
and by i t s e l f , as Bayle's c o n f l i c t w i t h J u r i e u , showed. The 
orthodox p o s i t i o n i s t h a t i t depends upon r e v e l a t i o n and i s i n 
some sense t h e r e f o r e derived from S c r i p t u r e . The fundamental 
p r i n c i p l e of the orthodox i s t o be considered i'as a t r u t h of f a c t , 
c l e a r l y revealed; and since i t must f i l i a l l y be admitted t l i a t 
t he causes and t h e reasoiis f o r i t cannot IJS understood, 
i t would be b e t t e r t o cay t h i s from the outset; and stop t h e r e , and 
al l o w the o b j e c t i o n s of t h e philosophers t o be cojisidered as vaim 
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q u i b b l i n g s , and t o oppose n o t h i n g t o them but silence along w i t h 
44 
th e s h i e l d of f a i t h . " For Bayle, experience, and a d u a l i s t i c 
theology r e l a t e d t o t h a t experience, are not t o be allowed t o have 
the l a s t word. A ^Ueplo^iaxi statement \/iiich expresses the t r u t h 
t h a t S c r i p t u r e teaches w i l l be h i s "defence". Moreover there are 
no r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n s i b l e arguments f o r h i s p o s i t i o n i n the l a s t 
a n a l y s i s . 
I t i s u s e f u l t o n o t i c e , however, t h a t Bayle»s discussion of 
e v i l i s n o t confined t o the a r t i c l e s which f i r s t drew the a t t e n t i o n 
of h i s enemies and c r i t i c s , because i n these other a r t i c l e s are 
contained some o f h i s most i l l u m i n a t i n g conuaents on what he under-
stands t o be the issues i n v o l v e d . For example, i n h i s a r t i c l e on 
"Origen" he takes wp. a p o i n t t h a t has been pTOposed by the O r i g e n i s t s , 
that the s u f f e r i n g of p a i n , i n c l u d i n g man's s u f f e r i n g i n h e l l , i s of 
a s h o r t d u r a t i o n , and explains what he t h i n k s a Manichean might make 
of i t : 
The f i r s t t h i n g he might say i s , t h a t we do not f i n d i n our 
minds the idea of two s o r t s of goodness; one of v^hich c o n s i s t s 
i n making a present, whose bad e f f e c t s are foreseen w i t h o u t 
preventing them, though t h a t i s i n the power of the g i v e r ; 
the other i n g r a n t i n g a favour of sucli a nature as w i l l always 
be advantageous t o t h e r e c e i v e r . I t i s needless t o observe, 
t h a t by the idea of goodness we do not understand an imperfect 
soi't of goodness, such as we meet w i t h i n the heart of a sinner; 
but a goodness which i n a l o g i c a l abstracted sense i s cle a r of 
a l l f a i l u r e . This i d e a l goodness i s not a genus c o n t a i n i n g 
under i t the two species j u s t described. I t s e s s e n t i a l and 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a t t r i b u t e i s so t o dispose i t s subject as t o 
bestow favours, which by the short e s t and surest means i t can 
make use o f , may render the c o n d i t i o n of the i*eceiver happy. 
Some of h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n s are t o r e i n f o r c e what he has said elsewhere 
about the p e c u l i a r i t y o f "goodness" as applied t o those who dispense 
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favours t o those whom they l<now w i l l make a f a t a l use of them. On 
the p a r t i c u l a r problem of man's u l t i m a t e s a l v a t i o n from h e l l he 
c i t e s the character of Cardinal Mazarin and h i s f o i b l e of "spinning out 
the execution of h i s promises t o such a length of time, t h a t a l l 
t h e pleasure was wasted i n the expectation, and h i s favours were 
a l l cancelled by tlie a p p l i c a t i o n which was necessary i n order t o 
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e x t o r t them." 
I f God can abate man^s punishment by pain, of which torment in 
h e l l i s an extreme example, he can abate i t immediately and not simply 
halve i t s d u r a t i o n o r d i m i n i s h i t i n some other p r o p o r t i o n . Bayle 
w r i t e s t h a t "we can never r i s e from c r u e l t y t o i n f i n i t e goodness by 
a. bare dUninuti-on of c r u e l t y . " . And there could n o t , i n the i n f l i c t i o n 
of such i5unisliment, be any mistake on God's p a r t . "We commend the 
exactness of a Clockmaker, i f h i s pendu.lum does not e r r above two 
or three seconds i n a year. But the exactness of an a r t i f i c e r 
i n f i n i t e l y p e r f e c t , a b s o l u t e l y excludes a l l exceptions; h i s h o l i n e s s , 
h i s wisdom e t c . are a b s o l u t e l y simple, and without any mixture of 
contr a r y q u a l i t i e s : I say, without the l e a s t mixture which can be 
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conceived, or which can p o s s i b l y e x i s t i n the nature-of t h i n g s . " 
C l e a r l y , Bayle w i l l have no t r u c k w i t h any t a l k about God which, 
as he says, adopts the Manichean e r r o r of saving God's goodness a t the 
expense of h i s power. He concludes t h a t "both the ideas of experiesice 
and metaphysics concur i n demonstrating, t l i a t t o h u r t anyone, 
though i t be f o r never so short a p o r t i o n of time, and i n order 
t o procure him the grea t e s t b e n e f i t , i s a l t o g e t h e r jjicompatible 
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w i t h goodness, unless i t be abs o l u t e l y impossible t o f i n d out a 
s t r a i t path t o lead him from good t o good in a constant and 
48 
i n v a r i a b l e manner." 
. What i s a l s o important about the '"Origen" a r t i c l e i s t h a t i t 
draws a t t e n t i o n t o an important f a c t t o be borne :in mind when one 
i s endeavouring t o put Bayle«s views i n t o perspective e s p e c i a l l y 
when reading "llanicheAns" and "Paulicions" as already described. 
He i s i n t e r e s t e d ija exposing the e r r o r s of C h r i s t i a n theologians, 
i n c l u d i n g those of the p a t r i s t i c p e r i o d , but u s u a l l y steers c l e a r 
of the discussion of s p e c i f i c a l l y C h r i s t i a n s c r i p t u r e . I n other 
words, w h i l s t t h e r e are b r i e f a r t i c l e s on "An t i p a t e r " and "Archelaeus" 
who might i n t h e most general sense be described as New Testament 
subjects i f one were compiling a d i c t i o n a r y of New Testament 
personagesj-he avoids a l l discussion of New Testament m a t e r i a l , 
w i t h the exception of such an a r t i c l e as t h a t on "John the Evangelist'^ 
which i s simply a short discussion of an h i s t o r i c a l problem. He 
i s himself almost "Marcionite" i n h i s worry over t h e content of 
some Old Testament books, yet c u r i o u s l y does not make use of m a t e r i a l 
in the Old Testament which one might have thought cohered w i t h the 
New Testament m a t e r i a l on \\hich h i s f a i t h depended. His a r t i c l e 
on "Job" f o r example i s as b r i e f as the one on "John the E v a n g e l i s t " . 
I t may be t h a t Bayle d i d n o t make use of t h i s Old Testament m a t e r i a l 
because he bel i e v e d h i s enemies would not allow him t o make such a 
s e l e c t i v e use of i t , or he may have meant t o i n d i c a t e by the subjects 
he had chosen t h e kin d of t r e a t n e n t he could o f f e r of any Old 
Testament s u b j e c t . But t h e r e i s something odd about h i s appeals 
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t o s c r i p t u r e i n "Origen", f o r one instance. 'This i s the way of 
t e a c h i n g those t h e i r duty, who mean t o subject Theology t o Philosophy. 
You must show t o them the absurd consequences of t i i e i r method, and 
by t h a t means b r i n g them back t o t h i s maxim of C h r i s t i a n h u m i l i t y . 
That metaphysical n o t i o n s ought n o t t o be the r u l e , by which we are 
t o judge of t h e conduct of God; but t h a t we ought t o conform our-
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selves t o t h e or a c l e s of t h e s c r i p t u r e . " The o d d i t y l i e s i n the 
f a c t t h a t he nowhere t e l l s us what oracles he means, and one must 
suppose t h a t he means t h e oracles of the New Testament, since he 
does n o t c r i t i c i s e i t e x p l i c i t l y . Yet he must have a way of 
coping w i t h i t which was d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of the C h r i s t i a n 
t h e o l o g i a n s whom he c r i t i c i s e d , since they found i n the New 
Testament as i n t h e Old, t h e problem of theodicy embodied, and 
presumably a paradigm " s o l u t i o n " of the problem there - but t h a t 
•would s u r e l y r a i s e i n an i n t o l e r a b l e form f o r Bayle the problem of 
the goodness of God i n \fliom h i s f a i t h r e s t ed. One can only 
suppose t h a t the oracles of s c r i p t u r e on which he depended were 
those of the New Testament which inform man of the a t t r i b u t e s of 
God as Bayle had i n d i c a t e d them t o be and was prepared t o express . 
i n n o n - b i b l i c a l terminology, t o g e t h e r w i t h tJiose which refuse t o 
man t h e a b i l i t y r a t i o n a l l y t o defend such stateitents of b e l i e f . 
Philosophy was i i s e f u l only t o make clear and c o r r e c t t h e content 
of S c r i p t u r e , but coul d n o t f u n c t i o n Independently of Scriptui-e t o 
estatJlish f a i t h . 
Some of h i s a r t i c l e s on ancient philosophers also drew a t t e n t i o n 
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t o Bayle»s discussion of theodicy, and what i s h e l p f u l about them 
f o r t h e present purpose i s t h a t thay also i n d i c a t e v/hat l i t t l e he 
has t o say about "design" theology. He quoted w i t h approval the 
s c h o l a s t i c axiom "That a Philosopher ought n o t t o have recourse t o 
God, Non est P h i l o s o p h i recur r e r e ad Deura; They c a l l t h i s recourse 
th e Sanctuary of Ignorance. And indeed what could you say more 
absurd, i n a piece of Physics than t h i s ; Stones are hard. F i r e i s 
h o t , and Cold freezes R i v e r s ; because God has ordered i t so?" He 
v i r t u a l l y i n d i c a t e d the scope of L e i b n i z * programme when he wrote 
w i t h approval o f Ariaxagoras* i n a b i l i t y t o supply Socrates w i t h what 
he describes as absurd explanations, or explanations which would 
depend upon man*s having i n s i g h t i n t o God*s reasons f o r making the world 
as i t i s : 
A l l t h a t t h e greatest Philosophers can say, upon t h i s Occasion, 
amounts t o t h i s : That, since The Earth i s round, and s i t u a t e d 
a t such a Distance from the Sun; This Figure and S i t u a t i o n 
were necessary t o the Beauty and Symmetry of the Universe; the 
Author o f t h i s vast Machine having an i n f i n i t e I n t e l l i g e n c e 
and Wisdom. From hence we know, i n general, t h a t e verything i s 
r i g h t i n t h i s Machine, and t h a t there i s no Defect i n i t : - But, 
i f we should undertake t o make i t appear. Piece by Piece, t h a t 
e v e r y t h i n g i s i n t h e best -State i t could possibly be i n , we 
should i n f a l l i b l y assign very wrong Reasons. ^0 
As a p a r t i c u l a r i l l u s t r a t i o n he noted, 'Would S i r Isaac Newton, who 
has discovered so many Mathematical and Mechanical Beauties i n the 
Heavens, pretend t o warrant, t h a t , i t Things were not such, as he 
supposes them, as t o Magnitude, Distances, and V e l o c i t i e s , the World 
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would be an i r r e g u l a r work, i l l b u i l t , or i l l c ontrived?" ' Bayle 
considered a d i f f e r e n t view from t h a t of L e i b n i x * when he said, " I s 
n o t t h e Divine Understanding i n f i n i t e ? CJod has t h e r e f o r e the Ideas 
of an I n f i n i t y of Worlds, d i f f e r e n t from each other, a l l of them 
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B e a u t i f u l , Regular, and Mathematical, t o the l a s t Degree." God's 
work i s as i t ought t o be, but i s c l e a r l y one of a number of 
a l t e r n a t i v e s which would have been po s s i b l e . Therefore althotigh 
i t i s nonsense t o t r y .to give what Bayle c a l l s " p a r t i c u l a r reasons" 
why, f o r example, roan has two eyes placed i n h i s head as they are, 
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r a t h e r than s i x eyes placed r o i n d the head, t h i s does not i n h i b i t 
a general confidence t h a t t h i n g s are as God means them t o be. 
I n e v i t a b l y t h i s l e d him back a t var i o i i s p o i n t s i n o l i i e r ai*fcicles t o 
h i s problem of the o d i c y . Chrjrsippus r a i s e d a question i n h i s work 
on Providence: "Did t h e Nature of Things, or the Provide.nce t h a t 
made the World and human k i n d , make also the Diseases, t o which men 
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are s u b j e c t ? " Bayle l e f t Chrysippus* answer t o t h i s question without 
com.ment, except f o r h i s i r o n i c commendation of v;hat he in d i c a t e d as 
the best a pagan philosopher wit h o u t knowledge of the F a l l could say 
t o e x p l a i n t h e v i c e s o f men. Chrysippus had answered t h a t some 
fe a t u r e s of t h i n g s happened as "consequences" r a t l i e r than being p a r t 
of nature's primary aim and design. 
F o r the Formation o f a human Body, said he, the exactesfc Idea, 
even t h e Usefulness of the Work, r e q u i r e d , t h a t the Head should 
be composed of a Contexture of small and t h i n Bones; f o r from 
thence t h i s Inconvenience r e s u l t e d , t h a t i t would not be able 
t o r e s i s t Blows. Nature was preparing Health, and a t -the same 
t i m e , by a k i n d of Concomitancy, i t was necessary, t h a t the 
Source of Diseases should be opened. I t i s the same w i t h respect 
t o V i r t u e ; the d i r e c t A c t i o n of Nature, t h a t gave i t a Being, 
d i d , by a Coxinter-Blow, produce the Generation of Vices.54 
Presumably Bayle could not commend t h i s k i n d of "explanation" of one 
Instance of physi c a l e v i l i n the l i g h t of h i s remarks i n "Anaxagoras". 
And i n "Epicurus" one f i n d s oneself again w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s 
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which Bayle maintained he found i n s c r i p t u r e , v l i i c h l a i d '^the s o l i d 
Foundation of the Providence, and Perfections of God". The s c r i p t u r a l 
p r i n c i p l e of God*s having been the creator of a l l t h i n g s , of both 
t h e i r matter and t h e i r form gives us also three subsidiary p r i n c i p l e s . 
" 1 . That w i t h t l i e most l a w f u l A u t h o r i t y t h a t can be, he disposes of 
t h e Universe as he tteinks f i t : 11. That he needs only a s i n g l e Act 
of h i s W i l l t o do wliatever he pleases: 111. That n o t h i n g happens 
but what he has placed i n the Plan of h i s Work.'* He now introduced 
a theme v i i i c h a l s o appeared i n L e i b n i z ' Theodicy as an i m p l i c a t i o n 
o f h i s optimism: " I t follov/s from thence. That t h e Conduct of t h e 
World i s not an Employment t h a t can ei t h e r f a t i g u e or t r o u b l e God, 
and t h a t no Events whatsoever can d i s t u r b h i s F e l i c i t y . " Wliatever 
happens i s subservient t o "the Ends he has proposed t o himself from 
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a l l E t e r n i t y , and which are t h e greatest Mysteries of the Gospel," 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y from t h i s k i n d of viewpoint t h a t Leibniz was t o draw 
conclusions f a r d i f f e r e n t from Bayle's about how much could be done 
t o j u s t i f y God's dealings w i t h h i s c r e a t i o n . I t i s because they 
were so s i m i l a r t o one another i n c e r t a i n respects t h a t t h e i r work 
was r e c i p r o c a l l y so i n t e r e s t i n g , though tempera,mentally they were 
very d i f f e r e n t . L e i b n i z * contentment and enjoyment of t h i n g s are 
manifest i n h i s Theodicy, i t i s d i f f i c i a t t o imagine him w r i t i n g as 
Bayle d i d i n "Xenophanes" t h a t "\Ye ai-e subject t o pain and sorrow, t o 
such t e r t i b l e a f f l i c t i o n s , t h a t i t i s not t o be decided which i s most 
d r e a d f u l . The most vigorous h e a l t h does n o t secure us from g r i e f . 
For g r i e f flows i n upon us through a thousand channels, and i s of 
the nature of dense bodies: i t comprizes a great deal of laatter i n 
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a very small compass; e v i l i s heaped up, c3:'o\v^ _ded and pressed close 
i n i t . One hour's g r i e f contains more e v i l , than there i s good i n 
s i x or seven pleasant days." Nothing t h a t reason can u t t e r can 
support man u h r o u ^ h i s experience o f anguish. 
One can ha r d l y o v e r s t r e s s the importance o f Bayle's w r i t i n g s 
f o r h i s successors i n r a i s i n g i n h i s o\vn i n i m i t a b l e way the issue of 
theodicy. L e i b n i z alone was t o o f f e r a through-going "defence" o f 
God by t a c k l i n g what he saw t o be the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the orthodox 
p o s i t i o n as Bayle had s t a t e d i t , and dealing w i t h the a b s i i r d i t i e s and 
paradoxes Bayle found t o be i m p l i c i t i n i t . Bayle believed t l i a t the 
statements o f oi'thodoxy, however absurd they were i n the face of roan's 
experience o f p h y s i c a l p a i n , were guaranteed t o be true because they 
depend, i n some u n s p e c i f i e d sense, on s c r i p t u r e , and t h e r e f o r e on 
r e v e l a t i o n . Argument could n o t support h i s b e l i e f s , though he could 
e f f e c t i v e l y explain v/hat he meant by the goodness of God. I ^ i b n i z 
57 58 found i t a great f a u l t i n him, g i f t e d though he was t h a t he 
demonstrated n o t only the f o l l y and pretensions of humanity i n h i s 
r o l e as h i s t o r i a n and c r i t i c , but the nonsensical conclusions t o which 
reason could press, i n h i s r o l e as sceptic. L e i b n i z c l e a r l y r e g r e t t e d 
the f a c t t h a t Bayle died before the Theqdicy came out, so t h a t he d i d 
n o t have the o p p o r t i m i t y t o show him how reason could demonstrate the 
goodness of God and y e t face up t o t h e existence of e v i l i n the world. 
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B. Leibniz 
I t was Leibniz who provided an answer to Bayle whicai depended 
upon a f u l l exposition of the a p r i o r i approach \»hich had provided 
Bayle with a theoretical standpoint against the Manicheans, and 
which Bayle had found unsatisfactory unless j.t was to be seen as 
expressing the truth of Scripture. Leibnizi exposition depends 
above a l l on understanding the "rapport" of the divine attributes 
one with another in creation, so here was a profound difference 
i n the approaches of these two men to "theodicy". Despite t h i s 
they had a considerable admiration for one another. Bayle had been 
interested in Leibniz' work at l e a s t since 1686^, and the two 
exchanged t h e i r views not only through the obvious means of private 
correspondence, but by c i r c u l a t i n g t h e i r replies to one aiother via 
the journals which were such a feature of the i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e of 
the time. Much of t h e i r discussion was about the metaphysic in 
terms of vtoich Leibniz published h i s world view, vSiich seemed to 
Bayle to defeat the philosophical and theological imagination. This 
discussion i s reflected in the Theodicy but i s not there Leibniz* 
main concern. 
Leibniz was a more than worthy subject for Bayle»s attention, 
Barth described Leibniz as the pre-eminent representative of h i s 
period', "primarily the discoverer, the believer, and the exploiter 
of the miracle of human power", who above a l l stood for"man's 
optimistic e f f o r t to master l i f e by means of h i s understanding." 
" 30 
Of the Theodicy i n p a r t i c i i l a r Barth said that hardly "a hundred years 
a f t e r the horror and misseries of the Thirty Years War, there i s sounded 
and sung to a f i n i s h a hymn in px'aise of the Creator" which had i t s 
part to play i n r e l a t i n g the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and secular history of 
the day to the "radiance of Ctod". I t w i l l l a t e r on be seen that 
Kant also, f o r a l l h i s c r i t i c i s m of rational theodicy, brought his 
own " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " of God into play precisely in relation to his 
p o l i t i c a l theory. 
The Theodicy was of p a r t i c u l a r importance for Lelteiiz, in that 
i t was the one major work out of many that he wrote, by which he chose 
• 5 
that h i s contemporaries should know him. So f a r as England i s 
concerned, we may note that Princess Caroline thought the work so 
important that she hoped that Samuel Clarke would do a translation 
of i t into English though she was well aware that Clarke was not 
wholly sympathetic to Leibniz* approach. What Clai'ke was to do was 
to make br i e f ejctracts from the Theodicy wliich he published in trans-
l a t i o n i n 1717 together with h i s correspondence with Leibniz. The 
Correspondence represented,however b r i e f l y , some of the m.ost important 
theological points Leibniz wanted to make. Unfortunately, given the 
dispute between the Newtonians and Leibniz, the l a t t e r * s viev/s were not 
l i k e l y to become so i n t e r e s t i n g to the English as to make them want 
to read the Theodicy i t s e l f , or any other works of Leibniz* as they 
became ava i l a b l e . By the time they could have been assimilated by 
English-speaking tteologians, the focus of attention was on the work 
of Kant, and with rare exceptions, such as J.S. K i l l , Leibniz was 
31 
v i r t u a l l y forgotten as a theologian. I t i s therefore somewhat 
curious to read tliat "Fhe mod of the Theoclicy survived Voltaire *s 
r i d i c u l e and, s a c r i f i c i n g depth as i t achieved popularity, lived 
u n t i l the pessimism movement of the 19th century; eveii Darwin could 
not help r e f l e c t i n g i t . " This kind of comment i s tine only in tlie 
sense that by the time Barwin was writing, some of the themieg 
about God and nature so ably expressed by Leibniz had passed into 
common European culture. 
No more than Bayie oould Leibniz be s a t i s f i e d with any other 
God than one vfliose goodness was to be adored without hesitation. 
He could not agree with Bayle*s understanding of the r e l i g i o u s 
response to God as excluding "reason", however, because he did not 
see the god of r a t i o n a l theology as a sort of cosmic Nero, an aesthete 
Who enjoyed the spectacle of pain. He wanted to provide a theology 
which would, for once and a l l , banish t h i s nightmare, md console 
the man whose g r i e f l a y in his appreciation that e v i l was 
apparently woven into the entire cosmic texture. I/eifoniz* response 
to God was also a response of religious conscience, but was informed 
by what he believed to be a r a t i o n a l apprehension of God. He wanted 
i n t e l l i g e n t and sensitive men to see the world as he believed God 
sees i t . As a s c i e n t i s t , he exemplified "the power of discursive, 
l o g i c a l thought, of searching and of examination, of abstraction, 
of. d e f i n i t i o n and drawing conclusions." ' But he also sought for 
•'understanding", the "simple vision to -viiiieh truth offers i t s e l f 
13 
l i k e a landscape to the eye." 
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Given Leibniz* theological.orientation, he may be said to have 
offered the model theodicy of his time, "raingiing questions of grace 
and scripture with philosophical Issues ... having a primarily 
14 
conti'oversial and apologetic aim." One may well wonder why he 
included the questions of grace and scripture, and how he intended 
the m a t e r i a l on these qpestions to be read, since he had in Bayle 
a l i v e l y example of the hopelessness of trying to construct theodicy 
merely by invoking scripture. Human experience and scripture were 
for Bayle so b a f f l i n g that he was reluctant to quote from the Bible, I 
except when he wanted to make a point about the weakness of human ! 
reason. I t became c l e a r , however, that Leitaiiz maintained thait there I 
were three philpsophical topics to be looked a t , i . e . those of 
necessity, freedom, and the ori g i n of e v i l , and three theological 
topics, (by which he seems to have meant topics di r e c t l y derived 
from r e f l e c t i o n on scripiaire) original sin, grace, and predestination. 
On carefu l examination one sees that i t was the discussion of the i 
f i r s t three whicli provided him with his method of dealing with the 
• • i 6 
second three. Leibniz in effect provided Bayle with a method for 
coping with h i s dilemma over the meaning of scripinire, except that 
i t -was a technique Bayle could not employ, given Bayle«s concern 
with h i s particular kind of analysis of h i s t o r i c a l and empirical 
fact, as a possible basis for theodicy. 
More than that, one gradually r e a l i s e s that none of the material 
which related to any one of the three theological topics, in so f a r 
as they received expression in b i b l i c a l terminology, was an e s s e n t i a l 
part of Leibniz* theodicy so f a r as he himself was concerned, thougli • 
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of course i t was integral to h i s vrork as presented to the publico 
So one may answer a number of questions r e l a t i n g to the nature of 
17 
the Theodicy. One question ' that has been asked i s why i n the 
course of t h e i r disoussion, Bayle chose to deal with Leibniz primarily 
on the l e v e l of h i s a prioi-i argument, rather than tackle the question 
of the authority of scriptures whioli for Bayle was the foundation of the 
truths that alone " s a t i s f y " reason. The ansvrer perhaps i s that Bayle 
r e a l i s e d only too well that scripture and the- conclusions to be drawn 
from i t , such as they were, v/ere of l i t t l e significance for Leibnia, 
except as serving to confirm truth arrived at by a process of a pr i o r i 
r e f l e c t i o n as can be demonstrated from the Theodicy. Bayle had to 
t r y to meet Leibniz on h i s own ground, which i n a strange way was 
h i s too, because i t was a theological principle which enabled him to 
say that manicheism was a mistake, both for philosophy and theology, 
lis 
however i n i t i a l l y productive i t was of a certain kind of "expljination"* 
One also must r e a l i s e that Leibniz i s himself viriting \mder a 
cer t a i n kind of "constraint", and t h i s was v;hy he included the 
«*theologioal" topics i n t h e i r b i b l i c a l dress i n his work, so that 
i t could be read as a book of "piety" a l t h o u ^ he himself could well 
dispense with "revelation". As Barber says, Leibniz led a double 
l i f e , philosophically speaking. *The mainspring, the most important 
elements i n h i s thougihts, are to remain concealed from public view, 
and only those ideas are allowed to appear which he considers TO.11 
19 
not arouse disapproval or hinder him in his practical tasks." 
Barber and others have noted that one of Leibniis' concerns was for 
34 
the reunion of the churches, and he was well known for the determined 
emphasis of h i s b e l i e f that theology, metaphysics, and natui-al science 
20 
were appropriate to one another. The imderstanding of h i s p o l i t i c a l 
concerns enable one to temper somewhat the kind of comments Russell 
. offered in his book on Leibniz, where he r e f e i r e d to the necessity 
liaid upon Leibniz to give s a t i s f a c t i o n to h i s employers. Russell 
suggested tliat t h i s accounted for some inconsistencies i n Leibniz* 
v/ork, which arose "solely through the f(ear of admitting consequences 
shocking to the p r e v a i l i n g opinions of Leibniz* time". He went on, 
"Where such inconsistencies are found, we, who do not depend upon 
the smiles of princes, may simply draw the consequences wljlch Leibniz 
21 • shunned." As other commentators have put i t , Leibniz "was not 
s a t i s f i e d j as the modem scholar pretends to be, merely to put down 
the truth i n writing; h i s f i r s t aim was to introduce the truth into 
the society in which he l i v e d , i n particular into tlie worlds of 
22 
learning, of p o l i t i c s , and of r e l i g i o n . " 
Leibniz i s a profoundly devout man though h i s piety happens not 
to be fundamentally b i b l i c a l i n »t"S expression, but the f a c t that 
h i s published theology had a b i b l i c a l dress would seem to be under-
standable in view of what he sav/ h i s obligations to be. Some of 
Kant's work also looks a t f i r s t sight to be " b i b l i c a l " yet he too 
employed from time to time a b i b l i c a l camouflage without wanting 
tib 23 to promote devotion to God exactly compai-able to Leilmizi though 
h i s purpose In writing about God was an equally serious one. Neither 
of them took part in public r e l i g i o u s observances. Bayle was perhaps 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y shrewd i n spotting Leibniss' characteristic of " s i t t i n g 
loose" t o b i b l i c a l material i n the work of Leibniz vjhioh he knew, 
so presumably i f he had been able t o continue his discussion with 
Leibniis on the basis of the text of the Theodicy he would have 
found l i t t l e there to persuade him to a l t e r his views. So f a r as 
readers other than Bayle were concerned, the sheer complexity of 
the Theodicy would of f e r Leibniz some protection from a charge of 
being i n d i f f e r e n t t o b i b l i c a l revelation. I n addressing himself to 
every passage i n Bayle's writings which interested him, Leibniz often 
repeated himself, and i t i s not always easy to see what, i f any, 
order he employed i n parts Two and Three of the Theodicy, other than 
the order which was provided by the transitions from one topic t o 
another, which were i n themselves an indication of the "dialogue" 
i n which he wes i n effect engaged. 
In one respect Leibniz might be said at f i r s t sight to.tie more 
of a "Christian" theologian when he i s thinking about the vrorld than 
Bayle can bo seen t o be,since one could not discover from Bayle's 
writings whether he had a Christology that made any difference to 
hi©"Theodicy". Bayle's major theological principle was presumably 
related to I'evelation i n the sense that i t vjas derived from r e f l e c t i o n 
on the New Testament and on the whole achievement of Christian 
theology, though he rarely discussed such material i n his Dictionary. 
Leibniz d i d make some attempt to cope v;ith both Old and New Testament 
problematic passages about man's moral e v i l i n relatio n t o what he 
has t o say about God,^ although ultimately f o r Leibniz, man's moral 
e v i l l i k e other «evil» could be f i t t e d into the plan God had of the 
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25 sequence of creation, "than which none can be better conceived." 
And Leibniz invoked Pauline material for a purpose different from 
Bayle's, for Paul's words on the depths of the divine wisdom were 
not for Leibniz an i n v i t a t i o n to abandon the attempt to \inderstand 
what we can hold by f a i t h , but an in.vitation to proceed further 
26 
with our investigation of r e a l i t y . The important material here 
would be the Chrlstological material,-and when one looks to see 
whether the Theodi.cy had a Christocentric character one finds that 
Leibniz saw C h r i s t as the best of philosophers, the culmination of 
a l i n e that began with Moses. Christ had greater authority, and 
added to what Moses had said, the teaching that souls were immortal 
27 
and the wish that men would love God as well as fear him. C h r i s t 
inspired sublime t h o u ^ t s i n people who were H'ell s a t i s f i e d with 
Nature and with Fortune," who were for Leibniz preferable to those 
29 
who were discontented. Leibniz gave a minimal place to the 
3Q 
sufferings of C h r i s t on the ci^oss, but none to the resurrection, 
and i t would be d i f f i c u l t to see how a theology of "harmony" could 
employ '»resurrection". C h r i s t for Leibniz could be described as 
redeemer and mediator, and the one who took human nature upon 
himself to expiate man's s i n , the disorder man brings upon himself 
by h i s sin being often raanlfested i n his physical suffering. To 
that extent i t would seem that he took one d i s t i n c t i v e feature 
of C h r i s t i a n doctrine into account. Barth also wrote that i t was 
to L e i b n i z ' c r e d i t that he a t l e a s t once found a place for "looking 
31 
at creation through the message of Good Friday and Easter", in 
3? the L a t i n scholastic summary at the very end of the Theodicy, 
but omi ted iji F a r r e r '  edition f the whole work as not 
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33 l i k e l y to be of i n t e r e s t to many modern I'eaders. As Barth 
said, " i t i s in r e l a t i o n to C h r i s t , to His position as Member and 
Head of creation, as Lord and Saviour aiid Hope of the world, that 
Cod chose t h i s world as the best; and i t i s in the d i v i n i t y and 
humanity of C h r i s t that we are to recognise the maxima rati o as 
the supreme p r i n c i p l e of the perfection of the rmiverse and there-
fore of the perfection of God himself. ""^ ^ Leibniz' thinking 
here would seem to have been akin to that of DuiJ.s Scotns, who 
maintained an optimistic view of natiu'e, "bound to the theology 
36 
of Creation", and who developed on that basis a view of the 
Incamation as the crown of the doctrine of creation. Khowles 
writes of Duns Scotus that he maintained that God f i r s t of a l l 
loves himself; th«sa he desires to love and be loved by others; 
f i n a l l y he desires to be loved by the Que who can love Him to the 
l i m i t , and so he wll3ed from a l l eternity the union of His Son with 
36 
the created nature that was filled so to love Him. Leibniz did 
indeed write of C h r i s t , "He I s the eternal Son of God, even as he 
i s h i s only Son; but ... having taken upon him at f i r s t , fi'om 
the begijtmlng of things, the most excellent natui-e among created 
beings, to bring them a l l to perfection, he set himself amongst 
them: and t h i s i s tlie second f i l i a t i o n , whereby he i s the f i r s t -
bom of a l l creatures." Unfortunately t h i s sentence i s part and 
parcel of vftiat Leibniz describes as "a theology well-nigh astronomical", 
a piece of theological f i c t i o n which in the Theodicy at l e a s t he 
37 
rejected. So one must conclude with Barth that whilst optimism 
even at i t s best did not altogether lack the knowledge of Jesus 
38 
C h r i s t , i t did not know what to do with that knowledge. The 
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Theodicy, thei-efore, i s not Cliristocentric, but theocentric, yet 
without being an obviously d i r e c t r e f l e c t i o n on scripture, despite 
i t s verdict being one that "verbally corresponds so closely to the 
39 
C h r i s t i a n v e r d i c t " . (One may say that i t i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
the 'Theodicy" that w i l l be examined in the course of t h i s 
discussion, that i t i s theocentric, but never Christocentric. 
Leibniz determined the pattern of discussion with i-egard to t h i s 
pojjit, as with so many others.) 
L e i b n i z ' view of things was of a r e a l i t y which, contrary to 
Bayle, was not contradicted by the Christian "idea" of God but 
which rather could be experienced and appreciated by man as an 
ordered goodn.ess, a creation worthy of the God of f a i t h . The 
world Was not in. i t s e l f a s u f f i c i e n t object of attention, but 
physical r e a l i t y provided the data on which the mind reflected 
i n order to \mderstand certain principles, and i n the l i g h t of 
these the world could be adequately described in a way which vrould 
give delig.iit and s a t i s f a c t i o n . To look at "the structure and 
40 
economy of the universe" was but a preliminary whida would lead 
to man's recognising thii:igs in a l l their i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , in 
rel a t i o n to the mind of God. To "see" was to know a p r i o r i by 
41 
"cause" for "the mind i s elevated by true reason to that which 
42 
to us i s i n v i s i b l e , but none the l e s s ijure." 
To view the world ija r e l a t i o n to the mind of God implies a 
conf idence i n the power of human reason of a kind which now seems 
impossible to sustain. For Leibniz, however, such confidence was 
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integral to giving assent to the principle of the r a t i n n a l i t y of 
God, for roan's r a t i o n a l i t y i s a perfection "shai'ed" with God, from 
whom i t i s derived. Man*s reason d i f f e r s from God's "as a drop of' 
43 
water d i f f e r s from the ocean", but "the perfections of God are 
44 
those of our souls". So Leibniz could speak of "a close contemplation 
which grants us an enjoyment, so to speak, of the v i s i o n of the ideas 
of God."'*^ F a i t h , on t h i s a n a l y s i s , i s the issue of the exercise of 
reason, for i t i s the "assurance ... wherewith we can and ought to 
46 
say that God has done a l l things w e l l . " There i s an area of 
"mystery", truth u l t i m a t e above man's reason, such as "the miracles 
reserved for God alone, as for instance, Creation; such i s the 
choice of the oi*der of the universe, which depends upon universal 
harmony, and upon the clear knowledge of an i n f i n i t y of things a t 
47 
once." But given man's capacity to r e f l e c t on the truth of things, 
he can think through to the eternal v e r i t i e s , which Include f i r s t 
of a l l those truths which have a l o g i c a l , metaphysical, or geometrical 
48 
necessity, which cannot be denied without contradiction. He can 
further analyse r e a l i t y in terms of the principle of e f f i c i e n t 
49 
c a u s a l i t y , and t h i s leads him to r e a l i s e that the existence of 
things as they are i s not determined solely by l o g i c a l reason, but 
by other considerations, both moral and teleological which cm. also 
be seen to be included i n the concept of the "eternal verities ." 
50 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the p r i n c i p l e of determinant reason, the 
p r i n c i p l e of the best, was for Leibniz a simple but f r u i t f u l means 
of explaining why the things that now e x i s t are what they are. and why 
57 
they occupy t h e i r place in tirie scheme of things. I t is the foundation 
52 
of "an infinitude of very j u s t and very profitable arguments". I t s 
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application w i l l eliminate any appearance of i n s t a b i l i t y i n the world, 
and any hint that anything e x i s t s "by chance" and i s not controlled by 
God's creative providence. His attempt to see the world as an 
i n t e l l i g i b l e spectacle, i n some sense as God sees i t , r e s u l t s i n 
h i s producing a kind of "explanation" of God in relation to "theodicy" 
which was to perplex Kant for years, u n t i l he found a philosophical 
stance which enabled him to repudiate Leibniz' enterprise, tiiougii 
not h i s optimism. 
Leibniz' God delights i n h i s om self-sufficiency, for "his 
b l i s s i s ever perfect and can receive no increase, either from within 
53 
or from without." I n designing to create the world, he "purposed 
solely to manliest and communicate h i s perfections i n the way that 
was most e f f i c a c i o u s , and most worthy of h i s greatness, h i s v^isdom 
54 
and h i s goodness." I t i s especially true that goodness w i l l 
characterise h i s creatures, for "God, as well as every wise jaid 
benefict^t mind, i s i n c l i n e d towards a l l possible good, and ... t h i s 
55 
i n c l i n a t i o n i s proportionate to the excellence of the good." This 
appetite to produce what i s excellent results in the production of 
the world, "the vihole succession and the whole agglomeration of a l l 
existent things".^^ The love of the best i s for Leibniz "the only 
57 
impulse whose very exercise i s absolutely i n f i n i t e " , and i f God 
did not make the best world, "he w u l d not himself be s a t i s f i e d with 
h i s work, he would blame himself f or i t s imperfection; and that 
c o n f l i c t s with the supreme f e l i c i t y of the divine nature."^^ 
- 41 " 
God's gpodness i s the perfection of one of the tliree principles 
59 
of the divine nature, w i l l , understanding and power. Ju s t as God's 
60 
w i l l , with I t s perfection of goodness, . in r e l a t i o n to creation i s 
determined by the best, so h i s understanding, with i t s perfection of 
wisdom, guides him "to produce as much reason and knowledge in the 
6l 
miiverse as h i s plan can admi.t." God's consideration of the "ideas" 
6 o 
which have t h e i r source " i n " hito " i s an important matter for Leibniz. 
Leibniz does not endeavour to describe hov/ God forms or thinks the 
63 
vast range of ideas, a l l of which he thinks d i s t i n c t l y a l l the time,. 
but maintains only that "the choice of the order of the universe" 
depends f i r s t of a l l upon "the c l e a r knowledge of an i n f i J i i t y of 
64 
things a t once". God»s vision of unlimited p o s s i b i l i t y ijicludes 
h i s being able to think of the "possibles" intensively, making 
65 
" I n f i n i t e l y I n f i n i t e combinations" of them when considering the 
pattern of h i s creation. In other words he calculates and ponders 
on the best sequence of things, a whole set of creatures at once. 
His idea of one thing i s brought to bear on his idea of another, 
for "each thing as an idea has contributed, before i t s existence, 
to the resolution that had been made upon the existence of a l l things". 
I t i s i n connection with God*s s i f t i n g of the "possibles" that Leibniz 
reaches a c r u c i a l point i n h i s attempt to construct a theodicy. He 
i s clear that what he i s offering i s a re-Interpretation, in a sense, of 
Plat^nism, and he therefore notes that "the Region of the Eternal 
V e r i t i e s must be substituted for matter when we are concerned with 
seeking out the source of things". He i s consequently forced to 
say, that God's imderstanding "furnishes the principles of e v i l , 
without being s u l l i e d by i t , without being e v i l ; i t represents 
66 
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natures as they e x i s t i n the eternal y e r i t i e s ; i t contains within 
i t the reason wherefore e v i l i s permitted". So of the possibles 
Leibniz writes that God "penetrates them, compares them, weighs them 
one against the otlier, to estimate their degrees of perfection or 
imperfection, the strong and the weak, the good an.d the e v i l . " ^ ^ 
V/hat God seeks i s a "compossible" sequence of ideas, which means 
that not a l l the possibles w i l l be acbaalised, not because some of 
them are unquestionably " e v i l " , but because they are not a l l 
compatible in one world order. 
C l e a r l y , i t i s Leibniz' understanding of t h i s concejJt of "the 
region of the Eternal V e r i t i e s " which la fundamental to h i s "defence" 
of God, and h i s explanation of how i t i s that God tolerates what 
seems to men to be outrageous and detestable. The status of the 
eternal v e r i t i e s i n r e l a t i o n to God i s ambiguous. "Whilst they 
are i n some undefined sense not identical with any of the principles 
of the divine being, i t i s on the other hand not appropriate to 
speak of them as created. They have no existence which could be 
said to be independent of God either before he considers them or 
i n order that he may consider them. They are nevertheless rosant 
to represent tliat which i s ri g l i t and valid for every possible 
world irrespective of whether God creates anything to correspond 
to them, i . e . tiniths which cannot be denied without contradiction. 
They are also, as already indicated, characterised by "value" as 
70 
well as by l o g i c a l necessity. The values that are itaintained by 
Leibniz are those which are derived from h i s analysis of "the 
71 
p r i n c i p l e s of morals under terms that imply an obligation." i t 
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72 i s ''justice'* that helps t6 interpret the meaning of Cod's goodness* 
Riley draws attention to the importance of t h i s f o r Leibnia and vjrites 
of Leibniz' view of justice as charity tempered by a knowledge of 
what i s deserved, Charity, Riley maintains ivith reference to many 
of Lei"bniz* v;ritings, i s a habit of lovinge Loving i s understood 
as a f e e l i n g of perfection i n others, perfection being both the 
caxise of love and the reason that regulates that lov&o'^^ God's 
generous benevolenoe, which Leibniz advocates f o r men i n imit a t i o n 
of God, i s inevitably an active benevolence. This raises a problem 
f o r Leibniz i n that a ju s t i c e which i s the result of r a t i o n a l l y 
informed ohoioe, and the action consequent upon that choice i s not 
altogether consistent with his notion of "hgj:>inony" i n so f a r as he 
interpx^ets that i n terras of proportion, of "ratios as precise as 
76 
any i n mathematioa"* Consistency would require that a l l the 
eternal, veritie.'s would have to be of the f i r s t group mentioned above -
i»e« those t r u t h s which cannot be denied without contradiction. Bat 
as Riley points out, "a jus t i c e of harmony and proportion alone 
presupposes an aesthetic passivity which f a i l s t o take Christian 
voluntarism i n t o account"o As we have seen, justice i s not simply 
a r e l a t i o n but an action, sxid action f o r Leibnia i s an a c t i v i t y of 
a being whose choice of the heat has been r a t i o n a l l y determined by 
the best that i s i n view. 
A. serious problem here i s the question of whether or not Leibniz 
so describes the next "stage" i n God's deliberations as t o result i n 
his o f f e r i n g a re^-oonstruotion of manicheisra i n his e f f o r t s to cope 
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with the problem as Bayle set i t . In a sense i t r e f l e c t s the 
r e l i g i o u s courage of those who cannot, and would not wish to 
deny the presence of e v i l s in the world. Such mem are bold enough 
to attribute them to God in some sense, as part of the consequence 
of b e l i e f in him as omnipotent creator, and yet want to naintaln 
that the word "good" when used of God i s not purely equivocal. 
Perhaps t h i s was Leibniz' way of coping witJx what seems to have 
been one of Bayle's major points - that a p r i o r i argument alone 
was without force when confronted with the facts of physical e v i l . 
C e r t a i n l y Leibniz i s not trying to defend an a p r i o r i argument which 
would purport to show that e v i l was impossible in a world which was 
God's work. The reverse i s true - what he offers i s an a p r i o r i 
argument which maintains that e v i l , understood in a certain kind of 
way, i s necessary to a world which i s God's work. What i s involved 
i n God's deliberation lQ,ading to the choice of the best sequence 
i s the interaction of the p r i n c i p l e s of God's being with the region 
of the eterxial v e r i t i e s and the consequent production of the universe^ 
since the eternal v e r i t i e s regulate divine as well as creaturely thought 
and action. L e i b n i z ' d i f f i c u l t i e s arie evident when he writes that 
"as soon as God has decreed to create something there i s a struggle 
between a l l the possibles, a l l of theoi laying claim to existence, 
and that those which, being united, produce most r e a l i t y , most 
perfection, most significance carry the day." The position i s 
hardly helped when he immediately endeavours to avoid the "region" 
metaphor and goes on: " I t i s true that t h i s struggle can be only 
i d e a l , that i s to say, i t can only be a c o n f l i c t of reasons in the 
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most perfect under standing, which cannot f a i l to act In the most 
perfect way, and consequently to choose the best." But he 
usually writes as though God*s choice of the best i s determined 
by something other than himself. He writes as though the "possibles" 
are t h e i r own reason for actualisation, when considered as included 
in a particular sequence or system as compared with other sequences. 
This i s despite h i s having also t o maintann tl:iat the essences do 
not contain within themselves t h e i r own springs of productive power 
and self-movement, which are the marks of a created being, separate 
from the being of God. He could also be c r i t i c i s e d with sows j u s t i c e 
even at t h i s stage, for including i n the very concept of godliead 
the c o n f l i c t between originative principles whidi was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of Manicheism. There seem, indeed, to be two.kjaids of c o n f l i c t going 
on in connection with God*s creative activity.. One i s the c o n f l i c t 
among the possibles, and the other, to be looked at shortly, i s a 
c o n f l i c t i n the very w i l l of God, and t h i s especially lends weight 
to the accusation that what he i s offering i s a kind of manicheism. 
The f a c t that there i s any c o n f l i c t i s what makes the d i f f i c u l t y , and 
i t i s reasonable to ask whether Leibniz ever s a t i s f a c t o r i l y resolved 
the problem he set himself. I t i s questionable whether any i^esolution 
of the problem as he poses i t i s possible, and whether he woiild not 
have done better to abandon the discussion when i t reached t h i s 
p articular stage of i n t r a c t i b i l i t y . Csoth Bayle and Kant refused to 
attempt to cope with the problem as Leibniz sav/it.) To conclude the 
description of what he says about the c o n f l i c t amongsC'the possibles, 
one must also notice that Leibniz has both to deny tlmt he must admit 
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"a brate and blind necessity in the cause of the existence of 
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things" J and a s s e r t that God acts from necessity. This; alone 
guarantees the goodness of the world and w i l l silence those who 
think tha^ Cfod could have done better. The necessity which determines 
God i s a "happy" or "moral" necessity. "God chose between d i f f e r e i t 
courses a l l possible: thus, metaphysically speaking, he could have 
chosen or done what was not the best; but he could not morally 
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speaking have done so." So freedom for Leibniz i s not the licence 
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to be unreasonable, but to be wise enough to w i l l only the good, 
and powerful enough to give effect to that w i l l . "The wise mind 
w i l l s only the'good: i s i t then a servitude v/Si&x the w i l l acts in 
accordance with wisdom? Ajid can one be l e s s a slave than to act 
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by one^s own choice in accordan.ce with the most perfect, reason?" 
And of God he w r i t e s : 
For either God w i l l act through a vague indifference and 
a t random, or again he w i l l act on caprice or through some 
other passion, or f i n a l l y must act -through a prevailing 
i n c l i n a t i o n of reason which prompts him to the best. But 
passions, which come from the confused perception of an 
apparent good, cannot occur in God; and vague indifference 
i s something chimerical. I t i s therefore o?:ay tiie strongest 
• reason that can regulate God»s choice. I t i s an imperfection 
i n our freedom that makes us capable of diooging e v i l instead 
of goodj a greater e v i l instead of the lesser e v i l , the l e s s e r 
good instead of the greater good. That arises from the 
appearances of good and e v i l , which deceive us; whereas God 
i s always prompted to the time and the greatest good, that i s , 
to the absolutely true good, which he cannot f a i l to know.^ '^  
God i s therefore e s s e n t i a l l y free either to create or not to create, 
and e f f e c t i v e l y free ih that there i s no imbalance between h i s 
knowledge and h i s power. 
God*s toleration of such e v i l s in the world i s therefore not to 
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h i s d i s c r e d i t , and L e i b n i z ' boldness in being prepared to malce this 
point at l e a s t protects him from the charge of offering a f a c i l e 
optimism. For'the moment one can note one important analogy he 
offers as an a l t e r n a t i v e to some of Bayle«s to help his readers, 
though he knows how dangerous such analogies can be. Leibniz 
considers tliat 
there are cases where one w i l l j u s t i f i a b l y prefer beauty 
of construction in a palace to the convenience of a few 
domestics. But I admit that the construction would be 
bad, however beautiful i t might be, i f i t were a cause 
of diseases to the inhabitants; provided i t was possible 
to make one that would be better, taking into account 
beauty, convenience and health altog-ether. I t may be 
indeed, that one cannot have a l l these advantages a t 
once. Thus, supposing one wished to build on the northern 
and more bracing side of the mountain, i f the ca s t l e were 
then bound to be of an unendurable construction, one would 
prefer to make i t face soutbAvard. ^6 
What t h i s means in terras of an explanation of God's toleration 
of e v i l i n h i s o r i g i n a l creative act, emerges in h i s distinguishing 
a thi-ee-fold function of God»s w i l l . The r e s u l t of t h i s distinction 
i s to make e v i l an integral part of the pattern of things, thougjli 
Leibniz i s somewhat uneasy with the result of h i s discussion. He 
distinguishes between God*s antecedent, mediate, and consequent w i l l . 
God's antecedent w i l l considers "each good separately in the capacity 
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of a good". Acts of h i s antecedent w i l l are described as "love of 
virtue and hatred of vice, which tend in an undefined way to bring 
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virtue into existence and to prevent the existence of vice". To 
produce the decision on the basis of a defined choice seems to be 
the function of the "mediate" w i l l , which operates at an intermediate 
stage between God's consideration of things separately and h i s w i l l i n g 
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the best sequence int o existence. At t h i s stage i n the creative 
programme God compares a l l the possible combinations of essences 
and chooses the best sequence* He thereby excludes an i n f i n i t e 
number o f essences from aotualisation aM opts for a sequence i n 
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which there i s a concomitance of what i s good, to which God i s 
"antecedently" attracted, together with some of the essences from 
which he i s antecedently averted. "The supreme goodness of God 
causes his antecedent w i l l t o repel a l l evil,-but moral e v i l more 
than any others i t only admits e v i l at a l l f o r i r r e s i s t i b l e superior 
reasons, and with great correctives v;hich repair i t s i l l effects to 
91 92 goal advantage." Of his "decree t o create the best"*^ Leibniz 
writes! "Success entire and i n f a l l i b l e belongs only to the conasgjient 
w i l l , as i t i s called. This i t i s which i s complete} and i n regard 
to i t t h i s r u l e obtains, that one never f a i l s to do what one w i l l s 
when one has the power. Now t h i s consequent w i l l , f i n a l and decisive, 
results from the c o n f l i c t of a l l the antecedent w i l l s , of those which 
tend towards good, even as of those which repel evil} and from the 
9^ 
concurrence of a l l these particular W3.11G comes the t o t a l v f i l l . " -
Despite the c o n f l i c t i n the region of the v e r i t i e s , and the 
c o n f l i c t i n the w i l l of God i n r e l a t i o n to the v e r i t i e s , there ai'e 
no flaws i n the actual production of the world* " I t i s therefore 
not t o be wondered at that he who penetrates a l l things at one stroke 
should always s t r i k e true at the outset; and i t must not be said that 
he succeeds without the guidance of any cogiiition. On the contrary, 
i t i s because his knowledge i s perfect that his voluntary 
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actions are also perfect." The flawless production of the world 
depends upon the exercise of God's power, the t h i r d principle of 
God's being, on the basis of which the other two liave their efficacy. 
Power "precedes even understanding and w i l l , but i t operates as the 
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one displays i t and the otlier requires i t . " ' i t i s indeterminate, 
and God's goodness and wisdom combined, determine him to produce the 
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best. Leibniz emphasises t h i s when he writes, " I set no botinds 
to God's power, since I recognize that i t exteaidg ad maximum, ad 
omnia, to a l l that implies no contradiction; and I set none to his 
97 
goodness, since i t a t t a i n s to the best, ad optimum." 
To conclude what he has to say about God's power, one may return 
to h i s analogy, where he writes that God i s 
l i k e a great a r c h i t e c t whose aim i n view i s the sa t i s f a c t i o n 
of the glory of having b u i l t a beautiful palace, and who 
considers a l l that i s to enter into t h i s construction: the 
form and the material, the place, the situation, the means, 
the workmen, the expense, before he forms a complete resolve. 
For a wise person laying his plans cannot separate the end 
from the means; he does not contemplate any end without 
knowing i f there are means of attaining thereto.®^ 
One may npte in passing that since actual existence i s not an 
essence which God "saw" i n the region of the eternal v e r i t i e s and, 
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as i t were, added to a sequence of essences, God's creative act 
of w i l l rather transposes the diosen sequence into a new mode of 
being, separate from the existence which he himself enjoys, and t h i s 
therefore defines the chosen sequence as "imperfect". "Existence" 
i s hot f i n a l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e to man because of i t s necessary connotation 
of "imperfection". This coheres with the other way in vhich i t i s 
not i n t e l l i g i b l e , vdiich a r i s e s from Leibniz* more a posteriori 
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description of the world. From neither an a p r i o r i approach nor 
from the a^  p o s t e r i o r i description of tJiings which coheres with 
that a p r i o r i view w i l l Leibniz concede a point TO ans^ne who wishes 
. %o argue that i f i s by no means clear that the existing world i s 
a l l r i g h t because of the e v i l s found in i t . He wants to maintain, 
tliat i t i s a l l .right , despite what seem to us to be outrageous e v i l s , 
~ not that i t has been a l l r i g h t , has gone wrong, and w i l l be put 
right again; near that i t i s not a l l right but w i l l be made so at 
some future time. With regard to t h i s very l a s t point he may be 
said to leave himself gome loopholes, which w i l l be looked at 
l a t e r , though he can hardly make much of them in the l i g h t of what 
he maintains as the major point of h i s defence of God. They do, 
however, r e f l e c t h i s uneasiness v/ith the r e s u l t s of h i s a p r i o r i 
a n a l y s i s of God*s w i l l i n p a r t i c u l a r , and of that w i l l iix relation 
to the eternal v e r i t i e s . 
When one tunas to the an.cient tradition which Leibniz inherited 
and re-phrased, of a way of looking at the world a posteriori rather 
vhan a p r i o r i , which suited both the conteii?j3.ative and the s c i e n t i s t 
for a time, one finds that i t has been disoissed by A.O. Lovejoy,"''^^ 
and so f a r as the medieval period i s concerned even more helpfully 
by Chenu.'^ '^'' The l a t t e r quotes A.J. Festugiere, writing that 
•Che world i s t r u l y an. • order', a kosmos. To be sure, disorder 
i s found within i t , not, however, as an esse n t i a l l y e v i l 
thing, but only as a lesser good. There could be no 'order* 
without a m u l t i p l i c i t y of beings, each consequently limited; 
or without a d i v e r s i t y of beings, each consequently endowed 
with a greater or smaller share of goodness. I f , tlierefore, 
one considers only s part of the whole, one necessarily 
discovers l i m i t s or privations of goodness, disorders. But 
t h i s i s precisely because one i s looking only at a part, 
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not the whole. I f one makes the effort to comprehend the 
whole into a single view, the disorder disappears; i t 
becomes explicable within the wliole and becomes absorbed 
into the t o t a l order. Almys look to the whole - such 
w i l l be the ^vj^e of t ^ i s self-consciously optimistic 
philosophy. 
I f one did not know that one was reading Chenu's book about the 
developing twelfth-century medieval European understanding of the 
world one would think that one had come upon an apt description of 
the view of things found i n the Theodicy•> 
With regard to Leibniz* "looking to the whole" one must aclcnowledge 
that for him the a p o s t e r i o r i examination of the things in the world 
i s a mere preliminary to h i s examination of things which .wJ^ W lead 
to our being able to recognise them in a l l t h e i r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , 
because for him the d i s t i n c t knowledge which i s satisfj^ing i s not 
of the material and changeable, but of the causes or principles 
of things, of "what i s always". To describe the world in terms of 
a posteriori design theology i s merely to "believe", to judge by 
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e f f e c t s , i n contrast with "seeing" which i s to know a p r i o r i , by 
cause. For him, the true correlation of the i n t e l l e c t with the world 
to produce a sa t i s f a c t o r y j u s ^ t i f i c a t i o n of God would involve carrying 
on thinking a p r i o r i , i n other words i n terms of h i s "monadology". 
In these terms one finds that things ai-e pre-established by God to 
e x i s t i n harmony with one another as a single whole, composed as 
they are of an i n f i n i t y of individual substances or "monads" variously 
arranged so as to represent to the human mind the variety, order and 
beauty we acknowledge. Leibniz' v i t a l clue to the construction of 
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t h i s a p r i o r i i n t e l l i g i b l e world i s rational human self-conscious 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y . Given the text of the ?>fonadology i t i s perfectly 
possible to work through the text of the Theodicy and put together 
the material vftich one recognises as corresponding -co the MonadQlogy. 
i T t must be said that in the Theodicy t h i s material i s somewhat in the 
backgromid and appears thei'e as an accidental result of Bayle's 
interest i n t h i s area of Leibniz* philosophy-. So although Leibniz 
would f i n a l l y want to rest h i s case on his demonstration of nature 
as made up of individual substances arranged to form the hierarchy 
of being, thereby understanding the world in det a i l as a world 
worthy of God, one sees that in the Theodicy this i s not the kind of 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n of God of which Leibniz preferred to make use in t h i s 
"public" work. CSie would have to say of him tliat he has rather 
had recourse to what for him are inevitably more su p e r f i c i a l 
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arguments, a p o s t e r i o r i arguments. I t i s also clear from reading 
the work of some of Leibniz* great c r i t i c s on "theodicy" that the 
material with which they were primarily concerned was h i s discussion 
of God«s perfections and h i s a posteriori argument rather than with 
his "monadology". 
With regard to h i s a p o s t e r i o r i argument, as with h i s a p r i o r i 
argument^ one finds that i t i s closely underpinned by h i s t m s t ij i 
God at points where arguroant could do no more. In the llgfit Of 
what he has said about the "concomitance" of the possibles God 
has chosen, Leibniz can therefore emphasise the evidence of the 
co-existence of things. '^ For i t must be Imown that a l l thjjigs are 
connected in each one of the possible worlds; the universe, whatever 
i t may be. I s a l l of a piece, l i k e an ocean: the l e a s t movement 
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extends i t s effect there to any diffbance whatsoever, even though 
X 06 
t h i s e f f e c t becomeg,less perceptible in proportion to the distance." 
The harmony of things leads him to say that God i s therefore 
" i i i f l n i t e l y more s k i l f u l than a watchmaker,. v/ho himself makes 
macliines and automata that are capable of pi'oduclng as wonderful 
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e f f e c t s as i f they possessed intelligence." God has nade of 
108 
matter "the most excellent of a l l possible machines" but i t i s 
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neither a machine properly speaking, nor does God abandon i t to 
i t s own devices. Leibniz maintain^ that "there i s organism every-
liO 
where i n a matter whose disposition proceeds from God", and the 
nature of every creature i s that 'Nvhich God conveys to i t in creating 
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i t always". T h i s relationship of dependence Leibniz w i l l also 
l l 2 
describe as "continued creation" maintaining that 'Kjod gives ever 
to the creature and produces contin,ually a l l that in i t i s positive, 
good and perfect;, every perfect g i f t coming from ISie Father of 
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L i g h t s . " 
There i s a r i c h variety of creatures i n God's world, which i s 
also a r e f l e c t i o n of God*s ingenuity and wisdom. "To ffiu.ltiply one 
and the same thing only would be superfluity, and poverty too. To 
have a thousand well-bound Ve r g i l s in one's librai^y, always to sing 
the a i r s from the opera of Cadmus and Hermione, to break a l l the 
china in order to have cups of gold, to have only diamond buttons, 
to eat nothing but partridges, to drtok only Hungarian or Shir&z 
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wine - would one c a l l that reason?" 
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The variety of things i s ordered h i e r a r c h i c a l l y , however. 
'There are degrees among creatures. The general order requires 
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i t . " To quote Chenu again: "The key to the understanding of 
the universe and of man i n the imiverse, was taken to be the ordered, 
dynamic, and progressive chain of a l l beijtig, - a chain i n which 
causality and meaning f a l l together, and in which each being i s a 
«theophany«, a revelation of God." What Lei-haiz understands by 
the "chain" of things he spe l l s out by saying that "The connexion. 
and order of things bring i t about that the body of every animal and 
of every plant i s composed of other animals and of other plants, or 
of other l i v i n g and organic beings; consequently"there i s subordination, 
and one body, one substance serves the other: thus the i r perfection 
IIT* 118 cannot be equal." " The d i v i s i o n of the continuum to i n f i n i t y as 
he puts i t , ensures that he can r u l e out a defect which would be 
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called the "vacuum formarum, a gap in the order of species." I t . 
i s not normally necessary to refer to Leibniz s c r i t i c i s m of other 
works on theodicy i n order to elucidate h i s own, but i t i s perhaps 
worth not i c i n g that he does not commit himself to the "doctrine" of the 
f i x i t y of species in the main text of the Theodicy, a doctrine which 
was soon to become go important for the understanding of "nature". 
But he does say in passing in hig dlseusslan of King's book, that 
"God, having taken care that the species should be immortal, ^ince 
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the individtJial cannot be so here on earth .... However, one 
migjit say that to maintain that a species w i l l always be identif i a b l e 
as such does not absolutely exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y that there might 
be changes i n some of i t s members so that new species develop. There 
are hints i n the Theodicy that Leibniz could be understood as having 
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seriously considered t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y , but they are only h i n t s , and 
one must see them rather i n relation to his optimistic f a i t h 
than to a theory -co whicJi he lias been driven by h i s assessment of 
evidence in the b i o l o g i c a l f i e l d . 
A reading of caieau once more makes i t clear that leitaniz i s 
very much a representative of a r i c h axid influenitial tradition of 
interpretation. Chenu writes of the continuity of beings that i t 
i s "at once dynamic and s t a t i c in p r i n c i p l e . Between each of these 
beings i n t h e i r sepai'ate ranks exi s t s an intimate bond: the greater 
intensity of the superior being exerts an attractive force upon the • 
one next below i t and draws i t upward -coward i t s owii h i ^ e r l e v e l ; 
and out of t h i s attraction a r i s e s the fulfilisent of the lower being .. 
We are f a r from a discontinuous m i v e r s e in vhich each being possesses 
i t s dynamism and i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y wnolly and only within i t s e l f ... 
Such continuity in the univerBe does not compromise the i n t r i n s i c 
law operative at each l e v e l , the proper autonomy of each b0ihg: i t 
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does not infringe theppurity.of natures of essences." "Vfhen one 
returns to the Theodicy one finds that Leibniz picks up part of 
one of Bayle's discussions with an opponent about \ihether creatures 
are "eternally, immutably auid e s s e n t i a l l y as perfect and as good as 
l22 
they can be". Leibniz i n s i s t s that things are different in their 
degree, i . e . ijo. t h e i r place in the hierarchy of things, but w i l l not 
conclude from that that "a thing cannot change i t s kind in relation 
to good or e v i l " . So he can say, 'I'hus the best may be changed into 
another which neither y i e l d s to i t nor surpasses i t ; but there w i l l 
always be an order among them, and that the best order possible." 
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Whereas the whole sequence may be the best possible, "what e x i s t s 
through the universe. In each portion of tiine" may not be the best, 
" I t might be tnerefore that the universe becaflie even better and 
better, i f the nature of things were such that i t was not permitted 
to a t t a i n to the best a l l at once." But he concludes, "these are 
J 23 
problems of which i t i s hard for u s to judge" , as Kant was 
a l s o to agree in. some of h i s e a r l i e s t works. Later on i n the work, 
wr i t i n g of the perfection of man, Leibniz says, " I t i s perhaps not 
impossible that there be somewhere.a species of animals much 
resembling man and more perfect tlian we are. I t may be even 
that the human race w i l l a t t a i n irx time to a greater perfection 
than that which we can now envisage. T.hus the laws of nration do 
not prevent man from being more perfect; But the place God has 
assigned to man i n space and in time l i m i t s the perfections he was 
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able to r e c e i v e . " 
T h i s s o r t of material in i t s e l f could liardly count as evidence 
for Leibniz« liaving done more than merely toy with the idea that 
"kinds" are mutable. QD, the other hand he does not commit himself 
to maintaining that the security and s t a b i l i t y of h i s best seqxience 
e n t a i l s that species should be iumitable, t h o u ^ t h i s l a t e r seams 
to have become an integral feature of a world view which, attempted 
to structure a theodicy in relation to i t s biology. Leibniz i s 
committed i n the f i r s t instance to a p r i o r i convictions about God 
and h i s perfections, rather to particular bases for those convictions 
which have been extrapolated from an examination of the empirical 
world. 
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One can see t h i s more c l e a r l y v/he'n one looks a t the biological 
theory with which he worked, that oJ; "preformationism", of which 
Loemker remarks that i t was "a special case of h i s l o g i c a l 
determinism". This determinism "precluded h i s advance to a 
conception of the unfolding of the forms of l i f e , as genetic 
l25 l26 detei-minism s t i l l c o n f l i c t s with evolution." Jacques Monod 
writes particulai'ly well with reference to t h i s l a s t point and more 
helpf u l l y in that he accounts, in effect, for the strength of the , 
notion of the f i x i t y of species, in terms of i t s biological v a l i d i t y . 
He provides a useful perspective on those who have at times been ' 
only too ready to c r i t i c i s e great theoreticians and theologians of 
the past for not having .committed themselves to some foi-m or other sf fU. Mh'oH 
of mutability of species as i t . rmy be vinderfetood today. One must, 
however, suppose that Leibniz meant by "preformation" something 
that was not absurdly inconsistent with his concept of "the division 
of the continuum to infinity!', though i t i s no doubt true that other 
thinkers l a t e r meant by preformation "a medianistic explanation for 
the f i x i t y of species and the impassibility of the discontinuities 
l27 
between them". I t was not to become known for some time that 
Leibniz was prepared to allow movement within h i s continuum such 
that the phrase mutability of species ffit^^i be appropriate to i t , 
though what he says in the Theodicy in effect leaves him .:room 
for t h a t . 
He makes i t c l e a r , for example, that whilst the universe as a 
whole i s stable, i t s s t a b i l i t y i s not displayed in a r i g i d pattern. 
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since i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y organic in character, as has already been 
l28 
noted. The "primary seeds'' contained in bodies are such that 
"new organisms are only a mechanical conseqttence of a preceding 
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organic constitution." He maintains as h i s belief, "that tliose 
souls which one day s h a l l be human gouls, l i k e those of other 
species, have been in. the seed, and in the progenitors as f a r 
back as Adam, atxd have consequently existed since the beginning 
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of things, always i n a kind of organic body." He i s , however, 
reluctant to commit himself to any one particular theory as to how 
a sentient or animal soul becomes a human soul. When he eventmlly 
returns to t h i s topic he has a statement which could be construed 
as leaving him at l e a s t in theory open to the p o s s i b i l i t y of tvansf&T'^ 
• (nation precisely on the basis of preformtion'. 
As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does 
not see that one needs no creative power in order to change 
place or shape, to form a sqxiare or a column, or some 
other parade-groimd figure, by the movement of the soldiers 
who are d r i l l i n g ; or again to fashion a statue by removing 
a few pieces from a block of marble; or to hake some 
figure i n r e l i e f , by changing, decreasing or increasing a 
piece of wax? The production of modificatloug has never 
been c a l l e d creati.on, and i t i s an abuse of terms to scare 
the world thus. God produces substances from nothing, and 
the substances produce accidents by the changes of t h e i r 
l i m i t s.^-"^^ 
Given 20th century insights iiitO.-JDNA and i t s r epllcative mechanism 
i t i s perhaps a pity that he did not think of. "preformation" in terms 
Of h i s metaphor about soldiers d r i l l i n g into different formations, 
rather than i n terms of h i s imagjnary"gculptor". I t i s clear tha.t 
h i s employment of substance-accident language i s another way of 
saying what he algo expresses by h i s use of "preformation". Further, 
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what he stresses in connection with "substance" ig "action" - the 
s t r i v i n g peculiar to i t , "called 'force', 'effort*, *cona.tus*, from 
132 
Which action i t s e l f must follow i f nothing prevents i t . " This 
sort of material seems to be relevant to the empirical-metaphysical 
analysis of creatures that corresponds to the s t r i v i n g amongstthe 
possibles i n God's understanding, before h i s choice of the best 
sequence for creation* The degree of striviAg proper to each 
creature i s one of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which places i t in i t s 
position i n the hierarchy of being, because i t re l a t e s to i t s 
degree of perfection. Hence Leibniz employs the A r i s t o t e l i a n term 
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"entelechy" and so can write, "And the q u a l i t i e s or derivative 
forces, or what are c a l l e d accidental forms, I take to be modifications 
of the primitive Entelechy, even as shapes are modifications of 
Batter." 
What Leibniz says with regard to thege various topics may or 
may not be judged to leave him i n a position where at f i r s t sight 
he can be more favourably regarded as one taking s u f f i c i e n t notice 
of developments i n biology to liave h i s theodicy taken seriously. 
Unfortunately, h i s theodicy, so far as i t i s about physical e v i l , 
has undoubtedly to be seen as concerned f i r s t and foremost with what 
he has to say about God's perfections, and secondly with gome 
t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysical "explanations" of physical e v i l . His 
b i o l o g i c a l theories, in so f a r as they appear in t h i s particular 
work, cohere with h i s a p r i o r i theology rather than .inform i t in 
such a way as to cause Leibniz to change or abandon i t . What one 
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sees l a t e r on i n Kant i n the f i r s t instance, and then dtiring the 
course of the l 8 t h to I 9 t h century i s the denial of the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a theodicy i n terms of God's perfections as Leibnia works i t out, 
at about the same time as new pattems of explanation developed i n 
biology. Curiously, many of the features of "Leibnizianism",which 
i n so many v/ays xvas the expression of a whole religious culture^ 
appeared again and again i n the controversy over the Origin of 
Speoiea. I n that controversy two of the many issues were the commitment 
of theodicy t o the notion of the f i x i . t y of species and the problem of 
physical e v i l as that was to be seen i n ar.i evolving and changing 
"biosphere". ' 
I t i s quickly apparent that Leibnijs' analysis of e v i l i s at i t s 
weakest when he discusses i t i n terms of physical, and metaphysical 
e v i l . One must say that he finds r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e to concern him 
i n the apparent distresses of the non-hurnan world which seem to . 
m i l i t a t e against the order and beauty of things, but he i s perturbed 
by the e v i l perpetrated by human beings. His optimism v/ould have 
survived the Lisbon eai^thqualce as Kant's did f o r a time. V/hereas 
Kant ©ventuaLly reached a point where even the attempt t o begin t o 
construct a theodicy was impossible, especially one which assessed 
physical e v i l d i f f e r e n t l y , he alwaj's shares both Leibniz' concern 
with human e v i l and his optimistic f a i t h i n God. In Kant f a i t h found 
i t s expression i n the form of hop© for the future, and therefore 
of confidence of a sort i n God i n the present, rather than i n terms 
of Leibnlis' fascinated contemplative vision of the world teeming 
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With God»s creatures i n t h e i r h i e r a r c l i y . W h i l s t L e i b n i z i n gome 
respects cuts man doNvn t o size i n h i s estimate of h i s p o s i t i o n 
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and importance i n t h e order of t h i n g s , he makes a r e v e a l i n g 
cjimnent wheai he says t h a t "an e v i l w i l l i s i n i t s department what 
the e v i l p r i n c i p l e of the Ifeiuicheans would be i n the universe; and 
reason, vJiich i s an image of, t h e D i v i n i t y , provides f o r e v i l souls 
great; means of causing miTch e v i l . One gineLe C a l i g u l a , one Nero, 
has caused more e v i l than an earthquake. An e v i l man takes pleasure 
i n causing s u f f e r i n g and d e s t r u c t i o n , and f o r t h a t t h e r e are only too 
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many o p p o r t u n i t i e s . " " 
Metaphysical e v i l , as L e i b n i z understands i t , provides the 
context f o r h i s discussion of moral e v i l which i s h i s main pi-e-
occupa-cion as w e l l as f o r the discussion of physical e v i l . Meta-
137 
p h y s i c a l e v i l i s simply t o f a l l short of d i v i n e p e r f e c t i o n , t o 
be l e s s wise, legs good, l e s s powerful than. God - t o be a creature. 
L e i b n i z b r i e f l y pays a t t e n t i o n t o t h e "ejqalanation" of e v i l as 
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" p r i v a t i o n " , rela-clng t h i s t o t h e sch o l a s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n of e v i l 
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as " d e f i c i e n t " , , in-order t o r u l e out t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of g i v i n g 
some s o r t of " s t a t u s " t o the e v i l p r i n c i p l e of the Maiaicheans. He 
develops a t some l e n g t h a "parable" about e v i l understood as 
"i m p e r f e c t i o n " , of boats going downstream w i t h t h e c u r r e n t , some 
more h e a v i l y laden than o t h e r s , t h e r e f o r e t r a v e l l i n g down r i v e r 
a t v a r y i n g speeds. The sluggishness and i n e r t i a of t h e various 
vessels are compared w i t h the "xiatural imperfec-cion" of creatures, 
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e s s e n t i a l t o t h e i r l o c a t i o n i n t h e order of t h i n g s . T his k i n d 
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of parable i s p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l when he comes t o t a c k l e the 
question o f moral e v i l i n so f a r as t h a t can be a t t r i b u t e d t o 
ignorance, though such human f r a i l t y need not lead t o offences 
against God. Human happiness and indeed v i r t u e are only two of 
t h e many "goods" which a t t r a c t God, and l e i b n i z i s driven t o gay 
t h a t v i r t u e " i s n o t the on l y good q u a l i t y o f creatures. There 
are innumerable others which a t t r a c t the i n p l i n a t i o n of God: from 
a l l these i n c l i n a t i o n s t h e r e r e s u l t s the most possible good, and 
i t t u r n s out t h a t i f t h e r e were only v i r t u e , i f there were o n l y 
J.42 
r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s , there would be less good. 
From t h i s po'oit of view, the cause of physi c a l s u f f e r i n g i n men 
i s f i r s t of a l l t h e i r own moral e v i l . "Qae s u f f e r s because one has 
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acted; one s u f f e r s e v i l because one does e v i l . " Physical e v i l 
i s a penalty e s t a b l i s h e d by God as p a r t of the harmony of a l l t h i n g s . 
Yet I^eibniz has t o face t h e problem of "innocent" s u f f e r i n g . 
" I t i s t r u e t h a t one o f ^ t e n s u f f e r s through the e v i l a c tions of 
others; but when caie has no p a r t i n the offence one must look 
upon i t as a c e r t a i n t y t h a t these s u f f e r i n g s prepare f o r us a 
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greater happiness." But a more fundamental p o i n t t h a t L e i b n i z 
was prepared t o face i s t h a t according t o h i s view of God»s p l a n , i t 
was e s s e n t i a l t h a t "there should not be l a c k t o g here on e a r t h a 
r a t i o n a l animal clothed In f l e s h and bones, whose sisructure involves 
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s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o p a i n . " Leibniz stresses o f t e n enough t h a t 
God could never be described as n e g l i g e n t or casual in h i s dealings 
wlTjh h i s crea-cion, even w i t h those p a r t s of i t w h i d i are n o t 
conscious of him: "God does not neglect inanimate t h i n g s : they do 
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n o t f e e l , but God f e e l s f o r them ... He would reproach himself 
f o r t h e s l i g l i t e s t a c t u a l d e f e c t there were i n the universe even 
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though i t were perceived of none." God f e e l s concern f o r 
animals a l s o , thoueJi t h e i r pleasiares and pain are noz so keen 
as t h e y are i n man. According t o L e i b n i z , i t i s r e f l e c t i o n t h a t 
148 
makes pain a misery, and w i t h o u t i t pain i s inconsiderable. But 
he comments: "When God j u s t i f i e d t o the Prophet Jonah the pardon thac 
he had granted t o the i n h a b i t a n t s o f Nineveh, he even touched upon 
t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e beasts who would have been i n v o l v e d i n t h e 
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r u i n o f t h i s g r e a t c i t y . " H i s a t t i t u d e i s t h a t since s u s c e p t i b i l i t y 
t o p a i n i s a consequence of e n j o y i n g existence i n a m a t e r i a l i m i v e r s e , 
and since we have been given t h i s k i n d of existence as a g i f t of God, 
we must conclude t h a t t o be w i t h o u t i t >¥ould have l u v o l w d the 
presence o f a s t i l l greater e v i l , or of a gi-eatly diminished capacity 
f o r pleasure. He w r i t e s o f the "pleasures of the senses when these 
are mingled w i t h xhat which borders on pain" - "A l i t t l e a c i d , 
sharpness or b i t t e r n e s s i s o f t e n more pleasing than sugar; sliadows 
esihaiice c o l o u r s ; and even a dissonance i n the r i g h t place gives 
r e l i e f t o harmony. We wish t o be t e r r i f i e d by rope-dancers on the 
p o i n t o f f a l l i n g and we wish t h a t tragedies s h a l l w e l l - n i g h cause 
us t o weep. Do men r e l i s h h e a l t h enough, or thank God enough f o r 
±t, w i t h o u t ever having been sic k ? And i s i t not most o f t e n necessary 
t h a t a l i t t l e evi]. render the good more d i s c e r n i b l e , t h a t i s t o say, 
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gr e a t e r ? " ' Oxxe may note^however^ t h a t Leibniz would prob^tl*^ ^r-«-|eA.^ 
l i k e Kant, t o be v/ithout the experience of both pleasure and pain so 
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f a r as ^me of h i s remarks make h i s p o s i t i o n p l a i n . 
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The very pain of physical creatures, together w i t h monstrosities 
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and apparent i . r r e g u l a r i t i e s , i s an i»dispensabl6 f e a t u r e of God»s 
or d e r i n g of t h i n g s , r t i s th e r e f o r e not i n i t s e l f , anymore than i s 
anything e l s e t h a t could be c i t e d , an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the. world i s n o t 
worthy of God as L e i b n i z believes him t o be. Jvxst as a mathematician 
can make sense of a series of apparently i r r e g u l a r numbers, and give 
the equation and c o n s t r u c t i o n of a t w i s t i n g and t u r n i n g l i n e , so the 
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order of creatures i s wj.thin God^s comprehension and i n t e n t i o n . 
Leibniz» b r i e f references t o t h e stixdy of geology and asti'onomy^to 
which Kant also l a t e r turned h i s a t t e n t i o n , make h i s p o i n t t h a t even 
various d i s a s t e r s i n f a c t were f o r the purpose of making the globe 
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f i t f o r occupation by man. He does not , however, make the mistake 
of t r y i n g t o account f o r every p a r t i c u l a r e v i l , except i n so f a r as 
he remarks t h a t i t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r him "to p o i n t out t h a t there i s 
no t h i n g t o prevent t h e connexion of a c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l e v i l w i t h 
what i s best on t h e whole". However, he does add t h a t 'This incomplete 
e x p l a n a t i o n , leavixig something t o be discovered i n the l i f e t o come, 
i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r answering the o b j e c t i m s , though not f o r a 
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comprehension of t h e matter." 
He also endeavours t o put e v i l as he understands i t i n t o perspective 
i n an a e s t h e t i c sense. God t u r n s everything, even human e v i l , t o 
serve h i s ends. "God, by a wonderful a r t * t u r n s a l l the e r r o r s of 
these l i t t l e worlds t o the greater adornment o f h i s great world. I t 
i s as i n those devices of perspective, where c e r t a i n b e a u t i f u l 
designs look l i k e mere confusion u n t i l one restores them t o the 
- 65 -
r i g h t angle of v i s i o n or one views them by. means of a c e r t a i n glass 
or m i r r o r , i t i s by p l a c i n g and using them properly t h a t one makes 
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them serve as adornment f o r a room." Though wan cannot 
comprehend the p a t t e r n of things^he r a t i o n a l l y says, "One must 
O^idge the works of God as w i s e l y as Socriateis judged those of 
H e r a c l i t u s i n these words: What I have understood t h e r e g i pleases 
me; I t h i n k t h a t t h e r e s t would please me no less i f I understood 
i t . " " V . 
When a l l has been said t h a t , can be said about t h e accidental 
damage of one p h y s i c a l being by another^ and the p e r f e c t i o n s which 
s e n t i e n t beings would l a c k i f they were a0.t also capable of s u f f e r i n g 
p a i n , and a l l t h a t r a t i o n a l argument can do t o maintain man's 
resources of patience and courage has been done, one may s t i l l 
have t o ask a question whidi Leibniz c l e a r l y infuses t o ask, or rath e r 
i s prepared t o dismiss as d i s c r e d i t a b l e t o us. The question i s 
whether or n o t t h e r e are e v i l s i n the world which we cannot believe 
are approved by God, and which c a l l i n t o question the world's 
goodness and t h e r e f o r e God's c r e d i t . L e i b n i z * dispassionate judge-
ment about the s t a t e of t h i n g s u l t i m t e l y depends upon what he has 
t o gay about the reg i o n of t h e e t e r n a l v e r i t i e s and t h e operation 
of God's p e r f e c t i o n s i n c r e a t i o n . The questioning by Kant of the 
v a l i d i t y of t h a t k i n d of d e s c r i p t i o n i n e v i t a b l y destroys the value 
of much of what he has t o say about the place of e v i l i n the scheme 
of t h i n g s . Questions were t o be asked about the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t 
human reason could a r r i v e a t a p r i o r i knowledge of God, and t h a t 
the proper f u n c t i o n of reason i s t h e consideration of a p r i o r i 
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t i i i t h s , i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o Crod. Confidence i n hviman reason 
was thought t o be i n t e g r a l l y r e l a t e d t o assent to the p r i n c i p l e of 
the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f God. A reconsideration and re-assessment 
of t h a t confidence so t h a t human reason was more c o r r e c t l y r e l a t e d , 
perhaps, t o i n d u c t i v e and e m p i r i c a l method, had t o lead t o another 
way of t r y i n g t o c o n s t r u c t theodicy or t o th e abandonment of any 
such p r o j e c t . I t w i l l l a t e r be possible t o .ija^dicate, howeverj, a 
number of the f e a t u r e s of L e i b n i z i a n theodicy which appeal" and re-appear 
w e l l i n t o the n i n e t e e n t h century debate about evo l u t i o n and theology. 
These f e a t u r e s show how the Theodicy provided the paradigm example 
of a work whixih n o t o n l y summed up great t r a d i t i o n s of thougjit of 
the past i n r e l a t i o n t o L e i b n i z ' contemporaries' achievements i n 
b i o l o g y , but s t i l l ijiiformed t h e minds of those s t r u g g l i n g w i t h new 
pat t e r n s of explanation - p a t t e r n s which could not so e a s i l y be 
shown t o cohere w i t h the kinds of t h e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g s t i l l c u r r e n t . 
Before t u m i i g t o t h e work of Kant i t i s u s e f u l to look a t Linnaeus' 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s e t t i n g up of t h e form of the nineteenth-century 
debate, and then a t Hume's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the d i s s o l u t i o n of theodicy. 
Hume i s important n o t o n l y because of h i s iiifluesice on Kant, but 
because h i s p a r t i c u l a r kixid of 'temper' was t o prove extremely u s e f u l 
t o men such as T.H. Huxley before they had had time t o get t o g r i p s 
w i t h what Kant was o f f e r i n g them. They might not have time t o l e a r n 
about Kant's k i n d o f f a i t h i n God combined w i t h a methodology which 
could have enabled them t o cope b e t t e r w i t h t h e debate about the 
O r i g i n , but a great deal could s t i l l be learned from Hume abf:»ut a 
c e r t a i n detachnent concexmlng matters which i t was h a r d l y possible 
f o r man t o decide. 
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C" Linnaeus and Hume 
Le i b n i z seems t o have exercised a degree of caution about 
committing himself t o the n o t i o n of the " f i x i t y of species". However, 
one conclusion which seems t o have been dra^vn from t h e concept of the 
i n f i n i t e l y graduated sequen.ce o f thi n g s was .that the sequence at a l l 
times must be complete, and t h a t one ought t o be able t o trace out 
each step i n t h e continuum. I t ought t o be possible t o i d e n t i f y each 
p a r t i c u l a r species w n i d i God had created i n order t o make the world the 
"best", i n terms of i t s d i v e r s i t y . The work of Linnaeus was o f 
considerable importance i n promoting the confidence t h a t men could 
understand the way i n which t h e creator had ordered l i v i n g t h i n g s . 
The method of Linnaeus was adopted by such n a t u r a l i s t s as G i l b e r t 
White,^ and through him a Liimaean s t y l e of nature study took f i r m 
h o l d i n England ( g r a f t e d on t o e x i s t i n g i n t e r e s t s i n Botany and Zoology), 
I t has been suggested t h a t Darwin's Formation of Vegetable Mould through 
the A c t i o n of Worms , f o r example, i s t y p i c a l l y "Linnaean". I t was t o 
be p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i o n s , correspondence and 
l i b r a r y of Linnaeus were ev e n t u a l l y bought i n 1784 by James Edward 
Smith, a young medical student from Norwich. I t was he, together 
w i t h S i r Joseph Banks, who was a t one time presidejit of the Royal 
So c i e t y and:.the Rev. S . Goodenou^, l a t e r a bishop, who between tliem 
founded the LinnecLn Society i n 1788, Smith becoming president of the 
Society u n t i l h i s death i n 1828. Linnaeus was classed w i t h people 
l i k e Newton, Boj'le and Locke as a f r i e n d t o r e l i g i o n by English 
4 
o p i n i o n o f t h e l a t e e ighteenth century, as one who exemplified i n 
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h i s l i f e and w r i t i n g s r e veraice f o r the d e i t y and a constant sense 
of the d i v i n e omnipresence.^ I t i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g t h a t h i s 
jJart icular c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the understanding of nature sliould liave 
been held i n great esteem, though i t i s t r u e t h a t by the time of 
Hume's death i t had becone fashionable, as G i l b e r t White wrote t o 
h i s brother, t o despise Linnaeus i n p u b l i c , though many i n p r i v a t e 
languished t o understand h i s method.^ L±nn.aeus exemplified i n h i s 
own approac3i t o nature t h e r e l i g i o u s a t t i t u d e which was t o provide 
f o r design theology a s t r e n g t h beyond t h a t which could be provided 
f o r i t by p h i l o s o p h i c a l defence, and hence a st r e n g t h t h k t could 
survive the k i n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c i s m o f f e r e d by Hume - a 
p o i n t of which Hums was himself w e l l aware. Linnaeus wrote of nan's 
awareness of the Creator's kingdom, t h a t the more a man discovers 
about the vrorld, 
the many more new proofs he f i n d s of the Creator's wise 
s k i l l , and the more does he become obliged t o admire and 
praise Him. From t h i s we see how f a r the knowledge of 
nature leads us i n t o moral theology i t s e l f , and how 
completely i t d e p i c t s f o r us t h e Creator's magnificent 
work; the mountains are a proof of His might; the p l a n t s 
are a witness of His s k i l l ; the animals are fee example 
of H i s providence; t h e whole o f nature confirms t h a t He 
i s wise; and the e n t i r e world,, t h a t i t s Creator i s a 
divilne and Almighty Lord .. ."^  
The 'IForeword" t h a t was Included i n e d i t i o n s subsequent t o t h e f i r s t 
e d i t i o n (1735) of Linnaeus' Systeaa Naturae also o f f e r e d what could 
be described as a t h e o l o g i c a l motive f o r the study of n a t u r a l h i s t o r y , 
Linnaeus wrote t l i a t "From behind I saw the E t e r n a l , All-knowing, and 
Almighty God as He went forward, and I swooned.'. I tracked His f o o t -
steps over nature's f i e l d and ma.rked i n each one, evsi i n those I 
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could hardly discern, an ineffable wisdom and might, and impenetrable 
completeness." Ajid of the God in whose, footsteps he believed himself 
to be following he wrote: " I f one w i l l c a l l him 'Fate*, one makes no 
mistake, because a l l things hang on h i s finger; i f one w i l l c a l l 
Him •Nature'*, one e r r s not . because everything comes from Him; 
would one c a l l Him 'Providence*, one i s right, because a l l goes 
according to h i s beck and c a l l " — " God for Liimaeus i s the 'fBeing • 
who has fovmded and b u i l t a l l t h i s , which shines everywhere before 
our eyes, without being able to be seen, and can only be seen in 
imagination, because such great Majesty resides on a sacred throne 
8 
to which none can reach except the soul ..." Thus he could write 
elsewhere that "the contemplation of natnire gives a foretaste of 
heavenly b l i s s , a constant joy to the sotil and a beginning of i t s 
complete refreshment, and i s the highest point of .human happiness. 
When the soul partakes thereof, i t i s as i t were awakened from a 
heavy torpor and wanders round in the light, losing i t s e l f , sp.ending 
9 
i t s time, so to speak, in a heavenly land or an earthly heaven." 
One need hardly suppose that when Darwin as an undergraduate 
went beetle-hunting that he was inspired with the Linnaean vision, 
but that v i s i o n had a good deal to do with the way i n which educated 
Europeans were converted to the study of natural history, together of. 
course with the " u t i l i t a r i a n " j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t that was also 
available. I t was for Linnaeus "ungodly" to say that God's work i s 
useles s . Even i f what i s discovered does not serve mankind either 
for food or medicine, the sheer inexhaustible variety of things 
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serves for man's delight. Each item of the creation, when examined 
and compai'ed with others, ejdiibits God's % i s e l y decided purpose, 
whicli serves either for the animal's or plant's propagation or 
existence, or in respect to their neighbours* ... Everything lays 
c l e a r the supreme wisdom of the Creator who has made nothing in vain, 
but so s k i l f u l l y constructed everything, that no human a r t , not even 
the greatest, could imitate the l e a s t . And for t h i s reason to assign 
a l l t h i s to oblivion w u l d be to admit that nature had cast her pearls 
10 
before swine ..." His "naming" of what he studied was essential to 
h i s study and for the communication of what he had learned to others. 
'5?or i f one describes a thing to me ever so carefully, I have no 
understanding and use from i t , i f he cannot name the thing he speaks 
about ... for i t i s impossible that-that object can always a;ccompany 
11 
the description." 
His search for coherence, the means to the rational and communicable 
expression of h i s vision ^led him jn h i s f i r s t edition of the Systema 
Naturae of 1735 to affirm that the number of species to be discovered 
i n the \yorld i s the same as the number of forms created at the 
beginning of the world, and that no new species a r i s e . He was prepajred 
to indicate in another v/ork of 1736 that he would prefer to side with 
those who doubted whether-this kind of assumption could be proved. 
Although he was to eliminate from l a t e r editions of the Systema h i s 
12 
theological defence of "species", h i s original support for i t , and 
the success of h i s method,continued to lend i t great weight. What 
seems to have led him to abandon support for i t in public was h i s 
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developing laiowledge of botany in particular, and the way in whidi 
he came to interpret that knowledge. He used to believe that "there ; 
are today two d i s t i n c t differences between the plants: one a 
veritable.difference, the m u l t i p l i c i t y produced by the Almighty's 
a l l - w i s e hand; but the other, variations in the outer s h e l l , the 
work of nature i n a moment of j e s t . " The species of the Creator 
were the "true ones, and those of the gardner were the abnormal 
ones: the former I hold to be of the greater significance for the 
sake of t h e i r Originator; the l a t t e r I repudiate because of t h e i r 
originatoi's. The former e x i s t and have existed from the beginning of 
the world; the l a t t e r , which are monstrosities, can only boa,st a 
13 
Short l i f e , " Linnaeus' son was to write to one of h i s father's 
friends i n 1778 that Linnaeus "believed, no doubt, that Species 
animalium et plantarum and that genera were the wo.rks of time: but 
that ordines natiirales were the works of the Creator; i f the l a t t e r h<^<'' 
14 
existed the former could not have arisen." 
Like Leibniz, Linnaeus looked at the natural order of things 
without attempting to disguise from himself the r e a l i t y of what he 
sav/, and yet affirmed the harmony of the world, and the vray in whidi 
i t g l o r i f i e d i t s creator. I n his Pol i t i a Naturae he described how 
he vmderstood man, '^nature's l a s t and most distinguished servant" 
to be an instmment i n keeping a "seemly balance" in nature, "so that 
nothing \fliich i s unprofitable may increase too much", in his destruction 
of other creatures for h i s own benefit. But of man he said that he 
too was subject to some natural laws to keep his numbers within boxmds. 
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Thex'e was .a war of a l l against a l l at every l e v e l of the animal 
15 
kingdom. And i n h i s Oeconomia Naturae he saidj "The v.'eapons 
with which the Lord of Nature has armed Himself ai'e t e r r i b l e : to 
the snakes, which he has cast on the ground l i k e naked f i s h , without 
feet, wjngs or f i n s , and viiich might therefore most e a s i l y of a l l be 
16 
destroyed, he has given t h e i r poisonous bai'bs -.." One of the 
17 
Creator's masterpieces was the Lappland Reindeer's Gadfly, .whidi ' 
caused the reindeer endless tormeit, God 
has protected the delicate f l i e s , and made them hairy l i k e 
the Lapp in h i s jacket, that they might not freeze to death 
i n these cold, northern, snow-covered mountains ... God has 
provided abundant nourishment for t h e i r young, the whole 
winter long, i n the reindeer's warm blood, l i k e a foetus in 
i t s mother»s womb ... God has insinuated these wretched 
creatures into t h e i r winter quarters in an a l l too favourab3.e 
manner, by .placing them inside the skin and outside the muscles 
of the body, in a temperate place where there i s neither too 
severe heat nor cold .. . God has selected the reindeer's back 
for t h i s purpose and not i t s flanks or belly, -so that they 
cannot be ciushed when the reindeer l i e s down! 18 
Theology was not be able to accommodate t h i s kind of information, 
and the interpretation of i t exemplified i n Linnaeus' work could 
never commend i t s e l f to n a t u r a l i s t s and philosophers without h i s 
particu3.ar v i s i o n . The work of Hume for example, exhibits a 
dis.satisfaction with the " f a i t h " of someone l i k e Linnaeus, a 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n made tolerable only by the decision to leave the 
to p i c of '^nature" related to "theodicy" alone aS too complex to 
handle i n sucai a way that anything coherent and i n t e l l i g i b l e could 
19 
be said about i t . Hume, to T,H. Huxley's disappo:intment, was not 
pa r t i c u l a r l y interested i n the sci a i c e s of h i s day, for t h e i r own 
sake, though one of his concerns was certainly v^ith the use of a 
cei'tain kind of analogical ai'gument as a proper kind of procedure 
20 in science. Hurlbutt commented: "A close inspection of Hume's 
philosophy shows that the p r i n c i p l e of analogy, i n the s c i e n t i f i c 
and non~Thoraistic sense, probably i s of more importance to h i s 
episteraology than to that of any other philosopher of the timej 
21 
for he makes i t tlie basis of matter-of-fact rea.soning." Hume 
wants both to deny to theology i t s ostensible "modernization" by 
analogies drawn from science, ana to show how the kind of arguments 
the " s c i e n t i f i c " theologians are using are invalid, and how analogical 
reasoning may be used correctly, as he understands the matter. I t 
seems clear that he I'eceived a great deal of stimulus towards 
formulatjjig h i s own d i s t i n c t i v e point of view from the new English 
22 
version of the Dictionary of Bayle, produced in 1734, only three 
. years a f t e r Law's tra n s l a t i o n and edition of King's book. As Courtines 
remarked: 'Hume cu l l e d much useful material from Bayle, who saved 
the canny Scot many an hour of tedious research because he had the 
forethought to compile a Dietioimaire whidi l i v e d up to i t s t i t l e , 
23 • ' 
historique et c r i t i q u e " . I t i s of particular interest here that he 
made careful extracts of what he took to be important points relating 
to theodicy from the D i c t i o n a r y , t h o u ^ some of h i s references seem 
25 
also to be taken from Law's introduction to King's work. The point 
at wSiich he i s perhaps l e a s t sympathetic to Bayle i s over h i s i n t e r -
pretation of the function of reason, since Bayle's position enabled 
people to confuse scepticism with a t h e i s m , a n d therefoi^e seemed to 
be di s c r e d i t i n g the one faculty on which philosophy could r e l y "in 
i t s attempts to . re s t r a i n the forces, already s u f f i c i e n t l y strong, of 
27 
ignorance, fanaticism and superstition." By 1744 Hume had himself . 
82 ~ 
a reputation for atheism which was to cost him a university chair, 
29 Suspicion of him was based on h i s Treatise of Human Nature of 1739-40 
and was no doubt fostered by. h i s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding 
30 
of 1748, The f i r s t part of the Enquiry was to a certain extent a 
re-writing of Book I of the T r e a t i s e but with some sections presumably 
31 
inserted quite deliberately, on s p e c i f i c a l l y theological topics. 
Section v i i i , "On. Liberty and Necessity" included some remarks on 
moral and physical evil to which attention w i l l again be drawn 3.ater 
on in t h i s exposition. I t i s Section x, "On Miracles" and Section x i , 
"Of a particular providence and a future s t a t e " which introduce h i s 
discussion of the view of re l i g i o n represented by Butler's Analogy of 
32 
1736, a view which was to be of such importance during much of the 
33 ' 
nineteenth centui'y. Given Butler's somewhat cautiously expressed 
34 
confidence i n God one can see how what he had to say seemed "soimd" 
to the English i n a way in which the confident speculations of a 
Leibniz could not. In t h i s part of the Enquiry, Hume was "preparing 
to invade what had been regarded both by Deists and by t h e i r opponents 
35 
as inviolable common ground." His t a c t i c s included those ^lalich he 
was to develop i n a much more extended form in the Dialogues - the 
narration of an imaginary conversation in the course of which the 
anthropcmorphism of design-theology could be esdiibited for c r i t i c i s m . 
37 
Like Kant, he foiSnd in Epiciirus a model of detachment over the issue 
of arguing from what were thougjit to be the cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
world to i t s p r i n c i p l e s of explanation. Flew also notes the contribution 
Hume made here to the development of what he c a l l s '^naturalistic 
explanations" as d i s t i n c t , for example, from "special creation" in 
biology. • . 
83 
Both of these works wei« to prove extremely important to Kant 
because of the way in which Beattie, concerned with Hume's Treatise, 
39 
wrote the book which made clear to Kant the relevance of what Hume 
had said about causality to Avhat he had said in the Enquiry about 
providence. Beattie had discerned the d r i f t of Hume's thought and 
thereby reminded Kant of h i s earJ.ier reading of the Enquiry, and 
made him think afresh about the character of the argummts for the 
40 
deity i n a way that had not been so clear to him before. 
Hume's most thorough-going attack on design-theology was to'be 
contained in his Dialogues, written up during the course of continuing 
controversies of one sort and another. For example, in 1756 there was 
an attempt to get the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to 
41 
enquire into h i s writings. T h i s occurred after h i s publication i n 
1754, of the f i r s t volume of h i s History of Great B r i t a i n , though the 
good sense of moderate opinion led to the abandonment of the proposed 
investigation, i f only because i t woxild give him even greater notoriety. 
His experience oi w r i t i n g at a time when "some p o l i t i c a l or other 
42 
orthodoxy was enforced by law or custom" was further developed in 
1757 with the fuss over h i s projected five "Dissertations". He 
43 
eventually published only four, including the s l i g h t l y altered 
44 
Natural History but not the essays on suicide and immortality, for 
which essays on the nature of tragedy and taste were substituted. He 
was by t h i s time a master of the s t y l e necessary to produce a short 
essay on acceptable subjects, without being thoroughly offensive and 
yet hopefully makijig some contribution to the foi'mation of opinion.'*'^ 
Hume was helped through h i s times of conti"oversy by h i s many good 
' 46 
friends, but even they were not prepared to put up with the scandal 
which might have ensued from the publication of the Dialogues, so 
Hume had to give the matter careful thought. The very form i n which 
he wrote them was a s k i l f u l employment of a technique he had used 
with more or l e s s success already. I t would appear that by the mid-
• 47 eighteenth century the dialogue form was something of an anachronism, 
but was s t i l l used in an attempt to recover i n philosophical wi^iting 
48 , 
some of the spontaneity of discussion. Hume's particxilar model was 
49 
Cicero's The Nature of the Gods which had become a popular work i n 
the eighteenth c e n t u r y . C i c e r o ' s choice of a theism which enabled 
him to f e e l that human l i f e had significance emerged during the 
course of a complex but methodical c r i t i c i s m of past and present 
theological stances. Bayle's Dictionary could wei;L be read as a 
c r i t i c a l commentary on the arguments employed. As Hume pointed out, 
the dialogue form was an alternative to "methodical and didac t i c " 
51 52 
exposition of a "system". So Bucklfey wrote of Cicero's method, 
that i t i s 
a dialogue in which s c i e n t i f i c or practical formulations are 
situated in t h e i r divergent frames of reference, brought into 
the c o n f l i c t of irreconcileable debate, and are tested 
according to the views of each auditor for their probability 
content ... the debate i s only resolved insofar as anyone 
chooses to adopt one of the conflicting positions or to modify 
i t or to formulate a new position with elements from the 
al t e r n a t i v e s or components ... Philosophizing l i e s precisely 
i l l t h i s ongoing conversation, the cliain of stateiuants and 
judgments, and the va].ue of the method converges pre c i s e l y 
on t h i s discrimination of perspectives and the differentiation 
of frames of references. As one cannot think outside of such 
a reference, the philosophic dialogues attempt to examine the 
varying products of the divergent schools as devices for 
invention and judgement. 
85-^ 
Expounding a system, on the other hand, presupposed that one would 
state one's aim at the begimiing of the discourse and carry on the 
argument with l i t t l e concei'n for the questions which might be raised 
by those concerned about the topic. The dialogue form tiad the 
disadvantage of leaving certain subjects in obscurity, thus indicating 
the problematic nature of some "uncertain" topics, but at l e a s t t h i s 
would be a f t e r an an a l y s i s which had endeavoured to look at a l l 
aspects of people's convictions, whether or not they happened to 
provide support, for a particular "dogma". 
54 
The dialogues also ref2.ect the l i f e of the "man of l e t t e r s " . 
Hume himself thoroughly enjoyed good company and maintained that 
conversation, with i t s i m p l i c i t practice of "mutual deference or 
c i v i l i t y " , led people to "euro and conceal that presumption and 
arrog'ance so natural to the human mind." But the main purpose 
of h i s euiployment of the dialogue form does seem to have been to 
ensure at some future date the publication of h i s opinions on some 
aspects of b e l i e f , i n such a way as to get other people to take them 
seriously. The Dialogues are therefore a part i c u l a r l y good specimen 
of a certain kind of writing, in that, they contain two teachings, 
"a popular teaching of an edifying character, which i s in the fore-
ground; and a philosophical teaching concerning the most important 
subject, which i s indicated only between the l i n e s . " ^ ^ So Asa Gray 
can be c i t e d as an example of someone who could quote Hume with 
approval as having anticipated some of the arguments against Paley, 
though he thought Hume's mature convictions did not r e s t there - he 
~ 86 -
did not apparently appreciate the character of Hume's work though 
was to vise the dialogue form himself but not as cleverly, to 
subvert an "orthodoxy". I t took someone l i k e J.S. M i l l , who for 
most of his l i f e e f f e c t i v e l y concealed h i s opinionfon some of the 
problems of r e l i g i o n to write: 
I n the case of the f reethinking philosophers of the l a s t 
century, i t i s often impossible to be quite certain what 
t h e i r opinions r e a l l y were: how far the rese.rvations they 
made, expressed r e a l convictions, or were concessions to 
supposed n e c e s s i t i e s of position ... I have a strong 
. impression that Hume's scepticism or rather his professed 
admiration of scepticism was rather to ayoid offence than 
to conceal h i s opinion; that he preferred to be c a l l e d a 
sceptic, rather than by a more odious name; and having to 
promulgate conclusions which he knew would be regarded as 
contradicting, on one hand the evidence of common sense, 
and on the other the doctrines of religion, did not l i k e 
to declare them as positive convictions, but thougitit i t 
more judicious to exhibit them as the results we mig^it 
come to, i f \ve put complete confidence in the trustworthiness 
of ourrational faculty.^® 
Hume himself had some illuminating comments to make about the 
work which reveal h i s own view of i t very c l e a r l y . He wrote to 
Gil b e r t E l l i o t i n 1751 that he had often thought 
that the best way of composing a Dialogue, would be for 
Persons that are of different Opinions about any Question 
of Importance, to write alternately the different Parts 
of the Discourses, & reply to each other. By t h i s Means, 
that vulgar Error would be avoided, of putting nothing but 
Nonsense into the Mouth of the Adversary: And at the same 
time, a Variety of Character & Genius being upheld, would 
make the whole look more natural & unaffected.60 
Strauss again had an apt comment: 'The views of the author of a 
drama or dialogue must not, without previous pi'oof, be identified 
with the views expressed by one or more of h i s characters, or with 
those agreed on by a l l h i s characters, or by h i s more att r a c t i v e 
~ 67 ~ 
characters. The r e a l opijiion of an author i s not necessarily 
i d e n t i c a l with that which he expresses in the largest number of 
6l 
passages." In a la t e r l e t t e r of 1776, when.Hume was revising 
t h i s work, which he had not done for f i f t e e n y ^ r s , he said, " I 
find that nothing can be more cautiously and more a r t f u l l y written." 
He f r e e l y used different contributors to express vaiat may be supposed 
from h i s other writings to have been his own point of view. 
His l e t t e r to E l l i o t , was a plea for help in strengthening the 
character of Cleanthes: ^ » 
Had i t been my good PorlnAne to l i v e near you, I shou'd have 
taken on me the Character of Philo in the dialogue, which 
you'll own I coud . have su.pported naturally eabugh: And you 
would not have been averse to that of Cleanthes. I believe, 
too, we could both of vis have kept our Temper very well; 
only, you have not reach*d an absolute philosophical Indifference 
on these Points. What Danger can ever come from ingenious 
Reasoning & Enquiry? The worst speculative Sceptic ever I knew, 
was a mu<ih better Man that the best superstitious Devotee & 
bigot,63 
The r e s t of the l e t t e r revealed Hume's d i f f i c u l t y , as he put i t , in 
analysing Cleanthej' argumoat into a proper form, so that i t did not 
re l y on the "propensity" of the mind towards i t , a propensity which 
he would i n any case wiant to show was not "a legitimate Ground of 
• 64 t.» • 
Assent". E l l i o t need not go further than Part'"", since Cleanthes 
allows in Part iV,"that a l l bur Inference i s founded on the Similitude 
of the Works of Nature to the usual Effects of Min.d. Otherwise they 
must appear a mere Qiaos. "^^ Hume then touched on a perpetual problem 
which appears i n coimection with t h i s kin.d of argument: "The only 
d i f f i c u l t y i s , why the other dissimilitudes do noi; weakai the argameat. 
And ijideed i t would seem from experience and feeling, that they do not 
- 88 
weaken i t so much as we might naturally expect." So any help for 
67 
Cleanthes would be "very acceptable". E l l i o t did offer help, but 
was one of several of Hume's friends who discouraged Hume from 
ac t u a l l y publishing. He thoroughly disapproved of Hume's scepticism, 
68 
for a l l i t s "unparallelled s u h t i l i t y and elegance." To another 
f r i e n d , Hugh B l a i r , Hume wrote a friendly "threat" promising to 
dedicate the Dialogues to him i f he ever did bring them out. B l a i r 
70 
had written to Hume predicting that he would be wbrshi.pped in 
. France and that the Fi-ench would have erected a statue to him had 
he published h i s Dialogues. B l a i r begged him to publish posthumously, 
though he c l e a r l y thought i t better not to bring the work out a t a l l . 
. V/hen Hume r e a l i s e d he was at the end of h i s l i f e he v/as increasiJigly 
anxious to secure publication of what he f e l t was, and i f h i s friends 
71 
were to be trusted r e a l l y was, the best thing he had ever w i t t e n . 
He had not published them himself because he decided he wanted to 
" l i v e quietly and keep remote from a l l Clamour." He thought them 
not more exceptionable than other things he had published, though 
perhaps he should have suppressed those works too. In any case, 
he thought the Dialogues were l e s s obnoxious than the Enquiry. 
His friends need not prefix t h e i r names to the t i t l e page, though 
the publication would be made more excusable i f i t were clear that 
they were executing the v/ishes of a dead friend. So Hume wrote, 
that he "there introduces a Sceptic, who i s indeed refuted, and at 
• 72 • 
l a s t gives up the Argument, nay conf esses that he was only amusing 
himself by a l l his C a v i l s ; yet before he i s silenced, he advances 
several Topics, which w i l l give Umbrage, and w i l l be deemed very 
~ 8 9 -
bold and free, as well as much out of the Common Road." I t does not 
follow, however, that t h i s i s conclusive evidence for tho view that 
everything that Philo says can be taken without further scrutiny to . 
be Hume's own opinion. As Noxon commented, "the role of Philo i s very 
l i k e that usually played by Hume himself - the role of the cri . t i c 
who does not commit himself to defeiidlng his own position but makes 
the claims of others disintegrate mder analysis, who aims not to 
73 
prove or to claim but to show that no claim can be rationally j u s t i f i e d . " 
One can only suppose that Hume hoped that the cultivated detachnient of h i s • 
view of r e l i g i o n made the Dialogues an appropriate companion-piece to 
h i s autobiographical essay, but h i s friends did not share h i s view of 
i t . On h i s death, they published a collected edition of h i s 
philosophical writings, together wi.th My own L i f e and a tribute 
written by Adam Smith. However, when Hume's nephew did eventually 
bring out the Dialogues i n 1779, they raised much l e s s disturbance 
than had been feared, perhaps because Hume himself was no longer 
74 
available as the appropriate target of cr i t i c i s m . 
Some attention has already been paid to Hume's refereaices to 
.Bayle's work. Huine was also familiar with the kind of theology 
75 
represented by Leibniz and c r i t i c i s e d ' i t with confidence, .especially 
76 
i n h i s remarks on moral and physical e v i l , and the mistake of 
77 
.imagining oneself to understand the actions of God. There were 
constant reminders of Leibniz' thinking available, though he was 
78 
unpopular in England because of h i s dispute with the Newtonians. 
The Leibniz-Clarke cori'espondence, for example, was also well-known 
9 0 -
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on the Continent; Clarke's kind of theology seems to have been one 
80 
of Hume's targets i n i t s own right; and Law's ecjition of Kiiig's 
book was popular enough to deserve seve.ral reprintings. Moreover, apart 
from iihe Lisbon earthquake, there were also the Ix>ndon earthquakes of 
1750, These were treated by some as a special v i s i t a t i o n by God on 81 82 London's si n s , reviving interest i n Burnet's Theory of the Earth, 
Any s h i f t of the burden of disasters such aS these from "providence" 
83 
to '^nature" was in competition with the "theodicy" pi-omalgated 
84 
from fashionable London pulpits and Hume had reason to be scathing 
about the way in which the clergy played on people's fears. He 
86 
knew about Vol t a i r e ' s publication of Candide, which he said was 
" f u l l of Sprightliness & Impiety, & i s indeed a Satyre upon Providence, 
• 87 
under Pretext of c r i t i c i s i n g the Leibnitian System," London 
PLiblishers quickly produced translations of Candid e and War burton 
judged that one of i t s aims was to recomraead natxiralism arid r i d i c u l e 
88 
Leibniz, Hume would never need to wait for translations from the 
French i n any case, and was indeed c r i t i c i s e d by Samuel Johnson because 
89 
the very structure of h i s sentences was French, so there i s no 
reason to suppose that he could not have read the Theodicy for himself 
in one of i t s many French editions had he been so inclined. (Barber 
conveys tlie inforraation that one of the French-speakiJig Wolff ian 
enthusiasts i n Germany thought tliat a reading of the Theodicy vould 
enable Hume to cope with the problem of e v i l as he liad reviewed i t 
90 
^ "^ ^^  .Enquiry, ) However, Hume's unambiguous reference to Leibniz 
in the Dialogues suggests that even i f he had read the Theodicy he 
cared l i t t l e f o r i t . He hardly does Leibniz j u s t i c e , though i t i s 
91 -
useful to remember in any discussion oi the Dialogues that Leibniz 
was not one of Hume*s principo-l concerns in the way in which he was 
for Kant. Hume's reference to Leibniz by name i n the Dialogues i s 
v i a Demea, who says that a look around Cleanthes* l i b r a r y w i l l show 
that "there i s scarce one of those innumerable writers, from whom 
the sense of human misery has not, i n some passage or other, extorted 
a complaint and confession of i t . At lea s t , then, chance i s entirely 
on that side; and no one author has ever, so f a r as I can r e c o l l e c t , 
been so extravagent as to deny I t . " Philo, however, goes on to 
indicate that Demea has made a mistake, because he affirms that 
"LEIKIITZ has denied i t ; and i s perhaps the f i r s t " , who ventured 
upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; at l e a s t , the f i r s t , who 
made i t e s s e n t i a l to h i s philosophical system." HxAme's footnote 
to t h i s remark reads: 'That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King 
and some few others, before LEIBNITZ, though by none of so great fame . 
as that GERMAN philosopher", as though to offer a correction of 
91 
Philo*s 'terror". Hume's view of the torments to which m.en may be 
subject, c/isorders of both mind and body, seems to have changed l i t t l e 
between wr i t i n g the E'nquiry and the pialogues. Whereas in w i t i J i g 
the Enquiry he may perhaps be said to express some di s s a t i s f a c t i o n with 
93 
h i s own scepticism, i n the I>ialogv.T;eg- he i s prepared to l e t i t have 
f u l l r e i n , i n order to provoke h i s combatants. Qtiite clearly,he sided 
with Bayle in h i s analysis of human i l l s and human f o l l y , and as with 
94 
Bayle, the problem for him was the moral attributes of God, and the 
"ontological" status, of those at t r i b u t e s when they were no longer to 
be understood solely i n rela t i o n to human nature. His conclusion was 
9 2 -
not unlike Bayle's, moreover, in that he saw the attempt to i n s i s t on 
the goodness of God in conjunction with his other attributes, to make • 
God incomprehensible when a l l the "evidence" was taken into account. 
But whereas Bayle may have been prepared to rely on " f a i t h " , Hume 
95 
seems to have preferred suspension of judgment on the whole issue. 
I t i s not to the purpose here to giye more than a s u f f i c i e n t 
indication of the argument of the Dialogues to make clear Hume's 
c r i t i c i s m of Leibniz in p a r t i c u l a r , througjiout the ongoing conversation, 
as well as in Part ^  as such, where he chose to name Leibniz as one of 
the objects of h i s c r i t i c i s m . In that section Cleanthes himself did not 
draw upon Le i b n i z ' a p r i o r i theology, and Demea invoked i t only once 
when he said, "This world i s taut a point in comparison of the imiverse; 
t h i s l i f e but a moment i n comparison of eternity ...." But he dealt 
with what he took to be the nbn-sense of I^eibniz' a p r i o r i theology 
as he went along and cl e v e r l y parodied some of Leibniz' favourite analogies 
which the l a t t e r had offered as alternatives to those produced by Bayle. 
97 
His basic point as he had indicated in the Enquiry , was the f o l l y of 
allowing ourselves to indulge in \vhat he called "the unbounded licence 
of conjecture," - that of t a c i t l y considex'ing ourselves "as in the place 
of the Supreme Beiflg". His view of man was tiiat he i s not equipped to 
98 
discuss with assurance the origin of worlds. Hume would endeavour to 
show that the kind of hypothesis used by Galileo, for example, was not 
99 
a model for a theologian. What Copernicus and Galileo had to say, 
followed, eventually by Newton, represented a gain in i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , 
which for Hume was not achieved by any supposedly comparable t h e i s t i c 
hypothesis. Newton's theology which gave the lead to so many others 
- 93 -
of h i s time.'^^^ seemed to represent science AS a source of argument 
in support of one kind of theology, and this had made i t nruch easier 
to get the new science accepted In the tmi v e r s i t i e s . But Hume wanted 
to emphasise the point that, the sciencejtof h i s day and the theologj' 
thought to be appropriate to them were not to be confused. 
Given the agreement between the participants in the Dialogues 
i O l 
that they were not going to argue i n terms of "p o s s i b i l i t y " but of 
"experience" Hume would r a i s e a question which applied to desigti 
theology of any variety, whether of the a p r i o r i or a poste r i o r i kijnd. 
"What peculiar privilege has t h i s l i t t l e agitation of the brain which 
we c a l l thought, that we must thus make i t the model of the whole 
102 
universe?" Even i f agreement could be reached on the point that 
103 
ideas i n a human mind f a l l into order of themselves i t did not 
follow that i t was possible to give "precise meaning" to something 
104 
similar said of the deity, l e t alone what else could be said, in 
105 
Hume»s opinion, of the a c t i v i t y of the human mind. Moreover, Hume 
wanted to draw attention to \«iat he called the "inconvenience" of the 
anthropomorphism that was involved: "there i s no ground to suppose a 
plan of the world to be formed in the divine mind, consisting of d i s t i n c t 
ideas, d i f f e r e n t l y arranged; i n the same manner as an architect forms 
106 
±a h i s head the plan of a house which he intends to execute." For 
hira, nothing could be gained by such a supposition, since as he under-
stood i t , the ideal universe and the universe of experience were both 
107 
exactly a l i k e . And he went on to affirm that i t was merely arbitrary 
to say "We must stop somewhere" in reply to the man wJio wanted to ask 
- 94 " 
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a question about the cause of God or of the ideal world. As he 
said, " i f we stop, and go no farther; why go so f a r ? Why not stop 
at the material world? How can we satisfy ourselves vrithout going 
°" ^ infinitum? And a f t e r a l l , what satisfaction i s there i n that 
i n f i n i t e progression? Let us remember the story of the INDIAN philosopher 
and h i s elephant. I t was never more applicable than to the present 
109 
subject." For Hume^talk about the ideas i n God's mjaid was to double 
the problem, not to simplify i t or solve i t in any sense. "An ideal 
system, arranged of i t s e l f , without a precedent design, i s not a whit 
more explicable than a material one, which attains i t s order in a l i k e 
manner; nor i s there any more d i f f i c u l t y in the l a t t e r supposition than 
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in the former." He returned to the jjroblem once more in connection 
with another point. He said: "In a l l Ijistances whiclri we have ever 
seen ideas are copied from r e a l objects, and are ectypal, not archetypa]|., 
to express myself in learned terms: You reverse t h i s order, and give 
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thought the precedence." His view of r e a l i t y therefore enabled him 
to produce a rather different version of some of Leibniz* analogies. 
"A builder i s never esteemed prudent , who undertakes a plan, beyond what 
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his stock w i l l enable him to f i n i s h . " And an extended parody of 
Leibniz runs: 
Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment 
convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, f i r e s , 
passag'es, s t a i r s , and the whole oeconomy of the building were the 
source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the exti'emes 
of heat and cold; you w u l d certainly, blame the contrivance, 
without any farther examination. The architect would in vain 
display h i s s u b t i l t y , and prove to you, that i f t h i s door or that 
window were altered, greater i l l s would ensue. What he says, 
may be s t r i c t l y true: The alteration of one particular, while 
the ";other parts of the buildiixg remain, may only augment the 
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inconveniences. But s t i l l you would assert i n general, that, i f 
the arbhitect had had s k i l l and good intention, he might have 
formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the 
parts i n such a manner, as would have remedied a l l or most of 
these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your own ignorance 
of such a plan, w i l l never convince you of the impossibility of 
i t . I f you f i n d any inconveniences and deformities in the 
building, you w i l l always without entering into any d e t a i l , 
condemn the a r c h i t e c t .^ '^^  
P l a i n l y , Hume wanted the focus of attention to be on vtoat l i t t l e could 
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be said as a r e s u l t of a posteriori considerations, without any 
prior guarantee of the goodness of God such as Leibniz had offered. 
A.E. Taylor thought that H i l l o ^ s attempt to account for the presence 
of t e l e o l o g i c a l order i n the organic realm 'without presupposing Paley's 
"prospectively contriving mind" much the weakest part of h i s case. 
T h i s point i s obviously important both for wliatever Hume has s a i d 
which.may be thought to apply s p e c i f i c a l l y to Leibniz, and for the 
position represented by Cleanthes. The strength of Cleanthes' position 
as Taylor re-phrased i t , i s that 
iihere i s no reason to believe that mltid has ever come into being 
as a r e s u l t of the causal process in inanimate nature, and every 
i^ason to believe that i t has not, but must be reckoned with as 
present and operative throughout the whole course of nature, 
including the enormous stretch of astronomical time which we are 
taught by science to look on as preceding the appearance of 
organisms in any part of the universe of which we have any 
knowledge.^15 
Aad as Taylor put i t further on: "The real and i r r e s i s t i b l e argument 
i s ... that our success i n increasing understanding of the pattern of 
things i s i t s e l f the evidence that the pattei-n i s due to omnipresent 
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all-pervading intelligence as i t s source." Fvirther, as T.E. Jessop 
made cl e a r , the 
lim i t a t i o n of reference and method in the Dialogues comes out most 
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starkly in the treatment of man. He comes into the universe of 
Cleanthes and Philo in three ways only - as an animal, as an 
a r t i f i c e r , and as a subject of pain. I t i s by omitting some of 
man»s most d i s t i n c t i v e features from the f a c t s which on the one 
hand are set for explanation, and on the other hand are to provide 
the material for the explanation, that the discussion i s kept on 
an easy p l a i n . 
So Jessop a l s o wanted to ask questions about the significance of man's 
knowing of h i s world, i n order to illuminate one of Hume *s weaknesses 
as he saw i t . Whilst Hume was no doubt r i ^ i t to be suspicious of the 
conceit which man ejiihibits in putting himself in imagination in the 
place of the deity, there might be a theoretical d i f f i c u l t y in not 
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engaging in some kind ot " c r i t i c a l anthropomorphism". Jessop said 
that 'IHuiBe omits from h i s picture of the world h i s o%vn a b i l i t y , as a 
man i n i t , to draw that picture and to declare what can ajia what cannot 
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be reasonably Inferred from i t . " I f wiiat Hume said was meant to be 
a comprehensive c r i t i c i s m of the theism of h i s day he could not e^cluj^e 
himself fs^m h i s own universe. So Jessop stated that the "deepest of 
a l l metaphysical contradictions i s to imply both tliat we know anything 
at a l l about the world and that our knowing f a l l s outside of i t , and i s 
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therefore in no way signifi c a n t of i t s nature." I f Hume could have 
agreed with Taylor's view of man's mind as being of i t s very natinre such 
that the phases of mental processes "should be held together by tin i t y 
l 2 l 
of forward-looking i n t e r e s t " ; and i f he had been prepared to choose 
something l i k e that view of man as h i s principle ot explanation of the 
whole; then, he mii^it at the very le a s t have been able to give a more 
sensitive appreciation of Cleanthes' views, and consequently made a 
stronger case for him and a more adequate c r i t i c i s m of Leibniz. 
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The view that Hume both hankered after ••the flesh-pots of 
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rationalism" and could neither do i t j u s t i c e nor do without i t 
appeared in h i s reluctance to abandon the vocabulary of theism in 
h i s characterisation of ••nature". He presupposed that "generation" 
was not more comprehensible than "reason" and that both were "certain 
123 
powers ana energies in nature". Either might therefore serve as the 
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eternal or o r i g i n a l "inherent principle ol order", and such an 
in t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e of explanation was sufficicait for him. He asked 
"whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy i n a l l , the parts of 
t h i s world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among a l l the 
operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether 
the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure 
of human thought be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy 
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to each other ... •• Whatever may be the internal cause forming the 
stmicture of the human mind i s the same cause as that which "is "responsible" 
for the structure and decomposition of other natural organisms, and 
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presumably also of madness. •»Mind^ » was the word which he was s t i l l 
prepared to use of t h i s intei-nal cause. G.J. Nathan commented that 
as i t i s "the ultimate explanation for a l l order in the uiiiverse, i t 
i s , i n a sense, also e n t i t l e d to be cal l e d God. This God has only the 
remotest connection with the one t r a d i t i o n a l l y conceived. Hume's God 
i s immanent in the world as i t s stnicturing force and not transcendent 
l27 
to i t as a designer." So for Hume, " I t were better, therefore, 
never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing i t to 
contaiJi the princ i p l e of i t s order v/ithin i t s e l f , we r e a l l y a s s e r t i t 
to be God; and the sooner we arrive a t that divine Being, so much 
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the better." What he seems to mean by "better" here he indicates in 
the next sentence: "Wlien you go one step beyond the mundane system, 
you only excite an i n q u i s i t i v e humour, which i t i s impossible ever 
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to s a t i s f y . " What Hume proposed as an ultimately mysterious 
yet"rational"principle of explanation he also identified as "Nature". 
So' what he said may have son© merit insofar as he was in effect 
emphasizing "the influence of Nature over human l i v e s " and was refusing 
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"to identify Nature with blind i r r a t i o n a l i t y . " But Hume did not i 
offer a worked out "reconstruction" of what he meant by 'Nature" as an i 
alternative to "God", but merely sketched some ot the vieVs ot nature 
. • • i 
common i n his time as part and parcel of the context of his discussion i 
of theodicy. ; ; . . 
I t may be that he would never have found himself in t h i s position 
i 
i f either he or the targets of h i s c r i t i c i s m had been able to provide for 
themselves different "models" for what was meant by divine c r e a t i v i t y . 
F a r r e r indicated that i f Ijeibniz had f u l l y trader stood the implications 
of what he had said about the "divine creative choice" - that i t seeias 
to be "an i n t u i t i v e turning away from an i n f i n i t e , or at l e a s t indefinite, 
range of l e s s a t t r a c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y " , he would have seen that i t would 
be more akin to the "sort of choice exercised in a r t i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y " . 
hud as Farrer said, a- consequence of such a l i n e of speculation 
could be "that the divine mind designs more through us, and l e s s simply 
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for us". Cleanthes had a deity, as Taylor remarked who i s no more 
than "aiA exceptionally s k i l f u l a r t i s a n piecing together m t e r i a l s to 
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compose a madiine for uhe execution of a determinate piece of work." 
For t h i s l a t t e r commen-cator also what. Butler and l a t e r Paley were getting 
at, would be more adequately presented in terms of a model of "a rightly 
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proportioned work of a r t or a we l l - l i v e d l i f e " . The purposes to 
which such models r e l a t e ••cannot be set forth in any single unambiguous 
formula l i k e that wnich describes the effect for which a machine has 
been design.ed". The attractiveness of these models l i e s iij. the fact 
•chat "the good poem and the good l i f e are embodiments of purposive 
a c t i v i t i e s which are worth pursuing simply on their own account for i 
t h e i r inherent goodness••, whereas making watches, houses and ships i s 
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worth while only as means to ends - the avoidance of "ijiconveniences". 
One may propose that the nearest approach Cleanthes made to the ; 
appropriate kind of model was h i s example of a "lib r a r y " . However, 
since the l i b r a r y turned out to be ••animal" and ••vegetable", and to 
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perpetuate i t s e l f by ••descent and propagation" the axpposed " i l l u s t r a t i o n " f 
was xmhelpful, not to say confusing. I t i s interesting that in h i s 
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• ' c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s " of some of the argumait of t h i s work, N. Kemp Smith 
said that Cleanthes was ••unfairly •• taking advantage of the fact That 
works such as the Aeneid are the outcome of creative a r t . But he had 
a different view of creative a r t from that indicated ei.ther by Farrer 
or by Taylor. He did not see in creative a c t i v i t y a model for divine 
a c t i v i t y because he saw creative a c t i v i t y i n terms of the "Architect" 
analogy. The ar c h i t e c t ' s plans govern the a c t i v i t i e s of the contractor 
from s t a r t to f i n i s h . I n other words N. Kemp Smi-ch thought in terms of 
the analogy which F a r r e r suggested never did j u s t i c e to what Leibniz was 
saying about God and which Hume parodied. N. Kemp Smith reinforced 
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h i s point by r e l y i n g heavily on what Hume had to say about creative 
a r t , which further hindered the move v/hicli he seemed to be about to 
make in support of what F a r r e r suggested. 
What Hume sketched out with reference to 'Inature" i n the Dialogues 
emerges only i n the course of various arguments and rarely for i t s own 
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sake as a proper subject ot inte r e s t . What may be of value i n his 
presentation of the material i s h i s insistence on the kind of attention 
to and descriptions ot nature yiiich may allow s c i e n t i f i c enquiry to 
proceed. For example, a bri e f discussion of. cosmogony leji him to 
a point which has been seen as stating l o g i c a l l y a view which merely 
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awaited "darwinism" to f i l l i n the "evidential gaps". Hume wrote: 
I t i s in vain, therefore, to i n s i s t upon the uses of the parts 
i n animals or vegetables and th e i r curious adjustment to each 
other. I would fain know how an animal could subsist, unless 
i t s parts were so adjusted? Do we not find, that i t immediately 
perJiShes whenever t h i s adjustment ceases, and tliat i t s matter 
corrupting t r i e s some new form. I t happens, indeed, tliat the 
parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some regular form 
immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and i f i t were 
not soj could the world subsist? Must i t not dissolve as well as 
the animal, and pass through new positions and situations - t i l l 
i n a great, but f i n i t e succession, i t f a l l s at l a s t into the 
present or some such order?"i37 
Like Bayle, however, the participants i n the Dialogues remained puzzled 
by the d e t a i l s , without being able to "explain" thein by a corresponding 
theological statement. Cleanthes raised the question about the "many 
conveniences and advantages which mean and a l l animals possess". He 
commented: 
Two eyes, two ears, are not absolutely necessary for the subsistence 
of the species. Human race might have been propagated and preserved, 
without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, and those innumerable f r u i t s and 
products whidi serve to ottr s a t i s f a c t i o n and enjoyment. I f no 
camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts ot . 
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. AFRIG\ and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved? I f 
no loadstone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful 
direction to the needle, would huraati society and the human kind 
have l?een immediately extinguished?!^^ 
But he could do no more than suggest these examples to reinforce what 
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he had to say about.his need for a deity able" to produce the 
••conveniences", and h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with fingal nature as the 
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source of sudi apparent benefits, 
K i i l o made another point to vJiich "danvinism^' would tCli'fiv^  give 
pa r t i c u l a r attention when he said : 
You ascribe, CLEANTl-TIES, (and I believe j u s t l y ) a purpose and 
intention to Nature. But what, I beseech you, i s the object 
of that curious a r t i f i c e and nachinery, which she has displayed 
i n a l l animals? The preservation alone of individuals and 
propagation of tlie species. I t seems enough for her purpose, 
i f sucli a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any 
care or concern for the happjjiess of the members that compose 
i t . No resource for t h i s purpose: no mchinery, in order 
merely to give pleasure or ease: no fund of pilre joy and 
contentment: no indulgence without some v/ant or necessity 
accompanying i t . At l e a s t , the few phenomena of t h i s nature 141 
are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of s t i l l gi'eater importance. 
And he described as one of the circumstances which introduces e v i l into 
the world "that contrivance or oeconomy of the animal creation, by whi.ch 
pains, as well as pleasures, are employed to excite a l l creatures to 
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action, and make them v i g i l a n t in the great work of self-preservation." 
He a l s o found the ••frugality" of iiature distressing i n another connect.ion. 
"So w e l l adjusted are the organs and capacities of a l l animals, and so 
well f i t t e d to t h e i r preservation, that, as far as history or t r a d i t i o n 
reaches, there appears not to be any single species, which has yet been 
extingitished i n the universe. Every afiimal has the requisite endowments; 
but these endowments are bestowed with so scrupulous an oeconomy, that 
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any considerable diminution must entirely destroy the creature." 
Further, he maintained that d i v e r s i t y and s t a b i l i t y were not necessarily 
tt> count as evidence which stood to God's credit . "The author of 
Nature i s inconceivably powerful: h i s force i s supposed great, i f 
not altogether inexhaustible: nor i s there any reason, as far as we 
can judge ., to make him observe t h i s s t r i c t f r u g a l i t y in h i s dealing 
with creatures. I t would have been better, were h i s power extremely 
limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed these with 
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more f a c u l t i e s for t h e i r happiness and preservation." 
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I t i s true that i n the l a s t part of the Dialogues Hume used 
jPhilo to support Cleanthes in his d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with mere 'Inature" 
as the source of "design", so that Philo re-phrased what he has! to 
say to provide the basis from which he could develop a minimal theism. 
The principles oi the anatomist,"That Nature does nothing in vain", . 
and of the astronomer - 'That Nature acts by the simplest methods, 
and chuses the most proper means to any end" now became maxims which 
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l a i d a "strong foundation of piety and relig i o n " . I t i s t h i s kind 
of support for Cleanthes wliich enaoled Nathan, as has already been 
noted, to write of Huuie's deity as immanent in the world as i t s 
structuring force and not transcendent to i t as i t s designer. Philo«s 
f i r s t employment of a sim i l a r maxim, however, was in a context where 
he was prepared to destroy any basis for theism. Hume had already aade 
i t c lear in the course of the D;ialogues that a man might f e e l e n t i t l e d 
to select any one of a number of analogies for h i s deity. There was 
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the analogy of the "stupid mechanic", or chat- of a variety of 
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d e i t i e s to whom the attributes of omnipotence, wisdom and goodness 
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could not be ascribed. There Was the analogj' of the •'infinite 
spider, who spun t h i s whole complicated mass from h i s bowels, and 
annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of i t , by absorbing i t 
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again, and resolving i t into his own essence.'' There was one 
analogy in p a r t i c u l a r that he used, as part of his c r i t i c i s m of 
theodicy, which seemed to him- to be an excellent one to express what 
he understood to be the kind of thing meant by "physical evil^'. 
Look round t h i s miiverse. What an immense profusion of beings, 
animated an.d organized, sensible ana active? You admire t h i s 
prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a l i t t l e more 
n a r i w l y these l i v i n g existences, the only beings worth regarding. 
How h o s t i l e and destrucfciye to each other? How i n s u f f i c i e n t a l l 
of them for -(iieir own happiness! How contemptible or odious to 
the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a 
blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and 
pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, 
her maimed and abortive children I•^^^ 
Htime e a r l i e r implied that the fruga l i t y of nature could lafean that 
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the power of the deity was limited, rather than 1ihat he was 
supremely wise. As a matter of inference, a man arguing a posteriori 
could not suppose that '•the world, con.sidered in general, and as i t 
appears to us in t h i s l i f e " was not •'diffei-ent from what a man or such 
a limited Being woula, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, 
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ana benevolent Deity". And so Hume insisted, via Demea, that man 
may not pretend any exemption from the lot of a l l other animals: 
The whole earth ... i s cursed and polluted. A perpetual war 
i s kindled amongst a l l l i v i n g creatures. Necessity, hunger, 
want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, anxiety, 
terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The f i r s t entrance into 
l i f e gives anguish to the new-bora infant and to i t s wretched 
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parent: Weakness, impotence, d i s t r e s s , attend eadi stage of 
that l i f e : and ' t i s at l a s t finished i n agony and horror. 
Philo followed t h i s up by emphasising the 
curious a r t i f i c e s of Nature, in order to imbitter the l i f e of 
every l i v i n g being. The stronger prey upon the weaker, and keep 
them i n perpetual t e r r o r and anxiety. The weaker too, i n t h e i r 
turn, often prey ijipon the stronger, and vex and molest them 
without relaxation. Consider that innumerable race of insects, 
which e i t h e r are bred on the body of each animal, or f l y i n g about 
i n f i x t h e i r stings i n him. These insects have otiiers s t i l l l e s s 
than themselves, which torment them. AxiA thus on eacJi hand, 
befoi-e and behind, above and below, every animal i s surrounded 
with enemies, which incessantly seek h i s misery and distructlon. 
The e v i l s ffiah surmounts by combining with other, men to make h i s world 
habitable he seems promptly to balance by s e l f - i n f l i c t e d i l l s . I t 
seems cl e a r that the course of nature i s not established to further 
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the cause of human or animal f e l i c i t y . 
Nelson Pike developed the theodicy produced by Demea (to which 
attention has already been drawn) I n an attempt to cope withfehis view. 
Pike wanted to work out h i s argument about the p o s s i b i l i t y of there 
being morally s u f f i c i e n t reasons for allowing suffering i n the best 
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of a l l possible worlds. But Pike had nothing to say about what 
v/ould count as a morally s a f f i c i e n t reason for the sufferings of 
creatures other than men, and more parti c u l a r l y , as Pike does in fact 
show quite c l e a r l y , Hume was wholly uninterested in t h i s area of theodicy. 
However i t i s not ^ despite Pike^that Hume expi'essed no opinion o«i the 
subject, because he said in tJie next paragraph a f t e r Demea*s statement, 
via Cleanthes, that to propose some svLCh resolution of the problem was 
to admit an "arbitrary supposition", by which he meant a supposition 
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contrary to "matters of^fact, v i s i b l e and uncontroverted." Demea 
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had put together two suggestions of Ijeibniz*. One was that the world 
v/as but a poiixt i n comparison with the rest of the universe, and laie 
other was that 3.ife was but a moment in comparison with eternity. 
'•The present e v i l phenomena, therefore, are r e c t i f i e d i n other regions, 
and i n some future period of existence. And the eyes of men, being then 
opened to larger views of things, see the whole connection of general 
laws; and trace, with adoratfS>.*^., the benevoleaice and rectitude of the 
Deity, through a l l the mazes and i n t r i c a c i e s of h i s providence." But 
Cleanthes asked!; "Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the 
apparent phenomena? To establish one hypothesis upon another, i s 
building e n t i r e l y i n the a i r ; and the titmost we ever a t t a i n , by these 
conjectures and f i c t i o n s , i s to ascertain the bare p o s s i b i l i t y of oiir 
opinion; but never can we, upon such terms, establish i t s r e a l i t y . " 
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Pike drew attention to Philo»s agreement to carry on with the 
discussion i n the hope that Cleanthes himself would be able to describe 
a somewhat different view of human l i f e and the condition of iaankind ^  
j 59 
from Which the moral attributes of the deity migjit perhaps be inferred. 
Pike commented: " I t i s clear from the context that t h i s adjustment i s made 
only for puirposes of argument and not because Hume senses any inadequacy 
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i n Philo«s f i r s t position.•• Not oMy did Cleanthes* deity need a 
mind ••like the human", but also "a goodness l i k e the human", and t h i s 
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Hume repeatedly denied can be inferred from phCTromoia. ' So to what 
he had said about the stimulus of pain rather than of pleasure 
constituting the primary motivation of animals, he added a query about 
J 6? 
the -supposed regularity of nature as evidence of "goodn.ess". ' A 
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being who understooa the "secret springs of the universe" might j u s t 
as e a s i l y have created a world where everything was always well, as the 
one that actually e x i s t s . 
A f l e e t whose purposes were salutary, to society, might always 
meet with a f a i r wind: Good princes enjoy sound health and 
long l i f e : Persons, bom to power and authority, be fi-amed 
With good tempers and virtuous dispositions... Some small 
touches, given to CALIGULA'S brain in h i s infancy, might have 
converted him into a THAJAN: one wave, a l i t t l e higher than 
the r e s t , by burying CAESAR and h i s fortune in,the bottom of 
the ocean might have restored liberty to, a considerable part 
of mankind. 
He would allow that a prior confidence in Providence, and i t s reasons 
for not so intervening might "save the conclusion concerning the divine 
a t t r i b u t e s , " but Scoi'«^  " i t can never be suffi c i e n t to establish rhat 
conclusion." In the developmcsnt of this"theology"of " i f only" he 
applied h i s c r i t i c i s m of natural endowments to man also, with s p e c i f i c 
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application to itEm's need to develop a cultured, and prosperous society. 
. Such a society depends upon continued effort, "BUT. as industry i s a 
power, and the most valuable of any. Nature seems determined, suitably 
to her usual maxim, to bestow i t on men with a very sparing hand; and 
rather to punish him severely for h i s deficiency in i t , than to reward 
him for h i s attainments." Hume did not ask for men to be exalted to 
a higher rank of being but said that " i t i s hard; I dare to repeat i t , 
i t i s hard, that being placed in a world so f u l l of wants and n e c e s s i t i e s : 
where almost every being and element i s either our foe or refuses i t s 
assistance ... we should also have our own temper '^o struggle with, and 
should be deprived of that faculty, which can alone fence against these 
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multiplied e v i l s . " He also asked again about the supposed regularity 
of things by drawing attention, not t h i s time to apparent deficiencies 
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which could pei-haps have been remedied, but to the dispa'oportion of 
vfliat i s provided to what i s required. He concluded: •There i s nothing 
so advantageous i n the imiverse, but what frequently becomes pernicious, 
by i t s excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with the requisite 
accuracy, aga4nst a l l disorder or confusion. The ir r e g u l a r i t y i s never, 
perhaps, so great as to destroy any species; but i s often s u f f i c i e n t 
165 
to involve the individtials i n ruin and misery." 
T 
! . • -
I t was only a f t e r t h i s determined onslaught on the case of those 
who wanted to proffer a theodicy that Hume worked out a conclusion 
which allowed him to write h i s l e t t e r in which he said that h i s sceptic 
i s refuted and a t l a s t gives up the argument. However, what he said 
about e v i l i n the Dialogrues surely amounts to more Idian r a i s i n g •'cavils" 
for the sake of ••amusement". Erasmus Diarwin seems to have agreed with 
him tliat theodicy was an impossible subject, and shared much of IIume»s 
outlook on questions of r e l i g i o n . On the other hand, both Mai thus and 
Paley, in t h e i r different ways, t r i e d to show where Hume was mistaken. 
They both took him seriously, but di*ew " t h e i s t i c " conclusions from the 
••evidence••. After looking at the work of Kant, i t w i l l be to these 
conmients on Hume that'we may turn, and to the repudiation both of 
Hume and of these c r i t i c s of h i s , by Coleridge. 
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I). Immanuel Kant 
On the topic of theodicy, as on many others, the writings of 
Kant are illuminating and in s t r u c t i v e . In Kant»s work there i s 
material which i l l u s t r a t e s very well the change of standpoint 
with regard to theodicy y^tiich took place in the mind of someone who 
was not only a b r i l l i a n t c r i t i c , but a great constructive philosopher 
In h i s own right. Kant's examination of theodicy was conducted along 
With h i s c r i t i c a l a n a l y s is of the meaning and value of certain 
p r i n c i p l e s of explanation of the natural order. His estimate of 
those principles affected what he could say about physical e v i l as 
a topic, i n his theology . Much of what he had to say was available 
i n E n glish by the time of the publication of the Origin of Species. 
The method of approach which Kant had developed during the course of 
his career could perhaps have saved theologians from some of t h e i r 
acrimonious debates with s c i e n t i s t s on the issues raised by the 
publication of the Origin. I f one were now to adopt Kant's approach 
to theology, i t might be tliat one would have to rule out any attempt 
to construct a modem theodicy on the Leibnizian model, however 
sophisticated. There might also be a positive gain to theology i f i t 
could be shovoi that Kant's approach made i t possible to c l a r i f y some 
of the issues in the science-religion debate. In any case, i t i s 
worth-while to examine the work of the greatest philosopher of h i s 
day for h i s views on theodicy in relation to the developments taking 
place in the various f i e l d s of the natural sciences in which he had an 
in t e r e s t . 
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So f a r as Pierre Bayle i s concei-ned, i t would seem that Kant 
would have read him as representative of the tradition of scepticism 
which continued to f l o u r i s h in Europe tliroughotit the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Sometimes Kant made a i'eferraice to BEiyle in 
passing, and sometimes i t i s possible to discern a discussion of Bayle 
where he i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned.^ Moreover, Kant, though 
operating more or l e s s independently of a traditional theological 
"ethos", (for him i t would have been pietism) clearly shared a number 
of Bayle's concerns. I t may be ,therefore,tliat h i s understanding of 
2 
"practical reason" received stimulus not only from Rousseau, taut tliat 
3 
i t was to some extent shaped in h i s mind by h i s reading of Bayle. 
And i t i s at l e a s t possible that he took the measure of Bayle on the 
topic of e v i l also, and even that he foxmd himself driven to a position 
not altogether unlike that of Bayle. Kant would hold to a rationally 
defensible f a i t h , l i k e Leibniz, though dependent on a defence different 
from the latter«s, but f e l t a l l the force, l i k e Bayle, of the maniche^-^. 
view of the universe and of MEUI'S experioice of i t . 
Kant's major problem, however, was always Leibniz. His philosophical 
procedure has been said to take "the form of a continuous discussion of 
Leibniz", and ticluded i n that discussion was a questioning of whether 
Leibniz' understanding of being, knowing and e v i l , were not a l l too 
4 
optimistic. The development of Kant's thought can be seen as an 
attempt to reckon with commitment to Leibnizian forms of thought, 
g 
together with a c r i t i q u e of Leibniz. This i s hardly surprising, given 
the importance of L e i b n i z ' philosophy in Kant's era in Gerruany, for 
i t was the f i r s t German deductive metaphysical "aystem" and v/as strongly 
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established i n German higher education, Leibniz had often written i n 
French to secure international attention to what he had to say, but 
German culture had taken h i s philosophy as i t s own expression. That 
culture 'Nvas strengthened by the a l l i a n c e between the o f f i c i a l 
Protestantism, the sobered pietism, and tlie modified li b e r a l i s m of 
i t s defenders. Moreover, i n t h i s period of intellectvial uncertainty, 
spiri.tuai anarchy, and p o l i t i c a l and moral confusion, i t respected the 
values which formed the very essence of the old rSgime and thus appeared 
as a conservative force tending to order and traditionalism."^ The 
Theodicy i t s e l f was available in L a t i a in 1719 and then in> German in 
7 1720;' the Monadology was also available in both these languages by 
8 9 1721, and the Clarke-Leibniz Correspondence jn German in 1720, at 
Wolff's i n s t i g a t i o n . I t i s worth noting at t h i s point that for Wolf f 
and h i s followers the theological underpinning of Leibnizian optimism 
was rather obscured by pre-occupation with s c i e n t i f i c achievement. The 
"best of a l l possible worlds" was now not so much a reply to Bayle's 
manich^sw* as an expression of confidence in the nev/ science. I t 
remains to be seen to what extent Kant kept track of the theological 
issues, and thus distinguished himself from the Wolffians. For the 
s c i e n t i s t s , and that Included Kant, the Correspondence alone was a 
constant reminder of '^the points at which the astonishing imagination 
of the l i b r a r i a n a t Hanover were bound to clash with the solid 
10 
convictions of the Newtonian s c i e n t i s t s , " The main point here i s 
that Kant was exposed both to some of Leibniz' greatest work, and to 
sound c r i t i c i s m of i t , since tv/o of Kant's teachers, Schultze and 
Knutzen, had examiixed the notion of the pre-established harmony i n 
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p a r t i c u l a r . Even the e a r l i e s t of Kant's " p r e - c r i t i c a l " woi'ks, the 
product of h i s years as a private tutor, reflected both the profound 
influence of Leibniz on him.!as well as the signs of the development 
12 
of the points on which he was so fundamentally to d i f f e r from him. 
Further, 1749 saw the publication of the f u l l text of Leitoiiz* 
Pi'otagaea, of 1691, known hitherto only in abstract in the Acta 
Eruditorum. The work exhibited in f u l l a point of view hinted at in 
the Theodicy, in whibh Leibniz had raised the question of how one might 
make sense of the "mins" of the earth's crust, the reminders of changes 
13 
at whicli Mo^es had hijited in a few words. In the Protagaea Leibniz 
revealed that he had found i t necessary to integrate h i s biological 
studies with h i s geological theories. He had been led, on the basis 
of h i s observations, to postulate the p o s s i b i l i t y of a certain degree 
14 
of transformation having taken place within species. His tbaory of 
"preformation" would of course allow for that. Then Kant v/ould 
15 
presumably be aware of the: great controversy of 1753 which attracted 
attention a l l over Europe, about whether Leibniz or Maupertuis, currently 
the president of the Berlin Academy, had been the f i r s t to enmiciate 
the " l e a s t action" p r i n c i p l e . The significance of the principle for 
theology was that i t was taken to be an expression of a higher reason 
l 6 i 7 • 
n i l i n g nature, as both Kant and Hume were to observe. In the course 
of the controversy, one of Leibniz* supporters, Koeiiig, produced a 
l e t t e r of Leibniz', which included an exposition of the principle of 
18 
continuity. T h i s principle was said by Leibniz to perhaps help to 
"establish several important truths in a gwuine philosophy which r i s e s 
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above the imagination to seek the origin of phenomena in the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
19 
regions". This might upset "the commonly accepted rules based on 
the assumption of a perfect and absolute separaticaa of the different 
orders of simultaneous creatures that f i l l the ttniverse .^^ This 
kind of statement would probably allow for the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
transmutation of one species in.to another, but whether or not i t would 
be held to be authoritative for some kinds of explanation of nature, 
rather than others, Leibniz was not regarded as a figure from the past 
who could be ignored. His was a l i v i n g voice providing stimulus to 
think afresh on some important subjects. 
To turn now to Kant's own work, h i s papers of 1754 on the questions 
Has there been a qhtmge in the Rotation of the earth? and Doe;s the 
22 23 earth grow old? announced an important work of 1753 (began as a 
competition essay for the B e r l i n Academy in 1754) and indicated some 
of i t s themes. 'Has our globe already reached the degree of perfection 
for which i t was destined or i s i t s t i l l i n i t s infancy?" For Kant 
noted that "the same causes which, bring a thing to perfection drive i t 
in imperceptible stages on to i t s eixtinction .^^ Kant has therefore 
Ijeen held to anticipate "the view of the r e l a t i v e l y uniform action of 
the e x i s t i n g physical causes i i i a l t e r i n g the physical conditions of 
the Ifeirth, as worked out by L y e l l i n h i s Principles of Geology nearly 
a hundred years l a t e r , and now adopted by a l l geologists and physio-
graphers .'^ ^ A pa r t i c u l a r impetus here to pierce the r i g i d thinking 
of the eighteenth century had been provided for Kant by the work 
?7 
of Thomas Wrig^at of Durham, " The l a t t e r ' s book of 1750 on the 
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Orig;inal Theoi-y or New Hypothesis of the aniverse was reported in a 
newspaper absti'act in Germany i n 1751.'" Kant's great work of 
1755 was e n t i t l e d . Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, 
or, An Essay on the Constitution and Mechanical Origin of the Whole 
Universe treated according to Newton's Principles, and was f i r s t 
published anonymously. Kant refrained from describing the published 
30 
version as a "cosmogony", though l a t e r used the word in the body of 
' 31 • 
a major work of 1763, where he re-deployed some of the same material. 
I t i s c l e a r l y to be takeai iirfco account when considering h i s c r i t i c i s m 
of h i s own theology and theodicy l a t e r oh i n h i s l i f e . ( I t my also be 
noted here that the. work of 1755 was of considerable interest and 
importance to two such diverse thinkers as S.T. Coleridge and T.H. 
Huxley.) 
3? 
Confident in h i s " s e a i r i t y regarding the duties of r e l i g i o n " ' 
Kant embarked on h i s rmdertaking, which was to "discover the system 
vfliich binds together the grea.t members of the creation in the whole . 
extent of infinitude, and to derive the formation of the heavenly bodies 
themselves, and the origin of t h e i r movements, from the primitive state 
of nature, by mechanical laws Here was his problem, of whether 
and how he could meaningfully t a l k of ascribing to nature by i t s e l f 
r e s u l t s i n which at the same time "the immediate hand of the supreme 
being i s r i g h t l y recognised .i*' Kant saw in nature "tlie glory of the 
34 
Supreme Being break forth with the brightest splendour", and 
consequently thought that from nature may be derived "proofs which 
35 
are drawn from the beauty and pefect arrangement of the itniverse", 
which establish the existence of t h i s supremely wise Creator. Nature 
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i s not independent of the div ine provitlence. Rather, things of 
d iverse natures "tend in combination with each other to effectuate 
harjuonies and beauties" and in so doing acknowledge t h e i r common 
o r i g i n in "the I n f i n i t e I n t e l l i g e n c e , the understanding in which 
37 
the e s s e n t i a l properties of a l l things have been r e l a t i v e l y designed". 
The pr inc ip l e s of mechanics might explain the making of the universe , 
but mechanism i s not an a l l - s u f f i c i e n t explanation for a l l subjects of 
d i scuss ion . He could say, 'Kvith in te l l igent certainty and without 
audaci ty; 'Give me maxter, and I w i l l construct a world out of i t i * 
i . e . give me matter and I v / i l l show you how a world s h a l l a r i s e out : 
of i t . " But he i s not in a posi t ion to make such a- boast with regard 
to even "the lowest plant or insect". He caaanot say, "Give me matter, 
and I w i l l show you how a c a t e r p i l l a r can be produced". He maintained 
that i n such an instance he was ignorant of the "real inner conditions 
of the subject and the complication of i t s aianifold constitutents 
Kant therefore suggested that the "origin of the whole present 
const i tut ion of the universe , w i l l become i n t e l l i g i b l e before the 
production of a s ing le herb or c a t e r p i l l a r by m^echanical causes, w i l l 
become d i s t i n c t l y and completely understood (This l a s t point i s 
worth bearing in mind in connection with what Kant had to say in part 
of h i s Cr i t ique of Judgment.) . ! 
KEUit contfinued h i s Le ibn iz ian exposition by wri t ing of the 
perfect ion of things moving the imagination, and of the rapture of 
the understanding in the contemplation of the variety and beauty of 
39 
the universe , formed in the " in f in i t e receptacle of the iSivine 
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Pi'escjnce". in God was "the storehouse of a true immensity of natux-es 
41 
and worlds ."^  Kant , however, allowed for an "evolution" of the 
universe , rather than for i t s being bi-ought into being a l l a t once. 
I t was conformable to God's wisdom that the re lat ions of the elements 
and substances of the world should evolve "out of t h e i r implanted 
42 
u n i v e r s a l laws by an unconstrained consecution". ' Yet -there i s a 
43 
fundamental s t a b i l i t y , the mark of the choice of God, i n the imiverse , 
since i t evolves from "primitive matter", which with i t s qua l i t i e s and 
forces lay at the bas i s of a l l chiange, and as the "inmiediate 
consequence of the Divine Exis tence" was both r i c h and complete. 
Kant had no hes i ta t ion in a s ser t ing that he found nothing that could 
"raise the s p i r i t of man to a nobler wonder, by opening to him a 
prospect into the i n f i n i t e domain of omiiipotence" than that part of 
h i s theory which concerned the successive r e a l i z a t i o n of the creat ion. 
I n f i n i t e space, co-extensive with the divine presence, i s that i n which 
"is to be found" the provision f o r a l l possible formations, "buried i n 
a s i l e n t night". God's aim i s to gradually put h i s cosmos into an 
order which conforms to "the excellence of h i s plan". I f we coixld 
see the whole of e t e r n i t y , "we would also be able to see the whole 
of inf i n i t e space f i l l e d with systems of worlds and the creation a l l 
45 
complete". The r e a l i z a t i o n of the creation begins with a "primary 
s t i r r i n g " of nature , and man f inds himself "in the neighbourhood of 
the centre", where nature has already evolved out of chaos, and 
46 
at ta ined i t s proper perfect ion . The creation of the whole i s 
c l e a r l y not the work of a moment, but i t requires mi l l ions of centuries 
to form new systems of worlds, a l l developed in re la t ion to that f i r s t 
44 
formative point. 
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There coiild be no i n f a l l i b l e demonstration of t h i s ~ only recourse 
48 
to analogy. And he found analogy p a r t i c u l a r l y he lpfu l when he 
embarked on a sketch of a theodicy, in his discussion of the loss and 
destruction of things in God's developing world. Kant began by 
d i s a i s s i n g the tendency of what had been brought to completion to 
49 
disintegi'ate ~ the top ic of one ot h i s papers of 1754. T h i s pr inc ip l e 
establ ished that the tiniverse would again be f r u i t f u l of other worlds 
to compensate i t s e l f for the l o s s of some creatures , "because i t i s 
nothing e l se than the exercise of the Divine omnipotence". "Innumerable 
animals and plants are da i ly destroyed and disappear as the victims 
of time: but not the l e s s does nature by her unexhausted power of 
reproduction, br ing for th others in other places to f i l l up the void". 
I f portions of the earth are buried in the sea, "at other places natiu'e 
repa irs the loss and brings f o r t h otlier regions which were hidden in 
the depths of being i n order to spread over them the new wealth of her 
f e r t i l i t y " . The same kinds of assumptions apply to "worlds and systems", 
for "creation i s always busy constinicting new formations in the heavens, 
50 
and advantageously making up for the loss". So one need not be 
astonished to f i n d a "certain t rans i tor ines s even in. the greatest of 
the works of God", though from our point of view there seems also to 
be a fiaidamental s t a b i l i t y in the construction of the world which irakes 
i t of endless duration, and gives grounds for confidence in God. (This 
concem with the " s t a b i l i t y " of things remains throughout h i s career -
in h i s Inaugural IBissertation of 1770, for one example.) 
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H i s pre-occupation with s t a b i l i t y and permanence i s an essent ia l 
ingredient in h i s theodicy, and another feature of i t i s nature's 
apparent prodiga l i ty , proved by "the nviinberless new generations" 
which abotmd. "What an innumerable miiititude of flowers and insects 
are destroyed by a s ingle cold day! Aad how l i t t l e are they missed 
although they are the glorious products of the a r t of nature and 
demonstrations of the DlviJae Oranipoteaice". Siiice even the production 
of nature ' s most exce l lent creatures costs nature nothing, ttie 
destruction of some creatures i s a 'taecessary shading among the mult i -
p l i c i t y of her suns J^^ 
Natui-e as a whole, therefore , does not su f fer , though iJifected a i r , 
earthquakes and inundations desti'oy whole r a c e s . The same general poiiifc 
applied to worlds and systems when they have played t h e i r part . Nature-
adorns e tern i ty wi th changing scenes, and God occupies himself i n 
52 
incessant creation to make s t i l l greater worlds. On the one hand there 
i s what Kant ca l l ed the "vanity" which cleaves to f i n i t e natures , 
53 
( r e f e r r i n g to "revelation" ) , and on the other, "the renovation of 
54 
f a l l e n nature". Even the greatest catastrophe may be regarded wiT.h 
55 
confidence, as evidence of the common ways of providence. ' Flower, 
in sec t , or TOrld-system pay t h e i r tr ibute to mortality, each of them 
being but a mere point in comparison with the "Infinitude whidi creation 
has to exhib i t in unlimited space throughout the succession ox etGi-iiity".^"^ 
The Phoenix of nature carr ied on the plan of the deity to " f i l l e t ern i ty , 
as w e l l as a l l the regions of space, with her wonders",' 
129 -
T h i s a l l seems to represent a range of speculative, thitxking as 
daring as anything produced by Le ibn iz , though ICant did not venture 
on an ana lys i s of the ca lcu la t ion on which of the div ine choice was 
based, - perhaps he pre-sup posed t h i s , as i t had been attempted by 
L e i b n i z , H i s speculation i s not about God's ca l cu la t ions , but about 
the developmcait of the universe , wh i l s t s t i l l t ry ing to re ta in "s tabi l i ty" 
as e s s e n t i a l in the cou.rse of the cosmogony. In the course of h i s -
career , he found that he could not pre-suppose the Leibniz ian theologj' 
quite as Le ibniz had donej though he s t i l l Nsuuted to a f f i rm f a i t h In " 
God i n a r a t i o n a l and responsible way. The i n a b i l i t y to presuppose 
L e i b n i z ' p a r t i c u l a r theology contributed to a problem about the wuy 
in v/hich he could a f f i r m the fundamental s t a b i l i t y of things, ( w i t l i 
the concept of the f i x i t y of species as i t s appropriate notion in the 
f i e l d of b io logy) , arid t h i s in t i im ult imately made i t impossible for 
him to provide a theodicy j j i r e la t i on to physical e v i l . Yet a 
fundamental confidence i n God, a confidence as secure as that of 
L e i b n i z , did not allow him to abandon theology. He ins i s ted on attempting 
to construct a theologj' in re la t i on to man's moral, soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e , T in other words, continuing with "the Leibniz ian programme to a 
certain, minimal degree, and leaving open the question of whether such 
a theology could count as a theodicy, since i t did. not attempt to 
t a c k l e the question of phys i ca l e v i l . I n 1755, however, he seems s t i l l 
to have been th inking in terms of the Theodicy when thinking about 
man's own re la t ionship to the physical world. There i s .no ultima,te 
threat to man, f o r he can regard h i s own being with xevereace, knowing 
that h i s soul i s destined to sixrvive a l l the transformations of h i s 
world, and "find i n fe l lowship wi-ch the I n f i n i t e Being, the eiijoyment 
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of i t s true f e l i c i t y " , free of "the f e t t e r s which keep us bound to 
the vanity of the c r e a t u r e s " . U n i t e d with the soiirce of a l l 
perfect ion , the soul w i l l contemplate nature and see everywhere 
59 
"utter s ecur i ty , complete adaptation". God i s . thus the energy 
60 
which i s the "true a t tract ion-po int of alL excellence". 
T h i s l a s t theme depends upon a par t i cu lar understanding of the 
"chain pf being", for creatures '"whose place of generation and abode"^^ 
i s near the centre of creat ion are "the lowest and most imperfect 
species whxcli const i tutes as i t were, the beginning of the, world of 
s p i r i t s " . From t h i s centre - (where even the excellence of r a t i o n a l 
beings may be l o s t in a t o t a l want of re f l ec t ion and thought) there i s 
an "extended ladder" by which the "world of s p i r i t s , which r e s t s on 
t h e i r a l tered dependence on matter" approaches the excellence of the 
62 
Deity - One may we l l ask a t t h i s stage whether Kant was as conf ident' 
about the goodness of the phys i ca l world as was L e i b n i z , or whether he 
was not already f e e l i n g the force of Bayle ' s points about the strengrt;h 
of the manichfion case . 
Another discuss ion of theodicy appeared in a iJublication of 1755, 
the New Exposit ion of the F i r s t Pr inc ip l e s of Metaphysical Knowledge, 
produced to q u a l i f y Kant to teach philosophy as we l l as sc ience. Kant 
attempted to r e - c a s t the notion of s u f f i c i e n t reason to cover the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a determination of a fh ing which was not merely l o g i c a l , 
but which depended upon i t s l i n k s with other actua l ly existent thijngs.^'* 
From t h i s context emerg-ed a c r i t i c i s m of "compossibility", cen tra l to 
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Theodicy, and in tegra l to the notion of the pre-established 
h a r m o n y . K a n t noticed the pecu l iar i ty of one feature of compossibility 
that i t did not depend so le ly upon the re la t i on of. the essences -to 
the d iv ine i n t e l l e c t , but ra ther upon the character of the "essences" 
themselves. Kant concerned himself p a r t i c u l a r l y with the di f ference 
between the " i n t e l l i g i b l e " as Leibniz seemed to have understood i t , and 
the i n t e l l i g i b l e nature of what i s offered to man*s sensas- T h i s 
c r i t i q u e of Le ibn iz was developed from posit ions Kant l a t e r found to 
be untenable, and this i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of h i s section "refutation 
67 68 
of Doubts", which included "a dialogue between Ca lus , the defender 
of the l i b e r t y of i n d i f f erei ice, and T i t i u s , the supporter of a 
determining reason". T h i s materia l i s v i r t u a l l y a re-presentation of 
some of the m t e r i a l of the Theodicy, With regard to "determining 
69 
reason", F . E . Englajtid drew attention to Kaait's image of God as 
"fountain and gushing spring from viSiich a l l things take the ir downward 
course", a f igure drawn from Plotinus to i l l u s t r a t e the emanation of 
the various orders of being from God. England wrote: "the spring, 
overJtowing, produces that which comes a f t e r i t , and t h i s in turn gives 
r i s e to the next stage and so f o r t h . There i s no actua l dispersion of 
the higher into the lower forms, no diminution of the higher i n giving 
r i s e to the lower. The order throughout i s not a temporal, but a 
l o g i c a l order of connection." And Kant also sa id that God does not 
seem able to "eschew the web which he himself began and which i s woven 
conformably with h i s f i r s t move or expression in the future periods of 
70 
succeeding time . . . " 
F u r t h e r evidence of Kant's pre-occupation with Leibniz i s fomd 
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i n Kant*E( i n t e r e s t i n a competition being organised by the B e r l i n 
71 
Academy, the subject having been se t in 1753 for 1755. Tne word 
"optimism" had made i t s appearance in tlie D ic t ionar ie s : 'The 
connection of optimism with tlieodicy w i l l be h i s t o r i c a l l y c l ear i f 
we remember that the word optimism was f i r s t used i n 1737 i j i the 
Memo i r e s de Ti^voux, only twenty-seven years a f t e r the appearance of 
the Tfeeodic^e. ""^ ^ The Acaden^y declared that candidates were required 
toecamine Pope's system a,s indicated in the proposition "Al l i s r i ^ t " . 
Part of the discuss ion was to involve a coniparison of Pope with "the 
system of optimissH,or choosing what i s best, so as to bring out c l e a r l y 
where they agree and where they d i f f e r ," Hazard was c lear that the 
competition was meant to be a d iscuss ion of the work of Leibniz in 
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comparison with that of Pops, (as the attention to the importance of 
the notion of God's "choice" perhaps indicated)^ though the ant i -Le ibniz lans 
could not name Leibniz as the d i r e c t target of t l i e lr c x i t i c i s m . On the' 
1st November, 1755, however, L i sbon had i t s notorious earthquake. Kant 
wrote a paper on the subject whicu came out i n 1756 (tlie year which a l so 
saw the beginning of the Seven Y e a r s ' War on German s o i l ) discussing the 
or ig in of the worst d i sas t er in Western Europe, i j i r e la t ion to h i s 
un,derstanding of God's providence. T h i s paper, The History and Physiography 
of the Earthquake which to\\^rds the end of 1755 shook a great part of the 
74 
E a r t h should be read as an attempt to re late the posit ion he had 
esdiibited i n the U n i v e r s a l Natural History to the appal l ing natural d i s a s t e r . 
( I t was too early to appreciate the f u l l horror of the war i t s e l f . ) Kant ' s 
attempt to face a s p e c i f i c issue in the l ight of h i s theodicy brou^t 
him to a s s e r t tha.t maa's capacity f o r laiowledge of the economy of the 
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earth miast be understood to include h i s assessment of the recent 
75 
dreadful events. And man had to acknowledge that he had no right 
to "expect convenient consequences only from the laws of nature, 
76 
which. God hath ordered". We would be foo l i sh to suppose that "if 
Providence had consulted us , everything would have been better regulated 
11 
for our advantage." (One r e c a l l s that Leibniz also held the view 
that the happiness of r a t i o n a l creatures was not God's sole a im. ) What 
man should do. was to accomodate himself to nature, since he has also 
derived so many benef i t s from i t - the same springs which produce 
health - g iving mineral baths "owe t h e i r mineral property and warmth 
to the very same causes, from which happen in the bowels of the earth 
the inflammations that shake i t Like Hume, Kant thought i t was 
wrong to concftude that an earthquake was a punishment for s i n , though 
h i s reason for that pos i t ion was that i t was presuraptious for man "to 
79 
perspect the designs of the Divine decrees". Whatever the d i sas ter , 
Kan-ir s t i l l maintained t l iat "the whole complex of natin-e i s a . worthy 
object o^ ^ the Divine Wisdom and of i t s disposit ions". Although man 
cannot guess at "the views of Omnipotence in the government of the 
world", Kant had no hes i ta t ions i n saying something about how man 
ought to l i v e , jfen was not bom "to build ever las t ing cottages upon 
80 
t h i s stage of vanity". He was rather to be s t i r r e d by d i sas ter to 
a c t as "a beneficent instrument i n the bountiful hand of the Almighty", 
bearing i n mind that none of the goods of the earth could s a t i s f y man's 
81 
i n s t i n c t for happiness. And an essay of 1759, Some Bef lec t ions on 
82 
Optimism a lso exhibi ts the determination to maintain the Leibniz ian 
stance. 'From the point where I stand, armed with the ins ight granted 
to my feeble i n t e l l e c t , I s h a l l look around as far as I can and learn 
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to tinder stand more and more: -chat the Whole i s the best , and that 
83 
everything e x i s t s f or the sake of the Whole." 
The next work whicli i s important for trac ing Kant's in teres t in 
theodicy i s a substant ia l piece of w r i t i n g , published in 1763, produced 
a f t e r the "si lence" of 1757-62, when he was es tabl i sh ing himself as a 
l e c t u r e r , and published only short-papers. Thi s work, The Qaly Possible 
Argument for the Existence of God,^*^ represents an attempt to work out 
a theology which i s not merely a repet i t ion of L e i b n i z ' , as he had 
preferred i t i n the Theodicy, but which would in e f f ec t spe l l out 
Kant^s own theological pre-supposit ions, and to which his readers 
would be able to t u r n . Kant himself seems to have thought i t d i r e c t l y 
appropriate to the Universa l Natural His tory especia l ly , , s ince one 
sect ion on "Cosmogony" drew on that work e x p l i c i t l y . Jfeny other 
i l l u s t r a t i o n s from s c i e n t i f i c work were brougiit i n , because he shared 
the conviction of some of h i s most distinguished contei i¥)oraries , tha.t 
by means of "philosophy" man could ascend to the cognition of God. He 
seems to have been aware that some would regard an attempt at a new 
expression of theology with h o s t i l i t y and suspicion. He emphasised in 
the preface that the work was no more than a sketch, f or he was already 
wary of those who wished "but for an apparent occasion to brand a 
publ icat ion with the b i t t e r reproadi of heterodoxy". Kasit wrote 
out h i s own a p r i o r i proof , which did not assume the existence of 
any p a r t i c u l a r th ing , but which operated on the prijaciple that the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of the existence of Idlings i s founded ij i an actual existence, 
86 
the sum of a l l poss ib i . l i ty . T h i s i s the proof which i s c r i t i c i z e d as 
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an " i l l u s i o n " in the Cr i t ique of Pure Reason, together of course with 
the other proofs which in t h i s work ot 1763 he discerned not to do 
J u s t i c e to what i s involved in a conviction of God's transcendent 
existence as Kant had come to understand i t . CNot everyone would 
fol low Kant in h i s s e l f - c r i t i c i s m , - both the Leifanizians in Gei'many, 
and Coleridge i n England, preferred t h i s work of 1763 as providing 
the appropriate theological counterpart for "science".) Kant 
es tabl i shed to h i s own s a t i s f a c t i o n i n 1763 "the s u f f i c i e n c y , uni ty 
aiid independence" of God's existence "as a great ground", being carefu l 
a l so to urge the point that God i s not "a blind necessary grovmd of 
87 
other things" f o r he has "cogjiition and resolution". The "internal 
p o s s i b i l i t y of things" i n v i t e s us to make a "necessary reference to 
order and harmony and uni ty" , - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which i n t h e i r turn 
88 
require a reference to God. The main body of the work i s concerned 
with i l l u s t r a t i o n s to support t h i s po int . 
Since Kant*s God i s one whose charac ter i s t i c s include that of 
extreme transcendence, not only did he discard the kind of teleology 
89 
s a t i r i s e d by V o l t a i r e , but a lso ins i s ted that no reference was to 
90 
be made to God's "wisdom" and "wi l l" where 'Inatxire" would do instead. 
T h i s did not mean, however, that there was no meaningful reference for 
"God" - that the notion of "God" simply collapsed into that of "nature". 
I l l u s t r a t i o n s drawn from the d i f f e r i n g aspects of man's physical equipment, 
92 
and from the "creatures of both the animal and vegetable kingdom", 
l ed inexorably to a theological conclusion: that " a l l consistence, 
f in i i t fu lness and beauty . . . depend, by means of the e s sent ia l order 
of nature , upon God And another point he wished to s tress was that 
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"soiiiething i s not good because i t happens according to the course of 
nature , but the course of nature i s good provided that which flovrs 
there from be good. And God comprised in h i s decree a world, in whidi 
everything f o r the most part by a na tura l coherence f u l f i l s the ru l e 
93 
of the good; so he favoured i t with h i s choice . . . " I t i s precise ly 
because things happen in accordance, with laws un iversa l ly e f f ec t ive 
tha t things can be re ferred to God as t h e i r ultimate "ground", to a 
transcendent creator rather than to an arch i t ec t , or an "interfering" 
24 
d e i t y . I t i s the " f i r s t Divine disposit ion" tliat allows to animals 
and plants "a f i t n e s s , not only to develope, but ac tua l ly -fo beget 
t h e i r l i k e for the future according to a natural law Such 
reference to a transcendent creator therefore seems to have made i t 
poss ible for Kant to to l era te information being produced by the s c i en t i s t s 
about the way in which the order l e f t to operate by God exhibits i t s e l f . 
(\ microscope reveals 
numerous species of animals in a s ingle drop of water, rapacious 
sorts which, equipped with instruments of destruction, while they 
are ready to pursue others , are destroyed by more potent tyrants 
of t h i s aqueous world; when I see the t r i c k s , the violence and 
the scene of dissension in a p a r f i c l e of matter, and elevate my 
eyes in order to behold the immense space f i l l e d with worlds l i k e 
clouds of dust , no human langua8"e can express the f ee l ing , which 
such a thought exc i t e s , and a l l subt i le metaphysical dissect ions 
f a l l f a r short of the sublimity and dignity pecul iar to such an 
in tu i t ion .96 
Moreover, since i t was not always possible in the terms of the cruder 
theology which Kant was c r i t i c i s i n g to make sense of every kind of 'aaw" 
i n terms of an immediate divine intention., i t seemed better to h iB i to 
remove a l l such reference, rather than make use of i t i n some instances 
and not i n others . For example, i t might i n i t i a l l y appear that there . 
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could be some sense in t a l k i n g of the beds of r i v e r s having been 
97 
excavated by God, but i t did not seem possible to make theological 
comments aoout the new population studies on which SiSssmilch had 
embarked. Bather than say that "Providence" ordered more boys than 
g i r l s to be bom, i n order to make good the loss of yotaig men "by War 
98 
and dangerous sorts of employments", Kant urged the search for 
other explanations, vJiich did not invoke the deity.. Yet whatever tlie 
i s s u e , Kant r e c a l l e d h i s readers to theology. The discoveries of the 
s c i e n t i s t were proofs of the great chain , vftiich "even i n the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of things", united the parts of the creation that 
99 
appeared not to concern one another, and yfaich had t h e i r source in 
the existence of God, i n whom "l ie ready the essences of things" 
according to "an exce l l en t p lan" .^^° 
One p a r t i c u l a r l y important passage i s that whidi s p e l l s out what 
he meant by the divine " a l l - s u f f ic iency", the concept of God to which 
men are l e d when they "venture to look behind the curtain that conceals 
from created eyes the mysteries of the Inscrutable", that "comprehends 
i n i t s e l f everything poss ib le to be thougiit". So he wrote, "What e x i s t s , 
whether i t be possible or a c t u a l , i s but something, so f a r as i t i s 
given by Him. A human laiigaage may l e t the I n f i n i t e speak to himself 
thus: I am from eterni ty to e t ern i ty , besides me there i s nothing, 
l O i 
something i s so f a r as i t i s througji me." (This par t i cu lar passage 
was to be re -wr i t ten by Kant in. the course of h i s f i r s t C r i t i q u e , in 
e f f e c t expressing h i s despair that he could hot a t that stage hold any 
more to a phi losophical posit ion which had allowed him to w^ite t h i s 
kind of theology, but yet continuing to acknowledge i t s s trength . ) 
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Kant wotad see 'later that although he had saved the r e a l i t y of things 
from an immanent de i ty , or an i n t e r f e r i n g de i ty , he had not pi'ovided 
an answer to the question about how one could understand the concept 
of an immutable and a l l - s u f f i c i e n t God as the "ground" of a world ijx 
which were met " c o l l i s i o n , want, mutabil ity", a l l of which he was 
c a r e f u l to speci fy were contrary to the designation of a de i ty . On 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r point , he had by t h i s time broken with L e i b n i z ' 
theology, i n so f a r as Le ibniz had allowed for the "metaphysics of 
competition" within the godhead, a s the counterpart for what went on 
i n the world. 
However, Kant seems to have become increasingly uneasy about the 
re la t ionsh ip between h i s theology and the materia l to which he was 
paying at tent ion i n the developing b io logica l sc iences . The theology he 
had produced seemed to " f i t " with h i s Cosmogony, but there was now a 
qti.estion to face about i t s ' " f i t " with other mater ia l . From tJiis stage 
onwards, he seems to have found that the concept of the f i x i t y of species 
was the notion which expressed i n the bio logical context the "s tab i l i ty" 
which marked the world God had chosen, though he found the problem of 
phys ica l e v i l i j icreas ingly in.tractable. And along with these problems 
and fundamental to them, was the s h i f t in h i s philosophical stance, h i s 
102 
"copemican revolution", which af fected both the "objectivity" of the 
"s tab i l i t y" of the world, asid the " f i x i t y of species", and also the 
103 
"Objectivity" of what he could say aoout God. Towards the end of 
h i s l i f e he found himself t ack l ing only the shreds, comparatively 
speaking, of the Le ibn iz ian programme of theodicy. 
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We may now look at the material which reveals Kant's in teres t 
in the re levant sc iences . Another paper of 1763, Attempt at Introducing 
104 
Negativej^uantit ies into Philosophy, showed Kant to be es tabl i shing 
some of h i s t y p i c a l pos i t ions . The main subject of discussion was a 
105 
work of Maupertuis on what Cass i rer cal led "empirical psychology". 
T h i s was an attempt to apply mathematical methods to physical sensation, 
and therefore to "estimate the sura of happiness and misery i n huitnan 
106 
l i f e " - a question discussed by Le ibn iz . Kant tliought t h i s to be 
an insoluble problem i n any case, and rejected Maupertuis' negative 
conclusions. I f one were to accept, as Kan.t dj:d, that in some sense 
the increase i n the perfect ion of the world was possible, one of the 
implicat ions might be not tliat misery predominates over happiness, but 
that "displeasure" as much as "pleasure" was an e f fect ive stimulus to 
107 
man in promoting that perfec t ion , - again, a Leibniz ian point of view. 
One point to be aware of here, i s the c r i t i c i s m s of Kant that have been 
l e v e l l e d a t him for h i s react ion to Maupertuis' writ ings as a v/hole. 
Bentley G l a s s , i n h i s essay on "Maupertuis", made the comment that Kant 
had ignored "the l a t e r development of the theory of evolution, including 
the o r i g i n of man from lower forms of l i f e , a theory which has inescapable 
implications for the sources of mental, emotional, and behavioural 
108 
phenomena". However, i t would seem to be asking a great deal of 
Kant, wi th h i s demand for coherent evidence from h i s f e l l o w - s c i e n t i s t s , 
to plump for a tlieory l a t e r found to be he lpful in i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y to 
a t h e s i s aboiit evolution, embracing Imiaaxi be.lngs, and a l l other l i v i n g 
crea tures . Kant adopted a pattern of explanation which was predominant 
i n h i s time, though i t happened not to be the one which v/as eventually 
preferred by b i o l o g i s t s . He had what seened to him to be phi losophical 
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and theo log ica l grotmds f o r doing so. 
Bentley Glass was probably follov/ing the lead given by A . O . 
109 
Lovejoy i n h i s estimate of Kant and we may pay some attention to 
t h a t est imate, ^¥e may take Kant 's own directions about the areas of 
contemporary study Avhich interested him, and which he thought were 
important to i n s t r a c t students in d i sc ip l ined method, - for ejample, 
110 
the annoimcement of h i s l ec tures f o r 1765--66. Under t,he general 
heading of "Metaphysics" he proposed to treat of "empirical psychology", 
(with a d i f f e r e n t focus from that of l laupertuis) . Kant understood 
psychology f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r purpose to be "the metaphysical science 
of Man gained from experience", which would enable h i s hearers to grasp 
111 
"some i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t s serviceable f o r application in l i f e " . Kant 
was thus , according to C a s s i r e r , the man who "introduced anthropology 
as a branch of study i n German u n i v e r s i t i e s and who lectured on i t 
r egu lar ly for decades The word "anthropology" has a wide; range 
of meanings, however, even amongst profess ional "anthropologists", -
to forget t h i s leads to an apparent misapprehension of Kant such as 
Lovejoy showed i n h i s comments on him. He wrote of Kant's Anthropology 
of 1798 that i t "does not , indeed, deal chieifly with the questions to 
which h i s e a r l i e r anthropological wri t ings are devoted; the greater 
part o i i t i s a rather miscellaneous but not vminteresting combination 
of h i s ' c r i t i c a l ' psychology and e t h i c s with the purely temperamental 
convict ions , t a s t e s , and prejudices of a septuagenarian bachelor professor, 
133 
on matters of every-day l i f e and s o c i a l intercourse". ' i n h i s in tro -
114 
ductory remarks to h i s Afathropolqgy, however, Kant said that the work 
was a handbook of one of the l ec ture cuurses he had been giving f o r 
141 
115 • t h i r t y years. When he wrote that "Anthropology, ti>eated physio-
116 
l o g i c a l l y , describes what Nature has made of Man", he may well 
be referring to the elements of h i s "empirical psychology". But the 
main focus of interest for him was in the study of anthropology, 
"treated pragmatically", which stated wimt man, "as a freely acting 
being can. and s h a l l make of himself ." His sources of information for 
t h i s included not b i o l o g i c a l studies, but "world history, biogi'aphies, 
plays and novels", and he remarked that a town such as K&iigsberg was 
ideal "for gaining knowledge concerning men and the world without 
t r a v e l l i n g ." Whilst Irf>vejoy was undoubtedly rig^it i n general to 
maintain that Kant had an aversion from the hypothesis of organic 
117 
evolution, there seems to be l i t t l e point in looking to the 
Anthropology for evidence either for or against h i s interest in the 
hypothesis. Lovejoy was also probably riaJit to point out that Kant 
exhibits an ove r a l l confidence in the future of the world and the 
118 
creatares i n i t i n i t s f i n a l epoch, relying on the work of Bonnet, 
but Kant was simply employing an imaginative extrapolation of Leibnizian 
thinking, rather than paying attention to contemporary studies which 
happen to have been seen, i n retrospect, to have contributed to the 
working out of the hypothesis of organic evolution. Kant seems to 
have used Bonnet's kind of conception of the future in at l e a s t one 
119 
other paper, ' expressing some of h i s ideas on p o l i t i c a l philosophy. 
A l l i n a l l , i t would seem that h i s Anthropology should be considered 
primarily i n connection with h i s writings on eth i c s rather than with 
some of h i s other works which are concerned with biology, and to wSiich 
attentioii w i l l shortly be given. 
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To return to the lecture announcement, v/e may note that after h i s 
consideration ot "empirical fJsychology", Kant proposed to deal with 
cosmology and ontology, and then to pass on to two further major areas 
of study, l o g i c and e t h i c s . F i n a l l y , attention would be given to 
"physical geography". ' (When he was putting h i s Aathroi?ology into a, 
form suitable f o r publication he had not f e l t able to struggle with the 
manuscript of these l a t t e r l e c t u r e s . ) He s a i d of physical geography , 
in the "announcement" that " i t describes the interconnection between 
lands and sea and those things which influence trade and co^mmerce", 
and i n i t s second part "considers Man throughout the earth and distinguishes 
what i s nK>ral i n him". So he noted that '^ Vhen we compare different sorts 
of men and consider the moral conditions of e a r l i e r times, a great map 
122 
of the human race unfolds i t s e l f before our eyes". The course was 
to conclude with a study of " p o l i t i c a l " geography. The whole project 
was a t t r a c t i v e to Kant because i t opened up the prospect of creating a 
unity of knowledge, as well as furthering the general education of h i s 
pupils. 
Before turning to h i s l a t e r comments on geography, we may notice 
Kant's review of 1771 of Jloscati's lecture which had been given in. 
123 
P a r i s . T h i s lecture was of interest to him in his search for 
instructive analogies i n h i s study of man. The main thesis of the 
lecture seems to have been that "the upright gait of Man i s enforced 
and against nature. Man can maintain himself and move in an upright 
postvire only with discomfort and disease**. " Man had been misled by 
reason to deviate fptfm h l s f i r s t animal orgsmisation. Upright posture 
f i t t e d best the development of h i s reason, a t the cost of physical 
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discomfort. I t i s hardly safe to conclude anything from the review 
except that i t provides evidence of Kant's attention to material 
whicl-i would help him to comprehend the present state of man. I t i s 
not clear that Kant intended to ass e r t as h i s own view "the descent 
124 
of c i v i l i z e d man from quadrupedal ancestors", though even i f he had, 
he would not necessarily have committed himself to the concept of the 
mutability of species. 
In a special announcement of 1775 about h i s lectures on Physical 
125 
Geography, Kant offered some comments On the different races of Man. 
The lectures were to be given as "a useful entertainment rather than 
a laborious occupation"* and the paper was "more l i k e a game than a 
profoTiad exploration", though i t was, nevei'theless, ii).tended to offer 
something to the i n t e l l e c t . Kant noted the views of two groups of 
interpreters of nature in i t s biological aspects. There were the 
systematists, whose work of l a b e l l i n g creatures was an aid to recognition 
and memory, and thei r c r i t i c s who thought rather in terms of "natural 
d i v i s i o n " concerning "stocks based on kinships". For the l a t t e r group, 
such a pattern of explanation better assisted the human understanding 
•in i t s endeavours to come to grips with the phenomenon of gi'oups of 
126 
d i f f e r e n t creatures. To trace a l l the developments that have arisen 
would be to produce a "History of Nature", though Kant c l e a r l y loathed 
1?7 
any project which could lead to "audacious conjectures". " What he 
was prepared to allow as an appropriate interpretation of the evidence 
av a i l a b l e was that modification of creatures according to t h e i r 
circumstances did take place, but only within each particular species. 
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The differences betwe^ creatures were not to be explained by "local 
creations", but nor were they the r e s u l t of "chance or general 
mechanical laws", - these could not produce such adaptations as a 
thicker h u l l for a grain of wheat, or a new layer of feathers in a 
l28" 
b i r d . Rather, i t was Leibniz» "preformation" theory which was 
here seen to safeguard both divine providence and creatures' independence. 
Kant described "preformation" as "an adniraDle provision of nature to-
equip her creatures by given inner devices for a l l future circumstances". 
This applied to men as to other creatures. "Just as chance and mechanical 
causes cannot o r i g i n a l l y produce an organized body, so they cannot add 
to the generative power anything that propagates itself.» 
The same view of the species question was to appear in h i s review 
129' 
of Herder's book, Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind 
130 
and Kant's Determination of the Concept of a Human Race , both of 
1785. Herder's book i s not of major importance for t h i s discussion, 
despite Beck's description of i t as a "theodicy", meaning by the word 
in t h i s instance "the theory of man*s harmony with the rest of creation", -
l 3 l 
a "leibnizlan l i v i n g universe". What i s u s e i u l , however, i s to note 
132 
at t h i s point Benz's comment that the concept of "evolixtion" was 
introduced by Herder as the ant i t h e s i s of "revolution", i n an h i s t o r i c a l 
and p o l i t i c a l context, before i t s r e s t r i c t i o n primarily to the s c i e n t i f i c 
context, and certa i n l y before i t had i t s present connotations. Benz 
suggested that becavise of i t s origin the notion never l o s t i t s i d e a l i s t i c 
connotations, despite i t s l a t e r emphasis, and connection with biology 
133 
and p h y s i c a l i t y . Evolution f o r Kant also was related to the 
- 145 
imperfection of the human species i n the p o l i t i c a l and so c i a l context. 
In nature^ant would at t h i s stage in his" career concede the notion of 
a gradation between the various species of organisms, with a progressive 
approximation up to man as a useful way of organising a view of the 
134 135 multitudes of species but would not tolerate an understanding 
of gradation to mean the development of one species from another or 
of man from the same l i v i n g stem as other species. Vfe may also note 
a comment of Kant's i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of Herder that reveals how 
fa r h i s views had changed from the days of the 1755 Universal Natural 
History. Now he wrote that '»nature allows us to see nothing e l s e than 
that i t abandons Individuals to complete destruction and only maintains 
the type. But then we demand to know i f the soul of man w i l l also 
survive h i s destruction here on earth; this can be concluded perhaps 
on moral - or i f you l i k e metaphysical - grounds, but never by any kind 
of analogy to v i s i b l e creation 
To return to the species question, we find i n h i s paper on the 
concept of a human race: "When I hear of the effect of the imagination 
on the foetus i n pregnant women or the docking of the t a i l s of English 
horses owing to which ~ i t i s said - Nature a l t e r s her procreation, I 
have a maxim which opposes such f a c t s . ; In the whole of organic natiare, 
in spi.te of a l l changes i n individual creatures, the species maintains 
j 37 
i t s e l f unchanged."' His employment of a "scholastic" formula provoked 
Iiovejoy to comment that Kant craved "a imiverse sharply categorized 
138 
and c l a s s i f i e d and t i e d up in orderly parcels". Kant could not 
allow either to man*s imagination or to his technology "the capacity 
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of transforming the o r i g i n a l pattern and a l t e r i n g the generative power 
i t s e l f " . As he had asserted ten years e a r l i e r , he could nofc allow the 
truth of what seemed to him to be something l i k e a ghost story or a 
t a l e of witchcraft, for "inheritance can only be based on those original 
139 
forms or dispositions which l i e in the genus i t s e l f " . S imilarly in 
another paper of 1788, On the Use of the Teleological Principles in 
140 
Philosophy he re-stated h i s by now familiar position, by saying 
that he commonly met with "the shallow view that a l l the differences 
in our genus are the r e s u l t of chance and may a r i s e and disappear 
accidentally. I f i t were so, permanent species would be non-existotit .^^^ 
Agaija, he waiited to distinguish what he believed to be properly s c i e n t i f i c 
explanation from imaginative interpretations of nature- 'Where every 
empirical inference comes to an end, where s c i e n t i s t s operate with s e l f -
invented forces, following unheard-of and never v e r i f i a b l e laws, they 
are outside natural sclejhce, even i f they s t i l l speak of natural causes." 
He himself was prepared to employ tel e o l o g i c a l explanation though not 
theological explanation, provoked by s c i e n t i f i c investigation into 
organisms, every part of which functions as both means and ends. 
Teleological explanation i s usei'ill.ly called into play in the consider-
ation of how the "laws of gradual development" might account for the 
142 
present appearance of different species. 
To understand the way i n whidti Kant was now operating, one has to 
•feke seriously the clue he gave when he wrote thiat he had a "maxim" to 
oppose to the proposition that nature altered her procreation. To 
elucidate t h i s , i t i s necessary to take notice of what he had by t h i s 
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time said i n some of h i s other published work. For example, in his 
143 
Jnaugural Dissertation of 1770 (offered on the occasion of h i s 
appointment to a chair a t Kdftilgsberg that year) he made a number of 
important points. He now repudiated the a c t i v i t y of the i n t e l l e c t 
unaerstood as a repetition of God*s thi».king, since the human I n t e l l e c t 
144 
suffei's from the c o n f l i c t of antinomies . He could no longer maintain 
the relationship of things to human reason on the analogy of "an 
i n f i n i t e l y extended approximation" to God's ttnderstanding of things, 
though he recognised that "this special conception of s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge as an approximation to divine thought gave wings to science 
145 
to make new discoveries". But he was, nevertheless, prepared to go 
on using certain principles of orderly explanation which had been 
associated with that conception of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. There were 
two - that " a l l things i n the universe take place in. accordance with 
the order of nature", and "principles are not to be multiplied beyond 
What i s absolutely necessary", which were related to a t h i r d , another 
146 
expression of h i s concern with the permanence and stablll-cy of the 
creation, as a counterpart of h i s concept of God. 
No matter comes into being or passes away and a l l the vicissitudes 
of the world concern i t s form alone. This postulate, at the 
instigation of the common i n t e l l e c t , i s spread abroad through a l l 
the schools of philosophers, not because i t has been taken as 
discovered or demonstrated by arguments a p r i o r i but because, i f 
you admit matter i t s e l f as in flux or transitory, nothing at a l l 
would be l e f t which was stable and durable which night more f u l l y 
promote the explanation of phenomena according to imiversal and 
perpetual laws and i n t h i s way promote the use of the i n t e l l e c t . 
T h i s theme cC.hls view of 1755, i s here reaffirmed i n the Ifeht of h i s 
awareness of proposals being made with increasing weight about how 
to interpret biological phenomena, and to be bom in mind for the 
~ 148 
Critique of Judgment. 
This i s not the place to elaborate on Kant's philosophical 
148 
revolution, exliibited in f u l l in h i s Critique of I>ure Reason, written 
149 
between 1771-1781, and the expression, philosophically groxmded, 
both of his caution and of h i s confidence. But :Ln the Critique he 
explained why he continued to employ various explanatory principles, 
to which he again paid s p e c i f i c attention: E n t i t i e s were not to be 
150 
multiplied unnecessarily; no variety was to be considered the 
151 lowest; and the t h i r d here, viiich related the other two, was that • • A 
152 
of the " a f f i n i t y of a l l concepts", by which he meant the principle 
of continuity. A proposition such as these, or the one that.-species 
153 
maintain themselves ranchanged, was a maxim of reason. A maxim 
might be derived not from the constitution of the object but from the 
Intei-est of reason in respect, of a certain possible perfection of the 
knowledge of the object, given a concern to make the "manifold" 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . To t r e a t maxims as "yielding objective insight" led to 
endless c o n f l i c t , whereas to t r e a t them as r e f l e c t i n g different irxterests 
of reason with regard to a subject which " l i e s too deeply hidden to allow 
of one's being able to speak from insight" into i t s nature, was to adopt 
154 
more or l e s s helpful rules to guide one in one's investigations. 
155 
There were other instances he would c i t e , and employ i n various ways. 
One should at t h i s stage also notice a fresh stimulus that had 
been provided by the work of Leibniz. Kant was.on t h i s matter r e f l e c t i n g 
on the relationship between l o g i c and biology in terms of class concepts, 
- •'49 *-
important for both biologists and theologians of his day, discussed 
afresh as the r e s u l t of the publication by Raspe of Leibniz' New 
Essays i n 1765. T h i s publication, and the collection of more of 
Ifilb n i z ' work published by Dutens in 1768, made possible the 
151 
appreciation of Leibniz > views in a way that complemented the 
Theodicy i n p a r t i c u l a r . A whole section of material in the Critique 
may be read as Kant's reaction to the new Leibniz, and to the renewed 
insistence on a physics understood as a science of the l i v i n g , Jather 
than as mere "mechanism", Kant thought about Leibniz at t h i s period 
158 
in comparison with de Buff on and Linnaeus, and h i s r e f l e c t i o n s niay 
also be read as a comment on t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l successors, to whom 
Cas s i r e r drew attention in connection with h i s exposition of t h i s 
portion of the C r i t i q u e . W h a t may be especially noted here are 
Kant's comments on the notion of the "ladder of being", given that the 
maxims of reason do not y i e l d objective insight into inscrutable nature: 
the steps of t h i s ladder, as they are presented to us in experience, 
stand much too f a r apart; and what may seem to us small differences 
are usually in nature i t s e l f such wide gaps, that from any such 
observations we can come to no decision i n regard to nature's 
ultimate design especially i f we bear in mind that in so great a 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of things there can never be much d i f f i c u l t y in finding 
s i m i l a r i t i e s and approximations. 
And yet the "maxim" of the "ladder" served to "mark out the path towards 
systematic vinlty" of knowledge. Coleridge, sometimes supposed to be an 
outstanding interpreter of Kant, missed these fundamental points when 
producing his own version of what could be meant by the "ladder of being". 
On these issues alone one can perhaps a:lready see how i t v/as that 
160 
Kant could l a t e r write of h i s C r i t i q u e that i t was h i s apologia for 
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Leibniz, against h i s l e s s c r i t i c a l followers. Other points applicable 
to the Theodicy may also be noticed. For instance, Kant made some 
comments about Leibniz' " i n t e l l e c t u a l system of the world"i'^^^ I t 
may be s i g n i f i c a n t that Kant expressed gi'eat admiration for Plato on 
162 
t h i s topic. To express such approval of Plato and to c r i t i c i s e him 
served incidentally to remind the reader of the attractiveness of 
Leibniz without also c r i t i c i s i n g him e x p l i c i t l y . Kant maintained 
that Plato r i g h t l y discerned a proof of "an origin from ideas" not only 
in the moral sphere but i n nature i t s e l f . "A plant, and animal, the 
orderly arrangement of the cosmos - presumably therefore the entire 
natui-al world - c l e a r l y show that they are possible on3.y according to 
ideas." The imperfection of things compared with the idea of what i s 
most perfect of i t s kind implied for Plato their complete determination 
163 
i n the "Supreme Understanding". I t i s "the t o t a l i t y of tlilng-s, in 
t h e i r intercomiection as constituting the universe, that i s completely 
adequate to the idea ." Kant only dissociated himself from Plato when 
he suggested that the l a t t e r had exaggerated in h i s " s p i r i t u a l f l i g h t 
from the ectypal mode of r e f l e c t i n g upon the physical world order to 
164 
the architectonic ordering of i t according to ideas", though h i s 
teaching s t i l l had great merit in the areas of morality, l e g i s l a t i o n 
and r e l i g i o n generally. One may suppose that Kant found Leibniz to be 
as valuable in these areas also, although he had long since abandoned 
Leibniz' kitid of project for discussing the operation c£ the divine 
perfections - Leibniz' own particular type of exaggeration. On the 
other hand, Leibniz had ma.de a fundamental mistake in wliat he had to 
say about e v i l . One might accept Linnaeus' principle that "Everything 
which nature has i t s e l f i n s t i t u t e d i s good for same purpose." For 
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example, "Even poisons have thei.r use. They serve to counteract 
other poisons generated i n our bodily humoiu"s, and must have a place 
i n evei-y complete pharmacopoeia." And yet, as Kant went on, "The 
objections against the persuasions and complacency of our purely 
speculative reason a r i s e from the very nature of reason i t s e l f j and 
must therefore have t h e i r own good use and purpose, which ought not 
165 
to be disdained." He was thus provoked to-make a more extended 
comment on a point he had made before, and which shows him beginning 
to t a c k l e the problem with which he had l e f t himself i n 1763. He 
166 
stated that 
the principles that r e a l i t i e s (as pure assertions) never l o g i c a l l y 
c o n f l i c t with each other i s an entirely true preposition as 
regards the rel a t i o n of concepts, but has not the l e a s t meaning 
in regard either to nature or to anything in i t s e l f . For r e a l 
c o n f l i c t certainly does take place ... where two r e a l i t i e s 
combined in one subject cancel one another's e f f e c t s . This i s 
brought before our eyes incessantly by a l l the hindering and 
counteracting processes in nature ... 
. . . . • • 
The Lelbnizian view involved vie.wine^ e v i l f a s "merely consequences of 
the li m i t a t i o n s of created beings, that i s , negations, since negations 
alone c o n f l i c t with r e a l i t y " . True though this may be of concepts, 
i t may not be held true of appearances, where "contradiction, whereby 
the concept of a thing i s removed" i s Inadequate as a description of 
what goes on. This would be better described as "the c o n f l i c t of 
reciprocal injury, in which each of two real grounds destroys the effect 
of the other - a c o n f l i c t which we can represent to ourselves only in 
terms of conditions presented to us i n s e n s i b i l i t y " . This I s where one 
begins to see how a new philosophical stance reinforces a particular 
theological stance, all.though Kant i s not yet ready either to express 
h i s despair a t the contemplation of the natural order - that was yet 
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to come,«or to attempt a re-phrasing of theodicy within certain l i m i t s , 
which depended upon the abandonment of the attempt, however meta-
physically expressed, to "solve" the problem of physical e v i l . 
One must also t r y to make an assessment of the influence of Hume 
on Kant at t h i s point, since Kant, as shown by the csomplexity of the 
Critique, was open to consider many different points of view. The 
notice of Kant's lectures of 1765 had included a reference to Hume as 
an example of one who had made a good start In the ^ tudy of ethics, an 
167 
approach which for Kant was yet lacking in precision and completeness. 
Some of Hume's work, including h i s Enquiry had been translated by Sulzer 
between 1754-6, but i t was not u n t i l 1772, when a translation of Seattle's 
Essay on the Nature and Immutabiiity of Truth was published, that Kant 
begun to work out the consequences of Hume»s thinking for h i s own philo-
sophical position, which embraced a whole range of problems beyond the 
scope of t h i s discussion. Seattle's work transmitted to Kant those parts 
of the T r e a t i s e which had no counterpart in the Enquiry, and Kant now found 
himself thinking through a c r i t i c i s m of empiricism with which he i n part 
agreed, without involving himself in a complete destruction of metaphysics 
and theology. Kant " s t r i v e s to determine how much of Leibniz' b e l i e f in 
.the l e g i s l a t i v e power of pure reason can be retained after f u l l j u s t i c e 
l68 
has been done to Hume's damaging c r i t i c i s m s " . I t i s not that Kant 
took Hume's writings and offered a commentary on them so much as that 
he refuted Hume's whole stance, discussing points which arose i n 
r e l a t i o n to i t even i f Hume did not make the points, or indeed see 
169 
a l l the possible consequences of h i s empiricism. 
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The celebrated David Hume was caie of those geographers of human 
reason who have imagined that they have s u f f i c i e n t l y disposed 
of a l l such questions by setting them outside the horizon of 
human reason - a horizon which yet he was not able to determine. 
Hume dwelt in particular upon the principle of causality, and 
quite r i g h t l y observed that i t s truth, and even the objective 
v a l i d i t y of the concept of e f f i c i e n t cause in general, i s based 
on no insight, that i s , on no a p r i o r i knowledge, and that i t s 
authority cannot therefore be ascribed to i t s necessity, but 
merely to i t s general u t i l i t y i n the course of experience, and 
• to a certain subjective necessity which i t thereby acquires.^70 
Hume».s scepticism may be a convenient resting place for human reason, 
"where i t can r e f l e c t upon i t s dogmatic wanderings and make survey of 
the region in which i t finds I t s e l f , so that for the future i t may be 
able to choose i t s path with more certainty", but i t i s no> place for 
171 
permanent settlement. For a l l the ingenuity Hume displayed he 
shared a defect "in common with a l l dogmatists, namely, that he did 
not make a systematic review of a l l the various kinds of a p r i o r i 
synthesis ascribable to the understanding ."For example, not only the 
pr i n c i p l e of causa l i t y , but the principle of permanence, also anticipates 
172 
experience. 
The sp e c i a l material of possible influence to be looked for hei-e 
i s of course the Dialogues, and i t s discussion of physical e v i l . 
173 
Hamann's tran s l a t i o n of the Dialogues was given to Kant to read 
sometime early in August, 1780. Schreiter published h i s translation 
i n 1781, and Hamann did nothing more with h i s version, perhaps, as N.K. 
Smith said/ibecause he was not unwilling to. escape the notoriety of 
.174 
seeming to father so sceptical a work r The same commentator also 
noted that "Kant, in h i s Immediate acceptance of the main argument of 
the Dialogues, as i n h i s appreciation of Hume's arguments in the Treatise, 
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175 outstripped h i s contemporaries and nearly a l l h i s successors." 
I t i s noteworthy hov/ f a i t h f u l l y the section of the Critique entitled 
•The Impossibility of the Physico-Theological Proof" reproduced 
Hume's arguments, though obviously Kant did not employ thei r l i t e r a r y 
form. Kant's sympathetic handling of the proof i s evidence of the 
value he saw i t to have. He "sees how clearly akin the attitude 
which l i e s behind the tendency to take i t seriously i s to the dis c i p l i n e 
177 1 of morality ."^  Apart from the Critique I t s e l f , Kant's own introduction 
to i t , written for publication i n 1783, i s also i n s t r u c t i v e . Kant here 
wrote about Hume's philosophical position, his relationship to h i s 
179 
contemporaries, and the j o l t Hume's writings gave to Kant himself. 
His concluding section, "Of the Boundaries of Pure Reason", included 
180 
h i s discussion of the Dialogues s p e c i f i c a l l y . Kant's vie-ff of these 
was they were an instance of mistaken scepticism, and he specially 
noted the supposition that our discursive i n t e l l e c t was alone the 
181 
archetype of every possible understanding. Whilst i t was true that 
there was no Inference from the world to God, Hume's objections to 
deism were weak. In any case, Hume had missed a c r u c i a l point, 
concerned with that theism "which i s supposed to come into being by 
a cl o s e r determination of our concept of the highest being v/hich in 
tX 82 
d^m i s merely transcendent r God's transcendence does not exclude 
a l l other assertion about him. One can make nothing of deism, but 
given a c l a s s i c a l defence of a part i c u l a r kind of predication, a certain 
l83 
correction could be made of Hume, and so he retained a place for 
184 
theology on the boundary of reason. 
However, Kant did not discuss Hume's treatment of e v i l in the 
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Dialogues. His primary concern was to redefine h i s own position with 
regard to Leibniz' philosophy and theology, and he may already have 
been c l e a r that he had a point of view on theodicy to which Hume did 
not contribute. He had already'discovered that he could not construct 
a theodicy on the basis of an explanation of the operation of the 
divine perfections i n creation, and i n so f a r as Hume's concern was 
not with the existence of God, but with h i a nature, they both shared . 
an apprehension of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved. Moreover, although he 
could work out a "closer determination" of h i s concept of God, and as 
he was to show, could demonstrate the v a l i d i t y of teleological thinking, 
the coherence of a view of nature with a particular theology seemed to 
him to be l o s t forever. He asked himself: "iVhy has Providence placed 
many things which are closely bottnd up with our h l ^ e s t interests do f a r 
beyond our reach that we are only permitted to apprehend them in a manner 
lacking in clearness and subject to doubt - in such a fashion that our . 
185 
enquiring gaze i s more excited than s a t i s f i e d ? " Yfe have, fo?- Kant, 
"to surrender the language of knowledge thougfa we s t i l l have s u f f i c i e n t 
ground to employ, i n the presence of the most exacting reason, the quite 
legitimate language of a firm f a i t h /'^ ^^  Although he found that he had 
to abandon Leibniz' epistemology he shared Leibniz' f a i t h and referred 
187 
to i t as a "conviction" which was "subjectively s u f f i c i e n t " , and so 
interwoven with h i s moral sentiment, that there was as l i t t l e danger of 
188 
h i s l o s i n g the one as the other. T h i s f a i t h would eventually enable 
him to attempt to cope v/ith the problem of moral e v i l , i f not with 
p h y s i c a l e v i l . And " b e l i e f " referred to "the guidance v/hich an idea 
gives me, and to i t s subjective influence in that furthering of the 
156 " 
a c t i v i t i e s of my reason which confirms me in the. idea and yet does 
so without my being in a position to give a speculative account of 
it . . 
To leave that point for the moment, we may now pay attention 
to the fact that most important for ICant was his c r i t i c i s m of h i s 
own position of 1763, and of the kind of metaphysical f a i t h which 
he thought he had established. 
Unconditioned necessity, ^vhich we so indispensably require as the 
l a s t bearer of a l l things, i s for human reason the veritable 
abyss ... We cannot put aside, and yet also cannot endure the 
thought, that a being, which we represent to ourselves as supreme 
among a l l possible beings, should, as i t were, say to I t s e l f : »I 
am from ete r n i t y to eternity,, and outside me there i s nothin.g 
save what i s tiirough my w i l l , but whence t^en am I?«190 
There i s more a t stake here than the choice of a limited 'range of 
191 
anthropomorphic language, though certainly t h i s has to be employed, 
for Kant wanted to deny to h i s concept of God even that a i ) r i o r l 
c ertainty which he had once believed was j u s t i f i a b l e . God's trans-
cendence was to be thought of in accordance with h i s "Copemican 
revolution". "God" was to be thought of as an Idea, "a necessary 
l92 
concept of reason". He t^en salvaged theology from the charge of 
Irrelevance by drav/ing attention to the point that he was led to such 
an Idea by reason i t s e l f , and t h i s r e a l i s a t i o n suggested tliat the Idea 
193 
might have a "regulative" use. S t i l l wanting a way of explaining 
194 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the univierse i t s e l f , , in terms of "a supreme 
intelligence, which i n originating the wo33d,acts in accordan.ce with 
195 
wise purposes", he thought oif t h i s idea i n a variety of ways. For 
example, he thought of .God as "a transcmadenta,l substrate tliat contains, 
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as i t were, the whole store of material from which a l l possible 
196 
predicates of things must be taken". Or one might say of the Idea 
in reply to Hume that i t i s "the archetype (prototypoii) of a l l things, 
whicli one and a l l , as imperfect copies (etyfcypa), derive fix>m i t the 
material of t h e i r p o s s i b i l i t y , and while approximating to i t i n 
varying degrees, yet always f a l l very short of actually attaining i t .^^^ 
I t might also s t i l l be considered as the supreme r e a l i t y which must 
"condition the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l l things as the i r grotind, not as thdlr 
198 
svnn", but; whatever was to be said, i t was with the important 
provise that "we are l e f t eotitirely without knowledge as to the exis-cence 
of a beiD.g of such outstanding pre-eminence ." A l l that may be 
responsibly affirmed i s that one should "look upon a l l coimectlon 
in the world as i f i t originated from an a l l s u f f i c i e n t necessary 
199 
cause". T h i s was the nearest approach he would altow himself to the 
summa i n t e l l i g e n t i a , the God of the I ^ i b n i z i a n t h e i s t .^ '^ ,^ He had other 
i n t e r e s t i n g ways of referring to t h i s "Gtod", as for example "an ideal 
without a flaw, a concept which conpletes and crowns the whole of 
human Icnowledge .^^^ Another alternative was that of a focus 
imaginarius, an " i l l u s i o n " which was "indispensably necessary i f we 
are to direct the understanding beyond every given experience (as part 
of the sum of possible experience), and thereby to secui-e i t s greatest 
possible extension, j u s t as, i n the case of mirror-vision, the 
i l l u s t r a t i o n involved i s indispensably necessary i f , besides the 
objects which l i e before our eyes, we are also to see those which l i e 
202 
a t a distance behind our back jr Using again the language of h i s 
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work of 1763 lie could on t h i s basis viGW "the sum of a l l appearances 
(the sensible v^orld i t s e l f ) " as having "a single, highest and a l l -
s u f f i c i e n t grotmd beyond i t s e l f , namely, a self-subsistent, o r i g i n a l , 
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creative reason .*r With such an "original grovmd" Kant cotad think 
of the "systematic unity of the manifold in the universe, and thereby 
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. the greatest possible empirical employment of reason". I t i s i n 
t h i s l i g h t that he could r e p r e s ^ t " a l l connections a.s i f they were 
tlie ordinances of a supreme reason of which ovx reason i s but a f a i n t 
copy None of t h i s , however, anj/more than h i s position of 1763, 
enabled him to re~emba.rk oh the construction of a theodicy in Leibnizian 
s t y l e . • . 
yfe may, however, trace the thread of Kant's concern wi-ch theodicy 
±n h i s essay of 1786, The conjectural begltmlng of the history of man-
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kjJxd. T h i s essay i s not, despite i t s t i t l e , an examination of 
contemporary opinion on man's biological origins, but an exercise 
in " p r a c t i c a l " theology. Kant seems in t h i s essay to have an eye on 
what was being done i n h i s time on the study of man but was somewhat 
wary of the r e s u l t s . He may have thought that the work was lacking 
in coherence, or ttnsubstantiated by adequate evidence. He may also 
have seen more c l e a r l y than others i t s possible implications. Any 
use which he made of the r e s u l t s i s a use with which he could i n face 
dispense, since h i s pattern of discussion of man's moral l i f e would 
be f a m i l i a r to h i s readers from some of h i s other works \ * i i c i i d i d 
not invoke " s c i e n t i f i c " material. The more seriously s c i e n t i f i c 
studies were to be taken in the future, however, the more a discussion 
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of man's nature which took so l i t t l e notice of the implications of 
the evidence they were to o f f e r would i n i t s turn be held to be of 
l i t t l e importance. Vfhat matters for the present purpose i s Kant's 
insistence that i t i s "corruption of morals" to be discontented with 
Pi'ovidence, though "he has traced out for us i n our t e r r e s t r i a l world 
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a path so d i f f i c u l t " . He remarked that the "b.ardships and miseri.es 
of l i f e " W i l l often draw from man "the wish for a pai'adise, the 
creature of h i s imagination, where he may dream or t r i f l e away h i s 
208 
existence in tranquil i n a c t i v i t y and constant peace". This i s 
elsewhere expressed as Mian's longing for a "golden age", a state in 
which man imaigines himself free from want, - "the pure enjoyment of 
l i f e from care dreamt away in idleness or t r i f l e d away in puerile 
amusements - aii earnest desire, which makes the Crusoes and the voyage 
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to the south-sea islands so charming ..." Man could not be content 
with such a paradise, given h i s distinctively human equipment. For Kant, 
contentment with Providence i s the source of courage under a l l apparent 
hardship. Such contentment may also bring aooiit in man a willingness 
to recognize that h i s ovm f a u l t may be the cause of some of the " e v i l " 
from which he suffers, and that the rtanedy may be self-amendment. 
Also important for the tinder standing of Kant's theology at t h i s 
time i s what he says that i s relevant to theodicy in h i s second great 
C r i t i q u e , that of P r a c t i c a l Reason of 1788. m t h i s work, h i s 
2 l l 
discussion of pleasure and pain and his e s t i m t e of t h e i r i-elevance 
to h i s endeavour to ascertain the fundamental principles of h i s austere 
?12 
e t h i c a l views, are open wixh some j u s t i c e to I r i s Murdoch's comment' 
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that ICant 'Kvants to segregate the messy warm empirical psyche from 
the clean operations of the reason Kant approved of the Stoic who 
cried out: "Pain, however thou tormentest me, I w i l l never admit that 
thou a r t an e v i l " . Pain need not diminish the worth of a man's, 
person, but could rather serve to r a i s e h i s pride, when a man could 
be conscious that "he had not deserved i t by any unrighteous action 
by-which he had rendered himself worthy of punishment .'^ ^^  I t i s 
true that as a being belonging to the world of sense, man's reason 
mu^t "attend to the int e r e s t of h i s sensible nature"' tliough reason 
was not i t s e l f to be used 'Werely as an instrument for the satisfaction 
of h i s wants as a sensiole f^ing ." The point was that "good" and 
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" e v i l " are properly referred to actions, not to sensations, and 
action r e s u l t s from the exercise of the human w i l l , which should be 
rat i o n a l l y determined. Kant therefore treated the physical context 
of man's l i f e as a hindrance to h i s moral l i f e . Man's desires and 
inclinations from which he i s never free and which jeopardise the 
value of the r e s t of h i s acti.ons, spring from physical causes, and 
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these could never of tliemselves coincide with the moral law. Th i s 
would seem to make inevitable the minimal place which Kant allowed 
to man's emotions i n h i s e t h i c s , -'k kind of suffering pride which 
accompanies, though i t does not motivate, the recognition of duty .^ '^ "^  
Although tliere i s t h i s lack of harmony between man's physicality 
and h i s a b i l i t y to discern, h i s obligations, man s t i l l seeks for 
happiness, and that happiness depends oh "the harmony of physical 
2l 8 
nature with h i s whole end". There i s no guarantee whatsoever that 
man w i l l i n t h i s sensible world receive the happiness he may come to 
deseri'e because he i s a being, "that belongs to the world as part of i t " 
and i s "therefore dependent on i t " , and "cannot by h i s w i l l be a 
cause o i t h i s nature, nor by h i s own poy/sr make i t thoroughly harmonise, 
so f a r as h i s happiness i s concerned, with h:fe p r a c t i c a l principles . " 
Kant, picking up themes from the l a s t part of the f i r s t Critique, 
therefore postulated "the existence of a c&nse of a l l nature, d i s t i n c t 
from nature i t s e l f , and containing the principle ... of the exact 
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harmony of happiness with morality". ' God i s to be understood as 
the "highest o r i g i n a l good" whose ultimate end in creating the world 
i s the morality of rational beings. Kant agrees with those who think 
tliat wha.t g l o r i f i e s God i s "respect for h i s command, the observance 
of the holy duty that h i s law imposes on us, when there i s added thereto 
His glorious plan of crowning such a beautiful order of tilings with 
corresponding happiness .^^^ But in distinction from Leibniz, he must 
also say that we do not know that t h i s world i s "the most perfect 
whole possible", for we do not also know a l l possible worlds (in order 
to be able to compare them with t h i s ) " , - we cannot Kope eV'Crtd see 
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tlie world as God sees i t . Nevertheless, h6 could s t i l l suggest 
that "thus wliat the study of nature and of man teaches us s u f f i c i e n t l y 
elsewhere may well be true here a l s o : that the unsearchable wisdom 
by which we e x i s t i s not l e s s worthy of admiration i n what i t has 
denied than i n what i t has granted .^^^ 
These samples of writing from t h i s Critique represent a considerable 
change in Kant's thinking since 1755, provoked by the development of 
his philosophical position in re l a t i o n to h i s understanding of God, 
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and the consideration of what now turned out to be for him an intractable 
problem. S t i l l fundamentally confident i n God, h i s attit&de to physical 
r e a l i t y i s increasingly ambiguous. A physical natui'e which seriously 
jeopardises tlie p o s s i b i l i t y of virtuous action, and a physical 
environment which does not of i t s e l f coincide with virtuous action so 
as to bring about man's happiness, i n effect argues for Kant's now 
operating with a view of r e a l i t y which would lend strength to the 
manicheal^ case. L i k e Leibniz, he held to a rationally defensible 
f a i t h , though without an analysis of the operation of the divine 
perfections i n r e l a t i o n to creation, but l i k e Bayle, he l e l t the f u l l 
weight of grief for the f a c t that pain and suffering seem to be integral 
to the existence of a credited order. He now found himself operating 
with a b e l i e f in a creditor of the physical universe of which man in 
t h i s l i f e i s a part, - yet without an answer to the question about 
why God should not bring about the coincidence.-of happiJiess with virtue 
i n t h i s l i f e . Such a question could not perhaps even be asked of a 
God whose paramount c h a r a c t e r i s t i c was his transcendence, so understood 
as to preclude any worship of him except that which mi^-t be thought 
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to be i m p l i c i t i n man's obedience to self-imposed moral principles. 
Moreover, as he had indicated in h i s review of Herder, Kant could 
no longer f e e l absolutely confident that h i s soul was destined to 
survive a l l the possible v i c i s s i t u d e s of exis-cence and find fellowship 
with God. I t i s therefore a mistake to think tliat a l l that Kant had 
to say about God in re l a t i o n to nature a t t h i s time i s i n effect 
expressed i n the famous passage about the starry heavens above and 
the moral law within, which are as sources inspirln-g awe, accessible 
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to him as God i s not. His view of the s e l f as "angelic", 
independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, 
functions as consolation, for the very magnificence of the starry 
heavens, and what they are - "a countless multitude of wot-lds" -
which he had discussed So many years before, also means that man's 
importance as an "animal creature" was annihilated. Such a creature, 
"after i t has been for a short time provided with v i t a l power, one 
knows not how, must again give back the matter of which i t was formed 
to the planet i t inhabits (a mere speck in the universe) This 
passage should be read in connection with one in h i s t h i r d and l a s t 
Critique of 1790, in the section of i t e n t i t l e d "Critique of Teleo-
l o g i c a l Judgement". Here Kant described what Allen W. Wood called 
nan's "moral despair" about the sensible world, and the exhaustion 
226 
of hope to which i t may lead. Righteous men i n the world, 
no natter how deserving they may be of happiness, w i l l be. 
subjected by nature, which takes no heed of such deserts, 
to a l l the e v i l s of want, disease, and untimely death, j u s t 
as are the other animals on the earth. And so i t w i l l 
continue to be u n t i l one wide grave engulfs them a l l - j u s t 
and unjust, there i s no d i s t i n c t i o n in Ihe grave - and hiu-ls 
them back into the abyss of the aimless chaos of matter from 
which they were taken - they that were able to believe ttiesi-
selves the f i n a l end of creation.^^^ 
The context of t h i s utterance i s that of Kant's estimate of habits 
of t e l e o l o g i c a l thinking, an estimate which he had begun to develop 
in the 1760s. As he put the point i n h i s f i r s t C r i tique, he seemed 
bound 
so to employ my reason as i f everything were mere nature. 
Purpos.ive unity i s , however, so important a condition of the 
application of reason to nature that I cannot ignore i t , 
e s p e c i a l l y as experience supplies me so r i c h l y with examples 
of i t . But I know no other condition trader which t h i s unity 
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can supply me with guidance in the investigation of nature, 
save only the postulate that a supreme intelligence has ordered 
a l l things in accordance with the wisest ends.^^^ 
2?9 
Kant had e a r l i e r ' said i n support of t h i s position that "A certain, 
unformulated consciousness of the true use of t h i s concept of reason 
seems indeed to have inspired the modest and reasonable language of 
the philosophers of a l l times, since they speak of the wisdom and 
providence of nature and of divine wisdom, j u s t as i f nature and 
divine wisdom were equivalent expressions". He urged that " i t must 
be a matter of complete indifference to us, when we perceive such unity, 
whether we say that God in h i s wisdom has w i l l e d i t to be so, or that 
nature has wisely arranged i t thus His instructions were 
tliat we were to "follow out the physico-mechahical connection in accord-
ance with universal iav/s, in the hppe of discovering what the teleo-
l o g i c a l connection actually i s . In t h i s way alone can the principle 
of purposive unity a i d always in extending the euployment of reason 
i n reference to experience, without being in any instance p r e j u d i c i a l 
23i 
to i t . " V/hen he came to publish h i s thi r d Critique, Kant did not 
"reinstate the older t e l e o l o g i c a l metaphysics. He t r i e s to show that 
i t s doctrines are not true of objective r e a l i t y in the s c i e n t i f i c sense 
but a r i s e from certain modes of thought which are, so he believes, 
unavoidably adopted by man. when he r e f l e c t s about the phenomena of l i f e 
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and h i s own experience." What he had to say about teleology 
brought into relationship ^ wh-at he had to say about the maxims in 
accordance with which i t was appropriate to discuss the natural order, 
and in the l i g h t of t h i s , he re-considered what he cottld say aoout 
theodicy. 
- 1 6 5 
In h is'Reflection" on the phenomena of l i f e he took, for example, 
the structure of a bird on which he commented: "the hollow formation 
of i t s bones, the position of i t s wangs for producing motion and of 
i t s t a i l for steering ... a l l t h i s i s i n the highest degree contingent 
i f we simply look to the nexus effectivus in nature, and do not c a l l 
i n a i d a special kind of caus a l i t y , namely tliat of ends (nexus f i n a l i s ) " . 
Nature, "regarded as mere mechanism could have fashioned i t s e l f i n a 
thousand other different ways without l i g h t i n g precisely on the unity 
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based on a princip l e l i k e t h i s " . The familiar maxims of s c i e n t i f i c 
enquiry had made t h e i r appearance in the "Introduction" to the whole 
work, where Kant drew attention to t h e i r character: 
For i t i s quite conceivable that, despite a l l the uniformity 
of the-things of nature according to universal laws, without 
which we would not have the form of general empirical Icnowledge 
a t a l l , the s p e c i f i c variety of the empirical laws of nature, 
with t h e i r e f f e c t s , might s t i l l be so great as to make i t 
impossible for our miderstanding to discover in nature an 
i n t e l l i g i b l e order, to divide i t s products into genera and 
species so as to a v a i l ourselves of the principles of explanation, 
and comprehension of one for explaining and interpreting another, 
and out of material coming to hand i n such confusion (properly 
speaking only i n f i n i t e l y multiform and ill-adapted to our power 
of apprehension) to make a consistent context of experience. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of being completely baffled by nalrare despite the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of such " s c i e n t i f i c " maxims i s s t i l l thei>e even when the 
concept of "purposiveness" i s called into play': "the universal idea 
of nature, as the complex of objects of sense, gives us no reason 
whatever for assuming that things of nature serve one an.other as means 
to ends, or that t h e i r very p o s s i b i l i t y i s only made f u l l y i n t e l l i g i b l e 
by a causality of t h i s sort .'^ ®^ The t e l e o l o g i c a l estimate, problem--. 
a t i c a l as i t i s , involved no pretence to "explain" nature though i t i s . 
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as Kant said, "at l e a s t one more pri n c i p l e for reducing i t s phenomena 
to r u l e s i n cases where the laws of i t s pvirely mechanical causality 
do not carry us s u f f i c i e n t l y far .'^ ^^  So his approach of 1763 to 
crude teleology was now philosophically-grounded. Thus he wrote: 
To say ... that the f a c t s that vapour f a l l s from the atmosphere 
in the form of snow, that the ocean has i t s currents that wash 
into these regions the wood groTOi in warmer lands, and that sea-
monsters containing quantities of o i l ai'e to be found there, are 
due to the idea of some benefit to certain poor creatures under-
lyin g the cause that brings together a l l these natural products, ' 
would be a very hazardous and arbitrary assertion. 
Nor may one invoke divine creation i n relation to the apprehension that 
an -organism as compared with a watcli, for example, i s a "machine" 
which 'Jjossesses inherent formative power, and such, moreover as i t 
can impart to material devoid of i t - . material which i t organises ."^ ^^  
Kant sounded a further note of caution when he i n s i s t e d that 
•We do well to consider even things that are unpleasant to us, and 
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that in partidular connections are contra-final", though, as in 
h i s f i r s t Critique, jproceeded to do h i s best to see what good some of 
these might nevertheless serve. He s t i l l f e l t the attraction of a 
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contemplative and optimistic view of the whole. 
We may regard i t as a favour that nature has extended to us, 
that besides giving us what i s useful i t lias dispensed beauty 
and charms i n such abundance, and for t h i s we may love i t , j u s t 
as we view i t with respect because of i t s immensity, and f e e l 
ourselves ennobled by such contemplation - j u s t as i f nature had 
erected and decorated i t s splendid stage with this precise 
purpose in mind. 
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But he coula not be s a t i s f i e d with such a view although he could 
continue to try to do j u s t i c e to i t , in a way not wholly dissimilar 
to that of h i s work of 1755. Thus he supposed that i t was absurd "to 
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hope that may be another Newton may some day a r i s e , to make i n t e l l i g i b l e 
to us even the genesis of but a blade of grass f rom natural laws that 
243 " 
no design has ordered" ^ though i t woula be presumptuous to assert 
that such i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y could never be achieved. ( I h i s i s a more 
cautious position than the one he displayed i n h i s 1775 paper, when 
he s a i d that organisms could not be produced mechanically.) His 
conviction was that; although v/e cannot discern an Author of the world, 
"we are u t t e r l y unaole to ascribe the p o s s i b i l i t y of ... physical ends ' 
to any other source other than an i n t e l l i g e n t Being Also, he returned 
to the material of the f i r s t Critique i n h i s endeavour to»say something ! 
more positive about such a being. He said that we could form the notion ! , 244 -of an " i n t u i t i v e " rather than a "discursive" mderstanding, and In 
t h i s way expanded h i s diiitinction between an i n t e l l e c t u s archetypus and 
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^ l;Mttel.lectus ectypus, so as to procure for nature a super-sensible 
• ' 246 ' r e a l ground a l b e i t unknowable to us. But h i s ban on the employment' ' 
of the divrine understanding to "explain" things i n the world was 
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permanently i n force: . 
the concession that a supreme Architect has d i r e c t l y created 
the forms of nature in the way they have existed from a l l time, 
or has predetermined those which in. their course of evolution 
regularly conform to the same type, does not further our know-
ledge one whit. The reason i s tliat we are wholly ignorant of 
the manner in which the supreme Being acts and of His ideas, 
in which the principles of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the natural beingy 
are supposed to be contained, and so cannot explain nature from 
Him by moving from above downwards, that i s a, p r i o r i . 
Leibniz' kind of theodicy was d e f i n i t e l y precluded. 
Lovejoy's view on Kant's t h i r d Critique was that the l a t t e r had 
"acquired the deplorable habit of affirming both sides of a contra-
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.248 diction and leaving i t to the 'supersensible' to .reconcile them . 
Love joy, however, did not r e l a t e h i s analysis of what Kant load to say 
about nature to Kant's c r i t i c a l standpoint. He drew upon Kant's 
f a m i l i a r warning about human pretensions in interpreting nature, and 
h i s demand for empirical eviaence of such "happenings" as certain water 
animals transforming themselves by degrees into marsh animals, and from 
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these a f t e r some generations ln.to land animals. But he did not pay 
attention to the philosophical, and one may say theological reasons 
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why Kant maintained this position. Kant's position had changed, 
to some extent, and one may surmise that he wanted to write out the 
. possible a l t e r n a t i v e s to despair aoout obtaining insight into natxire. 
For example, one p o s s i b i l i t y was to gxa through "the vast creation of 
organized beings i n order to see i f there i s not discoverable i n i t some 
trace of system, and indeed of a system following a genetic principle P''^^ 
Such a system might lead to what would seem to be "the wonderful 
s i m p l i c i t y of the o r i g i n a l plan, which has been able to produce such 
an immense variety of species by the shortening of one member and 
the lengthening of another ..." One might even go so f a r as to 
suspect that a l l forms have "an actual kinship due to descent from a 
common parent" and that they might even be traceable back to the 
"lowest perceivable stage of nature**. The reverse of t h i s procedure 
2*52 
would be to suppose ' "mother earth" giving birtli.'to creictures whose 
form displayed l e s s f i n a l i t y " , these i n t h e i r turn producing others 
which "adapted themselves more perfectly to their native surroundings 
and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s to each other", u n t i l there was a r e s t r i c t i o n to 
production of "definite species incapable of further modification ..." 
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25? Yet a t h i r d variant, " which was nearest to what has elsewhere been 
seesx to be Kant's own position, was that of the "system of pre-
estaolishment", whereby "the Supreme Cause would only endow the 
o r i g i n a l products of His wisdom with the inherent capacity by means 
of which an organized being produces another after i t s own kind, and 
the species preserves i t s continutms existmce, whilst the l o s s of 
individuals i s ever being repaired t h r o u ^ the agency of a nature that 
concurrently labours towards t l i e i r destruction More precisely, Kant 
wanted to define t h i s as a "system of epigenesis" or of "generic 
preformation" J meaning by t h i s that one might regard "the productive 
capacity of the parents, in respect of the inner f i n a l tendency that 
would be part of t l i e i r o r i g i n a l stock, and, therefore, the sped i f i c 
form, as s t i l l lia.ving been v i r t u a l i t e r preformed .^^^ This theory 
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could well be described as "evolution" so long as itft'djg carefully 
distinguished from -bhat theory of pre-formation which operated by 
thinking of individuals having been preformed. The advantage of the 
theory of ppigenesis, which Kant does not h ^ ^ exactly present as h i s 
own view - only p.resenting the arguments of an hypothetical advocate 
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of i t - was most c l e a r l y stated: 
For as regards things the p o s s i b i l i t y of whose origin can only 
be represented to the mind according to a causality of ends, 
epigenesis none the l e s s regards nature as a t l e a s t i t s e l f 
productive in respect of the continuation of the process, and 
not as merely unravelling something. Thus with the l e a s t 
possible expenditure of the supernatural i t entrusts to n&ture 
the explanation of a l l steps subsequent to the original beginning. 
But i t r e f r a i n s from determining anything as to t h i s o r i g i n a l 
beginning, which i s what ba f f l e s a l l the attempts of physics, no 
matter what chain of causes i t adopts. 
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Love joy's point of view on Kant vias i n general correct. He 
partiovaaxly drew a t t e n t i o n ^ ^ to the fact that Kant distinguished 
the notion of the transformation of species from the notion of the 
generation of things from ."crude inorganic matter", and that he had 
learned that "the admission of a common descent of d i f f e r e n t organic 
sjpeoies i s not necessarily inconsistent either with his hypothesis 
of 'purposive predispositions' or with those doctrines of the 
completely teleologioal character of organisms, and of t h e i r independence 
of a l l merely erfcernal causes of modification , which that hypothesis was 
designed to safeguarde" But to refer to Kant's position as simply "a 
deplorable h a b i t " i s hardly enough to do justice to Kant, whether or 
not he was r i g h t i n the bi o l o g i c a l theory he preferred. Kant at least 
envisaged the p o s s i b i l i t y of a theory of evolution which wovild involve 
the transformation of one species in t o another (a suggestion of Cassirer's 
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which Love joy said was incorrect; even though Kiant's fundamental 
philosophical stance did not permit him t o say whether anj of the theories 
about nature which he described were objectively r i ^ t or wrong. A l l he 
did was t o adopt the one which seemed to him to do justice t o the 
evidence he had. at his disposal. He was certainly s t i l l taking notice 
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of what was going on i n the relevant areas of study. I n 1795 he vn'ote 
to J.F. Sohillor about a proposed new journal, and said 
the paper i n the second monthly issue vAich deals with sex d i f f e i ^ 
ences seems to come from a very good brain; however I cannot 
puzzle i t out. Similar ideas concerning a real kinship going 
through the whole realm of nature have been expressed before. 
•Such things sometimes cross one's mind, but one does not know 
vfhat to do about them. Thus the fact that a l l f e r t i l i z a t i o n 
i n both organic realms requires two sexes to propagate t h e i r 
kind, always struck me as most astounding and as an abyss f o r 
thought. Vfe can hardly imagine Providence inventing t h i s order 
just f o r v a r i e t y . We have reason t o believe that propagation 
i s not possible otherwise. This opens up a prospect in t o an 
incalculable problem with which one om do absolutely nothing ~ 
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no more than with what aiilton's Angel t e l l s Adam about the 
Creation: 'Male l i g h t of remote suns mixes with female l i g j i t 
to unknom ultimate purposes*. 
I t i s in the writings of C a s s i r e r that tliere i s to be found a 
j u s t e r appreciation of Kant on t h i s subject, and only i n taking notice 
of Kant's r e a l position can one indicate the kind of theodicy he 
proposed. Cassirer pointed out that the eighteenth century mind 
"had tjome to r e s t in^ a fijced and definite world of forms. The r e a l i t y 
of things Was rooted i n t h i s world; their vrorth was determined by i t . 
The century rejoiced i n the unmistakeable precision of things, in t h e i r 
clear and sharp outlines and firm boundaries, and i t viev;ed the 
faculty of drawing such precise ooundaries as the highest subjective 
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strength of man and a t the same time as the basic power of reason." 
By the time Kant wrote h i s Critiques he had long since abandoned the 
supposition that such ah understanding of things could objectively be 
"loiown". But what he continued to think about in the "Critique of 
Teleo l o g i c a l Judgement" was man's !'knowing" of the world of forms, 
and the miles for research into nature. So Cassirer pointed out 
that Kant had "tracked down the hidden problem containea in Linnaeus' 
work", and that in "estaPlishing the principle of formal purposiveness 
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he spoke as the l o g i c i a n of Linnaeus' descriptive science". 
In acting as Linnaeus' lo g i c i a n , one might think that he was 
thinking i n terms of a theodicy when he maintained that "Man" i s the 
estxd and purpose ox the animal and vegetaule kingdoms. They exist 
i n r e l a t i o n to him, "and the multifarious uses to which h i s intelligence 
teaches him to jjut a l l these forms of l i f e . He i s the ultimate end 
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of creation here upon ea.rth, because he i s the one and only being upon 
i t that i s able to form a conceptions of ends, and form an aggregate 
of things purposively fashioned to construct by the aid of reason 
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a system of ends."' However, as we have seen, one of Kant's problems 
about understanding man in t h i s way was that he was an animal species 
within nature, - a nature, as he had already ijidicated, that both 
repairs the l o s s of individuals as i t concurrently aiabours to the i r 
destruction. He asserted that "so far from making man, regarded as 
one of the many anijnal^ species, an ultimate end, nature has no more 
exempted him from i t s destructive than from i t s p.roductive forces, 
nor has i t made -fche smallest exception to i t s subjection of everything 
to a mechanism of forces devoid of an end .'^ ^^  The habitat of the 
earth "shows no trace of any causes but those acting together without 
design, and i n f a c t tending towards destruction rather than calculated 
to p.romote genesis of forms, order, and ends .'^  The "archaeology of 
nature", i s a study to which 'taature i t s e l f i n v i t e s and summons us", 
but not, apparently, for our comfort. The present structure of the 
earth revealed by such a study "has a l l the appearance of being the 
outcome of the wild and all-subduing forces of a nature working in a 
state of chaos .•^ ^^  There could be no consolation for man "by means 
of nature and i t s beneficence", despite his being as a species "in 
complete and fundamental accord" with nature. Nature, i n i t s 
"destmctive operations - plague, famine, flood, cold, attacks from 
animals great and small, and a l l such th.ings" has as l i t t l e spared 
man as any other animal. Man's "inner natural tendencies", also 
betray him into self-invented misfortunes. Happiness in the realm 
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of. nature i s impossible and he must make great efforts towards the 
264 
achievement of h i s own civilissed culture. 
I t i s when Kant embarked on the elaboration of wi3at he meant by 
t h i s l a t t e r point that he introduced the sub-heading,. "The f i n a l end 
of the existence of a world, that i s of creation i t s e l f .^^^ Oaly in 
the development of t h i s theme, and not that of physical nature, could 
he t a l k of the s a t i s f a c t i o n of reason, and repeat and extend h i s 
discussion of the perfections of God on which he enoarked ixi his 
Critique of Pi'actical R e a s o n . G o d may be supposed to have the 
a t t r i b u t e s which Kant could prescribe on the basis ox h i s tniderstanding 
of "moral teleology". Nevertheless, since the world i s a s i t i s , there 
i s no-fching to prevent man f a l l i n g into utter despair except a kind of 
courage which seems to him to be indispensable i f he i s not to do 
"injury to moral sentiment". Hence he t r i e d to provide an answer 
to Hume's puzzle about the peculiar attractiveness of "design" 
tiieology. Man cannot believe that e v i l done by man makes no d i f f e r a i c e , 
because i t c o n f l i c t s with »fe lurking notion, however o b s c u r e o f 
something a f t e r which man f e e l s himself bound to s t r i v e . What seems 
to be indispensable i s the conviction of one principle upon which 
men could "conceive i t possible for nature to harmonize with the moral 
law dwelliftg within them. I t i s that of a Supreme Cause m l i n g the 
world according to moral laws." Kant would further propose that i t 
was 'this moral i n t e r e s t that f i r s t aroused attejrbiveness to beauty 
and the ends of natxire. T h i s would be admiraoly calculated to 
strengthen. t!ie above idea, though i t could not supply i t s foundation." 
And again., "that the physico-teleologlcal proof produces conviction 
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j u s t as i f i t were also a theological proof i s , therefore, not due to 
tlie use of ends of nature as .many empirical evidences of a supreme 
int e l l i g e n c e . On the contrary i t i s the moral evidence, which dwells 
in every man and a f f e c t s him so deeply, that insinuates i t s e l f into 
the reasoning." Kant would go so far as to say that t h i s "moral 
evidence" woiad "continue to r e t a i n i t s f u l l force were we to meet 
with no material a t a l l i n the world, or only ambiguous material, for 
physical teleology ^'^^ Itfhat he also might have said was that i t 
retaiJied i t s f u l l force for him despite man's experience of physical 
e v i l , as has already bem indicated. F a i t h i n God in t h i s context 
as i n the f i r s t C r i tique, was not simply to make uge of a* f r u i t f u l 
p r i n c i p l e of explanation for science. The conception of God now 
"acquires the p r i v i l e g e of f i g u r i n g i n our assurance as a matter of 
f a i t h " , and t h i s i s "the moral attitude of reason i n i t s assurance 
of the truth of what i s beyond the reach of theoretical kn-owledge ."^^ 
Kant therefore could urge man to accept into h i s moral perspective a 
cause harmonizing with himself as the end of nature, and -fco accept 
i t with deepest veneration - wholly different from any pathological 
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fear - and w i l l i n g l y bow dcvn before i t . 
"Whilst in the f i n a l throes of producing the Critique .of Judgement, 
however, Kant was faced with a r e v i v a l of conviction i n the v a l i d i t y 
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of the L e i U i i z i a n tradition by some of h i s opponents, led by Eberhard. 
Yet ;iinother competition Imd been set by the Berlin Academy in 1788 
'/fliich was to be a discussion of the progress made in metaphysics 
since the death of Leibniz. The competition was revived in 1790, 
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the time l i m i t extended to 1792 and then 3.795. By ttes time Kant . 
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275 brought out what he had written in connection with t h i s competition, 
he could afford to distinguish more clearly the points at wnich he 
differed from Leibniz. But in h i s e a r l i e r answer to Eberhard, he 
had to t r y to meet h i s opponent on h i s own ground, and. therefore 
interpreted Leibniz in such a way as to show that Leibniz* work 
needed completion by the c r i t i c a l philosophy. It. was, a f t e r a l l , a 
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" b i t t e r irony" that Eberhard was aole to quote The Only Possible 
Proof of 1763 to support one of h i s c r i t i c i s m s - that Kant himsell 
had agreed that there was a possible rational Imowledge of God. Kant 
was determined to deny that he rejected the value of Leibniz* work, 
but had nevertheless to show how i t was that his own work was necessary. 
•What was at stake for Eberhard was "the secular heritage of a doctrine 
which bdd allowed Geririany to take i t s place in European thou^it' '^^ '^  
He maintained that he himself alone, seemed toDbe capable of recognising 
what the philosophers of the past had meant, beyond wha.t they had 
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acttially said. Kant therefore endeavoured to show that the principle 
of s u f f i c i e n t reason, the monadology and the pre-established harmony 
2*^ 9 
were anticipations of h i s own themes. ' The l a s t idea, especially, 
was to be understood as iidicated in the Critique of Judgement to mean 
that "we must conceive a certain purposiveness in the arrangement b^y 
the highest cause of ourselves as well as of a l l things outside of us. 
This may, to be sure, be imderstood as already placed in creation (pre-
determined) ..." Such a harmony extended to the agreement between the 
realms of nature and grace which Kant described as "the realm of 
purposes in r e l a t i o n to the f i n a l pirpose, i . e . mankind mder laws". 
This i s the harmony required by morality which "absolutely cannot as 
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the Cr i t i q u e shows be conceived from the nature of the beings in the 
tmiverse. Rather, as an agreemen-c which for us at l e a s t i s accidental 
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i t can only oe conceived through an i n t e l l i g e n t f i r s t cau,se". 
Martin commented, ".It i s very rare in the history of philosophy for a 
great thinker to e s t a o l i s h so close a connection with a prediscessor, 
and t h i s bold interpretation contrasts favour:ably with the Biany places 
in the Critique of Pure Reason in which Leibniz i s c r i t i c i s e d , often 
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with l i t t l e success." The interpretation i s such as to distort 
what Leibniz said, but Kant had to show that he was not as revolutionary 
as had f i r s t been supposed, though he had somsthi;ag important to say. 
•5Ie wished to have the great name of Leibniz on h i s own side jja order 
to counter the t a c t i c s of h i s opponent." Moreover, the work shows 
"that Kant was able to conduct a puolic debate, that he knew how to 
use vigorous ad hominem arguments, and that he could extricate himself 
from a d i f f i c u l t situation with a s k i l l yftiich commands our admiration .^^^ 
ICant was not only answering serious c r i t i c i s m from other thinkers 
at t h i s time, but from the state too. In 1786 Frederick William I I had 
succeeeded Frederick the Great to whom Kant had dedicated some of h i s 
own works. Frederick William's head of the department dealing with 
churches and schools was Wdillner, who published an edict threatening 
punishment to teachers who deviated from what was taken to be B i b l i c a l 
r e l i g i o n . "Writings dealing with religion were to be cerisored. Kant 
was an obvious target. He had shorn where he stood on the subject 
of censorship i n 1784 and 1786 i n the Berlin Monthly. But the 
outbreak of the French Revolution had signalled a reaction to anythjjig 
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that might be thought not to protect the old order, and t l i i s reaction 
affected Kant's production of further comment on theological issues. 
Thus when Kant had finished the f i r s t book, "Concerning the jjidwelling 
of the E v i l P r i n c i p l e with the Good, or, on the r a d i c a l e v i l i n human 
nature" of h i s Religion, he had i t published in A p r i l 1792, in the 
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Berlin Monthly wnich had moved to Jena to escape the censorship. 
Kant had submitted t h i s book to the censor in 1791, and i t had been 
passed because i t was judged no-c to be for the general reader. The 
second book, •'Concerning tlie c o n f l i c t of the good with the e v i l 
p r i n c i p l e for sbvereighty over man", was quickly finished and submitted 
to the censor i n J u l y . Permission to publish was refused, because the 
work was in part an attack on a certain kind of theology and on a 
reactionary c ^ s o r s h i p related to that theology. Nevertheless, Kant 
obtained approval l o r the work from the Faculty of Theology at K<toigsberg 
and the Faculty of Philosophy a t Jena, and published the whole work in. 
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1793. An understanding of the context explains the comments aoout 
censorship in the "preface" to the f i r s t edition and throughout the 
worfc, including h i s attention to Bayle's text. 
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Kant said that he represented " i n the four following essays, the 
relationship of the good and e v i l principles as that of two s e l f -
subsistent active causes influencing men". So he wished to discuss 
man's moral l i f e i n "manich,co»-t»•» terms, and in t h i s sense was offering 
a re-appraisal of Bayle's problem. I t would, however, be a mistake to 
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think that Kant i s a "manicheoi-*s'% i f that were understood to mean 
that he was offering a metaphysically correct explanation of man's moral 
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dilemmas. Such an explanation i s ruled out by h i s philosophical 
position, as by h i s theological convictions. This i s not to say 
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that there are no passages in the work which might not be relevant 
to a discussion of a theodicy derived from nature. One may note 
espe c i a l l y a moment in which once mere h i s attitude to man's physical-
i t y i s revealed, i n a note I n which he discussed the gospel records 
of. C h r i s t ' s resurrection. What he found peculiarly d i f f i c u l t auout 
these was the concept which he thought them to Involve, "of the 
materiality of a l l worldly beings, which i s , indeed, very well suited 
to man's mode of sensuous representation but which i s most burdensome 
to reason in i t s f a i t h regarding the future .^^^ Also, on occasion 
he could be seen to be reconsidering some of the themes of c l a s s i c a l 
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theodicy, as.when he wrote: 
Take a man who, honoring the moral law, allows the tliought to 
occur to him (he can scarcely avoid doing so) of what sort of 
world he would create, under the guidance of p r a c t i c a l reason, 
were such a thing in h i s power, a world into which, moreover, 
he would place himself as a member. He would not merely nake 
the very choice which i s determined by that, moral idea of the 
highest good, were he vouchsafed solely the I'ight to choose; 
he would also w i l l that such a world should by a l l means come 
into existence (because the moral law demands that the highest 
good possible through our agency should be r e a l i z e d ) . . . 
However, at the time when he was completing Book 1 of the Religion 
he had another essay completed, and t h i s i s the work to which one should 
turn to discover h i s f i n a l comment on theodicy. On the F a i l u r e of A l l 
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Philosophical Essays i n Theodicy insisted as one might expect that 
attention must be transferred away from a discussion of the divine 
attributes i n r e l a t i o n to the problem of e v i l , and given to an analysis 
of the experien.ce in which men encounter e v i l , and how they cope with 
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t h e i r experience. The essay i s a condensed exposition of Kant's 
approach to theology i n the course of which he shows the f u t i l i t y and 
the presumption of those who t r y to "defend" Crod. Kant reminded the 
reader that "our reason i s absolutely inadequate to the insight of 
the r e l a t i o n wiiich a wiorld, that we may always know by experience, 
bears the Supreme Wisdom; for then a l l further essays of opiniative 
human wisdom to know the ways of. Civine Wisdom, are t o t a l l y rejected 
The world, "as a divine publication of the designs of h i s w i l l " i s otten 
"a shut book" to us, attd i t i s p r a c t i c a l , rather than speculative reason, 
Tuaiicih may be c o n s i d e r e d t h e immediate declaration and voice of God, 
whereby he giveth a meaning to the l e t t e r of h i s creation The 
book of Job epitomised t h i s position for K ^ t . One issue of the book 
was that 
God deigned to disclose the wisdom oi h i s creation to Job on 
the side or i t s inscrutableness chiefly. He l e t him view not 
only the b e a u t i i u l side of the creation, where raids comprehensible 
to man set the wisdom and the beautiful care of the Author of the 
world i n a clear l i g h t , but the f r i g h t f u l side, by naming product-
ions of His potency to him and among them even pernicious dreadful 
things, every one oi which seems to be adjusted for i t s e l f and i t s 
species answeraoly to the end proposed, but with regard to others 
and even to men dgaifcructive, baffling the end, and not agreeing 
with a universal plan arranged by goodness and wisdom; whereby he 
however sheweth the disposition and the preservation o i the whole 
announcing the Wise Author of the world, thougji at the same time 
h i s ways, which are inscrutable to us, must be hidden even in the 
physical order of things, how much more then must they be so i n 
i t s connexion with the moral order (which i s yet more impenetrable 
to our reason).294 
Job was forgiven because oi h i s honesty, though Kant wryly remarked that 
he would very l i k e l y have "experienced a bad fate before a tribunal of 
dogmatical theologists or an i n q u i s i t i o n , 
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Consequently, what Kant did in the l a s t few years of h i s l i f e , 
was to s h i f t h i s attention to re-expressing h i s conviction i n the 
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"providence" oj- God. I t i s not therefore wliolly f a i r of C o l l i n s 
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to w r i t e : 
Along with expressing the repugnance of a theodicy to one»s 
rel i g i o u s s e n s i b i l i t y , however, Kant also ruled out any 
philosophical discussion of divine providence and j u s t i c e . 
He f a i l e d to note the difference between the way that these 
themes are treated i n a deductive theodicy and in a r e a l i s t i c 
philosophy of God. The .latter restr.ict3 i t s e l f to the bare 
proposition that God produced the world through wisdom, j u s t i c e 
and mercy and does not attenpt to deduce the divine purposes 
or set up a calculus oi divine choices. 
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Kant had written i n the Religion a note explaining what he meant by 
the word "fortunate": "An expression of everything wished for, or 
worthy of being wishfed for, which we can neither foresee nor bring 
about through our own endeavours according to the laws of experience, 
for which, therefore, i f we wish to name i t s source, we can offer none 
other than a gracious Providence." Kant's " r e a l i s t i c philosophy of 
God" had found a basis i n "practical reason" and could be expressed 
in h i s " p o l i t i c a l " writings where some of h i s most "optimistic" 
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assertions about human l i f e are to be found. So Cassixer wrote; 
Kant displays a Rousseauist outlook and mentality when he 
describes as mankind's greatest problem the establishment 
of a society of c i t i z e n s which administers law universally, 
and what! he regards the history of mankind in general as 
the fulfilment of a hidden plan of nature, designed to achieve 
an i n t e r n a l l y and, for t h i s purpose, externally perfect 
constitution. The theodicy problem can be solved only i n and 
througii the State. I t i s man's business and i t i s h i s l o f t i e s t 
task to accomplish the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of God - not by means of 
• metaphysical breedings over happiness and unhappihess and over 
good axid e v i l but by freely creating and freely shaping the 
order in accordance with which he wants to l i v e . 
C a s s i r e r elsewhere emphasised how Kant differed profoundly from Rousseau 
in h i s renunciation of any deinand for happiness, of any longing for a 
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mythical age i n which man did not have to Struggle for h i s culture 304 
Kant hoped for "gradually advancing reform" towards a neW state of 
a f f a i r s . "As for revolutions which might hasten t h i s progress, they 
r e s t i n the hands oi Providence and cannot be ushered i n according to 
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plan v/ithout damage to freedom." We may b r i e f l y indicate how he 
sometimes attenptea to integrate h i s p o l i t i c a l optimism with a picture 
of nature i n t h i s period when he was working out h i s f i n a l r e j e c t i o n 
of c l a s s i c a l theodicy going back f i r s t of a l l to h i s work i n the 1780s. 
In h i s Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose of 1784 
he wrote of man»s natural impulses, "the sources of the very imsociabie-
ness and continual resistance which cause so many e v i l s " , which at fhe 
same time "encourage man towards new exertions of h i s powers and thus 
towards further development oi' h i s natural capacities. They would 
thus seem to indicate the design of a wise ci'eator - not, as i t might 
seem the hand of malicious s p i r i t who had meddled in the creator fs 
glorious work or spoiled " i t out of envy .'^ ^^  There i s a hidden, plan 
of nature for the development of the human species and in the fulfi.lment 
of t h i s plan l i e s the '|justif ication oi nature or rather perhaps of 
providence". He asked, 'IFor what i s the use of lauding and holding 
up for contemplation the glory and wisdom of creation i n the non-rational 
sphere of nature, i f the history ol' mankind, the very part of t h i s great-
display of supreme wisdom which contains the purpose of a l l the r e s t , 
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i s to I'emain a constant reproach to everything e l s e ? " Fiirther, 
some of the themes of Religion appear in his l a t e r essays which 
30-) 
operate with t h i s " p o l i t i c a l optimism". In The End of A l l Things 
of 1794 he i n s i s t e d that the world i s not tlie battleground of two 
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perpetual p r i n c i p l e s of being, the good arid the bad, any more than 
i t could be understood i n terms of other analogies which represented 
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the abode of men "very despicably", " such as an inn, a house of 
correction, a madhouse or a common sewer. P r a c t i c a l reason does i t s 
best i n the furtlierance of man's best aims, and leaves the r e s t to 
. 1 312 Providence, "a concurrence of Divine wisdom to the coiirse of nature". 
The theme of "perpetual peace" i n the Religioji figures as tlie t i t l e 
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of h i s essay of 1795, Cto Perpetttal Peace. The guarantee of sudi . 
peace i s given, to man by nature, and Providence i s the name for the 
purpose manifested i n the course of nature, i n rel a t i o n to the origin 
of the world, as maintaining the course of nature, and as guiding 
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the world for special ends. Man i s not to invoke "providence" 
instead of a "p.hysico-mechanical" cause of phenomena, but may introduce 
the idea of "a divine concurrence" i n indicating the f a i t h that "God 
w i l l make good the imperfection of our human j u s t i c e , i f only our 
feelings and intentions are sincere .... and that by means beyond our 
comprehension, and therefore we should not slacken our efforts after 315 316 • what i s good .« Kant readily enough spoke of 'Inature" rather than God, so long as he was talking of "what nature does for her o\m 
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ends with regard to the human race as members of the animal world", 
axid changed to "Providence" v/hen he at l a s t came to talk of " j u s t i f i c a t i o n " 
of the "course of the world". So, once again he proposed that " i t 
seems that, by no theodicy or viiidication of the j u s t i c e of God, can 
we j u s t i f y Creation i n putting such a race of corrupt creatures into 
the world a t a l l , i f , that i s , we assume that the human race neither 
w i l l nor ever can be i n a happier condition than i t i s now 
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In conclusion, one may tlierefore suggest that Kant had attempted 
to tackle the idea that one could have, as the counterpart to one's 
theology, a pa r t i c u l a r t h e s i s about the way in viiich nature, in the 
biological sense, was ordered. He had fomid no absolutely necessary 
coherence between h i s concept of God, and the view of nature he 
preferred, t h o u ^ one seemed to s u i t the other, given h i s particular 
understanding of God. Thus f a r , h i s theology of a transcendent 
creator, and h i s viev of nature, could both i n a sense survive the • 
s h i f t i n h i s philosophical stance, exhibited in f u l l in h i s series 
.Critiques primarily, and also in h i s shorter essays. Leibniz 
had takm the particular theological enterprise of "a speculative 
contemplation of God to i t s l i m i t s . Kant came to see that there 
could iie no stage at which he cotild say that human Icnowledge of 
creatures was a r e p l i c a t i o n i n any sense of the divine knowledge of 
creatures, and yet continued to think of creatures in relation to God . 
with a persistence that might seem astonishing were one not conscious 
of h i s fascination with the stance of I«ibniz. 
Like Bayle, however, Kant found that there was no solution to tiie 
question of man's experience of l i v i n g i n God»s world, a world apparently 
h o s t i l e to man's discernment of h i s possible ultimate value. This 
h o s t i l i t y constantly threatened h i s view of nature ija i t s possible 
relationship to God. Although he could never e n t i r e l y abandon the 
attempt to say something about the beauty and oj?der of nature, f a i t h 
for him also became an expression of h i s stance as a moral being, 
standing "against" the natural order. The; f a i t h in God which he shared 
with Leibniz did not allow him to abandon altogether every aspect of 
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the Leibnizian programme for theodicy. He r e s t r i c t e d the scope of 
h i s attempt to contribute to that programme to the endeavour to 
find a coherence between h i s theology and man's et h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l 
l i f e , with a l l the wariness engendered by h i s c r i t i c a l standpoint. 
^yhether such an endeavour, which did not provide a theodicy of 
physical e v i l , deserves the t i t l e of "theodicy", remains another 
question. 
What could have been learned from Kant, had h i s opinions been 
assimilated by the relevant people i n time, was a certain detachment, 
not to say humility, about man's a b i l i t y to assess the works of h i s 
creator. Kant had looked at most of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which so 
excited various "philosophers" i n England. The heat could have been 
takcai out of the debate on the Origin i f i t had been seen that the 
issue was one of finding more or l e s s adequate patterns of explanation 
v/hich could be adopted in accordance with t h e i r helpfulness to the -task 
i n hand - tha.t of making sense of biological phenomena. There need 
have been no commitaient to the suggestion that the principles of 
explanation which referred to the alternative patterns necessarily 
expressed what was "objectively" txue of the creation as i t came from 
the hand of i t s creator. No-6ne need then lave gone on arguing as 
though the cojicept of the f i x i t y of species was an essential bulwark 
of a theodicy of physical e v i l . Nor need i t have been supposed that 
there was only one p r i n c i p l e of explanation that could cohere witli 
theology, or which Indeed v/as the sole and s u f f i c i e n t one for the 
imdsrstanding of the natural order i t s e l f . And i t might have been 
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seen that tlie principles of science and the fundamental issues of 
re l i g i o n had a more complex re3.ationship than perhaps was supposed, . 
i f indeed, they were e s s e n t i a l l y dependent upon one another. 
Yet Kant had been so concerned to emphasise the transcendence 
of God, thus saving nature from h i s interference, and displaying i t 
as a subject for s c i e n t i f i c enquiry, that even had h i s woi'k been 
appreciated, i t would not inevitably have followed tliat h i s God 
would be preferred to the God of Paley. The God of Leibniz was not 
a viable a l t e r n a t i v e for the readers of the Origin, since the Leibnizian 
t r a d i t i o n seems not to have been e f f e c t i v e l y transmitted, and continued 
except on the Continent, t u t Paley«s God seemed to be a "personal" 
God, and h i s design-tiieology was l e s s sbphisticated and.difficult than 
Kant's peculiar view of creatures iJi relation to God, Design-theoiogy 
received a new expression from Paley's eloquent pen, free of*<3omplex 
philosophical stance. I f the altei-native were the " c r i t i c a l " Kant 
or Paley, the choice would be for Paley, and all.detachment would be 
l o s t . Only Coleridge seems to have t r i e d to work something out, in 
. ;• • .. bu-t-
pre-Origijn days, from the basis of h i s reading of Kant, h i s writings 
made r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e contribution to the formation of a generally 
shared and dispassionate "mind" on the p o s s i b i l i t y of rela t i n g God 
to nature. In any case, whatever the pattern of explanation preferred, 
and wiiatever the concept of God employed, the problem of physical e v i l 
remained. The question then would be, what view, i f any, made i t 
t o l e r a b l e . 
, ' • • - 186 ~ • • . . 
Vfe may now leave t h i s consideration of theodicy as i t was 
discussed by Kant and turn to the discussion of the topic in the 
country of the Origin. We have payed some attention to Linnaeus, 
\rtiose name was associated with the concept .of the f i x i t y of species; 
and to Hume, who together with Leibniz, liad to a limited degree 
provoked Kant's conceni with theodicy. The . "philosophers" to whom 
attention w i l l be. given aire Mai thus, Erasmus Darwin, and Paley, who 
had each of them i n t h e i r own way been stimulated by the work of 
Hume to comment on theology i n re l a t i o n to nature, and incidentally 
to make various observations pertinent to theodicy. CoIe.ridge w i l l 
be considered, since he both reacted to Hume and h i s "successors" as 
considered i n t h i s exposition, and attempted, however haphazardly, to 
pay serious attention to what had been said oh the Continent, from 
Leibniz' day to h i s own. I t i s in connection with the study of 
Coleridge, therefore, that something w i l l be said about tiie transmission 
of Kant's work to England, to lead up to the period inmiediately before, 
and including, the publication of the Origin. 
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Section I I 
Maltlius to Coleridge 
. A. Mslthus 
There wei-e several l a t e eighteenth-century attempts in England 
to cope with theodicy, and we may look at the ones which seem to be 
taking notice of Hume*s "problems" in th e i r very different ways, and 
then a t what l i t t l e Coleridge had to say about theodicy, since he 
knew not only of Hume's work, l>ut something of Lejbniz' and Kant's 
as w e l l . 
One of the attempts to cope with theodicy was that of Malthus, 
whose Essay on the Principle-of Population, as i t affects the Future 
Improyement of Society, with remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, 
1 
M. Condorcet, and other wr i t e r s , appeared in 1798. I t i s true that 
t h i s essay i s only i n part an attempt to constmct an a posteriori 
theodicy, but Malthus does seem to be trying to comment both favourably 
and unfavourably on some of Hume's topics which had come up in h i s 
Dialogue, and i s therefore worth looking a t . 
Malthus* work was published anonymously, because i t was an attenpt 
to c r i t i c i s e a f a c i l e optimism prevalent i n his time about the 
p e r f e c t i b i l i t y of hunan institutions^and because i t offered a theodicy 
which some readers would not recognise as such. Malthus said in h i s 
introduction that the "view which he has given of human l i f e has a 
melancholy hue; but he f e e l s conscious, that he has drawn these dark 
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t i n t s , from a conviction that they are r e a l l y in the picture; and . 
2 
not from a jaundiced eye, or an inherent spleen of disposition." 
He wanted to draw attention to the principoU d i f f i c u l t y which lay 
ij i the way to the improvement of society. The f l i c k e r of the 
enlightenment i n England, which he described as "the ardent and 
unshackled s p i r i t of inquiry that prevails throughout the lettered, 
and even xmlettered world" provided him with h i s opportninity to r a i s e 
3 
h i s problem: 
I t i s , undoubtedly, a most disheartening r e f l e c t i o n , tliat the great 
obstacle i n the way to any extraordinary improvement in society, 
i s of a nature that we can never hope to overcome. The perpetual 
tendency in the race of man to increase beyond the means of 
subsistence, i ^ one of the general laws of animated nature, which, 
we can have no reason to expect w i l l change. Yet, discouraging 
as the ccaitemplation of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y must be to those whose 
exertions are laudably directed to the improvement of the human 
species, i t i s evident, that no possible good can a r i s e from any 
endeavours to s l u r i t over, or keep i t i n the backgroimd. On 
the contrary, the most baleful mischiefs may be expected from 
the unmanly conduct of not daring to face truth, because i t i s 
unpleasing. Independently of what relates to t h i s great obstacle, 
s u f f i c i e n t yet remains to be done for mankind, to animate us to 
the most unremitted exertion. But i f we proceed without a 
t h o r o u ^ knowledge^ and accurate comprehension of the nature, 
extent, and mag3iitude, of the d i f f i c u l t i e s we have to encounter, 
of i f we unwisely di r e c t our efforts towards an object, i n which 
we cannot hope for success; we shall not only exhaust our 
strength i n f n i i t l e s s exertions, and remain at as great dlstence 
as ever from the summit of our wishes; but we s h a l l be perpetually 
crushed by the riecoil of t h i s rock of Sisyphus.'^ 
He maiJitained that h i s most important argument was not new, and that 
the p r i n c i p l e s on which i t depended had been explained i n part by 
5 
Hume (whom he c l e a r l y admired for his clearness of perception) and 
wore a t large by Dr. Adam Smith and others. Mere supposition, "the 
probable r e a l i z a t i o n of which cannot be inferred upon any j u s t 
philosophical grounds"^ i s put out of court. What he wanted to 
look a t are those laws which could only be altered by "an immediate 
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act of power i n that Being who f i r s t arranged the system of the 
universe; and for the advantage of h i s creatures, s t i l l executes, 
7 
according to fixed laws, a l l i t s various operations." These laws 
he f i r s t indicated as follows: 
Througji the animal and vegetable kingdom, nature has scattered 
the seeds of l i f e abroad with the most profuse and l i b e r a l 
hand. She has been comparatively sparing in the room, and the 
nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence 
contained in t h i s spot of earth, with ample food, and ample 
room to expand i n , would f i l l millions of worlds in the course 
of a few thousand years. Necessity, that imperious a l l pervading 
law of nature, r e s t r a i n s them within the prescribed bounds. The 
race of plants, and the race of animals shrink under t h i s great 
r e s t r i c t i v e law. And tlie race of man cannot, by any efforts of 
reasbn, escape from i t . Among plants and animals i t s effects 
are waste of seed, sickness, and prenature death. Aiaong mankind, 
misery and v i c e . The former, misery, i s an absolutely necessary 
consequence of i t . Vice i s a highly probable consequence, and 
we therefore see i t abundantly prevail, but i t ought not, perhaps, 
to be called an absolutely necessary consequence.^ 
The importance of t h i s argument for him was that he saw " no way by 
which man can escape from the weigjit of t h i s law which pervades a l l 
animated nature." T h i s i s the fotmdation of h i s argument against 
the p e r f e c t i b i l i t y of human society. Aad in another chapter he added 
that though the v i c e s of man were sufficient i n many circumstances to 
keep ttie population down, nature also has s i c k l y seasons, epidemics, 
pestilence and plague to <»ffe** , and famine, "the l a s t , the most 
10 
dreadful resource of nature." The problem was an urgent one because 
"the period when the number of men surpass t h e i r means of subsistence 
11 i 2 has long since a r r i v e d . " Chapter v i i i , in which t h i s statement 
13 
i s made, and chapter i x , are the most central to the argumentj 
for reasons which w i l l be mentioned l a t e r . 
la chapter ix, i t i s c l e a r that what Malthus wants to do, given 
t h i s context, i s to distinguish between subjects with whic^. no r e a l 
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progress can be made from those where progress has been ma,rked, 
14 
certain, and aclmowledged. Systems were to be founded on facts 
15 
and not f a c t s bent to systems . i t was for him important to 
stress that the 
constancy of the laws of nature, and of effects and causes, 
i s the foTindation of a l l human knowledge; though f a r be i t 
from me to say, that the same power which framed and executes 
the laws of nature may not change tliem a l l *in a moment, i n 
the twinkling of an eye *. Such a change may undoubtedly 
happen. A l l I mean to say i s , that i t i s impossible to i n f e r 
i t from reasoning. I f wiuhout any previous observable 
symptoms or indications of a change, we can infei* that a 
change w i l l take place, we may as v^ell make any assertion 
whatever, and. think i t as Tinreasciiable to be contradicted, 
in affirming that the moon w i l l come into contact with the 
earth tomorrow, as i n saying that the sun w i l l r i s e a t i t s 
usiia l time. 16 
Given that constancy i t was fo r him absurd, because there was no 
r e l i a b l e evidence for i t , to suppose that "the l i m i t of human l i f e 
i s undefined; because you cannot mark i t s precise term, and say so 
far exactly s h a l l i t go and no further; that tlierefore i t s extent 
may increase for ever, and be properly termed, indefinite or unlimited." 
There could not for example, be no l i m i t wliatsoever to the select i v e 
breeding of Lei c e s t e r s h i r e sheep. Were that breeding to continue 
for ever, the sheep w i l l never have heads and legs of the size 
18 
appropriate to a r a t . " I t cannot be true, therefore, that among 
animals, some of the offspring w i l l possess the desirable q u a l i t i e s 
of the parents i n a greater degree; or that animals are in d e f i n i t e l y 
19 
p e r f e c t i b l e . " Another example could be taken from the se l e c t i v e 
breeding involved i n the c u l t i v a t i o n of a garden flower from a wild 
20 
one. There was a fundamental f a l l a c y in the argument "which i n f e r s 
an unlimited progress, merely because some p a r t i a l improvement has 
21 
taken place," and because i t s l i m i t could not be pi-ecisely ascertained. 
17 
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On^the other hand i t was not impossible to suppose that "by an 
attention to breed, a certain degree of improvement, similar to 
that among animals, might take place among men." However, he 
doubted whe-Kier i n t e l l e c t could be communicated , though he cm ceded 
that s i z e , strength, beauty, complexion, and even longevity might be 
transmissable to a degree. What was necessary was to discriminate 
between a small improvement, the l i m i t of which was undefined, and an 
improvemeat r e a l l y unlimited. Malthus knew of no well-directed 
attempts to control the "breed" of a family, "except i n the ancient 
family of. the Bickerstaff s, who are said to have been very successful 
in whitening t h e i r skins, and increasing the height of tAeir race by 
prudent marriages, p a r t i c u l a r l y by that very judicious cross with 
^felud, the milk-maid, by which some capital defects i n the constitutions 
of the family were corrected." Moreover an improvement in the human 
race as a whole would involve "conderaning a l l the bad specimens to 
23 
celibacy". 
What i s i n t e r e s t i n g i s that i n chairter x v t i i he showed that he 
was prepared to abandon the "Butlerian" view that the world i s "a 
state of. t r i a l and school of vir t u e , preparatory to a superior state 
25 
of happiness" and offer another view, which displayed the world as 
26 
"a mighty process for awakeniiig matter into mind." i t i s t h i s 
view which offered a correction of Hume, and enabled him to s t a r t 
t a l k i n g about God's goodness, i n relation to the laws of nature 
which otherwise so appalled him. H u j i ^ had h i t on a clue, that of 
mind a r i s i n g from matter, taut had not seen what i t implied. Malthus' 
view appeared to him "to be more consistent with the various phenomena. 
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of nature which we observe around us, and more constant to our ideas 
27 
of the power, goodnes^ and foreknowledge of the Deity," but he was 
s t i l l suspicious of any claim to a f u l l y rational comprehension of 
things: , 
I t cannot be considered as an miimproving exercise of the human 
mind to endeavour to ^Vindicate the ways of God to man', i f we 
proceed with a proper d i s t r u s t of our own understandings, and a 
j u s t sense of our insufficiency to conpi:^hend the reason of a l l 
that we see: i f we h a i l every ray of l i ^ i t with gratitude; 
and when no l i g h t appears, think that the darkness i s from within, 
and not from without; - and bow with humble deference to the 
supreme wisdom of him, whose 'thoughts are ^ ^ove our thoughts*, 
•as the heavens are high above the earth*. 
Tne fimdamental point to which he returned repeatedly was that we must 
reason from nature to God and not attempt to argue the other way . 
roimd. So he embarks on another correction of Hume; 
The moment we allow ourselves to ask why some things are not 
otherwise, instead of endeavouring to account for them, as they 
are, we s h a l l never know where to stop; we s h a l l be led into 
the grossest, and most ch i l d i s h absurdities: ' a l l progress in 
the knowledge of the ways of providence must necessarily be at 
an end; and the study w i l l even cease to be an improving 
exercise of the human mind, i n f i n i t e power i s so vast and 
inconprehensible an idea, that the mind of man must necessarily 
be bewildered in the contemplation of i t . With the crade and 
puerile conceptions which we sometimes form of t h i s attribute 
to Deity, we might imagine that God could c a l l into being 
myriads, and myriads of existences; a l l free from pain and 
imperfection; a l l eminent in goodness and wisdom;, a l l 
capable of the higjiest enjoynents; and unnumbered as the 
points throughout i n f i n i t e space.29 
There was no need for these "vain and extravagant dspeams of fancy".' 
¥^hat he saw was "a constant succession of sentient beings, r i s i n g 
apparently from so many specks of matter, going through a long and 
sometimes painful process in t h i s world; but many of them attaining, 
ere the termination of i t , such higii qxialities and powers, as seem to 
31 
indicate t h e i r f i t n e s s for some superior state." We should not, 
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therefore, "exalt the power of God at' the expense of h i s goodness," 
but rather conclude "that even to the Great Creator, Almig^ity as he 
i s , a certain process may be necessary, a certain time, (or at lea s t 
what appears to us as time) may be requisite, i n order to form beings^ 
with those exalted q u a l i t i e s of mind which w i l l f i t them for h i s 
32 
h i ^ purposes". We might suppose therefore, that "the various 
impressions and excitements which nan receives through l i f e , may 
be cmsidored as the forming hand of h i s Creator, acting by general laws, 
and awakening h i s sluggish existence , by the animating touches of the 
Divin i t y , into a capacity of superior enjoyment. The o r i g i n a l sin 
of man, i s the torpor and corruption of the chaotic matter i n which 
33 
he may be said to be born." This was the employment which i s 
34 
"surely worthy of the highest attributes of the Deity." The 
probability that t h i s was the rigiit supposition i s reinforced i f we 
could thus account "even to our narrow understandings, for many of 
those roughnesses and ine q u a l i t i e s in l i f e , which querulous nan too 
frequently makes the subject of h i s complaint against the God of 
35 
nature." So i n attempting to deal with physical e v i l , he mentioned 
that pain and physical want were necessary to produce mind: 
To furnish the most unremitted excitements, and to ixrge man 
to further the gracious designs of Providence by the f u l l 
c u l t i v a t i o n of the earth, i t has .been ordained, that population 
should increase much fas t e r than food. This general law, (as 
i t lias app6arfed in the former parts of th i s essay) uiidoubtedly 
produces aiuch p a r t i a l e v i l ; but a l i t t l e r e f l e c t i o n may, 
perhaps, s a t i s f y us, that i t produces a great overbalance of 
good.36 
Here Walthus returned to h i s theme of the constancy of general laws, 
and h i s denial of the interference of God in natural processes. " I f 
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in the ordinary course of things, the finger of God were frequently 
v i s i b l e ; or to speak more correctly, i f God were frequently to 
change his purpose, (for the finger of God i s , indeed, v i s i b l e in 
every blade of grass that we see) a general and f a t a l torpor of 
37 
the human f a c u l t i e s would probably ensue." To him i t seemed 
in every way probable "bhat even the acknowledged d i f f i c u l t i e s 
occasioned by the law of population, tend rather to promote than 
38 
impede the general purpose of Providence." 
' The extremes of excitement, or the lack of i t , however, as of 
riches or poverty, might not be favourable to the growth of mind, 
"but i t i s c m t r a i y to the analogy of a l l nature, to expect that 
the whole of society can be a middle region. "^^ l a chapter xix'*^ 
he explained h i s hopes for t h i s "widdle region" 6f society, as being 
the area in which i n t e l l e c t u a l ii^provement might be most expected. 
I t was nature, i n her i n f i n i t e variety, which was the stiffldlus here. 
The shades that are here and there blended in the picture, give 
s p i r i t , l i f e , and prominence to her exuberant beauties; and 
those roughnesses and i n e q u a l i t i e s , those i n f e r i o r parts that 
support the superior, though they sometimes offend tlie 
fastidious microscopic eye of short-sighted man, contribute 
to the symmetry, grace, and f a i r proportion of the whole.^ 
Variety coxild e x i s t without i n f e r i o r parts, or apparent blemislies, 
and 'taature i s admirably adapted to further the high purpose of the 
42 
creation and to produce the greatest possible quantity of good". 
Thus the "darkness" that obscured metaphysical subjects was 
i t s e l f a further stimulus to knowledge, and 'revelation* might damp 
43 
the w;lngs of man's, i n t e l l e c t . ' Any actual infringement of the general 
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laws of nature, however, appeared "in the l i ^ t of the immediate hand 
of God mixing new ingredients into the m i ^ t y mass, suited to the 
particular state of the process, and calculated to give r i s e to a 
new and powerful t r a i n of impressions, tending to pii r i f y , e xalt, 
44 
and improve the human mind." Such a revelation of the divine w i l l 
was attended with doubts and d i f f i c u l t i e s , but t h i s was no argument 
against the divine o r i g i n of the scriptures which were suited to 
the improvement of human f a c u l t i e s , and the moral amelioration of 
45 
mankind. 
Malthus saw that b u i l t into h i s work was the assumption that 
i t was impossible that e v i l should ever be removed from the world, 
since God needed e v i l i n i t s physical aspect to form matter into 
mind. He maintained that the weight of e v i l , the necessity expressed 
in h i s "law" existed not to create despair but a c t i v i t y , and "the 
continual variations in.the weight, and the distribution of t h i s 
46 
pressure kieep a l i v e a constant expectation of throwing i t o f f . " 
Man's exertions i n h i s c i r c l e of Influence would enable him, most 
probably, to improve and exalt h i s own mind, and f u l f i l the w i l l of 
47 
his Creator. This was Malthus' ground for maintaining that i t was 
our duty to adopt whatever schemes of socia l improvement seemed to 
be appropriate despite the lack of confidence he evidently f e l t about 
their ultimate importance for anyone other than the particular 
individuals viho might be involved. 
Considering that t h i s f i r s t essay was written without any attempt 
49 
to present supporting "evidence" for Ifeilthus' main t h e s i s , i t may be 
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taken as a good example of the kind of thinking in r e l a t i o n to some 
theological topics of a reasonably well-educated curate of the day, 
who came from a home where h i s father knew Huffle and Rousseau and 
• 50 
Godwin, who had a mind formed by the thinking of the past, and 
brought i t to bear on a contemporary problem as he saw i t . I t was 
t h i s combination of a b i l i t i e s which Valey saw as resulting in a piece 
ot work complementary to h i s own, Natural Theology. The revised 
version of Malthus' Essay which he brought out in 1803 under his name^ 
i s a very different piece of work. I t i s t h i s version, now called 
An Essay on the P r i n c i p l e of Population, or a View of i t s r a s t and 
Present E f f e c t s on Human Happiness, which made him important i n the 
nineteenth century, not as a w r i t e r of theodicy, but as a demographer, 
economist and sociologist, I t created for Malthus as nany friends as 
enemies, (and the l a t e r approval of M i l l ) , and had Mai thus adopted as 
51 
a prophet of the s e c u l a r i s t s . T h i s second version was to.run into 
many editions, and Malthus* "law" was to be described by the Lord 
Chief J i i s t i c e as an "irrefrageable t r u t h " in 1887 during the hearing 
52 
of the Bradlaugh-Besant case. In the short time between the writing 
of the two books Malthus had amassed a l o t of material from a great 
variety of sources, including h i s t o r i e s both ancient and modern, and 
accounts of voyages and expeditions. Material culled from Buffon 
could be put together with Hume's essay on "The Populousness of Ancient 
Nations" which he now used more extensively. Reference could also be 
made to Paley's writings on morality, and his natural theology which 
53 
had recently come out i n which Malthus* o\m f i r s t essay was cited 
with approval. He now also revealed that he had indeed read Hurae's 
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Dialogues, and that he had taken as one of h i s principles Hume's 
statement that "almost a l l the moral as well as natiu-al e v i l s of 
54 
hunan l i f e a r i s e from idleness." Althougji h i s work was different 
i n character from tlie e a r l i e r version he wanted to make i t clear. 
that he did not absolutely repudiate what he had said there ^  but 
by drav/ing on the material he now found to be available, he wanted 
55 
xo give h i s t h e s i s a. more pra c t i c a l and permanent interest. This 
accounts faeHv J'«v the material he had adopted from the older essay 
into the new one, and for what he had omitted from that older work, 
because that material did not s u i t the different plan of treating 
the subject which he had now adopted * Theodicy was no longer a 
manageable topic. The paragraph about Nature scattering the seed 
57 
of l i f e was kept, and i s to be found at the vei'y beginning of the 
new work. I t i s also easy to find edioes of themes of h i s e a r l i e r 
work, including h i s theological reflections, none of which are 
important in t h i s new version. In f a c t , were i t not for having 
looked at the e a r l i e r material, cne would e a s i l y dismiss them as 
expressions of ccaivehtional piety which could be of no importance 
to the w r i t e r . What t h i s work r e f l e c t s i s an i n a b i l i t y t o r e l a t e 
h i s theology to h i s other knowledge, and yet a reluctance to discard 
that theology altogether, however incoherent i t was. I t may be 
signi f i c a n t that chapter x v i i i disappeared, despite the author's 
e a r l i e r conviction that i t did represent what was happening In the 
natm'al order, and so, inevitably, did chapter xix. The one major section 
that was kept was chapters v i i i and ix of the f i r s t work, '.vhidi 
60 
now appears as one cliapter, "Of systems of Eqixality-Wallace-
Condorcet", with some minor al t e r a t i o n s of v.'ording. 
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Both Darwin and Wallace are on record as maintaining that i t 
was t h e i r readiiig of Malthus that provided them with the i r interpret-
ation of what they were seeing and recording on t h e i r respective 
voyages and expeditions. What i s not clear i s whether i t was the 
f i r s t or second version of Malthus* work that they read. However, 
given the s t i r created by the second version, and the f a c t that 
the essay of 1803 went through four more editions in Malthus* 
lif e t i m e alone, i t i s f a i r to surmise that i t i s t h i s one they 
read. Even t h i s essay, however, was seen by a few to r a i s e the 
old theological i s s u e s . Thomas Doubleday's work of 1842, The True 
61 
Law of Population shown to be coainected with the good of the People, 
stated m i t s "preface" the author's "general conviction of the 
benevolence of the Deity, and the wonderful providence by which, 
luider the agency of an unseen law, mirecognised and imthought of, 
the happiness of mankind i s often regulated and aciiieved upon a 
scale of moral government, of which the human eye can only see 
portions, and which the human i n t e l l e c t can only apprehend in part," 
Like Ealey, one postulate fundamental for h i s reasoning, was the 
63 
goodness of God, and on t h i s b a s i s he tackled Malthus* mistakes. 
64 
And M.T. Sadler's two volume works of 1830 The Law of Population, 
with-a quotation from Pope on the t i t l e page, c r i t i c i s e d ifeilthus 
precisely because h i s work "lowers the character of the Deity in 
that a t t r i b u t e , which, as Rousseau has well observed, i s the most 
65 
e s s e n t i a l to him, h i s goodness, or otherwise impugns his xi'dsdom ..." 
This wri t e r preferred a picture of "the omnipotent Father, grasping 
in h i s almighty hand th a t golden chain, bright with benevolence and 
mercy, by which he sustains from the heights of eternity h i s 
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universal offspring." God had not. l e f t h i s offspring to be regulated 
by the i n f l i c t i o n s of Malthus' "Manichean p r i n c i p l e . " ^ " Sadler and 
Doubleday i n effect Itiform us about one reason why Malthus dropped 
the themes of theodicy from the second version of h i s essay, though 
he was not careful enough to remove a l l reference to the Deity from 
i t . • A Deity responsible for Malthus' "law" and the theodicy to 
which i t was related, was not, i t seemed, a deity to be worshipped 
for h i s goodness. 
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B. Erasmus Darwin 
Another "philosopher" who was influenced by both Linneaus and 
David Hume was Charles Darwin's grandfather, Erasmus. A certain 
amount of attention has been paid to his contribution to the 
development of the theory of evolution as expressed by Charles 
Darwin. As one writer, Desmond King-Kele,^ remarked, Erasmus i s 
gtaierally credited, together with Lamarck and h i s grandson Charles ^  
as being one of the three most i n f l u e n t i a l contributors to the 
theory. King-Hele also noted that Erasmus was far moreiaware of 
the r e l i g i o u s and philosophical implications of evolution than was 
h i s grandson, and t h i s assessment i n particular needs looking at 
c a r e f u l l y . Erasmus was by profession neither philosopher, theologian 
nor n a t u r a l i s t , but a medical practitioner who was philosophically-
minded. He was a member of tlie Lunar Society which included mn such' 
as Galton and Wedgwood, themselves members of families a l l i e d in 
marriage to h i s own, and he was a member of some of the L i t e r a r y 
and Philosophical S o c i e t i e s being formed up and down the country in 
the 1770«s and a f t e r . H is inaugural address to the society he himself 
founded i n Derby in 1784 included the following statement: 
As we are fashioned and constituted by the niggard hand of 
Nature with such imperfect and contracted f a c u l t i e s , with 
so few and such imperfect senses; while the bodies which 
surround us are indued with i n f i n i t e variety of properties; 
with attractions, repulsions, gravitations, exhalations, 
p o l a r i t i e s , minuteness, i r r e s i s t a n c e , e t c . Y i i i c h are not 
cognizable by our d u l l organs of sense, or not adapted to 
them; what are we to do? S h a l l we s i t down contented with 
ignorance, and a f t e r we have procured our food, sleep away 
our time l i k e the inhabitants of the woods and pastures? 
No, certainly? - since there i s another way by which we may 
i n d i r e c t l y become acquainted with those properties of 
bodies which escape our senses; and that i s by observing 
and registering t h e i r e f f e c t s upon each other. Tnis i s the 
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tree of knowledge, whose f r u i t forbidden to the bnite creation 
has been plucked by the daring hand of experimental philosophy ... 
I hope at some distant time, perhaps not very distant, by our o\vn 
publications we may add something to the common-heap of Imowledge; 
which I prophesy w i l l never cease to accumulate so long as the 
human footstep i s seen upon the earth.*^ 
His p a r t i c u l a r contribution to the common heap of knowledge was in 
the f i r s t instance h i s Zoonomia; or, the Laws of Organic L i f e of 
4 5 1794. Charles Darwin«!3 short biographical essay on h i s grandfather, 
included the information that the Zoonomia had been i n preparation for 
many years before i t s publication,, and that Erasmus had thought of 
publisliing i t anonymously as early as 1775. And he wrote to Charles' 
father i n 1792: »>I am studying my 'Zoonomia', >i3iich I think I sha l l 
publish, iji hopes of s e l l i n g i t , as I am now too old and hardened 
to f e e l a l i t t l e abuse The work was dedicated to v i r t u a l l y 
the only body i n England which provided a s c i e n t i f i c t r a i i i j i i g and 
education - the College of Physicians - tog-ether with the Royal 
Philosophical Society and the two u n i v e r s i t i e s , and "to anyone else 
who studies the operation of the mind as a science or practises 
medicdxie as a profession." A poem dedicated to Erasmus by one Dewhurst 
Bilsbarrow of Trjjaity College, Cambridge,also formed part of the 
7 
introductory matter. T h i s poem concluded witix the l i n e s J 
" T i l l , l i n k by l i n k with step aspiring trod, 
You climb from NATURE to the throne of GOD, 
- So saw the Patriarch with admiring eyes 
From earth to heaven a golden ladder r i s e ; 
Involved i n clouds the BQrstic scale ascends, 
And brutes and angels crowd the distant ends." 
The purpose of thus placing the poem was to allow Erasmus Darwin to 
give the f i r s t volume of the Zoonomia a s u p e r f i c i a l l y theolog:ical 
r 
framework of reference. Tne l a s t paragraphs related what he had 
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said i n the body of the work to what he was prepared to write 
about the " f i n a l cause" of a l l , 
the motivej for the accomplishment of whic*L the preceding 
cliain of causes was put into action. The idea of a f i n a l 
cause, therefore, includes that of a rational mind, which 
employs means to e f f e c t i t s purpose ... This perpetual 
chain of causes and effects, whose f i r s t l i n k i s r i v e t t e d 
to the throne of GOD, divides i t s e l f into innumerable 
diverging branches, which, l i k e the nerves a r i s i n g from 
the brain, permeate the most minute and most remote 
extremeties of the system, diffusing motion and sensation 
to the whole. 
Modern discoveries i n chemistry and geology he went on, served to 
i l l u s t r a t e God's power, and need not lead to atheism. He drew to 
a pious conclusion by the use of composite quotation from the Psalms. 
On various occasions in the work he appeared to be trying, however 
9 
s u p e r f i c i a l l y , to r e l a t e what he had to say about "jaauure" to God, 
as he did i n h i s "preface"^which indicated one of h i s most important 
themes. He there said that he wanted to tinravel a theory of 
diseases by means of what he c a l l e d a comparison of animal l i f e , 
having previously c l a s s i f i e d i t ±ito orders, genera and species. 
•The great CREATOR of a l l things has i n f i n i t e l y d i v e r s i f i e d the works 
of h i s hands, but has a t the same time stanped a Geri:ain similitude 
on the features of nature, that demonstrates to us, that the whole 
i s one family of one parent. On t h i s similitude i s grounded a l l 
10 
rational Sinaiogy ..." He also remarked that t h i s theory "appears 
to have been shadowed or allegorized in the curious account i n 
11 
sacred w r i t of tlie formation of Eve from a r i b of Adam." 
Erasmus not only used Linnaeus* System Na-burae but claimed to 
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have the authority of Linnaeus on h i s side not for the notion of 
the f i x i t y of species, but for the theory that so f a r as vegetables 
a t l e a s t were concemed, very few were originally created and that 
the complex forms now laiown arose because of the "perpetual contest 
for l i g h t and a i r above ground, and for food and moistaire beneath 
the s o i l ... from climate or other causes." Erasmus was prepared 
to apply the same kind of explanation to the "tribes of animals", 
and indeed to wr3.te that "as the earth and ocean were probably peopled 
with vegetable productions long before the existence of animals; and 
many families of these animals long before other families of them, 
s h a l l we conjecture that one and the same kind of l i v i n g filament 
12 
i s and has been the cause of a l l organic l i f e ? " The strength of 
the case for regarding him as a precursor of Lamarck and Charles 
Darwin l i e s s p e c i a l l y i n one section of the work, where he i l l u s t r a t e d 
13 
h i s t h e s i s , and the emphasis he there gave to certain points. He 
took some of h i s clues from what he saw happening to animals imder 
domestication and select i v e breeding, as well as from the ciianges 
which he believed were " i n part produced by thej.r own exertions in 
consequence of t h e i r desires and aversions, of their pleasures and 
pains, or of i r r i t a t i o n s , or of associations; and many of these 
acquired forms or propensities are transmitted to t h e i r posterity." 
And there are three pa r t i c u l a r "objects of desire", which "tmve changed 
the forms of maiiy animals by t h e i r exertions to gratify them" - namely 
14 
l u s t , hunger, and security. He carefully dissociated h i s theory 
from any theory of "prefoi-mation", or at any rate from one of i t s 
cruder versions which was current. 
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Many ingenious philosophers have found so great d i f f i c u l t y 
i n conceiving the manner of the reproduction of animals, 
that they have, supposed a l l the numerous progeny to have 
existed i n miniature i n the animal o r i g i n a l l y created; and 
that these inf i a i t e l y minute forms are only evolved or distended 
as the embryon increases i n the womb. T h i s idea, besides i t s 
being unsupported by any analogy we are acquainted with, 
ascribes a greater tenuity to organized matter than we can 
readily admit; as these iixcluded embryons are supposed each 
of them to consist of the various and complicate parts of 
animal bodies: they must posses a much greater degree of 
minuteness, than that which was ascribed to the devils that 
tempted St. Anthony; of whom 20,000 were said to be able to 
dance a saraband on the point of the f i n e s t needle without 
incommoding each other.^S 
As w e l l as claiming the authority of Linnaeus, Darwin c i t e d Hume, 
16 
together with Locke and Berkeley, as an authority on "ideas". He 
also derived some clues iErom Hume which suggested, to him that i n h i s 
. development of what he understood Linnaeus to be proposing he was on 
the right l i n e s : 
The l a t e Mr. David Hume, in h i s posthumous works, places the 
powers of generation much above those of our boasted resason; 
and adds, that reason can only make a machine; and probably 
from having observed, that the greatest part of the earth has 
been formed out of organic recrements .. . he concludes that 
the world i t s e l f might have been generated rather than created; 
that i s , i t might have been produced from very small beginnings, 
increasing by the a c t i v i t y of i t s inherent principles, ralther 
than by a sudden evolution of the v/hole by the Almightyf i a t . 
No doubt Hume himself would have t h o u ^ t E!rasmus» Speculative extra-
polation from h i s views absolute nonsense, but the l a t t e r ' s words are 
interesting evidence of the way someone could read the Dialogues 
shortly a f t e r t h e i r publication. Erasmus continued: 
What a magnificent idea of the i n f i n i t e power of THE GREAT 
ARCHITECT I THE CAUSE OF CAUSES! PARENT OF PARENTS! ENS 
ENTIUM! For i f we may compare i n f i n i t i e s , i t would seem 
to require a greater i n f i n i t y of power to cause the causes 
of e f f e c t s , than to cause the effects themselves. T h i s 
idea i s analogous to the improving excellence observable in 
every part of the ci-eation; such as i n the progressive 
increase of the s o l i d or habitable parts of the earth from 
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water; and in the progressive increase of the wisdom 
and happiness of i t s inliabitants; and i s consonant to 
the idea of our present situation beingr a state of 
probation, which by our exertions we may improve, and 
are consequently responsible for our actions.^''' 
Having paid necessary tribute to piety he made the comment that 
"the greatest part of the earth has been formed out of organic 
recrem^ts", together with some remarks which one i s hard put to 
decide whether he could possibly have meant seriously. 
As the habitable parts of the earth have been and continue 
to be, perpetually increasing by the production of sea-
s h e l l s and c o r a l l i n e s , and by the recrements of other 
animals, and vegetables; so from the beginning of the 
existence of t h i s terraqueous globe, the animals, which 
Inhabit i t , have constantly improved, and are s t i l l i n a 
state of progressive improvement. This idea of the ' 
gradual generation of a l l things seems to have been as 
f a m i l i a r to the ancient philosophers as to the modern 
ones; and to have given r i s e to the beautiful hieroglyphic 
figure of WieTTporov oiov ^ or f i r s t great egg, produced 
by NIGHT, that i s , whose origin i s involved in obscurity, 
and animated by epos, that i s , by DIVINE LOVE; from 
whence proceeded a l l thjngs which exist.•'^ 
One must emphasise, however, that both the occasional expression 
of r e l i g i o u s sentiment, and the ideas about "evolution" form a ves^ 
small part indeed of Erasmus' work. What he was seeking was "A 
•. ,. • / 
theory founded upon nature, that should bind together the scattered 
f a c t s of medical knowledge, and converge into ctie point of view the 
laws of organic l i f e " . Such a comprehensive view could contribute 
to society in a variety of ways, i n encouraging good men to be doctors, 
in enabling the public to distinguish good from bad medicine, and above 
a l l , i t 'Nvould teach mankind i n some important situations the loiowiedg^ 
19 
of themselves". ' His discussion of "human sentiments" i n volume 11 
was always under the control of t h i s interest in self-lmowledge. 
He described as " i n t e l l e c t u a l cowardice" the kind of credulity that 
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had been i n s t i l l e d into people about miracles, for example, with 
regard to whiclx he said, "^ the golden rule of David Hume may be 
applied with great advantage, »When two mii'aculous assertions 
oppose each other, believe the l e s s m i r a c u l o u s . H e also 
dismissed the t e r r o r of h e l l as a belief "derogatory to the Creator 
24 
of a l l things." Wh^ he came to discuss "Pity", however, i t i s 
noteworthy that he regarded i t as the foundation of our moral sense 
and the source of a l l our v i r t u e s . Maii's sympaaiy with animals 
would lead him never to k i l l them, were i t not apparent that the 
condition of a l l creatures was properly expressed in the " f i r s t law 
of nature", as 'Eat or be eaten". He commented -feat"We cannot long-
e x i s t without the destruction of other.animal or vegetable beings .. 
but urged people to distinguish between the sympathy to be acted upon 
with regard to the remediable e v i l s of l i f e , and the fortitude necessary 
22 . 
to cope with irremediable e v i l s . 
The themes and interest of Erasmus in writing t h i s work were 
c l e a r l y the same as those of llalthus, but should probably be read as 
p a r a l l e l examples of the kind of "philosophy" being produced in England 
±n the l a t e eighteenth century. There i s no reason to suppose with 
23 
C D . Darlington, that Erasmus* work actually prompted that of 
Malthus, since the l a t t e r »s concern i n i t i a l l y was with a certain kind 
of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l philosophy related to theology, and Erasmus* 
concern was with medicine. Another point i s that the success of the 
Zoonomia (three editions in seven years and translation into French, 
German, Russian and I t a l i a n ) may have resulted in i t s being an important 
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influence on Lamarck. However, the kind of thinking which came 
to be known as "lamarckianism", perhaps v/ith some i n j u s t i c e to 
Lamarck himself, was exhibited i n one section of Thomas Bro^TO»s 
24 
Observations on the Zoonomia of 1798, prior to the knowledge of 
Lamarck's work i n England. Erasmus* hypothesis of generation rather 
than creation was a j u s t opinion,this c r i t i c asserted, " i f the 
25 
inconceivable be the source of the magnificent". The idea of 
the "single l i v i n g filament" was a bold, a p r i o r i idea, a t t r a c t i v e 
i n i t s s i m p l i c i t y , but i t was not c l e a r how the filament was supposed 
to contain within i t s e l f , or to produce, the present different species. 
The writer continued: 
Dr. Darwin seems to consider the animals of former times, as 
possessing powers, much superior to those of the i r posterittj. 
They reasoned on t h e i r wants; they wished; and i t was done. 
Tne boar, which o r i g i n a l l y differed l i t t l e from the other beasts 
of the forest, f i r s t obtained tusks, because he conceived them 
to be useful weapons, and then, by another process of reasoning, 
a thick, s h i e l d - l i k e shoulder, to defend himself from the tusks 
of h i s fellows. Tne stag in l i k e manner, formed to himself 
horns, at once sharp, and branched for the different purposes 
of offence and defence. Some animals obtained wings, others 
f i n s , and others swiftness of foot; while the vegetables 
exerted themselves, i n inventing varied modes of concealing, 
and defending t h e i r feeds and honey. 
His c r i t i c i s m of Darwin was that no-one could set bounds to t h i s kind 
of argument. And, " I f we admit the supposed capacity of producing 
organs by the mere f e e l i n g of a want, man must have greatly degenerated, 
or been o r i g i n a l l y i n f e r i o r i n power." No amoimt of wishing w i l l now 
enable man to grow wings, and the same observation applies to other 
animals, i n whom 'teo improvements of form have been observed ... 
since the f i r s t dawnlngs of zoology." They too, must have l o s t the 
power of pTOduction, rather than to have attained what they desired. 
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" I f we may be allowed to judge, from t h e i r situation, the hare lias 
s t i l l , i n the chase, the same reason, as the bii*ds of old, to wish 
for wings, and the dove for greater swiftness of f l i g h t , to escape 
from the pursuin.g hawk; Yet the scale of i n f e r i o r i t y s t i l l subsists; 
and such i s the order of nature, that the strength of a l l i s supported 
27 
by the weakness of a l l . " There was in t h i s kind of c r i t i c i s m no 
argument about the " f a c t " of a.certain "hierarchy" i n creatures. 
And "hierarchy" was mentioned i n connection with an awareness 
that t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y Involved the destmction of one creature by 
another. Also, as i n the work of Erasmus Darwin himself as w e l l as 
in that of Malthus, there was a recognition that mail's awareness of 
t h i s destruction was one of the miseries of human l i f e , which might 
be made tolerable only by exertions to improve joan's l o t . Such 
exertion was in. accord with the general tendency exhibited by 
creatures as a whole. 
In h i s Phytologia; or the Philosophy of Agriculture and Gardening 
of 1800, Erasmus produced another version of h i s thesis about the 
formation of geological s t r a t a , and urged the view that the progressive 
building up of strata gave pleasure to those organised beings which 
formed them. This time he concluded: "We hence acquire t h i s sublime 
and interesting idea; that a l l the calcareous momtains in the world, 
and a l l the s t r a t a of clay, coal, marl, sand, and iron, which are 
incumbent on them, are MONUlVffiNTS OF THE PAST FELICITY OF 0RGANIZI5D 
NATURE! - AND CONSEQUENTLY OF THE B.ENEVOIENCE OF THE DEITY I "^® 
Shortly a f t e r drawing t h i s edifying corollary, when he embarked on 
28 
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a discussion of Linnaean c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , he proposed that the 
"mutability or uncertainty of the numbers of the organs of 
reproduction belonging to individual flowers, would seem to a r i s e 
from an attempt of a l l organized beings towards greater perfection .. 
Aiid he wrote of "the perpetual progress of a l l organised beings 
from l e s s to greater perfection e x i s t i n g from the beginning of tine 
to the end of i t r a power impressed on nature by the great Father 
30 
of a l l . " This remark was presumably his way of ti-ying to make 
hiss speculations acceptable to h i s more pious readers. . The more 
one reads of Erasmus Darwin's work, the more one i s drivcaa to the 
conclusion that he thought of himself as e s s e n t i a l l y a px<actical nan 
who n e c e s s a r i l y had to t r e a t of a theology which did not matter to 
him personally to make h i s work puolicly acceptable. Yet he did not 
Ignore the other side of the picture labelled "the happiness of 
31 
organic l i f e " . _ The law of l i f e , as he said in Zoonomia, .is "eat or 
be eaten", so he could draw a picture of the world as "one great 
slaughter house, one universal scene of rapacity and i n j u s t i c e ! " His 
particular parody of design-theology appeared when he wrote that a 
philosopher had v i s i t e d h i s l i b r a r y and observed that no statesman or 
hero could propagate as much misery as might be supposed* 
Thus, i f a Russian army, in these insants times, after having 
endured a laborious march of many hundred miles, i s destroyed 
by a French army i n defence of t h e i r republic, what has 
happened? Forty thousand human creatures dragged from t h e i r 
homes and t h e i r connexions cease to exist, and have manured 
the earth; but the quantity of organized matter, of which 
they were composed, presently revives in the forms of millions 
of microscopic animals, vegetables, ana in s e c t s , and afterwards 
of quadrupeds and men; the sum of whose happiness i s perhaps 
greater than that of the harassed soldiers, by whose destruction 
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they have gained t h e i r existence! I s not t h i s a consoling 
idea to a mind of iin i v e r s a l sympathy? 
And a friend had observed with reference to a project of draining 
land in order to provide pasture for oxen, that to do so involved 
destroying a "thousand f r e e republics oi jmts, and ten thousand 
rati o n a l frogs, besides innumerable aquatic insects, and aquatic. 
vegetables." • • 
The importance of Erasmus* work l i e s i n three points. One i s 
the view of Erasmus* awareness of the inplications of h i s work held 
by King^Hele; another i s the popularisation i n his own time of 
Darwin's view of l i f e through h i s transposition of that v i s i o n into 
poetry; and the t h i r d i s the way in which Erasmus may have provided 
for h i s grandson a pattern of a lamentably inadequate theology to be 
related to h i s study of nature, as effec t i v e l y as he provided him 
with the themes of the study of nature i t s e l f . I t i s true that 
Erasmus r e a l i s e d there could be c r i t i c i s m of h i s views on r e l i g i o n , 
but t h i s i s different from saying that he was aware of the religious 
and philosophical implications of h i s theory of evolution. He seems 
not to have had a b e l i e f i n a creator, such as one finds i n Paley, 
which would have enabled him to interpret h i s material so that i t 
seemed to have a meaningful refertaice to God. Hesketh Pearson 
quoted a l e t t e r of h i s of 1745 which perhaps represented h i s e a r l i e r 
"orthodoxy". Darwin's l e t t e r was written on the death,of his father 
and in i t he said ; 
That there e x i s t s a superior ens taitium, which formed these 
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wonderful creatures, i s a mathematical demonstration. That 
He influences things by a particular providence, i s hot so 
evident. The probability, according to my notion, i s against 
i t , since general laws seem s u f f i c i e n t for that end. S h a l l 
we say no particular providence i s necessary to r o l l t h i s 
Planet round the Sun, and yet affirm i t necessary ±n turning 
up cinque and quatorze, while shaking a box of dice or giving 
, ea.c5i h i s d a i l y bread? The l i g h t of Nature affords us not a 
single argument for a future state; t h i s i s the only one, 
that i t lis possible with God, since He v/ho made us out of 
nothing can surely re-create us; and that He w i l l do t h i s 
i s what we humbly hope ..."32 
Having looked at some of the material from h i s prose works, one can 
33 
see how i t would come about that a Biog]:aphical Memoir written of 
him as an honorary member of the L i t e r a r y and Philosophical Society 
of Newcastle-upon-Tyne would sijtggest that there was reason to 
suspect that he was not a believer in divine revelation, and that 
he thought b e l i e f to be a private a f f a i r between a man and h i s maker. 
Not long before h i s death a friend pressed him about h i s r e l i g i o n , 
and Darwin said that " i t was natural to extend our wishes and vi©ys 
beyond the present scene, and that i t was right to pursue such measures 
as are l i k e l y to secure our happiness in another world; but l e t us 
34 
not hear anything about h e l l " . 
Oddly enough, i n view of the way in whlc3i he i s now regarded as 
h i s grandson's precursor in the f i e l d of evolutionary theory, the writer 
of the memoir nowhere r e f e r s to that theory precisely, but only perhaps 
by implication in h i s description of Darwin as a "nBdical philosopher" 
- 35 
and a "philosophical a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t " , This may sviggest that his 
ideas were not always taken too seriously, though they had been widely 
( 36 disseminated through h i s published poetry. King-Hele remarked of 
37 
Danvin's l a s t poem. The Temple of Nature of 1803 that " I t i s a 
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splendid achievement, a t a time when biological science was by 
modem standards so primitive, to have described the origin and 
development of l i f e in a way which i s s t i l l largely acceptable." 
That i t was meant to state in poetic form the evolutionai'y t h e s i s 
of the Zoonomia i s cl e a r , both from the poem i t s e l f , and from some 
of i t s "philosophical notes". Darwin said: 
But i t may appear too bold i n the present state of our 
knowledge on t h i s subject, to suppose that a l l vegetables 
and animals now exi s t i n g were o r i g i n a l l y derived from the 
smallest microscopic ones, formed by spontaneous v i t a l i t y ? 
and that they have by innumerable reproductions, during 
innumerable centtirids of time, gradually accjiired the si z e , 
strength, and excellence of form and faculti e s which they 
now possess? and that such amazing powers were o r i g i n a l l y 
impressed on matter and s p i r i t by the great Pareiit of 
Parents! Cause of Causes! Ens EntiumJ 38 
39 
Canto i v , headed "Of Good and E v i l " , . included a reference to one 
of h i s standard examples: 
•The Wing'd Ichneumon for her embryon young 
Gores with sharp horn the c a t e r p i l l a r throng. 
The cruel l a r v a mines i t s s i l k y course. 
And tears the v i t a l s of i t s fostering mu-se." • 
So the world appeared to him as in the Phytolo^ia to be one great 
40 
slaughter house, aiid he asked: 
"Ah where can Sympathy refl e c t i n g fiixd . 
One bright idea to console the mind? 
One ray of l i g h t i n t h i s terrene abode 
To prove to Man the Goodness of h i s God?" 
The answer was to be found in human achievements. 
According to King-Hele, the poem The Botanic Garderx of 1789-92 
42 
was the chief source of Ex'asmus* fame during h i s OVBX l i f e t i m e , and 
KijQg-Hele praised him p a r t i c u l a r l y because *>no one has ever excelled 
him in writing couplets crammed with s c i e n t i f i c informatioix vdiich 
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43 yet read e a s i l y and epigrammatically." Here one finds ia the poem 
the material about the course of the development of the earth's 
surface which he had already sketched in the Zoono;mia. We may note, 
incidentally, that King-Hele approved of Darwin more than he did of 
Hutton, on whom Darwin was dependent for much of h i s information 
aisout geology. King-Hele said that Hutton was "obsessed wiiai the 
question of whether the excellent geological system he propounds 
44 
shows signs of divine wisdom." But between the publication of 
t h i s poem, popular thoug^i i t was, and the publica1;ion of the Temple 
of Na-ttire much had been done to destroy Darwin's reputation, not only 
as a poet but as a "natural philosopher" - hence, perhaps, the caution 
of the writer of the Memoir. His enemies were those who were frightened 
45 
of change of opinion in r e l i g i o n as in p o l i t i c s . Mockery of him, 
together with the sensible c r i t i c i s m of him continued in such works 
as Paley's Natural Theology; different styles of poeti?y; the f a c t 
that some of h i s ideas were embodied i n medical and agricultural 
works which would be superseded; - a l l these made him unattractive 
as a guide, and a doubtful authority. Only within h i s own family was 
he s t i l l so respected that h i s work was to provide a framework of 
reference for that of h i s grandson, both for his biology and for his 
theism. We may now turn to Paley as one of Erasmus Danvin's c r i t i c s , 
who saw how raucli the l a t t e r had been Influenced by Hume, and who 
therefore could attempt to deal with both of them together. 
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C . Paley 
1 
Vfbat one f inds ii i Wi l l iam P a l e y « s Natural Theology of 1802 
i s f l a t contradiction of Hurae»s scepticism about reason in i t s 
operation in t h i s subject area; the exhibition of some of 
Darwin*s views as nonsense; and some agreement with points found in 
Ifelthus' f i r s t essay, though the whole approach of Paley to nature 
was d i f f eren t in temper from that of Malthus. I t has already been 
noted that A . E , T a y l o r ' s c r i t i c i s m of Hume included h i s reconmendation 
of "the sound common sense of the almost un iversa l l y d iscredi ted 
Paley . . . . Nature i s , to be sux-e, not a gigantic «knitt±ttg-loom*, 
but. When a l l i s sa id , nature i s more l i k e a hn i t t i i ig loom than i t 
i s l i k e an animal or vegetable." T h i s meant that both nature and 
knitting-looms are "structures which have a s igni f icance r e l a t i v e 
2 
to something beyond themselves; both are instnimental to -something." 
T h i s view re-af f irmed the approval of Paley that was common not only 
during h i s own l i f e t i m e , but for Icng afterwai'ds. For example, of 
Paley*3 Natural Theology Charles Darwija said that he hardly ever 
admired a book more, and that formerly he could almost have said 
i t by heart . ' And T .H . Huxley described Paley as "the acute champion 
of teleology", and said that Paley a t least had no d i f f i c u l t y in 
admitting that the "production of things" was the r e s u l t of "t ia i i i s 
of mechanical d ispos i t ions f i x e d beforehand by in te l l i gen t appoijitment 
and kept in act ion by a power at the centre, that i s to say, he 
p r o l e p t i c a l l y accepted the modern doctrine of Evolut ion - and h i s 
successors might do we l l to follow t h e i r leader, or at any rate to 
attend to h i s weighty reasonings, before rushing into an antagonism 
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4 • which has no reasonable foundation." His a t t r a c t i o n for Huxley 
was part ly to be explained by the f a c t that Paley was fasc inated 
by the work o l the anatomists, and therefore provided a theology 
f o r meii such as S i r Richard Ov/en - a theology which Hiixley came to 
see was i r r e l e v a n t for s c i e n t i f i c work, yet undeniably in teres t ing . 
Paley a l so represented an antidote to the g3.ooin and scepticism on 
the one hand, and the hjsdonism on the other, which Hums indicated 
in the Dialogues, It . i s as though he was endeavouring to present 
Linnaeus* de i ty in a new kind of context. But i f someone were to 
f i n d Erasmus Darwin»s minimal theism more manageable than P a l e y » s 
(because anything could be sa id about nature i n r e l a t i o n to i t ) ; : -
put P a l e y » s "facts" into Darwin*s kind of t h e o r e t i c a l framework; 
f i n d something to say about "principles of order" and "laws" that 
would commend i t s e l f - then i t mig'ht be found that "the problem of 
theodicy would remain but would be f i rmly ruled out of "science". 
So Shaw commented: "If only some genius, whi l s t admitting P a l e y » s 
f a c t s , could knock the brains out of Paley by the discovery of a 
method by which watches could happen without watchmakers, tha.t 
genius was assxired of such a Avelcome from the t h o u ^ t of h i s day, 
as no na tura l philosopher had ever enjoyed before."^ The work of 
Charles Daiwin and others , however, d id not mean that Paley*s point 
of view was immediately d iscredi ted - i f even that supposed enemy 
of religion, Huxley, could commend him in such warm terms and mean 
vdiat he s a i d , how much more would those \^ilo would read Paley as a 
complement to B u t l e r . The Bridgewater treat i ses were a d i r e c t 
continuation of Paley"s t r a d i t i o n , and generations of undergraduates 
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7 
a t Cambridge d r i l l e d themselves through the Natural Theology and 
h i s other works; I t was a t Cambridge that Charles Darwin found 
i n Paley one of the few authors he could read with i n t e r e s t . There 
were some, l i k e Coleridgej vtoo hated Paley - S h e l l e y , f o r one i s 
reported to have <a.aimed that he would rather be damned with Plato 
8 
and Bacon than go to heaven wi th Paley and Malthus. But on the 
whole Paley was approved, and presented i n h i s Natural Theology 
perhaps the most important example of the theology the sc3.entists 
were going to have to teach themselves to do without. 
I n h i s work, Paley straightaway stated h i s case, and having done 
so, employed the same points throughout his argumoiit. The reader i s 
never allowed to forget P a l e y » s pos i t ion. A l l the i l l u s t r a t i o n s are 
l inked to what he stated at the begismingj as are h i s c r i t i c i s m s of 
both Hime and Erasmus Darwin, so that the reader should ult imately 
be convinced by the accumulation of material and i t s coherence, that 
P a l e y » s fundamental argument must be r ight . 
Paley shrewdly picked out sometliing r e l a t i v e l y small but complex, 
9 • 
a watch - to instance as h i s f i r s t i l l u s t r a t i o n and to engage h i s 
reader^s In teres t . Ignorance of the d e t a i l s of how such an object 
was made "exalts our opinion of the unseen, and unknown a r t i s t e s 
s k i l l , i f he be unseen and unknown, but ra ises no doubt in our minds 
of the existence and agency of such an a r t i s t , a t some former time, 
10 
and i n some place or o ther ." Nor was the argument destroyed i f 
the watch sometimes keeps time i r r e g u l a r l y , or i f we cannot under-
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11 stand every d e t a i l of i t s operation. To t r y to account for i t 
by saying that the "watch" must of i t s e l f have had "some in terna l 
configuration or other" i s meaningless. No man i n h i s senses 
would think of accounting for i t i n such a way; nor would he f ind 
explanation i n terms of "a pr inc ip le of order" i n t e l l i g i b l e . 'Me 
never knew a watch nade by the pr inc ip le of order; nor can he even 
form to himself aii idea of what i s meant by a pr inc ip l e of order, 
d i s t i n c t from the in te l l igence of the \vatchmaker." I t was, 
moreover, a "perversion of language" to describe a "law" as the 
"e f f i c i en t operative cause" of something. A law i s the mode by 
12 
which an agent proceeds, £th order according to vihich a power a c t s . 
And so long as a man knows something about the law i n question, even 
i f he does not comprehend i t fv i l ly , he need not have a to ta l d i s t r u s t 
13 
of h i s kn.owledge. Paley next elaborated h i s example of the watch 
so that the watch became a self-propagating one, from the examination 
of which the observer must conclude tha t "that an a r t i f i c e r had been 
14 
o r i g i n a l l y employed and concerned in the production" of the very 
f i r s t of these s elf-propagating jnachines. No i n f i n i t e regress 
J5 
woiad produce "se l f - support ." ' I t was p la in ly atheism to maintain 
"that no a r t or s k i l l whatever has been concerned in the business, 
althoughi a l l other evidence of a r t and s k i l l remain as they were."^^ 
17 
H i s other major example was that of the eye in what seems so f a r 
to be h i s examination of some of the points made in the f i r s t three 
parts of Hume*s Dialogues. I t i s as though he was now saying tJiat 
s self-propagating watch was a bet ter example than that of the s e l f -
propagating vegetable l i b r a r y , so that i t was Clean the?' example of 
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the eye that was the sound one to employ. Paley embarked on a 
de ta i l ed survey of the s tn i c ture and contrivance of the eye i n 
l 8 
h i s attempt to f ind a "cure for atheism". And in a digression 
" 19 he tackled the question of the need for such complex contrivances. 
The c r i t i c i s m with which he was dealing was that "Contrivance, by 
i t s veiy d e f i n i t i o n and nature , i s the refuge of Imperfection. To 
have recourse to expedients, implies d i f f i c u l t y , impediment, r e s t r a i n t , 
20 
defect of power." There may be answers to t h i s of whicli we are 
ignorant, he af f irmed, but "one answer i s t h i s : I t i s only by the 
d i sp lay of contrivance, that the existence, the agency, the wisdom 
of -• the Deity , could be t e s t i f i e d to his rat ional creatures . T h i s 
i s the sca le by which we ascend to a l l the knowledge of our Creator 
which we possess , so f a r as i t depends upon the phenonfina, or the 
works of na ture ." God l i m i t s h i s power in order to allow f o r the 
21 
exerc ise and exhibit ion of the laws which he has made. Fur ther , 
22 
whatever other i l l u s t r a t i o n s were to be employed, Paley i n s i s t e d 
that i r r e g u l a r i t i e s and imperfections were of no weight when the 
existence of the creator was under consideration, though they d id 
matter when h i s a t tr ibutes were being reviewed. Problems to do 
with the a t t r ibute s of God ' ' 
are then to be taken i n conjunction (the attention i s not 
to r e s t upon them, but tliey are to be taken in conjunction) 
with the unexceptionable evidoice whicli we possess, of 
s k i l l , power and benevolence, displayed in other instances; 
which evidences may, i n strength, number, and var i e ty , be 
such, and may so overpower apparent blemishes, as to induce 
upon us , upon the most reasonable ground, to be l ieve , that 
these l a s t ought to be re ferred to some cause, though we be 
ignorant of i t , other than defect of knowledge or of 
benevolence in the author.23 
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Reference to a cause implied that chance was excluded "from 
the present d i spos i t ion of the n a t u r a l world." - ••Universal experience 
24 
i s agaijast i t . What does chance ever do f o r us?*' I t would not 
account even f o r ••appearances of organisation f a r short of those 
of the eye, such as we observe i n f o s s i l s h e l l s , p e t r i f i e d bones, 
or other substances which bear the vest iges of animal or vegetable 
recrements, but which, e i t h e r in respect to u t i l i t y , or of the 
25 
Situation i n which they are discovered, may seem accidental enough." 
That Erasmus Darwin for one was now the target becomes evident, and 
P a l e y » s arguments against him were s imi lar to those of Thomas Brown. 
. The point of view Darwin represented ••has the same e f f e c t a s the 
26 
reso lv ing of things into chance'.'. Darwin had proposed that 
present creatures are the r e l i c t of others, "millions of other bodily ' 
forms and other species having p e r i l e d , being by the defect of the i r 
constiisCttion incapable of preservation, or of continuance by. 
generation." Paley thought there was no reason to discuss the 
question of the ext inct ion of some species - s ince there was no 
evidence for i t . Nor was i t credible that every conceivable var ie ty 
27 
was even, poss ib le . According to Pa ley , •Upon the supposition here 
s ta ted , we should see unicbms and mermaids, sylphs and centaurs, 
the fancies of pa inters , and the fables of poets, r e a l i s e d fty 
28 
examples." Such a concept of v a r i e t y , moreover, "rejects a l l plan", 
which seemed to .Paley to be exemplified in the d i s tr ibut ion of 
creatures into genera and species , "v/hich d i s tr ibut ion i s not an 
a r b i t r a r y act of the mind, but founded in the order which p r e v a i l s 
29 • 
i n exteri ial na ture ." Darwin's idea, of animals proposing uses for 
organs to themselves, was alsg r id ic ix led: •None of the senses 
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fundamentally depend upon the eitection of the animal; consequently, 
• . • i . ' 
ne i ther upon h i s sagacity, nor h i s experience * I t i s the impression 
30 
Which objects malce upon them, that constitutes t h e i r use ." The 
d ispos i t ion of the animal in re la t i on to i t s surroundings i s "a 
' 3 1 
concerted and contrived r e l a t i o n " . 'The web-foot deteraines, 
you isay, the duck to swim; but what would that a v a i l , i f there 
were no water to swim in?'.'• So he f i rmly concluded: '^Faculties 
thrown down upon animals a t random, and without reference to the . 
objects amidst which they are placed, would not produce to them the 
serv ices and benef i t s which we see: and i f there be that reference , 
then there i s in tent ion ." . Nor would Darwin»s absurd hypothesis 
answer for plants in which parts answer their uses^. "without any 
32 • 
concurrence froia the w i l l or choice of the p lant ." Vfheti Paley 
reverted to h i s point about l imi ta t ions of human reason at t h i s 
stage of h i s d iscuss ion i t was because he wanted to make i t c l ear 
that a p o s t e r i o r i design theology was not the speculative kind of 
th inking proposed by Darwin. I t was not to be supposed that theism 
could be equated with such sixi imtrustworthy hypothesis. There was -
a secur i ty and a sense that could be found in and througji the 
exerc i se of coherent argument of the sort Paley found to be warranted. 
" I take i t to be a general way or infus ing doubts and scruples into 
the mind, to recur to i t s own ignorance, i t s own imbec i l i ty : to . 
t e l l us that upon these subjects we know l i t t l e ; that l i t t l e 
imperfect ly; or rather , that we laiow nothing properly about the 
33 •' 
matter." Therefore , s ince the "mechanical" parts of the human 34 frame which may be "the coarsest portions of nature 's workmanship", 
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were thought by him to be the most "proper" to the argument he 
embarked on an extensive review of the human body, sometimes 
pickimg h i s examples very c l ever ly - the pivot j o i n t s of the neck 
• 35 
on which the head r e s t s , the perforation of tendons to allow for 
36 
another tendon to pass through i t . 'There i s nothing, I be l ieve , 
i n a s i l k or cotton m i l l , i n the b e l t s , or Straps, or ropes, by 
which motion i s communicated from one part of Uie machine to another, 
that i s more a r t i f i c i a l , or more evidently so, than i n t h i s 
37 
p e r f o r a t i o n . " From time to time he referred to h i s fundamental 
points of c r i t i c s m of other views. On Darwin again, for example: 
There i s no room f o r pretending that the action of the 
parts may have gradually formed the ep ig lo t t i s ; I do 
not mean i n the same i n d i v i d u a l , but in a succession 
of generations. Not only the act ion of the parts has 
no such tendency, but, the animal could not l i v e , nor 
consequently the parts a c t , e i ther without i t , - or with 
i t in a half-formed s t a t e . The species was not to wait 
f o r the gradual formation or expansion of a part which 
was, from the f i r s t , necessary to the l i f e of the ind iv idua l . 
He could a lso sometimes write what now seems to be absurd 
"explanation", but i t i s an i n j u s t i c e to him to quote such passages 
in i s o l a t i o n . When he wrote about the wisdo.m of the creator seen 
i n the way d i f f e r e n t items of a body contribute together »xo one 
e f f e c t and one use", he sai.d of the spleen that "I t i s poss ible , in 
my opinion, that the spleen may be merely a s tuf f ing , a soft cushion 
to f i l l up a vacancy or hollow, vaiich, unless occupied, would leave 
39 
the package loose and vmsteady . . . " And in connection witJi beauty, 
another of the Creator ' s concerns, he wrote of how over the whole 
body "is dramx an integument, which converts the disgust ing materials 
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of a dissecting-room into an object of at tract ion to the sight . . ." '*° 
• 41 
He a r r i v e d about a t h i r d of the way through h i s book a t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i v e way of ind icat ing what he meant by the divine a c t i v i t y 
i n creat ion . •'! can hardly imagine to myself a more dist inguishing 
nairk, and, consequently a more cer ta in proof of design, than 
preparation, i . e . the providing of things beforehand, which are not 
to be used i m t i l a considerable time afterwards: f o r t h i s implies 
a contempla:tioh of the fu ture , which belongs only to in te l l i gence ." 
Bo he once more made use of the exanple of the eye. "Thd eye i s of 
no use , a t the time when i t i s formed. I t i s an opt i ca l instrummt 
made i n a dungeon; constructed for the re fract ion of l i g h t to a 
focus , and per fec t for i t s purpose, before a ray of l i g h t has had 
access to i t ; gbemetrically adapted to the properties and act ion 
of an element, with which i t has no communication. I t i s about 
indeed to enter into that• communication: and t h i s i s prec i se ly the 
42 
th ing which evidences in tent ion ." The eye was prepared not for 
any gradual progress or advance on i t s own part but for the precise 
moment of the animal ' s b i r t h . And when he came to elaborate on the 
theme of the r e l a t i o n s of parts to one another he remarked: "Can 
any r e l a t i o n be more simple, yet more convincing, than t h i s , tha t the 
eyes are so placed as to look in the direct ion in which the legs move 
and the hands work?"^^ Another way in which he emphasised th is was in 
h i s a s ser t ion that the works of the Deity are known by ••expedients". 
The s n a i l , l ack ing wings, f ee t or thread can climb up and adhere to 
44 
plants •'by means of a sticking^-plaster". And of the. provision of 
- 248 
tlie means of growth f o r the lobster he asks : 'How was the lobster 
to e x t r i c a t e himself from h i s present confinement? how was he to 
uncase h i s bUckler, or draw h i s legs out of h i s boots?" - and 
described what he knew of the l o b s t e r ' s chaiige of s h e l l . 
Ret\ iming to Erasmus JSarwin Paley repeated that i t was not 
46 
var ie ty a lone, "d i s t inc t from every other reason" that was a motive 
i n the mind of the Crea tor . There i s var i e ty , buf i t i s controlled 
and modified by an elementary competition. 'To t h i s great variety 
i n organised l i f e , the Deity has given, or perhaps there a r i s e s 
out of i t , a corresponding var ie ty of animal appetit€;s. For the 
f i n a l cause of t h i s , we have not f a r to seek. Did a l l animals 
covet the same element, r e t rea t or food, i t i s evident how much 
fewer could be supplied and accommodated than vtoat. a t present l i v e 
conveniently together, and f i n d a p l e n t i f u l subsistoace." Unity of 
purpose i s thus maintained under a variety of patterns.'*''' So» 'liTe 
can perce ive , t l iat i f the seeds of plants were more strongly guarded than 
48 
they a r e , t h e i r greater secur i ty would in ter fere with other uses ." 
Some species of animals migiit s u f f e r for lack of food, plants might 
overrun the s o i l and seeds not have room to grow. There i s a balance 
maintained, the r e s u l t of which i s "that out of the many thousand 
d i f f e r e n t plants which cover the e a r t h , not a single species , perhaps, 
49 
has been l o s t s ince the crea t ion ." Therefore he d i r e c t l y c i ted 
50 
Darwin's Phytologia f o r c r i t i c i s m . Darwin had riot disproved 
contrivance but had only attempted to eliminate i t from h i s d iscuss ion. 
(Paley could a lso use Darwin's examples, from the notes in the 
51 
Botanic Garden when they su i ted h i s own purposes ij i w r i t i n g . ) 
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Paley was hes i tant about how to cope with material provided by 
the astronomers. Astronomy served to exhibit the magnificence of the 
52 
De i ty ' s operation, but man was destitute of the means of examining 
the const i tut ion of the heavenly bodies, - the ••very s impl ic i ty of 
t h e i r appearance i s against them." In other words, the asti'onomers did 
not f u r n i s h Paley with so many advantageous examples. He could 
congratulate man f o r the knowledge he had of astronomy, however, and 
thus re in force h i s b a s i c ins is tence on the adequacy, though not 
absolute s u f f i c i e n c y , of man's reason in r e l a t i o n to the project i n 
. - 53 " hand. 
Whether i l l u s t r a t i o n was to be drawn from the inser t world 
or from the heavens, Paley*s convict ion remained the same. "Contrivance, 
i f es-tablished, appears to me to prove everything \fliich we wish to 
prove." He was a t t h i s stage prepared to t a l k about the "personality" 
of the D e i t y , as dist inguished from 'Inature" or some such ••principJ.e". 
Such terras, as he had already explained, seemed to be intended to 
"admit and to express an e f f i c a c y , but to exoLude and to deny a 
personal agent." And personal i ty required mind, of v*iich he sa id 
that we had no authori ty to l i m i t i t s properties to any p a r t i c u l a r 
54 
corporeal form, or to any p a r t i c u l a r circumscription of space. 
To grasp the notion of God's s e l f - su f f i c i ca i cy was to see the mistake 
of a t t r i b u t i n g ••eternity" to the present universe , and understanding 
' 55 
the meaning of ••contrivance" would show the absurdity of that a t t r i b u t i o n . 
To l a b e l , or "teime" P a l e y ' s •'power a t the centre"^^ as '•genei^.tioa" 
e l i c i t e d from him the statement that the truth i s that "generation i s 
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57 
not a p r i n c i p l e , but a process" . Against Hume, i t was not a word 
which would "explain" the formation of the world with the l u c i d i t y 
i t had when appl ied to the coming into being of groups of plants 
and animals. The a postferiori argument to a divine agent seemed to 
him to be so cogent as to be "not only popular but vulgar", and t h i s 
was the only reason why those minds "which are habi tual ly in search of 
invention and o r i g i n a l i t y , f e e l a r e s t l e s s inc l ina t ion to s t r i k e off 
into other solut ions and other expwsitions .^^ 
Back to Darwin yet again he noted as an example of what he had 
s a i d , "Another system which has l a t e l y been brought forward, and with 
59 
much ingenuity", - that of "appetencies". He hes i tated to labfel 
t h i s system as a t h e i s t i c because the o r i g i n a l propensit ies of things 
"are, i n the plan i t s e l f , a t tr ibuted to the ordination and appointment 
60 
of an i n t e l l i g e n t and designing Creator". But i t was a t h e i s t i c i n 
that " i n the formation of p lants and animals, i n the structure and 
use of t h e i r p a r t s , i t does away with f i n a l causes". So he proposed: 
•Give our philosopher these appetencies; give him a portion of l i v i n g 
i r r i t a b l e matter (a nerve, or the c l ipp ing of a nerve ) , to work upon: 
give a l so to h i s inc ip ient or progressive forms, the power, in every 
stage of t h e i r a l t e r a t i o n , of pi'opagating the i r l i k e ; and, i f he i s 
to be bel ieved, he could replenish the world with a l l the vegetable 
61 
and animal productions which we a t present see in i t . " There was 
a t o t a l lack Of evidence f o r such suppositions, and 'How w i l l our 
philosopher get a t v i s i o n , or make an eye?" One mrast conclude t l iat 
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upon the whole, ''after a l l the schemes and struggles of a reluctant 
philosophy, the necessary resort i s to a Dei ty . The marks of design 
are too strong to be gotten over. Design must have had a designer. 
That designer must have been a person. That person i s GOD." 
64 
Passing the a t t r ibute s of God under review, Paley devoted a 
65 
separate section to God's goodness, res t ing h i s case on two 
observations: that contrivance was b e n e f i c i a l , and that there 
was a preponderance of pleasure over pain. Therefore, against Hume 
he maintained that "one great cause of oxir i n s e n s i b i l i t y to the 
goodness of the Creator , i s the very extensiveneas of h i s bounty. 
We pr ize but l i t t l e what we share only in common witli the r e s t , or 
with the general i ty of our spec ies ." But i t was tliese "common benef i t s" 
67 
which were the "great things". I t was i n those things "which are so 
common as to be of no d i s t i n c t i o n , that the amplitude of the Divine 
benignity i s perceived.'• And quoting from h i s •'Moral Philosophy" 
he aff irmed that pain and misery were never objects of contrivance 
69 
i n nature . "We never discover a t r a i n of contrivance to bring 
about an e v i l purpose." What then could be sa id of "venomous a n i m l s " 
which belonged to the category of anirials that prey on one another? 
•These properties of animals, wherever they are found, must, I th ink, 
be r e f e r r e d to des ign; ' because there i s in a l l cases of the f i r s t , 
and i n most cases of the second, an express and d i s t inc t organisation 
70 
provided f o r the producing of them." We cannot avoid the d i f f i c u l t y 
by saying the e f f e c t was not intended, but have to ask the question 
71 
whether i t be u l t imate ly e v i l . Addressing himself s p e c i f i c a l l y to . 
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Linnaeus* problem about serpents a s the l a t t e r had described i t , he 
paraphrased ..Linnaeus' points - tha t the venomous c i t e of the snake 
serves i t s own good; that l e s s than a tenth of snakes are so armed; 
that such a se lec t ive arming of some guards the whole t r i b e , so 
that s ince they are r a r e l y dist inguishable as poisonous by some 
external mark, a l l are avoided. The point a t which he balked was 
Linnaeus* comment that "when-the Indian poisonous snake bi tes 
73 
a t a considerable age, there xs no appeal." Paley bel ieved that 
the "case of b i t e s , which produce death in large animals (of st ings 
I th ink there are none) to be very few." Even the b i t e of a r a t t l e - " 
74 
snake would not u s u a l l y be mortal . Further, he was confident that 
problems concerning the re la t ionsh ip between man and some animals 
would not a r i s e were i t not f o r the f a c t that human beings i n s i s t 
on invading the environments of other creatures . 'fiVe invade the 
t e r r i t o r i e s of wi ld beasts and venomous r e p t i l e s , and then complain 
that we.are infested by t h e i r b i t e s and sfcings." There are 'Inatures" 
75 
proper to d i f f e r e n t s i tua t ions . "Let them enjoy t h e i r existence; 
l e t them have t h e i r country. Surface enough w i l l be l e f t to man, 
though h i s numbers were increased a hundred-fold, and l e f t to him, 
76 
where he mi^it l i v e , exempt from these annoyances." Of an ina l s 
devouring one another he remarked: "Is i t then to see the world f i l l e d 
with drooping, superannuated, ha l f - s tarved , he lp le s s , and unhelped 
animals, that you would a l t e r the present system of pursuit and prey?« 
77 Animals have no ant i c ipa t ion of danger to render t h e i r l i v e s mis rable. 
So t h i s matter gjit to be considered "in t r i c t connection with aiiother 
property of animal nature, v i z . super fecundity." SuperfecuD:dity i s a 
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provision of the Deity "to keep the world always f u l l " , and i t 
allows the species of animals to vary in proportion to different 
78 
situations afforded for room and food. But superfecundity, 
"though of great occasional use and importance, exceeds the ordinary 
capacity of nature to receive or support i t s progeny. A l l superabundance 
supposes destruction, or must destroy i t s e l f . " So, "thinnings must 
take place by the actions of animals on one another. And nature 
studiously guards against the loss of any species from the universe: 
Though there may be the appearance of f a i l u r e in some of -ttie d e t a i l s 
of Nature*s works, in her great purposes there never are. Her species 
never f a i l . The provision.which was o r i g i n a l l y made for continuiag 
the repleaiahment of the world, has proved i t s e l f to be effectual 
79 
thrcugh a long succession of ages." So he could express h i s 
confidence that "The whole tendency of nature i s towards gi'atification 
and enjoyment; which i s , i n other words, the goodness of i t s Auttior 
80 
towards h i s sensitive creation." 
Having established to h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n an understanding of what 
was to be meant by the benevolence of the deity i n the context of h i s 
a p o s t e r i o r i theology he turned to the origin of e v i l , for which he 
81 
said, there was no solution which reached to a l l cases of complaint. 
He suggested that the most "comprehensive" solution was that whidi came 
from the consideration of general rules, both those we comprehend, 
and those we do not. General laws, "however well set and constituted, 
often thwart and cross one another" and from t h i s some "particular 
inconveniences" a r i s e . Then follows a paragraph i n which he paid 
82 attention to ejiplanation i n terms of the e v i l s of "imperfection", 
of which he furnished a brief description: 
I t i s probable, that creation may be better replenished by 
sensitive taejng-s of different sorts, than by sensitive beings 
a l l of one sor t . I t i s likewise prooable, that i t may be 
better replenished by diffei'ent orders of beings r i s i n g one 
above another in gradation, then by beings possessed of 
equal degrees of perfection. Now a gradation of such beings, 
implies a gradation of imperfections. No c l a s s can j u s t l y 
complain of the imperfections which belong to i t s place i n 
the sc a l e , ubless i t were allov/able for i t to complain, that 
a scale of being was appointed i n nature; for which 
appointment there appear to be reasons of wisdom and goodness. 
Both the explanation i n terms of generial laws, and that i n terms of 
imperfection, are. ••the two metaphysical answers which have been 
given to-this great question. They are not the worse for being 
metaphysical, provided they be founded (which I think they a r e ) 
i n right reasoning; but they are of a nature too wide to be brougjit 
under our survey, and i t i s often d i f f i c u l t to apply them i n the 
83 
d e t a i l . " T h i s i s Pa,ley»s sole comment i n t h i s work on "metaphysical" 
theology and i t s possible v a l i d i t y . ( He would, presumaDly, s t i l l 
have recommended Law's translation of King's book, together with i t s 
notes on Bayle and Leibniz etcthough^made i t clear in his memoir 
of law that t h i s p a r t i c u l a r service Law rendered to theology was 
not comparable in value w3.th that preferred through many of h i s other 
84 
writings. ) A metaphysical theology woula not i t seems have 
supported Paley through h i s l a s t i l l n e s s e s , which Clarke suggested 
were s t i l l in h i s mind when he wrote the passages in the Natural 
85 
Theology about pain and death and t h e i r functions. He recovered 
s u f f i c i e n t l y to write h i s f i n a l observations which showed how he 
and Malthus were a t any rate i n i t i a l l y in support of one another. 
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I t has already been indicated that Paley was a t le a s t aware of 
problems to do with population, food supply and environment. Malthus 
apparently had converted h i a from the view that 'The quantity of 
happiness i n any country i s best mea.sured by the numoer of people", 
by h i s Essay of 1798, but even so, whoi discussing llalthusV opinions 
somewhat b r i e f l y i n the l a s t part of the Natural Ttieology, " i t cannot 
be said that he subjected his e a r l i e r opinions to a thorough revision. 
His n a t u r a l cheerfulness could not be damped by the depressing prospect 
opened up by Malthus." What he had to say about iJalthus appeared 
i n the course of some of h i s commients on society, commeats which 
were s t i l l part and parcel of a proper theodicy. For him, "engagement" 
was the great principle of human satisfaction, and in i t s pursuit 
87 
e v i l was to be put into perspective. He would have none of Hume 
or Ei-asmus Darwin's complaints about 'Iniggard natui:e". Fhr rai^ional 
occupation, which he defined as "the very material of contented 
existence," there would be no place l e f t , " i f e i t h e r the things 
with which we had to do were absolutely impracticable to our 
endeavours, or i f they were too obedient to our uses. A world, 
furnished with advantages on one side, and beset with d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
wants, and inconveniences on the other, is the proper abode of free, 
r a t i o n a l , and active natures, being the f i t t e s t to stimulate and 
exercise t h e i r f a c u l t i e s . " I t i s from the "refractoriness" of the 
objects with which men have to deal that the seed and princip l e of 
physical e v i l a r i s e s . With regard to " c i v i l e v i l s " , he drew 
attention i n a note to "a la t e t r e a t i s e upon, population" which he 
89 
thought should inspire the endeavour to ameliorate conditions. 
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There might be l i m i t s f i x e d by nature both to happiness and to the 
ntimber of people who could partake of i t , "but t h ^ are l i m i t s not 
yet attained, nor even approached, i n any comtry of the world." 
And those l i m i t s would only be ccncerned with the provision of animal 
wants, since there ai-e many ways of increasing human happiness, 
90 
"communicaole without r e s t r i c t i o n of numbers". On the other 
hand, he did not want "incessant, universal, indefatigable a c t i v i t y " 
which could be dangerous to society. So Mr. Hume's assertion,in h is 
posthumous dialogues, that ialeness was the root of tJie maiiy e v i l s 
-from which men suffered,needed careful qualification t o d'istinguish 
91 
unwantiBd idleness from desirable ease. 
When he tunied to the meaning of "providence" he defended the 
notion for i t s importance to piety. I t "applies to the consolation 
of men's minds, to t h e i r devotions, to the excitement of gratitude, 
th6 support of patience, the keeping al i v e and the strengthening of 
93 
the very motive for ^deavouring to please our Maker." The most 
reasonable view of human l i f e which had been suggested was that which 
regai'ded i t as a state of probation. I f such a suggestion was a 
matter of " r e l i g i o n " rather than of "philosophy", that i n i t s e l f 
ought not to preclude our employing the tradition, " i f i t should 
turn out to be the case, that the more religious our views are, the 
94 
more probability they contain." Philosophy and religion are coherent, 
for " i f one t r a i n of thinking be more desirable than another, i t i s 
that which regards the phenomdia of nature with a constant reference 
to a supreme i n t e l l i g e n t Aiithor. To have iaade t h i s the ruling, the 
habitual,sentiment of our minds, i s to have l a i n the foiindation of 
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everything which i s r e l i g i o u s . The wo;fld thenoefojrth 1)6001068 a 
temple, and l i f e i t s e l f one continued act of a d o r a t i o n . W e 
understand God to be arranging the planetary systems, and also 
"ooncerting and providing an appropriate mechanism, for the clasping 
and reclasping of the filaments of the feather of the humming b i r d . " ^ 
There i s no sign of h i s diminution of care '*by mu l t i p l i c i t y of objectg, 
or of d i s t r a c t i o n of thougjit by va r i e t y . We have no reason to fear, 
therefore, our being forgotten, or overlooked, or negleoted."^^ 
I n view of Coleridge*B c r i t i c i s m of Paley following on from 
the former's denunciation of Hume, Malthus, and Eraismus Dalrwin, i t 
i s perhaps worth paying p a r t i c u l a r attention to t h i s t h e s i s of 
Paley*B on the oare of God, as he understood i t , for each individual 
oreatiire. There was some j u s t i f i c a t i o n for Hiucley's view of Paley 
which would lend support to the proposal that Coleridge's d i s l i k e 
of Palsy's theology was wel3.-grounded from a "r e l i g i o u s " standpoint. 
But Palsy's God seems to have had. an interest i n the welfare of h i s 
creatures, an interest to which Husdey would not have found i t helpful 
to r e f e r when making the points of h i s own argument. I t was not, for 
Paley, simply that the f i r s t original "watoh" went on prod\icing subsequent 
"watches", but that each subsequent "watoh" was also related to i t s 
"watchmaker'* proper, the creator of the o r i g i n a l . God was not ordinarily 
"absent" from h i s world, and verba], abstractions such as "law" and 
"principle of order" should be recognised for what they were - expressions of 
what Paley i n s i s t e d was the immediate a c t i v i t y of God. 
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D. Coleridge 
Coleridge's search for a theology engaged him i n an examination 
of the work of Hume and somei of h i s successors, and drove him to look 
at German theology. I t i s especially true in his ca»e, that to looK 
a t what he said about theoaicy and nature i s to discern only one 
thread of h i s extraordinarily diverse intere s t s . Coleridge seems to 
have wanted to f i n d a way of talking about religion which was 
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y respectable. Though he had l i t t l e to say that was 
constructive on the pa r t i c u l a r topic of a theology, and a^theodicy 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , related to nature, he was important for h i s atteiition 
to the work of the great German theologians, and for whatever he did 
to a l e r t others to t h e i r work. And he stands on the brink of the era 
when the changes i n people's view of things would have to be made. 
What Coleridge bad learned since 1801 when he began to study 
philosophy seriously ^ may be found i n his public lectures, h i s published 
works, h i s l e t t e r s to h i s friends and in his notebooks. (No attempt i s 
made in t h i s study to look at his poetry.) One has always to bear in 
mind both Coleridge's v e r s a t i l i t y and range of c a p a b i l i t i e s and the 
other projects on which he worked from time to time, the problems he 
2 
had with h i s health, and h i s l i f e - l o n g struggle with "indolence". 
Both correspondence and notebooks r e f e r to projects which r a r e l y 
materialised. Also, w h i l s t Coleridge must be given some credit for 
a l e r t i n g the English to the work of Kant in particular, h i s own reaction 
to that work i s sometimes d i f f i c u l t to assess. The same must be said 
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of h i s concern with the work of Leibniz. He spotted the c e n t r a l problems 
of the great philosophers, bur h i s own reaction to them i s often 
disappointing. One interpretation of t h i s problem has been given 
by W.J. Bate:^ 
The overriding philosophical interest of Coleridge, from the time 
he became a d i s c i p l e of David Hartley at Cambridge u n t i l the end, 
was i n xuiity of interpretation, unity of feeling, unity of 
relationship of every sort, but with no s a c r i f i c e of the claims 
of d i v e r s i t y .... He goes from one side of thw path to the other ... 
from the empirical and s c i e n t i f i c to the s p i r i t u a l and i d e a l i s t i c , 
then back again, with further insights, in the hope of finding a 
more capacious frame of reference. 
Be that as i t may, one finds t h a t in 1818 Coleridge was depressed 
4 
by the prospect of having to lecture in public, though he aclmowledged 
that "lecturing i s the only means by which I can enable myself to go 
on at a l l v/ith the great philosophical work to whidi the best and most 
genial hours of the l a s t twenty years of my l i f e have been devoted. 
Poetry i s out of the question. The attempt would only huri-y me into 
that sphere of acute feelings, from which abstruse research, tlie mother 
of s e l f - o b l i v i o n , presents an asylum." Coleridge's lectures^ on 
philosophy of 1819 were taken down i n shorthand but he never brought 
them out in print despite h i s recognition of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
having such a work available to the public, as i t could contain more 6 7 than h i s audience had heard. So only the "prospectus" of the lectures 
would be b r i e f l y a v ailable. The lectures were attended by an audience 
which included William Hamilton. K. Cobum made the comment that 
Hamilton learned from Coleridge the importance of precision in language, 
and Hamilton's o\vn statement of the point was used by J.S. M i l l as a 
motto for the f i r s t book of h i s Logic. WXiobum also drew attention 
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to the importance and novelty of lectures of t h i s kind:'^^ 
The h i s t o r i c a l consideration of philosophers in public lectures 
was i n i t s e l f something of an innovation. True, English philosophy 
and philosophers had been dealt with by H a z l i t t i n a coursse of 
Lectures in 1812. But had anyone in England i n Coleridge's l i f e -
time had the temerity to give a course of public (not u n i v e r s i t y ) 
lectures on the ancient, mediaeval and modem philosophers? Is ife 
safe to suggest that perhaps half the names he mentioned were heard 
of by half the audience for the f i r s t time? 
There had in f a c t beeil lectures on the philosophy. of Kant given i n 
London, which w i l l be discussed When attention i s turned to Coleridge's 
i n t e r e s t i n Kant. But there was one hist6ry:--of philosophy available 
which Coleridge's audience could have read. William E n f i e l d had i n 
1791"''"'" produced h i s History, drawn from the work of Bruckner, Despite 
i t s shortcomings, E n f i e l d seems to have seen the problem facing 
contemporary philosophers rather as Kant saw i t , though without mentioning 
l 2 ' 
him by name. So he wrote i n h i s "preface", that man's atteaition to 
the great questions of the origins of things, the nature of God, of the 
soul, of morals, were to be approached with caution and diffidence i n 
view of the great variety of discussion there had been about them: 
Perhaps, too, men's researches into these subjects, have now been 
carri e d to such extent, and every argument upon them has been so 
thoroughly discussed, that i t may be possible to determine, with 
s u f f i c i e n t precision, how fa.r i t i s possible for the human f a c u l t i e s 
to proceed i n the investigation of truth, and why i t can proceed no 
further. Possibly the time may not be far distant, when an end w i l l 
be put to f r u i t l e s s controversy, by di s t i n c t l y ascertaining the 
l i m i t s of the human understanding. I f t h i s desirable point be ever 
attained, i t i s obvious that one of the means of accomplishing i t 
must be, an accurate attention to the manner in Which different 
sects in philosophy and r e l i g i o n have, from time to time, arisen, 
and to the various causes of diversity of opinion. 
I t i s not evident from h i s t e x t that E n f i e l d himself was up to t h i s task, 
but he performed a useful service in drawing a t t r i t i o n to certain 
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subject areas and the names of philosophers concerned with them. For 
13 
example, when writing "Of the philosophy of the Persians", . which 
included a description of Zoroaster and of what he had to say about 
the o r i g i n of e v i l , he provided footnote refei'ences to Bayle's 
Dictionary a r t i c l e s relevant to the subject, and to Leibniz' Theodicy, 
14 
in' one of i t s French editions. Of the Dictionary i t s e l f , he wrote ' 
of i t i n the course of h i s outline history of Bayle's l i f e and works, 
that i t was "the chief monument of his learning, genius, and wit, and 
an indisputable proof of his propensity towards scepticism." E n f i e l d 
made i t clear with reference to Bayle's discussion of " e v i l " that he 
regarded the t r a d i t i o n which Bayle represented with d i s t a s t e . Bayle's 
15 
writings, he maintained, 
betray a mind impressed with l i t t l e sympathy for r e l i g i o n and tend 
to foster that kind of scepticism which i s most pernicious. 
Upon a comparison of the writings of modern sceptics, i t w i l l appear, 
that they have adapted t h i s method of philosophising upon very 
different grounds, and for very different purposes: but in whatever 
form scepticism appears, or from whatever cause i t springs, i t .taay 
be confidently pronounced h o s t i l e to true philosophy; for i t s 
obvious tendency i s to invalidate every principle of human knowledge, 
to destroy every c r i t e r i o n of truth, and to undermine the foundations 
of a l l science, human and divine. 
One may suppose that Enfield was also making clear h i s view of Hume and 
any who took h i s views seriously. Lelbniz^^ was given a whole chapter 
to himself in B i f i e l d ' s work, and the l a t t e r l i s t e d a number of Leibniz' 
minor papers of viiich Bruckner had'been aware, as well as referring to 
the Theodicy and L e i b n i z ' cprrespondence with Clarke. Enfield praised 
Leibniz Whilst l i s t i n g ' a s h i s major fault h i s "fondness for the 
conjectural method of philosbphising, and the. f a c i l i t y with which he 
17 
admitted hypotheses unsupported by Induction and experiment." In 
h i s summary of Leibniz* philosophy he wrote of Lelbtiiz* deity that he 
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i s "always determined i n h i s choice by.sufficient reason; and t h i s 
can only be found in the degrees of perfection of possible worlds, 
• His ,wisdom kno^ chuses, and h i s power produces the 
'•  : • 18' • ^\T>^t; possible world." 
Coleridge's reading of Enfield probably provided him with some 
19 
useful directions in which to search up to the beginning of the 
eii^iteenth century, which was a l l that Eiifield had set out to cover, 
20 
but Coleridge made a c r i t i c i s m of Enfield indicating a f a u l t which 
he himself i n h i s lectures intended to correct. Enfield's work needed 
methodical c r i t i c i s m , in the sense that although i t was good to approach 
the relevant material h i s t o r i c a l l y , careful attention also needed to be 
given to the changes i n philosophical thinking, and to explanation of 
those changes - which was to say no more than Enfield himself had said 
i n h i s "Preface". 
. But Coleridge did have something more constnictive to offer: ••Pew 
and unimportant would the errors of men be, i f they did but know, f i r s t 
what they themselves mean: and secondly, what the words mean by which 
they attempt to convey t h e i r meaning - and I can conceive no subject so 
well f i t t e d to exemplify the mode and the importance of these two points 
as the History of Philosophy treated as in the scheme of these Lectures."^^ 
In 1820 he wrote that " I , herein imitating Leibnitz, have been i n the 
habit of considering what the meaning of the words r i ^ i t l y & s c r i p t u r a l l y 
22 
defined, might be ..." However, despite t h i s promising programme, 
attention to h i s l e t t e r s and notebooks reveals how very limited the 
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lectures were i n indicating the scope of Coleridge's concerns, especially 
i n view of h i s long i n t e r e s t i n philosophy. T h i s i s also true of some 
23 
of h i s prose works, especially the Biographia L i t e r a r i a of 1817, 
24 
o r i g i n a l l y devised a s a preface to a new edition of h i s poems; and 
25 
the Aids to Reflection begun in 1825. Also Important for t h i s 
study i s h i s Hints towards the formation of a more coniprehensive theory 
26 27 • of L i f e . This l a t t e r work was begun in 1815 for h i s surgeon friend 
Gilnan, perhaps to supersede Erasmus Darwin's philosophical works for 
the benefit of the medical professioii, but i t v/as not published u n t i l 
1848, under the editorship of another physician who had become a friend 
28 
of Coleridge's. So one finds i n the various Coleridgean sources 
that there i s ava i l a b l e a wealth of evidence whidi indicated the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a new approach by means of wnich crucial theological 
b e l i e f s could be re3.ated to nature. Yet although Coleridge rejected 
some philosophical points of view he never on the other hand seems 
to have assimilated from either Leibniz or Kant in pa r t i c u l a r a 
method which would have enabled him to make more than a minimal 
contribution to thinking about these particular issues. Part of the 
reason for t h i s may be that he lacked the a b i l i t y to do so - the great 
"opus" he planned never materialised. His "indolence", perhaps based 
in h i s i l l - h e a l t h , may have had something to do with i t - yet he did 
find the energy to pick up a variety of nature-philosophy which was 
to prove as f r u i t l e s s to refute Paley, as to point a new direction 
for study. I t may be that he r e a l i s e d that he could not cope with t h i s 
kindof.programme, and a l s o , that i t was not the kind of theological 
thinking that he most needed. 
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29 
Hume was the arch-enemy of rel i g i o n for Coleridge, axid i t i s 
to the l a t t e r ' s credit that he spotted that the answer to Hume was 
not to be found in the school of ••evidence" wr i t e r s , however 
b r i l l i a n t some of them might be. So for example, Coleridge wrote to 
30 
a fi'iend i n 1798 : 
31 
Have you given over the. thougiits of editing Butler's analogy 
with notes? - I f the Unitarian Society would publish i t i n tlieir 
t r a c t s , I would w i l l i n g l y & immedi:ately undertake i t with you -
adding a di s q u i s i t i o n on Hume's system of Causation - or rather 
of non-causation. This i s the p i l l a r , & confessedly, the sole 
p i l l a r , of modem Atheism - i f we could c l e a r l y and manifestly 
detect the sophisms of t h i s system, I think, tliat Butler's 
Analogy aided by well placed notes would answer i r r e s i s t a b l y a l l 
the objections to C h r i s t i a n i t y founded on a p r i o r i reasonings -. 
& atiese are the only reasonings that infidels32 use even with 
p l a u s i b i l i t y . 
By "a p r i o r i reasonings" i t i s clear that Coleridgje meant Hume's 
discussion of the cause-effect problem. To someone for whom "-brue 
metaphysics are nothing else but true d i v i n i t y " Hume's tenets were 
• 33 
indeed ••impious and pernicious •'. Coleridge pointed out i n h i s 
philosophical lectures,^'* paraphrasing Kant's comment in h i s Prolegomena, 
how important i t was to grasp the point of what Hume had said. 
Coleridge himself had for a long time been a l e r t to the importance of 
the p r i n c i p l e of causality for theology, irrespective of Hume*s 
parti c u l a r formulation of the problem. In Coleridge's "allegoric 
v i s i o n " i n h i s B r i s t o l lectures of 1795 he talked of ••an old dim 
eyed Man'» studying iiature. The old man was continually applying h i s 
microscope to the study of nature "and seemed greatly delighted i n 
counting the I r r e g u l a r i t i e s which were made v i s i b l e by i t ... " 
Coleridge said of him: 
He spoke in diverse Tongues and unfolded many A^ysteries, and 
among other strange Things he talked much about an i n f i n i t e 
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S e r i e s of Causes - which he explained to be - a s t r i n g of blind 
men of viiich the l a s t caught hold of the s k i r t of the one befpre 
him, he of the next, and so on t i l l they were a l l out of sight; 
and that they a l l walked straight without making one fal s e step. 
To the enquiry about who was a t the head to guide them, the man 
repli e d , "No one, but that the str i n g of blind men went on for ever 
without a begirming for though one blind man coiild not move without 
36 
stumbling, yet that i n f i n i t e Blindness supplies the want of sight." 
The same i l l u s t r a t i o n re-appears in the Biographia L i t e r a r i a and in one 
37 
of the Lay Sermons. One may note here that i t i s i n Coleridge's 
e a r l i e s t writings and l e t t e r s , that one finds themes of in t e r e s t which 
are expressed in much the same way years l a t e r , though sometimes in a 
different kind of context. 6a the subject of Hume, he had decided on 
h i s view of him long before the philosophical lectures were given, not 
only because of the importance to Coleridge of the priixciple of 
causality as i t needed to be interpreted to be of service to h i s 
theology, but also, one must presume, as a r e s u l t of h i s reading of 
the Dialogues themselves. In 1799 he wrote: 
I t i s fashionable among our philosophizers to assert the existence 
. of a surplus of misery in the world/which in my opinion i s no 
proof, that either systematic Thinking or vmaffected Self-observation 
i s fashionable among them. ~ But Hume wrote ~ and the B'rench 
imitated him - and we the French - and the French us - and so 
philosophisms f l y to and fro - in seriesocf imitated Imitations -
Shadows of shadows of shadows of a farthing Candle placed between 
two Looking-glasses. 38 
Coleridge was also acutely aware of the influence of some of the 
post-Humean philosophers of h i s day, and held them in the same contempt 
and d i s l i k e . He had read Malthtis* f i r s t Essay before he l e f t England 
39 
for Germany, and foxmd the work "exceedingly i l l o g i c a l " . ' He himself 
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could not support any theory \^4iich proposed that vice and misery were 
intended by Providence as the counterpose to the increase in population. 
Then he found in Germany how popular Si5ssmilch> work had remained. 
Although t h i s author also had d i s l i k e d the kind of theory objected to 
by Coleridge, the l a t t e r was not s a t i s f i e d , he said, with a confutation 
which was somewhat simply based.on the idea that since the theory 
"militated agajjist the Glory & Goodness of God" i t must therefore 
be f a l s e . Coleridge s t i l l hoped for the p o s s i b i l i t y of another kind 
of reply which would include a different interpretation of population 
studies. And on h i s return to England in 1800 he found himself 
dedicating two mornings and one whole day a week to a project of h i s 
own, "on the possible Progressiveness of Msn & on the principles of 
41 
Population"; , So. he c l e a r l y thought an important issue was at stake. 
When Malthus' second essay was published he t h o u ^ t that a summary of 
what Malthus had to say "would make a sensible f i r s t sentence of an 
42 
Essay in a Newspaper on the subject of population" but nothing more. 
His own comments on Malthus' second essay seem to be of l i t t l e interest, 
43 
even to an h i s t o r i a n of economic thought, though Southey seems to 
44 
have used them for h i s own review of the work. Malthus became 
45 
fixed in Coleridge's mind as a much-loathed "oracle", in the popular 
estimation. 
So f a r as Erasmus Darwin was coneemed, Coleridge did not i n i t i a l l y 
thjjik that he v/as one of those, together with Malthus and Hume, who 
were l i k e l y to destroy the s p i r i t u a l values of E n g l a n d . H e credited 
47 
him v/ith some virtues, and even as late as 1803 could s t i l l think 
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of him as having some a b i l i t y as a poetl^ But from 1796 onwards he 
c l e a r l y d i s l i k e d Darwin for h i s carelessness about r e l i g i o n , for a l l 
49 
that he was so knowledgeable and inventive on other subjects. ' T h i s 
was the more i r r i t a t i n g i n that he knew that Darwin had been iinpressed • 
by a note in Button's introduction to his Theory of the Earth which 
had stressed the importance of finding appropriate p r i n c i p l e s of 
50 
explanation for each area of discussion. So he remarked that Darwin 
seemed to be t y p i c a l of those i n f i d e l s who 'talk of a subject i n f i n i t e l y 
important, yet are proud to confess themselves profoundly ignorant of 
i t . " He continued: "Dr. Darwin would have been ashamed to have rejected 
Hutton's theory of the earth without having liiinutely examined i t ; yet 
what i s i t to us how the earth was made, a thing impossible to be known, 
51 
and u s e l e s s i f known?" He there voiced, perhaps, the view of those 
who could not see that new developmoits i a science were l i k e l y to make 
any difference to t h e i r theological thinking, and who for that very 
reason, would be ignored by those who did. Darwin was "an atheist by 
i n t u i t i o n " , who a l l at once had made up his mind on such important 
subjects "as whether we be the outcasts of a blind idiot called Nature, 
or the children of an a l l - w i s e and i n f i n i t e l y good God; whether we 
spend a few miseraole years on t h i s earth, and then sink into a clod of 
the v a l l e y , or only endure the anxieties of mortal l i f e i n order to f i t 
us for the enjoyment of imtoortal happiness." Anyone \iho shared what 
seemed to be Hume's views as exhibited in the Dialogues was one of 
Coleridge's targets for c r i t i c i s m . But i t may also be the case that 
Coleridge had some scathing comments to make about Daiwin i n h i s own 
52 
lectures on philosophy, because he remembered Darwin's t e l l i n g him 
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that he would l i k e to know a young man who had a metaphysical turn of 
mind and who would read up on the opinions of philosophers and give 
Darwin a syllabus of t h e i r views. He had no wish to provide Darsvin 
witli more j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i s "ignorance". Another remark of 1790 
i s important to bear i n mind for the future development of Coleridge's 
thought. He said:, "A Physician who should be even a Theist, s t i l l 
more a Christian, wpvild be.a r a r i t y indeed. I do not know one and I 
know a great many Hiysici a n s . They are shallow Animals: having always 
employed t h e i r minds about Body and Gut, they imagine that i n the whole 
• 
53 
system of things there i s nothiiig but Gut and Body ... " And a month 
l a t e r , he wrote that "true or f a l s e . Heaven i s a l e s s gloomy idea than 
Ajmihilation! - Dr. Beddoes and Dr. Darvvin think that L i f e i s uttei'ly 
54 • 
inexplicable, Avriting as M a t e r i a l i s t s . " Coleridg\3, as the re s t of 
t h i s l e t t e r showed, was already toying with defjjiitions of " l i f e " . 
So he was beginning to form the arguments he would employ i n his lectures 
and h i s Theory of L i f e , and would disagree with anyone who proposed that mind 
was merely a function of stru.cture. Concerning '^nature" he asked: " I s 
i t here that she begins to deceive us when she bids us believe tliat ours 
i s a mixed nature, belonging i n part to the earth, and l i k e i t transient, 
but belonging l i k e our reason and l i k e i t s magnificent products, the 
sciences, to a higher and more permanent state of existence?"^^ 
William lawrence^^ was to represent in public l i f e the physiological 
understanding of "function" by the time Coleridge was giving h i s lectures, 
Lav/reace had himself given a set of lectures bearing on the subject 
before the Royal College of Surgeons. Lawrence had represented more i n 
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those l e c t u r e s than that view alone, however. When he published h i s 
material i n 1819 as Lectures on Physiology, Zoology and the Natural 
History of Afan, he thereby precipitated a controversy of no mean 
57 
proportions. He eventually withdrew t h i s work from c i r c u l a t i o n , 
t h o u ^ enjoyed public acclaim l a t e r i n h i s l i f e for h i s work as a 
58 
surgeon. Darlington . supposed that part of the problem lawrence 
created for himself, given the accusation that his work contradicted 
the "plain sense" of scripture, lay i n the way he presented M s 
material he quoted h i s predecessors as supporting authorities and did 
not hesitate to point out to the society of h i s day the implications 
of \fixat he was saying. I f he was r i g h t about " selection" i t migjit 
well be possible to "improve" men by "breeding". What lawrence was 
59 
doing, as T.H. Huxley writing i n 1894 saw so clearly, was discussing 
i n publicifche position of the human species i n zoological c l a s s i f i c a t i o n " . 
He cited h i s f r i e n d S i r William Lawrence, as one of those who had been 
"well-nigh ostracised for h i s book On Man,, which now might be read i n a 
Sunday school without surprising anybody." Coleridge, however, had no 
favourable opinion of those \ * i o proposed that the human race developed 
60 
from a race of monkeys. I t reminded him of the story of a French 
lady, who heard of a dead man who had walked a league with h i s head 
under h i s arm. She then overheard someone else say, 'What! a league?" 
in a tone of surprise. "Aye!" saa';the lady, "the f i r s t step was the 
thing."^^ 
Coleridge's search for an alternative way of talking about l i f e , 
and the kind of approach he therefore developed was to a limited degree 
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only displayed i n one of the philosophical lectures, though indications 
of h i s approach appeared elsev/Iiere,^^ and i t was discussed with his 
63 
s e l e c t group of pupils, and in correspondence with h i s friends. In 
the lectures, a unique opportmity to a i r any views of which he was 
r e a l l y confident, Coleridge made l i t t l e of h i s ideas , perhaps because 
he s t i l l believed that he would one day complete a great work i n vhich 
h i s theology and philosophy of nature could be united and displayed in 
a l l t h e i r d e t a i l . So what ho had to offer jjx public at t h i s stage 
would have l i t t l e impact compared for instance with the succession 
of comments on Lawrence?s works produced by h i s c l e r i c a l detractors. 
P&ley, l i k e Hume, Darwiji and Mai thus m s also rejected by Coleridge 
as a contemporary "authority" on the meaning of l i f e . Paley was not . 
controversial, l i k e Malthus, nor in some respects discredited, l i k e 
Darwin, and those who knew about Hume may have thougiit that Paley had 
replied to h i s c r i t i c i s m s s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . I t was d i f f i c u l t , to say 
the l e a s t , to c r i t i c i s e Paley without having a worked out and publishable 
64 
alternative to offer. Aids provided some of the answers, i n terms of 
seeing that "evidence" might mean l i t t l e without "doctrine", but even 
65 
as l a t e as 1827 Coleridge was s t i l l struggling with some undefined 
issues of what he referred to as the philosophy and history of 
C h r i s t i a n i t y . His own i n i t i a l problem with Paley was that he represented 
the kind of theology to which Coleridge had himself once been committed, 
as i n h i s theological lectures ijri B r i s t o l i n 1795, and long found 
66 67 a t t r a c t i v e . Yet 1796 found him already planning a work which would 
include " s t r i c t u r e s on GodwiJi, Paley, &c, &c" and in 1803 he wi'ote 
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that he could produce "a dashing Review of the Natural Theology. 68 
The r e a l point for Coleridge was his horror of what he called the 
disease of h i s "discussing, calculating, prudential age", and i t s 
69 
blindness to the nature and importance of p r i n c i p l e s " , v/hich he 
70 
planned to discuss i n the Friend. Paley, with Hume, "had increased 
71 
the number of i n f i d e l s " because they had not taugiit people "to value 
actions primarily as the language & natural effect of the stats of the 
72 
agent." Men should consider '^vhat they are instead of merely what 
they do; so that the fi g - t r e e may bring forth i t ^ own f r u i t from i t ' s 
own l i v i n g principle, and not have the figs t i e d on to i t ' s barren 
sprays by the hand of outward Prudence & Respect of Character." The 
influence of Paley could never have been so pervasive " i f thinking 
mea. had been habitually led to look into the i r own souls, instead of 
73 
always looking out, both of themselves, and of t h e i r nature." By 1806 
when t h i s remark was written Coleridge was already well read in some of 
the work of Kant, and some information about the i n i t i a l attraction of 
Kant for Coleridge may be reflected in the remark. On the Natural 
Theology i t s e l f , he did see how Hume's comments about the adequacy of 
humiin reason to produce a proof of God could be turned against Paley. 
74 • 
So i n h i s philosophical lectures he referred to Hume's "theolog'ical 75 76 spider". MS"« Cobum's notes on the lecture show that Coleridge 
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had annotated h i s copy of Teimeman's History of Philosophy to make 
the point that i n terms of Paley«s logic, "Spiders would conclude, that 
Houses &c were spun out of Men's B e l l i e s ..." So he commented; 
What i f a man should a s s e r t that M i l l s were made by Corn-grinding, 
and shortly a f t e r dec3.are that both the Grinding and the Ground Coim 
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were the proper and Immediate Effects or Results of the M i l l s ? 
And yet Paley i n h i s Natural Theology, f i r s t , assumes Intelligence 
(meaning the power and exercise of Understanding) as the Cause of 
Organization - and shortly a f t e r , states Organization as the Cause 
of Understanding - i . e . that Understanding or Intelligence i s the 
Property or Result of i t s own E f f e c t s . The Grandfather being his 
Gvnx Grandchild! 
In h i s theological c r i t i c i s m of Paley one may also see where he could 
derive support from h i s reading, for example, of Kant's work of 1764, 
the Enquiry concerning the c l a r i t y of the principles of natural theology 
78 
and E t h i c s ^ i n i t s emphasis on the divine omnipresence. Coleridge 
wrote i n 1817: 'What indeed but the wages of Death can be expected 
from a Doctrine which degrades the Deity into a blank Hypothesis, and. 
that the Hypothesis of a clock-work-maker ..." The r e s u l t , for Coleridge, 
was "a Godless Nature and a Natureless abstract God, noy? an extramundane 
79 
homo magus, from whom the world had i t s being ..." What he for h i s 
part wanted was "to demonstrate the hollowness and falsehood of the 
Corpuscular Theory and of every other scheme of Philosophy'which 
commences with matter as a jam datum, or imder any disguise substitutes 
the Lockian, and Newtonian - From God we had our Being - for the Pauline -
80 
In whom we move and l i v e and have our Being." So in his Biographia 
he commented on "the mechanical system of philosophy which has needlessly 
infected our theological opinions, and teaching us to consider the world 
in i t s r e l a t i o n to God, as of a building to i t s mason, leaves the idea 
81 
of omnipresence a mere abstract notion in the state-room of otir reason." Humfe was rejected by Coleridge on the issues of the role of reason 
in b e l i e f , and for his pessimism, Malthus and Erasmus J)arwin also seemed 
to lack confidence in the divine goodness, though both proposed, i n 
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t h e i r different ways, a kind of speculative theism, related to the 
"evidence" as they saw i t . Paley at l e a s t attempted to offer a God 
who could be worshipped, and i t was to him i n particular that 
Coleridge seems to have been unjust - and he could have pressed Paley 
into service against both Malthus and Darwin. Coleridge also professed 
an i n t e r e s t i n scieaice, though h i s interests were more wide-ranging 
than Paley*s, but Paley distinguished carefully between what was useful 
to h i s kind of argument and what was not. Coleridge made almost eyery 
scrap of information ava i l a b l e to him serve h i s purposes, and he could 
have leamed something from Paley here. Paley'a strengrth seemed to l i e 
not only i n the attention he gave to the scimces vSiich told him about 
" s t r u c t u r e " in relati.on to the spe c i f i c contexts in which those stnxctures 
were to be found, but also i n the way in which he did from time to time 
in the Natural Theology try to take account of v/hat might constitute 
evidence against the goodness of God. Further, i t was an tinfalr 
reading of Paley to suppose that a l l he had to say about the relationship 
of God to the world had been said by means of the watch-watchmaker 
i l l u s t r a t i o n , or for that matter, that of the eye. He had t r i e d to say 
something about the divine omnipresence by emphasising the careful 
attention given by God to every creature. On the otJier hand, Paley did 
not. express h i s understanding of God's!relationship to the world by the 
use of anything resembling the "metaphysical" vocabulary \ * i c h Coleridge 
borrowed from h i s contemporaries in Germany. I t may be that i t i s in 
t h i s connection that one may discern Coleridge's, continuing problem with 
Paley, esp e c i a l l y i f Coleridge had noted Paley's comments about the kind 
of person who would not r e s t content with design theology but v/ho must 
re s t l e s s l y ' 'search for apparently novel ways of a r r i v i n g at the same 
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objective - the cure for atheism. A metaphysical-theological view 
of nature would have to be worked out in the most convincing d e t a i l 
i f i t were to supercede Paley's view of things. In so f a r as Paley 
was appealing to "good sense" and to readily de-scribable and comprehensiole 
f a c t s , i t would perhaps be easier to re-present those f a c t s than to 
embark on metaphysical abstraction from them. Coleridge knew, even i f 
Paley did not, how strange some of the d i s t i n c t i v e l y Leibniziah features 
of metaphysics deemed to anyone other than Leitaiiz. And he may have 
r e a l i z e d that Leibniz* public reputation during his l i f e t i m e did not 
depend upon works of metaphysics, but upon a work which kept metaphysics 
i n the ba.ckgro\md. Coleridge may have thought he could say the right 
things about God and the right things aoout nature, and succeed where 
a great predecessor had been too cautious to succeed. As i t happenea, 
Paley had pointed out the d i f f i c u l t i e s , ana he coulq not prove Paley 
wrong. Coleridge could not find God as a r e s u l t of h i s discussion of 
nature, and he could not wrire anything as effective as the Natural 
Theology. I t was either to be Paley»s theory of nature, or none at 
a l l , or a theology hardly worth the name, as re-presented by Erasmus 
Darwin's grandson. 
We may now turn to Coleridge's search for alternatives, in h i s Kftotiw^* 
of the great German philosophers. What one finds i s plenty of evidence 
of h i s breadth of reading, and equally, evidence of h i s incapacity to 
grasp and operate with the d i s t i n c t i v e l y Kantian contribution to a 
method of approach to God and nature. I t migjit be said that i n fact 
he changed h i s own views remarkably l i t t l e as a result of h i s reading, 
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and h i s own contributions to theology, as in Aids, for example, were not 
derived from the Germans, though i l l u s t r a t e d by material culled from 
t h e i r work, but from h i s own genius brought to bear on h i s reading of 
On 
scripture and the great "divines" of his own English t r a d i t i o n . We 
begin with Colerlage's.theological lectures of 1795 of wMch S.K. Barth 
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wrote: 'Wot surprisingly, i t i s the problem of e v i l which affords 
Coleridge h i s entree into the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l ramifications of 
revealed r e l i g i o n . " The production of the lectures perhaps provided 
him with h i s f i r s t opportunity to sort out h i s view of the problem. 
In 1794 he replied to a friend: "Your remark of the Physical E v i l i n 
the long Infancy of men would indeed puzzle a Pangloss - puzzle him to 
accomt for the wish of a benevolent heai^t l i k e your's to discover 
malignancy i n itte Creator".^"* And, " I would ardently, that you were a 
Necessitarian ^ ^ b e l i e v i n g in an a l l - l o v i n g Omnipotcaace) an Optimist."^^ 
He meant by "optimist" - "by having no w i l l but the w i l l of Heaven, ... 
we c a l l i n Omnipotence to fig^it our battles!" The lectiu-es of 1795 
ra l s e a and dismissed a l l notions of deity other than those of a single 
and a l l - l o v i n g omnipotence: 
By Deity we mean a creative or at least an organizing Intelligence. 
T h i s Deity i s either indifferent ox- mlignant or oenevolent or a 
mixture of both. An indifferent Deity i s a contradiction i n terms, 
or rather another word for No Deity. He that createa must have 
created with some view or other. A malignant Baity the experience 
of a l l our senses shows to be an Absurdity - he must be therefore 
ei t h e r benevolent or a mixture of the two Principles - I f these two 
pr i n c i p l e s are unequally m et i n a l l powerful Beings, the strongest 
must overpower the weaker. Deity would therefore become ei.ther 
t o t a l l y one or totally the other. But i f equally met he could not 
act a t a l l . Nothing therefore remains but the hypothesis of t o t a l 
Benevolence.^? 
With t h i s as h i s basis, he went on to develop a view of pain as the 
88 
stimulus to the removal of moral e v i l . Yet the contemplation of nature 
- 280 -
seems also in his view to be effective, to t h i s end 89 
Almost a l l the physical E v i l i n the World depends on the existence 
of moral E v i l - and the long-continued contemplation of the l a t t e r 
does not tend to meliorate the human heart. - The pleasures, 
which we i-eceive from r u r a l beauties, are of l i t t l e Consequence 
compared with the Moral E f f e c t of these pleasures - beholding 
constantly the Best possible We at l a s t become ourselves the best 
possible. In the country, a l l around us smile Good and Beauty -
and the Images of t h i s divihefe<Xfffc'A^*^dv are miniatured on the 
mind of the beholder, as a Landscape on a Convex Mirror. 
So .in the 1795 lectures he said he could weep for "the deadened and 
p e t r i f i e d Heart of that Man who could wander among the f i e l d s in a 
vernal Noon or summer Evening and doubt his Benevolence! The Qraaipotent 
has tmfolded to us the Volume of the World, that there we may read the 
Transcript of himself. I n Earth or Air the meadow's purple stores, the 
Moons mild radiance, or the Virgins form Blooming with rosy.-tsmiles, we see 
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pourtrayed the bright Impressions of the eternal Mind." Such a view 
of nature would voiderstandably f i n d the approach of the s c i e n t i s t s a t 
l e a s t i r r e l e v a n t i f not intolerable. In 1816-17 he wrote !«... But God 
created a world or he expressed the i n f i n i t e f i n i t e l y - ... The Darkness -
of Gravity & the Splendor of. Light, produce the lovely form, & aweful 
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Substance of L i f e ..." He wrote that inanimate nature was '|fixt 
93 
L i f e " , * and i n 1818, "The most pregnant h i s t o r i c Symbol on Eaii;h i s a 
Coral Bank on a Stratum of Coal - or rather a quarry of veined Marble 
94 
on a coal stratum." A l l was to be seen 4i relation'.to the divine 
creator's a c t i v i t y . "... the Diamond, thick, and hard, yet transmits 
a l l Light & r e t a i n s for i t s e l f the l i g h t of the God of Day ... Ideas 
i n man to the signatures of God, or the Ideas in Nature, as the Eye 
95 
to i t s objects - Imown only by the coincidence of vision and r e f l e c t i o n " . 
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1796 found him considering the production of an epic poem on the 
.96 Origin of E v i l " " - the Ancient Mariner. Bate wrote^^ of the way in 
which the subject had been eluding and intriguing Coleridge for months: 
For i f we postulate a universe pervaded by 'one l i f e ' , then - as 
i n monistic and pantheistic r e l i g i o n s generally - we seem confined 
to one of two choices i n an attempt to understand e v i l , neither 
one of which s a t i s f i e s both the mind and the heart. That i s , we 
must either admit e v i l as an inevitable part of the fab r i c and 
thus qualify our conception of a benevolent God, or else we are 
encouraged to explain i t away as something other than ' e v i l ' ( i . e . ' 
as something not so bad af t e r a l l ^ . No one knew t h i s better than 
Coleridge himself, and as the years passed he was to grow even 
l e s s s a t i s f i e d with either of tiiese alternatives. 
J u s t as Coleridge had lamched himself into dealing with these and other 
theological topics, the opportunity presented i t s e l f for him to trav e l In 
Germany in 1798. Most of the attention given to t h i s journey by writers 
on Coleridge focusses on h i s discovery of Kant, but given h i s existing 
concern :with the problem of e v i l and h i s view of nature, i t i s also 
profitable to take notice of h i s discovery of Leibniz. Leibniz was tne 
write r of the Theodicy as Coleridge no doubt already knew. I t may be 
th a t he now discovered him as a metaphysician, and that i t was the work 
of Leibniz and h i s non-Kantian followers which was ultimately at le a s t 
as important to Coleridge as the work of Kant himself. At any rate, i t 
may be not without significance i f one were to find tliat i t was the work 
of Kant before 1771 which Coleridge attempted to take seriously, rather 
than the work published a f t e r that date. I t i s only too easy to make 
the mistake of assuMAg that i t i s the " c r i t i c a l " Kant now valued by us 
which he found to be of help to him. I f he had adopted Kairt's " c r i t i c a l " 
standpoint, i t would be d i f f i c u l t to make sense for example, of some of 
the passages from h i s notebooks already quoted. I t may also be the case 
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that he could not cope with Leibniz either - but only with some of h i s 
l e s s able successors,and these l a t t e r would properly have been the 
targets of the " c r i t i c a l " Kant. 
Given Bate's description of "the overriding philosophical interest 
of Coleridge" which has already been quoted, one may perhaps postuD.ate 
that Coleridge would have l i k e d to have become the English Leibniz. He 
98 
re f e r r e d in the Biographia to L-eibniz' cr i t e r i o n of a tme philosophy, 
that i t would at once explain and c o l l e c t the fragments of truth scattered 
t h r o u ^ systems apparently unrelated to one another-and prpceeded to quote 
from one of L e i b n i z ' works, though i n h i s own translation. He also made 
99 
t h i s clear to himself i n his notebooks. There Coleridge wrote i n 1810 
that philosophy nrust . 
explain to us, and bring into dlstinbt and harmonious conceptions 
a l l those feelings, .... convictions, & i n s t i n c t s v i t a l or s p i r i t u a l , 
which a l l men possess as men, which we cannot lose altogether 
without l o s i n g our human nature, or pretend to despise without 
Introducing a discord &.-olontradiction between the principles of 
Thought 84 those of Action, which ought to be in closest harmony -
A genuine philosophy w i l l manifest i t s e l f therefore by i t s perfect 
congruence i n substance with the catholic.rcreed of Human Nature -
quod semper, quod iibique, quod ab omnibus - and by shewing the 
beauty and r a t i o n a l i t y of t h i s creed, and thus elevating opinion 
into surety even where i t i s not susceptible of certainty ... 
Also,*^^ "the ultimate grounds of a l l must I'emain inexploraole or m&x 
must cease to be progressive. Our Ignorance with a l l the intermediates 
of obscurity i s the eonditbn of our ever-increasing knowledge." Moreover, 
Coleridge wrote of h i s feelings on seeing a bust of Leibniz in Hanover in 
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1799 i n a way which finds no echo i n h i s praise of Kant. The bust 
"impressed on my whole soul a sensation which has ennobled and enriched 
i t ! - I t i s the face of a God! & Leibnitz was almost more than a man i n 
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the wonderful capaciousness of h i s Judgment & Imagination!" That he 
could share L e i b n i z ' convictions was shown when he wrote home on the 
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death of h i s c h i l d that he could not believe "in t h i s moving s t i r r i n g 
and harmonious universe" that the c h i l d ' s l i f e had ceased. The "l i v i n g 
God i s every where, & works every where - and where i s there room for 
Death?" He could not believe that God himself uses h i s own power 
va i n l y : 
That l i k e a c h i l d he builds palaces of mud and clay in the common 
road, and; then he destroys thiem, as weary of his pastime, or leaves 
them to be trod under by the Hoof of Accident? - That God works by 
general laws are to me words without meaning or worse than meanings 
l e s s - Ignorance and I m b e c i l l i t y , and Limitation must wish i n 
generals - What and who are these horrible shadows necessity and 
general law, to which God himself must offer s a c r i f i c ^ s - hecatombs 
of S a c r i f i c e s ? I f e e l a deep conviction that these shadows e x i s t 
not - they are only the dreams oi reasoning Pride, that would f a i n 
f i i i d solutions for a l l d i f f i c u l t i e s without Fai t h ! - that would 
make the discoveries which l i e thick sown in the path of the eternal 
Future uimecessary; and so conceiting that there i s sufficiency 
and completeness in the narrow present, weakens the presentiment of 
our wide and ever widening Immortality! - and God works in each 
for a l l - most true - but more couiprehensively true i s i t , that he 
works in a l l for each. 
(Precisely the same concern with 'Necessity and general law" reappear i n 
Aids.^*'^) 
More information about Coleridge's view of Leibniz i s contained in 
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a l e t t e r which was drafted, but not actually despatched, and which 
survived among h i s papers. This i s one of the l e t t e r s which marked the 
period i n 1801 when Coleridge began what he hoped would be a serious 
programme of philosophical study, and.which was to lead to h i s philosophical 
105 
l e c t u r e s . Coleridge thought that the. bitterness and contempt with which 
Leibniz was treated "not only by Newton's Understrappers but by the viSiole 
English L i t e r a r y Public" had not wholly subsided. Leibniz was thought 
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of as "a visionary & fa n t a s t i c Fellow" and h i s notions of "Plenum, 
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pre-established Harmony" had been misrepresented, though Coleridge 
conceded that these concepts were "too repugnant to our common Sense" 
107 108 
and perhaps too strange to survive th e i r inventor. And ; 
Volt a i r e in that jumble of Ignorance, Wickedness, & F o l l y , which 
with h i s usual Impudence he e n t i t l e d a Philosophical Dictionaryj 
made i t epidemic with a l l the No-thinking Freethinkers throughout 
• Europe J to consider Ix>cke*s Essay as a modest common sense System, 
which taught but l i t t l e indeed - & yet taugjit a l l that could be 
knoWn/& held i t up in opposition to the dreams of the Philosophy 
of Leibniz, whose mortal^g^ i n the Mind of Voltaire & h i s Joumey-
men was, not h i s monads, but that intolerable Doctrine of the 
Theodicee, that the system of the Universe demanded not only the 
f u l l acquiescence of the Judgement in i t s perfection, but likewise 
the deepest devotion of Love & Gratitude. 
On a journey vtoich included a stay at Durham, he foixna the Cathedral 
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l i b r a r i a n completely ignorant even of Leibniz' name, but despite such 
evidence of a lack of interest on the part of h i s countrymen, Coleridge's 
i n t e r e s t in Leibniz and in the l a t t e r ' s understanding of the question 
of e v i l remained unabated:'''^* 
To retin-n to the Question of E v i l - woe .to the man, to Ythom i t i s 
an imlnteresting Question - tho» man.y a mind, overwearied by i t , 
may shun i t with Dread/and here, N.B. scourg-e with deserved and 
l o f t y Scorn those C r i t i c s who laugji at the discussion of old 
Questions - ... The assertion that there i s in the essence of 
the divine nature a necessity of omniform harmonious action, 
and that Order and System/not number - in i t s e l f base and disorderly 
and i r r a t i o n a l - define the creative Energy, determine and employ 
i t - and that number i s subservient to order, regulated, organized, 
made beautiful and ra t i o n a l , an object both of Imag. and I n t e l l e c t , 
by Order - t h i s i s no mere assertion i t i s ... s t r i c t l y in harmony 
with the Fact, for the world appears so - and i t i s proved by what-
ever proves the Being of God - Indeed, i t i s involved i n the Idea 
of God. -
I n 1804 he was proposing to produce a work, himself, entitled 
'^Consolations and Comforts from the exercise and ri.ght application of the 
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Heason, the ImagiJiation, and the mbral Feelings, addressed especially 
to those i i Sickness, Adversity, or Distress of mind, from speculative 
112 
Gloom." The f i r s t part of t h i s work was to be p r a c t i c a l and the 
second speculative, "& w i l l contain a new Theodicee, & what w i l l perhaps 
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appear to many a new Basis of Morals". The struggle with t h i s project 
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c l e a r l y , continued for years, without coming to a successful conclusion, 
at l e a s t in the sense that Coleridge did not produce a theodicy which was 
some kind of answer to the problem of physical e v i l . I n f a c t he said 
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himself that Aids provided neither a "positive" proof of the T r i n i t y , 
nor a metaphysical examination of the origin of e v i l . Of t h i s l a t t e r 
topic, and that of the creation of the v i s i b l e world he remarked; "These 
as absolutely requiring the habit of abstraction, and severe Thinking, I 
have reserved for my larger work" - which never appeared. The passage 
in Aids which refers,; to the "origin of e v i l " may have been written xmder 
the influence of Coleridge's reading of iCant, and seems to represent a 
break with the theology of the Thepdjcy. Coleridge wrote: 
The Origin of E v i l , meanwhile, i s a question interesting ,onlj' to 
the Metaphysician, and in a systfea of moral and religious.Miilosophy. 
The Man of sober mind, who seeks for truths that possess a moral 
and p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t , i s content to be certain, f i r s t , that E v i l 
must have had a beginning, since otherwise i t must either be God, 
or a co-eternal and co-equal R i v a l of God; both impious notions, 
and the l a t t e r f o o l i s h to boot. 2dly, That i t could not originate 
i n God; for i f so, i t would be a t once E v i l and not E v i l , or God 
wovLLd be at once God (that i s , i n f i n i t e Goodness) and not God -
both a l i k e impossible positions. Instead therefore of troubling 
himself with this barren controversy, he more profitably turns h i s 
inquiries to that E v i l i^hich most concerns himself, and of which he 
may f i n d the o r i g i n . 
Coleridge here seems to have spotted the "mani-dx ean" character of what 
Leibniz had said about God. He does not refer h i s reader to at l e a s t 
one relevant essay of Kaht»s, (on the f a i l u r e of Leibniz* kind of 
attempt to j u s t i f y God) which had been available i n English for some 
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years, and which Coleridge had read, either in translation or in the 
o r i g i n a l , as we s h a l l see l a t e r . 
On the other hand Coleridge had fotmd that "leibnizian"-style 
117 
metaphysics cohered best with h i s own fundamental assumptions, and 
he was preparea to make use of i t . ( I t was when he turned from meta-
physics to ••biblical" theology that he found Kant*s work helpful in 
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some resspects. ) Although i t seems that Coleridge turned to some of 
Kant's successors for h i s 'taature-philosophy", rather than grapple with 
theSr t e i b n i z i a n sources, there are brief indications of h i s knowledge. 
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of Leibniz* work here and there, providing information that Coleridge 
was w e l l aware of the Leibnizian notion of "entelechy and of the lex 
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continui^JL' Perhaps the c l e a r e s t example of the way i n which he 
employed Leitaiizian vocabulary outside a work intended for publi<^.tion 
l 2 l 
i s i n the l e t t e r of 1817 already quoted for i t s c r i t i c i s m of Paley; 
For i t i s not of a dead machine that I speak; but I am endeavouring 
to trace the Genesis, the^iJtf*lJ , the Natura rerum, the B i r t h of 
Things: and t h i s under tne disadvantage of beginning (as f a r as 
the mere science i s concerned) with the lowest, per ascensum; 
whereas the only true point of view i s that of Religion, namely, 
per descensum. Observe too, that the two great poles of manifestation 
are Continuity (Lex Continui) and Individuation - the l a t t e r being 
the f i n a l cause of nature, or her object, from the Coral which i s 
almost confounded with Nature to the Man of Genius and genial 
Goodness, the maximum of Individuation in the present L i f e ; yet so 
as that the whole process i s c y c l i c a l tho* progressive, and the Man 
separates from Nature only that Nature may be found again in a 
higher dignity in the Man. For as the Ideal i s realized in Nature, 
so i s the Real idealized in man. 
However, although such a passage employs Leibnizian concepts Coleridge 
fought shy of any extensive discussion of Leibniz in p u b l i c , w h e t h e r in 
h i s philosophical lectures or i n the Biographia.^^^ Coleridge was aware 
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124 of the work of Oken (a d i s c i p l e of Schelling) and Cuvier for example, 
and he may have thought that since he was confronted with facts unknown 
to Leibniz, he ought to look for help to h i s own contemporaries. One of 
125 
h i s most important sources was the work of Schelling himself. In 
1816, about the time he was thinking about h i s Theory of L i f e , Coleridge 
l26 
seems s t i l l to have admired the l a t t e r as one of those viho, with Kant, 
had treated natural history, comparative anatomy and chemistry in terms 
of a new . system. On the other hand by 1817 he admitted that he suspected 
127 
that S c h e l l i n g might not always be in earnest in what he wrote, and 
by 1818 he was w r i t i n g severely of Schellihg's work. Hence he was 
129 
increasingly c r i t i c a l of the metaphysical material of h i s own Biographia. 
The point seems to be that whilst evidence abounds as to Coleridge's 
Interes t in the science of h i s day, h i s inevitaole reaction to i t was to 
130 
proceed with an exercise in metaphysical aostraction despite h i s 
problem aoout i t s coherence with h i s b i b l i c a l theology. So for example 
131 
i n one of h i s notebooks he wrote; " I f we assume, as a l l the facts 
accunralated by the genius and industry of the constellation of great Minds^ 
who With John Hunter as their Morning Star, have founded the science of 
Comparative Anatomy & Physiology, authorize us to assume, a gradmted 
scale of ascent from the minimum of consciousness ... up to the highest 
imaginable perfection of consciousness that can exist i n a Creature ..." 
Such a technique could accommodate most new "facts", i t seemed, 
though with one important exception, as we have seen - the suggestion 
that man was "the l a s t metamorphosis, the gay Image, of some lucky species 
132 
of Ape or Baboon". Against Darwin., and priding himself on his having 
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133 arrived a t h i s point of view without experiment Coleridge proposed ' 
that "the harmony between the vegetable and animal world, was not a 
harmony of resemblance, but of contrast; and that t h e i r relation to 
each o-ttier was that of corresponding opposites." Given t h i s principle, 
he could safeguard the special status he wished to accord to man whatever 
other concessions he might make to "evolutionary" thinking. This 
presumably meant that h i s medical friends might find h i s Theory of L i f e 
of much l e s s use to them than the work of Lawrence. Unless they had 
received a l e t t e r from him, h i s friends would not be aware of Coleridge's 
sources, since he did not in h i s works, explain what they were, nor did 
he aclmowledge the d i r e c t quotations he made from them. Bate proposed*"^* 
the t h e s i s that Coleridge was embarassed by h i s dabblings in the 
philosophy of "organicism", i n that he could not find a way of reconciling 
t h i s "philosophy" with h i s developing unaerstaiiding of Christian 
orthodoxy, "AS he sought to assemble h i s ideas, h i s bid habit of 
vicarioushess, of serving as usher for what he could not f e e l completely 
free to advance himself, reasserted i t s e l f more strongly, though now 
Ittt a distorted, almost somnabulistic way. He i n s t i n c t i v e l y reached 
out for another to take h i s place, as i f to say to h i s inner censor that 
i t was not he but Sc h e l l i n g , or someone else he happened to be reading, 
who was speaking thus ... There i s some ti'uth in t h i s , though i t does 
not quite explain the manner of presentation of the speculative passages 
in the Biographia, nor the absence i n the philosophical lectures of a 
f u l l discussion of these German contemporaries of whom he was so aware. 
I t ffifiy rather be that he wanted to conceal the sources of h i s apparent 
o r i g i n a l i t y . And he may liave misdirected his reader's attention 
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to a philosopher such as Kant who was important for some points of 
C61eridge»s theology, but who would not have regarded with approval, 
at l e a s t in h i s p o s t - c r i t i c a l period, Coleridge's particular variety 
of speculation. 
One may now ask the question as to what, i f anything, i s contained 
that i s of any spe c i a l significance for the purposes of t h i s study, in 
the Theory of L i f e . Coleridge was, after a l l , immensely proud of i t I 
I cherish, I must confess, a pet system, a bye blow of B^ '^ o'.vn 
Philosophizing; but i t i s so unlike to a l l the opinions and 
modes of reasoning groimded on the atomic. Corpuscular and 
mechanic Philosophy, which i s alone tolerated ii i the present 
day, and which since the time of Newton has been universally 
taken as synonimous with Philosophy i t s e l f - that I must 
content myself with caressing the h e r e t i c a l Brat in private " 
under the name of the ZoAdynamic Method - or the Doctrine of L i f e . 
13 
Coleridge may i n fac t have been trying to overcome what Farrer described 
as the bifurcation that had taken place in tlie seventeenth century between 
science and sense, by refusing, l i k e Leibniz and some of h i s successors, 
»*t6 identify the r e a l nature of things with what either sort of descrltrtion 
appeared to describe'^. He wanted to fi n d for himself "-that wonderful 
concordance of man with the world surrounding him" about which Leibniz 
in h i s own way had been so eloquent. For Coleridge, metaphysics therefore 
" i s a genus generalissimum, comprizing a.11 evidence tr'anscending that of 
138 
Sense - or rather the Sciences that have this for t h e i r object". He 
wanted i n the Theory of L i f e not merely to explain l i f e but to account 
139 
for i t , and by t h i s he meant stating something prior to nature as i t s 
ground or cause,"and to t h i s , in the question of L i f e , I know no possible 
answer, but GOD. To account for a thing i s to see into the principle of 
i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , and from that p r i n c i p l e to evolve i t s being." T h i s 
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140 also appears in Aids where he wrote; 'The moment we assume an 
Origin in Nature, a true Beginning, and actual F i r s t - that moment 
v/e r i s e above Nature, and are compelled to assume a supernatural 
141 
Bawer. (Gen. l . y . l . ) " When he tiu'ned to explanation of nature, 
he understood that explanation to "consist i n the reduction of the idea 
of L i f e to t h i s simplest and most comprehensive form or mode of action; 
that i s , to some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n s t i n c t or tendency, evident in a l l 
i t s manifestations, and involved i n the iaea i t s e l f . " On the assumption 
that t h i s could be done, " i t w i l l be required to present an ascending 
s e r i e s of corresponding phenomena as involved in, preceedipg from, and 
so f a r therefore explained by, the supposition of i t s progressive intensity 
and of the gradual enlargement of i t s sphere". So Nature in Aids i s 
142 
defined as "A Power subject to the Law of Continuity CLex Continui. 
In Natura non datur S a l t u s . ) " And" further, "Nature i s a Line in constant 
and continuous evolution. I t s beginning i s l o s t in the Super-natural; • 
and for our unders.tanding, therefore, i t must appear as a continuous 
l i n e without beginning or end." The explanation woula be even more 
143 
perfect, he wrote, "should the necessity of t h i s progression and 
of these ascending gradations be contained in the assumed idea of l i f e " . 
Thai the explanation would "only" have to add "the conditions common to 
a l l i t s phenomena, and those appropriate to each place and rank, in the 
scale of ascent, and then proceed to determine ttie primary and 
constitutive forms, i . e . the elementary powers in which t h i s tendency 
r e a l i z e s i t s e l f under different degfrees and conditions." Coleridge 
attempted to distinguish what he was doing from an exercise in nomen-
144 
clature, quite c l e a r l y understanding Linnaeus V point about i t s function. 
He seemed to think that h i s own purpose was in some way superior, since 
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he Indicated that knowledge of 'ithe common character of a whole class -
i n the nomenclature of botan.y'" did not provide an ••understanding" of 
a particular plant as he himself would want to understand i t . He also 
145 
distinguished himself from the inventor and maker of any "machine" 
of the world, 
v/ho knows i t s moving powiBr, or perhaps himself constitutes i t , who 
i s , as i t were, the soul of the work, and in whose mind a l l i t s 
parts, with a l l t h e i r bearings and relations, had pre-existed 
long before the machine i t s e l f had been put together. In him 
therefore would reside, what i t would be presumption to attempt 
to acquire, or to pretend to coiumunicate, the most perfect insight 
not only of the machine i t s e l f , and of a l l i t s various operations, 
but of i t s ul-cimate principle and i t s essential causes. The 
mysterious gi'ound, the e f f i c i e n t causes of v i t a l i t y , and whether . 
different l i v e s d i f f e r absolutely or only in degree. He alone can 
knpAV who not only said, 'Let the earth bring forth the l i v i n g 
creature, the beast of the earth after h i s kind, and i t was so;* 
but who said, ^Let us make man in our image, who himself breathed 
into h i s n o s t r i l s the breath of L i f e , and man became a l i v i n g soul," 
Coleridge suggested that h i s own position was that ot the simple inquirer, 
seeking for the minimal number of principles of explanation which would 
render nature i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
So to the question •^ Vhat i s L i f e ? " he was tempted to reply, "What 
i s not L i f e that r e a l l y i£?" The r e a l i t y of things lay i n their relation 
146 
to other things as t h e i r s u f f i c i e n t cause, since, as he remarked, 
a l l admit that " l i f e " does not necessarily imply consciousness or 
147 
s e n s i b i l i t y . So he suggested that -trhe aborescent forms on a frosty 
morning, to be seen on the v/indow and. pavement, must have some relation 
to the more perfect forms developed in the vegetable world. •' This 
••wider view^' of l i f e ' • f i l l s up the aroitrary chasm between physics and 
.physiology••, and. presumably between any and every ••science". Coleridge 
148 
i n s i s t e d : "The only danger l i e s i n the leaping from low to high. 
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with the neglect of the intervening gradations." Then followed an 
expansion of the statement he made in h i s l e t t e r of 1817 that the whole 
process of nature was ciy c l i c a l though progressive. He asserted that 
the one proof of the es s e n t i a l v i t a l i t y of nature was "that she does 
not ascend as li n k s in a suspended chain, but as the steps i j i si ladder; 
or rather she at one and the same time ascends as by a climax, and 
expanas as the concentric c i r c l e s on the lake from the point to which 
149 
the stone i n i t s f a l l had given the f i r s t impulse." Living things, 
organisms, are "mechanised from within", - they have within themselves 
a power "which unites a given a l l into a whole that i s presupposed by 
a l l i t s parts". L i f e as a whole i s manifested by a "tendency to 
150 
individuation"; i t i s govenied by "the principle of unity i n multei.ty". 
l 5 l 
In Aids t h i s point seems to appear i n an alternative phraseology, 
where he quoted Leighton: 
God hath suited every creature He hath made with a convenient 
good to which i t tends, and in the obtainment of which i t r e s t s 
and i s s a t i s f i e d . Natural bo a l e s have a l l t h e i r own natural 
place, whither, i f not hindered, they move incessantly t i l l they 
be i n i t ; and they declare, by resting there, that they are (as 
I may say) where they wotild be. Sensitive creatures are carried 
to seek a sensitive good, as agreeable to t h e i r rank in being, 
and, atta i n i n g that, aim no further. 
When he came to apply h i s pr i n c i p l e s to the sc a l e of being he sa i d ^ ^ ^ 
of gol^ for example, that i t expressed l i f e . To understand the meaning 
of t h i s , he described what he c a l l e d two counteracting tendencies of 
nature, "that of detachment from the imiversal l i f e , vtoicli u n i v e r s a l i t y 
i s represented to xxs by gravitation, and that of attachment or reduction 
into i t " . Gold and the other "noble metals" represent the units in 
which the l a t t e r tendency - that of Identity with the l i f e of nature. 
293 -
has the preponderance. ••It i s the form oif unity with the l e a s t degree 
of tendency to individuation." C r y s t a l s , the next exanple, represent 
•'the simplest forms of t o t a l i t y evolved", by which he meant ••the simplest 
forms of composition". When he turned to geology, he reminded his reader 
153 
of h i s understanding of strata as " f i x t l i f e ' * when he suggested that 
strata are to be viewed f i r s t l y as "the residue and product of vegetable 
and animal l i f e " . Secondly, strata manifest !'the tendencies of the L i f e 
of Nature to vegetation or animalization". I t i s in the lowest forms of 
the vegetable and animal world that "we pex-ceive t o t a l i t y dawning into 
individuation •'. He immediately stated that man i s the highest product 
of t h i s l e v e l of b ^ g and that i t was in men tliat "individuality i s not 
only perfected i n i t s corporeal sense, but begins a new series beyond 
the appropriate l i m i t s of physiology". ^Vhatever he was prepared to say 
about the unfolding of nature IJirough the different levels of being, he 
wanted to reserve for man a special status. Of the vegetable and animal 
world as a whole he s a i d : "The tendency to individuation, more or l e s s 
obscure, more or l e s s obvious, constitutes the common diaracter of a l l 
cla s s e s , as f a r as they maintain for themselves a distinction from the 
universal l i f e of the planet; while the degrees, both of intensity and 
extension, to which t h i s tendency i s realized, form the species, and 
t h e i r ranks in the great scale of ascent and expansion.'• 
In h i s atteji?)t to elaborate further vihat he miderstood of the scale 
of being he said that •'as the Individuals run into each other, so do the 
different genera. They likewise pass into each other so indistlnguishably 
154 
that the whole order forms a very network." This i s to oe read in 
conjunction with h i s statements on an ea r l i e r page where he urged men 
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to learn about the "interpenetration", the "total intussusception, of 
the existence of a l l i n each as the condition of Nature's vuiity and 
substantiality, and of the latency under the predominance of some one 
155 
power, wherein subsists l i f e and i t s endless variety ..." Also, 
i t i s important to notice another comment he made: 'Slence the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s which have embarrassed the'naturalists, who adopt the 
Linnaean c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , i n their endeavovirs to discover determinate 
characters of d i s t i n c t i o n between the vermes and the insects. "^ :^^  
However, Coleridge was not a foreruiaier of Darwin. He was not writing 
a book which was a prelude to the Origin of Species and i t s hypothesis 
of •transmutation". Whilst not committed to the conviction that there 
were absolutely clear distinctions to be drawn between creatures in 
t h e i r different ranks of being, t h i s did not imply for him that one 
group may include members who by a process of change themselves give 
arise i n the course of time to another entirely different and recognisably 
different species. 
Coleridge had written of "detachment" and "attachment", of " t o t a l i t y " 
157 
and "individuation". He aliso wrote of the "polarity", or "the e s s e n t i a l 
dualism of Nature, a r i s i n g out of i t s productive unity, and s t i l l tending 
to re-affirm i t , either as equilibrium, indifference, or identity". L i f e 
manifests i t s e l f i n the "counterpoint" of i t s different powers, and in t h e i r 
" s t r i f e " . His employment of t h i s kind of language was the nearest he 
approached tp anything that could be described by the word "theodicy" 
(except i n the sense in which Beck described Herder's book). Together 
159 
with the law of continuity, he asserted a certain "contradiction" 
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in the development of things, but t h i s i s not; described as pKjS'/C*^ *<f'^^ 
for example, even when he discussed feeling, s e n s i b i l i t y , and the 
160 
senses g-enerally. In the l a t t e r connection he was careful to 
protect himself from a charge of a certain incoherence in h i s discussion 
by saying, "1 pretend not to control the freedom, in wSiich the necessity 
of Nature i s rooted, by the precise l i m i t s of a system". He mig^it have 
seen the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n which some of the interpreters of Linnaeus 
had found themselves, but hardly provided an interpretation of their 
factual information that would commend i t s e l f to tne experimental 
161 • 
s c i e n t i s t . Coleridge was well aware that he was constructing and 
applying a hypothetical explanation which was the resttlt of an 
"analytic method" rather than a "synthetic" one. Man, he maintained, 
needs to comprehend the harmonies of nature, her endless forms, the 
thousand-fold r e a l i z a t i o n of her laws, "which yet in t h e i r absoluteness 
can be discovered only i n the recesses of h i s s p i r i t ..." 
Having said that, he could say almost anything he l i k e d . When he 
163 
explained to h i s readers of Aids the distinction beinveen an org^ism 
and a machine he wrote that not only the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c shape of an 
organism was evolved from "the i n v i s i b l e central power", but also that 
••the material Mass i t s e l f i s acquired by assimilation". He v/ent on: • 
The germinal power of the Plant transmutes the fixed a i r and the 
elementary Base of Water into Grass or Leaves; and on these the 
Organific P r i n c i p l e in the Ox or Elephant exei'cises an Alchemy 
s t i l l more stupendous. As the unseen Agency weaver>. i t s magic 
eddies, the foliage becomes indifferently the Bone ana i t s Marrow, 
the pulpy Brain, or the s o l i d Ivory. That what you see is^ blood, 
i s f l e s h , i s i t s e l f the work^ or shall I say, the translucence, 
or the i n v i s i b l e Energy, which soon surrenders or abandons them 
to i n f e r i o r Pov/ers, (for there i s no pause nor chasm in the 
a c t i v i t i e s of Nature) which repeat a similar metamorphosis 
according to t h e i r kind. 
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Coleridge concluded h i s remarks on t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n by saying, 
•These are not fancies, conjectures, or even hypotheses, but f a c t s ; 
to deny which i s impossible, not to reflect on which i s ignominious." 
164 
In the Theory of L i f e ' he did reveal an apprehension that laot 
everything he said might correspond to the truth about the way things 
are, when he distinguished b r i e f l y between h i s ••symbols" of natural 
processes which he said might be ••fIctitious^^, but continued that 
•'the thing signified'' was ••grounded in truth". One can find occasional 
references also expressing' Coleridge's hesitancy about h i s symbols^^^ 
but on the wnole he must be said to write as thougii what he said could 
confidently be taken as informing h i s readers about the truth of things 
at l e a s t in the Theory, of L i f e . 
I t has already been noted that Coleridge reminded h i s readers that 
God was the ground of the being not only of the worla as a whole but of 
the creatures on i t and especially of man. Man was made directly by God 
rather than brought forth from the earth. He began a new series in the ranks 
of being, and represented the perfection of individuality Insofar as 
that could be expi-essed through a.body ... In man's body nature had 
166 
i t s crown and consummation , and in. the human brain was the consummation 
16 V 
of nature's combined energies. Nature, i t seened, formed the different 
168 
classes "from choice and bounty•', and had nature gone no further the 
vegetable and insect creation would have formed a system of l i f e . But 
as nature ascended in power she apparently also sometimes exhibited 
169 
wliat Coleridge c a l l e d '"a retrograde movement". However, 'Mature 
never loses what she had once learnt, though in the aquirement of each 
new power she Intermits, or performs l e s s energetically, the act 
immediately preceding. She often drops a faculty but never f a i l s 
to pick i t up again. She may seem forgetful and absent, but i t i s 
only to r e c o l l e c t herself with additional, as well as recruited vigour, 
in some afte r and higher state; as i f the sleep of powers, as w e l l as 
of bodies, were the season and condition of their growth." 
170 
I t i s a t t h i s point, according to Coleridge, that nature loses 
analogies with the previous rank of being; '•with the single exception 
l 7 l 
of that more than valuable, that estimable philanthropist, the dog, 
andV'perhaps, of the horse and elephant, the analogies to ourselves, 
which we can discover in the qtiadrupeds or quadrumani, are of our 
vices, our f o l l i e s , and our imperfections." In particular, so f a r 
172 
as man's soul i s concerned," ••Nature did not a s s i s t as handmaid 
under the eye of her sovereign Master". In Aids Coleridge asserted 
that •'there i s more i n man that can be rationally referred to the l i f e 
of Nature and the mechanism of Organization••. Man has the whole world 
in counterpoint to himself, and yet "contains an entire world within 
l73 174 himself". He expanded t h i s b r i e f summary in a paragraph beginning: 
'•In Man the centripetal and individualizing tendency of our Nature i s 
i t s e l f concentred and individualized - he i s a revelation of Nature!" 
Man, he went on, i s henceforward delivered up to himself to manifest 
h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y , - in interdependence with others in p o l i t i c s ; in 
independence in h i s moral l i f e ; and in genius In his i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e -
And "polarity•• i n man's l i f e must appear both in h i s reverence for l i b e r t y 
and i n h i s reverence for law; in inaepehdence, but also in service and 
submission to the Supreme W i l l ; i n genius ana o r i g i n a l i t y , but also i n 
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"resignation to the r e a l world ... sympathy and Inter-comraunion with 
Nature". In the c o n c i l i a t i o n of extremes i s man's l i f e to be manifested. 
175 
The philosophical l e c t u r e s Included an extensive summary of Coleridge's 
pattern of explanatioix YhicSi led up to his assertions about man, and 
t h i s summary concluded by saying that nature for the production of man, 
took up a l l that she had been doing before, 
and by superior a i d presents the m t e r i a l s for foi'ming the 
microcosm of man, who, with none but the simplest forms of 
exteraal power, has the power of conquering the whole; and 
a l l that i n s t i n c t had done throughout the creation i n each 
separate part, to gain that by power of reason, so as bearing 
in i t s e l f the best witness of higher birth; no longer Qo be 
the slave) of nature, but to be placed as her Lord, no longer 
as receiving g i f t s , but as standing forth, fi-om the naked 
savage up to Newton, to bring whatever was within the eye 
within the power of the mind and to subject to the mind that 
which the senses had only given him the f i r s t notices of, as 
spies and out-ministers to discover what was yet to conquer. 
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Attention to one l e t t e r of Coleridge's of 1920 may provide one 
clue as to v^hy he did not publish h i s Theory though he was able to make 
use of some of i t s material elsewhere. He wro-j;e: 
Among many demonstrations, which I have educed, and ( i f I do 
not woefully deceive both myself and my fellow-enquirer, a man 
bred up in the very heart of the experimental and mechanic-
material philosophy of the age) s t r i c t l y warranting that name, 
I w i l l mention that of the pre-exlstence of our Earth to the 
Solar System, ana to i t ' s e x i s t i n g relations as a part of that 
system; and likewise of a vegetable world anterior to the 
co l l e c t i o n of Light, as solar Light, in the Focus of the vast 
E l l i p s e ; and that in t h i s must be sou^t & i s to be found, the 
true difference of animal L i f e & Vegetable Growth, and the 
dependence of the former on Light and Gravitation, and the 
difference again of Gravitation both from the centripetal Power 
and from sinple Attraction - and that I had arrived at t h i s 
conclusion by necessary evolution from the F i r s t Principle of 
my Philosophy before I was aware of i t ' s exact coincidence with 
the Mosaic Cosmogony. 
In other words, having worked out h i s idea to accommodate any and every 
piece of s c i e n t i f i c inforjiiation he could tolerate, he had another hurdle 
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to overcome, that of the coincidence, or lack of i t , of s c r i p t u r a l 
imagery with what he wanted to say. For Coleridge, as may be seen 
in h i s handling of material from Kant, the God of scripture and of 
the doctrine corresponding to scripture, came to be more important 
to him than the god of the philosophic Germans. 
There are several comments that can be made at t h i s point. F i r s t 
of a l l , given Coleridge »s own insistence that h i s attempt to make • • l i f e " 
i n t e l l i g i b l e did not depend Uipon experimental evidence i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
to see how i t could thererore have commended i t s e l f to the s c i e n t i s t s . 
• • > 
On the/^ib^ther hand, there was no reason v/hy i t should commend i t s e l f 
to a theologian, unless someone found i n i t some support for the 
conviction t h a t man was i n one c r u c i a l respect differentiated from the 
natural order. Further, the ••metaphysics•' of the work woula be 
confusing to anyone unaccustomed to thinking about nature i n the 
"J-eibnizian^* t r a d i t i o n . I f the work were known to be an extrapolation 
of a p r i n c i p l e which could actually be traced back to the writings of 
Leibniz himself, that alone would probably have been enough to condemn 
i t . The main comment so f a r , however, i s that those Interested i n 
philosophy had already spotted a point, arising out of t h e i r reading 
of Kant's f i r s t Critique which wDuld apply to Coleridge's Theory of L i f e 
in p a r t i c u l a r , since i t represented an attempt to re-work a t r a d i t i o n 
on Mihich Kant had h i s eye. So, for example, Haywood's 1844 Analysis of 
I77 
Kant's C r i t i c k of Pure Reason, which followed up h i s f i r s t translation 
of the C r i t i q u e In 1838, did attempt a sumjoary of the section of Kant 
where the l a t t e r had discussed the principles of explanation of nature 
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and t h e i r possible reference to God. Haywood noted: 
Linnaeus i n furtherance of the f i r s t of these principles sougjit 
to reduce nature to a few genera and species, and Buff on, on the 
conti'ary, observing the difference of each individual, sought to 
remove from that nature, genus and species. The one discovered 
the unity of na,ture i n t h i s , that i t always acts according to 
the same plan. The other maintained that nature always acts 
according to a different plan.. But both one and the other, the 
supporter of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as well as the supporter of 
specification, suppiosed that the principle of thei r opposite 
systems was in nature; and both agreed i n giving an objective 
. necessity to t h e i r idea, whether i t was that of homogeneousness 
or varie t y . 
Haywood was not a s p e c i a l l y perceptive c r i t i c of Kant, but had grasped 
one point that ICant had been making, and which one can only suppose that 
Coleridge simply had not seen, or that he diose to ignore, or thought ' 
that he had answered. The problem of "objectivity^' applied not only to 
what Coleridge said about the symbols he employed, and the way in which 
they were ultimately grounded in the truth of things, but particularly 
where Coleridge supposed that he could f i l l i n each and every gradation 
between the steps of the ladder of being. One may compare especially 
what Coleridge said, with Kant's comment on Leibniz*.law of the 
"continuous gradation"of created beings". One r e c a l l s -ttiatthis meant 
simply, 
the following out of that principle of a f f i n i t y Wuicli r e s t s on 
the interest of reason. For observation and insight into the 
constitution of nature could never j u s t i f y us in tlie objective 
assertion of the law. The steps of this ladder, as they are 
presented to us in experience, stand much too far apart; and 
what may seem to us small differences are usually in nature 
i t s e l f such wide gaps, that from such observations we can come 
to no decision in regard to nature's ultimate design - especially 
i f we bear i n mind that i n so great a multiplicity of things there 
can never be much d i f f i c u l t y ijn finding s i m i l a r i t i e s and 
approximations. •'•^^ 
A useful maxim did not i n i t s e l f determine the truth. The very fact that 
Coleridge could write the Theory of L i f e after h i s reading of the f i r s t 
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C r i t i q u e , and h i s i n a b i l i t y t o see t h e probleui or t o take i t s e r i o u s l y , 
must argue f o r some e s s e n t i a l i n d i f f e r e n c e t o the work o f the »'critical" 
Kant, and i s t o be borne i n mind. He took from Kant what he found 
u s e f u l t o him, and ignored the e i g n i f i c a n c e o f what c o n f l i c t e d w i t h 
h i s a\m p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i v e s . 
Before t u r n i n g i n more d e t a i l t o Coleridge's other attempts t o 
grapple w i t h Kant, however, i t i s worth n o t i c i n g t h a t Paley«s Natural ' 
Theology c l e a r l y represented a theology d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the under-
standing o f natiJire which could be, and was, r e v i s e d and appropriated ' 
f o r years t o come - a p o i n t suggested e a r l i e r i n t h i s e x p o s i t i o n . One 
l 8 l 
i n s t r u c t i v e example of t h i s i s t o be found i n Henry Lora Brougham's 
D i s s e r t a t i o n s on Subjects of Science connected w i t h N a t u r a l Theology, 
which was t h e ccaiduding volume of a new 1839 e d i t i o n of Paley's complete 
works. These d i s s e r t a t i o n s i n c i d e n t a l l y reveal the way i n which theology 
could go on being w r i t t e n i n t h i s couatry as though what Hume had said 
had been adequately d e a l t w i t h by Paley. H i t c h i e ' s An Account of the 
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L i f e and W r i t i n g s o f D. Hume Esq., o f 1807 was the only biography of 
him a v a i l a b l e u n t i l the p u b l i c a t i o n o f Burton »s work o f 1846, The L i f e 
and Ctorrespondence o f Pavid Hume, and n e i t h e r o f these works t a c k l e d 
i 83 
t h e major p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues Hume had ra i s e d . I n 1830 Robert Morehead 
had o f f e r e d t o t h e p u b l i c h i s Pialogues on Na t u r a l and Revealed R e l i g i o n 
184 
l a t e r r e f e r r e d t o w i t h approval by Burton, fchpy^h a shrewd reviewer saw 
how a l i e n t o Morehead's purposes Was the dialogue technique enployed by 
1&5 
Hume. Brougham, however, n o t only thought t h a t he coula ma3aage t h e 
dialogue form t o s u i t a t h e o l o g i c a l e x p o s i t i o n , but employed i t t o 
defend Paley. He r e c a l l e d the p o i n t t h a t dialogue was a technique used 
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by a n c i e n t philosophers and c l e a r l y saw no reason why i t should not be 
h e l p f u l t o him - a t l e a s t t o c l e a r the ground. What he p a r t i c u l a r l y 
wanted t o do was deal w i t h Paley»s reluctance t o employ i l l u s t r a t i o n s 
from t h e discoveries of the astronomers and w i t h t h i s i n mind examined 
Newton's P r i n o i p i a . (There were references t o Laplace, but not t o Kant.) 
The f i r s t volume.of Brougham i s l a r g e l y n a t u r a l h i s t o r y , but t h e 
a t t e n t i o n paid t o Newtoa ale i - t s one t o what i s t o be found i n t h e 
second volume ~ a discussion which could i n some respects have been 
w r i t t e n any time i n t h e eighteenth century. I n i t s e l f , t h e r e f o r e , 
t h i s work serves as a reminder of the apparent novelty of some of 
Coleridge's w r i t i n g s on theology f o r his,contemporaries j u s t as i t 
i l l u s t r a t e s the inadequacy of the "nieory of L i f e as a theology of natui-e. 
Brougham opened h i s second volume w i t h a " D i s s e r t a t i o n on The O r i g i n 
189 
of E v i l " . He s t a t e d t h a t "as long as design i s proved t o e x i s t i n 
the u n i v e r s e , t h e m a l i g n i t y of the o v e r r u l i n g p r i n c i p l e , how p a i n f u l 
soever t o our contemplation, would, though f u l l y admitted, o f f e r no 
proof against t h a t derived from the p o s i t i v e evidence of i t s existence." 
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The reader i s r e c a l l e d t o the works of Bayle, and then t o King, and 
191 
t o Law's commentary. Brou^am said t h a t one oould n o t cope v/ith 
manich(&?<Vj&i by a p r i o r i reasoning, but l i k e Paley, made no e x p l i c i t 
reference e i t h e r t o Leioniz or t o Kant. Of t h e concept of t h e chain 
192 
of beingyhe remarked t h a t i t 
o n l y wraps up t h e d i f f i c u l t y i n other words, without s o l v i n g i t . 
For then t h e question becomes t h i s - why d i d the D e i t y create 
such a chain as could not be f i l l e d up w i t h o u t misery? I t i s , 
indeed, merely r e - s t a t i n g the f a c t of e v i l e x i s t i n g ; f o r whether 
we say there i s s u f f e r i n g among sentient beings, ~ or the im.iverse 
c o n s i s t s of beings more or less happy, more or l e s s miserable, 
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o r t h e r e e x i s t s a chain o f beings v a r y i n g i n p e r f e c t i o n and i n 
f e l i c i t y , - i t i s m a n i f e s t l y a l l one p r o p o s i t i o n . 
Even i f Brougham had not read L e i b n i z , a t l e a s t a t t h i s p o i n t he would 
Obviously n o t have agrreed w i t h him on one l i n e of a possible t h e o l o g i c a l 
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defence i n response t o the problem of e v i l . He himself suggested 
t h a t t h e s o l u t i o n could only be a matter of approximation - a discussion 
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of l i m i t s , " b u t fundamentally, Paley was ri g h t - : 'The pains and the 
s u f f e r i n g s , b o d i l y and mental, t o yJiich we are exposed i f they do not 
sink i n t o n o t h i n g , a t l e a s t r e t r e a t w i t h i n comparatively narrow bands; 
t h e i l l s are h a r d l y seen when we survey the great and spendid p i c t u r e 
o f worlday enjoyment of ease." What i s odd about Brouigham*s argument 
i s t h a t he employed a k i n d of argument i n design theology which had 
been a p p l i e d t o t h e "Kvhole" u n i v e r s e i n the t r a d i t i o n . So, i n s t a n c i n g 
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the f i s h , he described the general presupposition which v^as t o form 
the basis o f any s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s . liVhat seemed t o be an e v i l o r 
defec t was "a p a r t o f the most p e r f e c t and e x c e l l e n t s t r u c t u r e , which 
i t was possible even f o r Omnipotence and Omniscience t o have adopted", 
and •too other conceivable arrangement could by p o s s i b i l i t y have produced 
so much advantage, o r tended tso rnsicSi t o f u l f i l the design iJi view". He 
did n o t see t h a t t h i s assumption could be questioned, or another 
"explanation" o f f e r e d . What he sai d of the apparent problem of di s c o v e r i n g 
a d e f e c t i n a f i s h could be a p p l i e d t o any creature. Evidence which 
appeared t o count against the s k i l l and goodness of t h e d e i t y i n forming 
the s t r u c t u r e of a creature was t o provoke only a suspension o f judgement. 
A s c i e n t i s t was t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e subject of h i s science, r e s t i n g " i n 
the humble hope and b e l i e f t h a t one day a l l would appear f o r the best". 
Paley»s m a t e r i a l could-now be supplemented by i l l u s t r a t i o n s from t h e work 
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Of Cuvier who was c l e a r l y being read as p r o v i d i n g more, and not 
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l e s s support, f o r n a t u r a l theology, Brougliam had learned from 
Cuvier, who had taken n o t i c e of Kant, t h a t the n o t i o n of t h e chain 
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of being could n o t be sustained given c l e a r evidence o f "blanks" 
i n t h e series of c r e a t u r e s , a l t h o u ^ there was a possible l i n e of 
defence i n sayiiig t h a t a l l t h e creatures of. a series e x i s t e d a t some 
time o r other, though n o t every rank would be.occupied a t a l l times. 
And i t may be noted here t h a t despite h i s apparent awareness of t h e 
work o f Cuvier, t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h a t work had not a f f e c t e d what 
Coleridge had wanted t o say i n h i s Theory o f L i f e ^ as i t influenced 
Brougham. On the o t h e r hand, j u s t as Coleridge had invoked the s p e c i a l 
i n t e r v e n t i o n of tne d e i t y i n t h e c r e a t i o n of man, so Brougham invoked^^'^ 
t h a t i n t e r v e n t i o n n o t only f o r man but also f o r other groups of creatures, 
which was a p r e d i c t a b l e and a commoil response t o Cuvier*s m a t e r i a l . 
F i n a l l y , Brougham's work would seem t o be more "up-to-date" than 
Coleridge's, i f anyone chose t o compare them. Brougham was t a k i n g 
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n o t i c e n o t only o f Cuvier, but o f h i s successors on the c o n t i n e n t , 
and i n England, of Smith, Buckland, Sedgwick and L y e l l . This alone 
was enough t o give t h e work an appearance of modernity so f a r as i t s 
"science" was concemad, and t o leave Coleridge's book as a piece of 
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metaphysical speculation. Brougham even had a reference ' t o "Mr. 
Darwin (grandson of t h e celebrated physician and p o e t ) " and h i s 
d i s c o v e r i e s i n South America. So i t i s the k i n d of theology worked out 
by Brougham and others which the s c i e n t i s t s who wanted t o work a t t h e i r 
science f r e e of t h e o l o g i c a l concepts had t o t a c k l e . Coleridge's work 
could be s a f e l y ignored, and i n any case, from 1845 onwards, the 
a t t e n t i o n of the p u b l i c was absorbed by the scandal associated w i t h 
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t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of another "evolutionary book". The Theory of L i f e 
i s o f i n t e r e s t only t o those concerned w i t h Coleridge »s own t h o u ^ t , 
and was of l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e even i n i t s own time. C e r t a i n l y , i t 
made no h e l p f u l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the development of a new theology 
r e l a t e d t o nature, o r t o theodicy. By not p u b l i s h i n g i t , though he 
employed some of i t s themes i n other work - f o r example, isx the Frj|.end 
and i n Aids - he v i r t u a l l y repudiated i t h i m s e l f . Other work he had 
on hand, or pi-oposed t o w r i t e , mattered more. 
We have already noted some p o i n t s a t which Coleri.dge, may have been 
in f l u e n c e d by the work of Kant, oir a t any r a t e , have found Kant h e l p f u l , 
and may now t u r n t o lo o k a t some o f the evidence about hoAv Coleridge cams 
t o know Kaixt^s w r i t i n g s or could have come t o know them bearing i n mind 
t h e p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of t h i s study. I t seems c l e a r t h a t Kant»s 
work was "discovered" by t h e Eng l i s h i n the course o f t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
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i n t o German c u l t u r e . Semple's 1838 t r a n s l a t i o n of Kant's R e l i g i o n 
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w i t h i n the Boundary of Pure Reason urged t h a t i t was most important 
t o study a work t h o u ^ t by t h e Germans themselves t o matter f o r t h e 
understanding of r e l i g i o n . 'That i t conceras us isl a n d e r s TO KNO^ V ttie 
r e l i g i o u s or q u a s i - r e l i g i o u s opinions entertained by our nexfc-door 
neighbours on t h e Continent, no sane man, I apprehend, can doubt", and 
these opinions were "the cherished and valued sentiments of a race who, 
both by speech and blood, are our nearest klDfffolk." John Mander»s 
205 &-recen t book e n t i t l e d Our German Cousins included^discussion o f the 
p e r i o d around t h e t u r n o f t h e eighteenth and nineteenth century, i n 
which he made th e general p o i n t t h a t p r i o r t o Madame de Sta*?l*s 3)e 
1 'Allemagne of 1813, very l i t t l e l i t e r a t u r e w r i t t e n i n Gernan was 
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a v a i l a b l e i n t r a n s l a t i o n . Often the s e l e c t i o n of m a t e r i a l was unfortunate, 
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and the t r a n s l a t i o n poor. He also asserted t h a t '^nothing of what was 
t r u e l y o r i g i n a l i n the philosophy of t h e period - K a n t , F i c h t e , 
Schleiermacher o r S c h e l l i n g - achieved t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o E nglish (except, 
a t second remove through'the work of C o l e r i d g e ) . " To say t h i s i s t o 
underestimate t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of what had i n f a c t been t r a n s l a t e d 
before 1800 so f a r as t h e work of Kant i s concerned, and probably t o 
overestimate t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of Coleridge i n the matter. W h i l s t i t 
i s t i m e t h a t a t r a n s l a t i o n of the C r i t i q u e of Pure Reason f o r example 
was not, t o appear f o r some time, Germans resident i n London had provided 
I n t r o d u c t i o n s t o t h e t h i n k i n g of Kant f o r the i n t e r e s t e d members of the 
p u b l i c . These i n t r o d u c t i o n s ^yere n o t " c r i t i c a l " i n themselves nor d i d 
they p i w i d e an account of t h e development of Kant's thought, or the way 
i n which h i s views d i f f e r e d before and a f t e r 1770, but they d i d provide 
some o f t h e "clues" t o Kant. Of two i n t r o d u c t i o n s , t h a t of F.A. N i t s d i 
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of 1796, A General and I n t r o d u c t o r y view of Professor Kant's P r i n c i p l e s 
concerning Man, t h e World and iaie D e i t y , (lectures of 1794-6) given i n 
London i s perhaps b e t t e r than A.F.M. W i l l i c h ' s Elements of the C r i t i c a l < t " ^ * 209 Philosophy ^which was more or less an accomt of Kant's work, - and 
i t d i d not provide enough comment and analysis t o a s s i s t those coming 
t o t h e work o f Kant .fbr t h e ;f i r . s t time . 
N i t s c h gave an e x p o s i t i o n of m a t e r i a l from the three C r i t i q u e s , 
t h e Prolegomena, t h e R e l i g i o n and of various others works. References 
t o The Only p o s s i b l e de;monstration of t h e Existence of a d e i t y ( l i k e 
some o f t h e o t h e r works t o wiiich he makes references, mis-dated) were t o 
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be t r e a t e d w i t h c aution. N i t s e h said t h a t t h i s work d i d not c o n s t i t u t e 
any p a r t of the Kantian system, as i t was published t e n years before 
t h a t system was conpleted. So f a r as Kant's predecessors are.concerned 
211 
i t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t he remarked: 
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Those who f o l l o w L e i b n i z , t h e greatest of a l l S p i r i t u a l i s t s , 
n a t u r a l l y assume i t as a fundamental p r i n c i p l e of t h e i r system, 
t h a t the w o r l d i s a compound of simple substances, t h a t our 
o p i n i o n of t h i n g s being extended and f i g u r e d i s t h e r e s u l t of 
confused ideas, and t h a t the s e n s i t i v e f a c u l t y which f u i j i i s h e s 
those ideas, so f a r from being the t r u e source of r e a l knowledge, 
i s r a t h e r a hindrance t o t h e i n t e l l e c t , which alone has the power 
t o contemplate t h i n g s as they are, and t o procure s u b s t a n t i a l 
laiowledge of the World. 
C l e a r l y , i f Coleridge read these words, he may have d e r i v e ^ from them 
a p r i n c i p l e which he could seek t o substantiate, both by pursuing i t i n 
h i s r e a d i n g of L e i b n i z , and developing i t i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s own theology 
and-philosophy. I t i s also convenient t o note here t h a t t h i s comment 
of N i t s c h ' s i s one of t h e very few more favouraole remarks made about 
L e i b n i z by commeatitators, f o r many years. Another instance i s t h a t of • 
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a review of Madame de S t a l l ' s book, which mentioned Bayle, r e f e r r e d 
t o Kant's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o Philosophy, and o f f e r e d a b r i e f word of praise 
f o r L e i b n i z , "who of a l l w r i t e r s since Bacon most abounds i n those 
f r u i t f u l thoughts which a r i s e from a comprehensive glance over the 
214 
p r i n c i p l e s of knowledge».'. But even the most casual comment tended 
t o be a derogatory one. L e i b n i z was more normally described as "a 
s p e c u l a t i v e philosopher who has accommodated himself t o a popular 
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o p i n i o n " . Closely associated w i t h Kant, the a s s o c i a t i o n d i d n o t h i n g 
216 
t o promote an understanding of e i t h e r . I t was perhaps p a r t i c u l a r l y 
u n f o r t u n a t e t h a t what seems t o have been the f i r s t work of L e i b n i z ' t o 
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be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o English and published j n 1850, was one which had 
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been published anonymously by L e i b n i z . He had not wished i t t o be 
kno\vn t h a t i t had been w r i t t e n by a Protes t a n t . I t was now o f f e r e d 
t o t h e p u b l i c by a C a t h o l i c , i n the hope t l i a t i t would c o n t r i b u t e t o 
2l9 
t h e tmderstandirig o f the C a t h o l i c p o s i t i o n . 
-To r e t u r n t o N i t s c h , however, i t ma:y also be noted t h a t he provided 
t h r e e statements t o help i n t h e understanding of Kant *s p r i n c i p l e s of 
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r e l i g i o n . He summarised Kant's p o s i t i o n f i r s t l y by saying, t h a t 
" I n t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d we discover the s t r i c t e s t f i t n e s s ; i n the moral 
wor l d t h i s f i t n e s s would be destroyed i f we conceive t h a t there could 
be any law t h a t cannot be f u l f i l l e d , even by approaclies t h a t are progressive." 
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The second was t h a t the c o n d i t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the unil?y of 
t h e h i ^ e s t good w i t h v i r t u e "can l i e no where else than i n the cause 
d i s t i n c t from n a t u r e , i n a cause which produced nature, and has the 
power t o r e a l i s e t h e agreement of nature w i t h our moral conduct." And 
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t h i r d l y : 
For even t o believe i n a Deity supposes a regard f o r the moral:-, 
law, and i t i s only he t h a t w i l l n o t r e l i n q u i s h t h a t law, t h a t 
can s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e in. a God. The physical world can of i t s e l f 
g ive no i n f o r m a t i o n o f a God; i t i s a c o l l e c t i o n of causes and 
e f f e c t s , where every cause has another cause i n i n f i n i t u m . And 
t h o u ^ we are l e d by i t t o a f i r s t cause, y e t i t i s the moral 
nature o f man alone, which teaches us t h a t t h e f i r s t cause i s a 
moral being, t h a t i s , a God. 
I t could not be supposed t h a t someone whose t h e o l o g i c a l education had 
been based on Paley's works would take r e a d i l y t o t h i s approach. 
Coleridge's own r e a c t i o n t o i t w i l l be i n d i c a t e d l a t e r - i t i s s u f f i c i e n t 
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f o r the moment t o n o t i c e ' t h a t N i t s c h »s book was reviewed w i t h varying 
degrees o f h o s t i l i t y and i n d i f f e r e n c e , ^ d o l e r i d g e had a f r i e n d who had 
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been i n t e r e s t e d i n the work o f Kant f o r a few-years. Thomas Beddoes 
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was working i n B r i s t o l w i t h Davy (the l a t t e r himself q u i t e possibly 
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i n f l u e n c e d i n h i s theology by the w r i t i n g s of Erasmus Dai'Win) and 
may have been one of the f i r s t people i n the covintry t o r e a l i s e the 
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i n t e r e s t and importance o f Kant, f o r s c i e n t i s t s as f o r philosophers. 
Other f r i e n d s who may also have been important influences on Coleridge 
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from time t o time were Thomas de Quincey. who himself t r a n s l a t e d many 
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of Kant's essays i j i t o . I t a g l i s h and published them i n various magazines, 
230 
and Henry Crabb Robinson. 
Quite a p a r t from i n t r o d u c t o r y m a t e r i a l being published, a usefu3. 
s e l e c t i o n of the work of Kant himself could be read w i t h o u t an expedition 
t o Germany or a c q u i r i n g t h e knowledge of the German language. 1798 saw 
t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of Essays and T r e a t i s e s on moral, p o l i t i c a l and various 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l subjects. From the German by the t r a n s l a t o r of t h e p r i n c i p l e s 
of t h e C r i t i c a l Philosophy. There seems t o be some doubt ' about 'blie 
: author's i d e n t i t y , but i t i s possible t h a t i t was W i l l i c h . T his 
c o l l e c t i o n included many of Kant's most i n t e r e s t i n g shorter essaysybut 
t h e essays were undated in. the compilation, and were i n f a c t i n no 
p a r t i c u l a r order. A reader would have d i f f i c u l t y i n l e a r n i n g what ICant 
had t o say which would mark him out as s i g a i f i c a n v l y d i s t i n c t i v e i a 
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philosophy from some of h i s contemporaries. Mander's comment on 
Coleridge t h a t " i t was probably the l u r e of the yet u n t r a n s l a t e d Kant 
t h a t f i r s t s e r i o u s l y a t t r a c t e d him t o l e a r n German and study the new 
philosophy" needs t o be seen i n the l i g h t of the knowledge of t h e 
p u b l i c a t i o n of these Essays, haphazard c o l l e c t i o n though they seemed 
t o be. A t t e n t i o n t o Coleridge shows t h a t he found h e l p f u l m a t e r i a l 
i n Kant's p r e - c r i t i c a l works, i n c l u d i n g some provided i n the Essay9» 
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i n h i s search f o r a means o f r e - w r i t I n g theology. C e r t a i n l y the e a r l i e s t 
t r a n s l a t o r s of t h e f i r s t C r i t i q u e were w e l l aware of the f i r s t e f f o r t s 
t o communicate Kant's t h i n k i n g t o t h e English by Nitsch: and W i l l i c h , 
and one or two others.^""'^ A f t e r Haywood's e d i t i o n s of 1838 and 1848, 
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remarked: 
Meiklejohn's ' version appeared ±a 1856, and i n h i s "Preface" he 
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I t i s curious t o observe, i n a l l t he English works w r i t t e n 
s p e c i a l l y upon Kant, t h a t n o t one of h i s conmientators ever 
ventures, f o r a moment, t o leave t h e words of Kant, and t o 
e x p l a i n t h e subject he nay be considering i n h i s ov;n words. 
N i t s c h and W i l l i c h , who professed t o w i t e on Kant's philosophy, 
are merely t r a n s l a t o r s ; Haywood, even i n h i s notes, merely 
repeats Kant; and the t r a n s l a t o r of 'Beck's P r i n c i p l e s of t h e 
C r i t i c a l Philosophy', w h i l e pretending t o g i v e , - i n h i s 
T r a n s l a t o r ' s Preface' h i s own views of the c r i t i c a l H iilosophy, 
has f a b r i c a t e d h i s Preface out of selections from the works of 
Kant. The same i s t h e case w i t h the Translator of Kant's 
Essays and T r e a t i s e s , (2 v o l s , 8vo, London, 1798). T h i s person 
tTas w r i t t e n a preface t o each of the volumes, and both are 
almost l i t e r a l t r a n s l a t i o n s from d i f f e r e n t p a rts of Kant's 
works. He had the impudence t o present the thoughts contained 
i n them as h i s own; few being then able t o detect the 
p l a g i a r i s m . 
Meiklejohn h i m s e l f was w e l l aware of t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f t r a n s l a t i n g the 
Critiq^ue given t h e d o u b t f u l a i d o f the ph i l o s o p h i c a l vocabulary then 
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c u r r e n t in. England. (Haywood had i n f a c t made one u s e f u l c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o t h e study o f Kant already noted, apart from h i s t r a n s l a t i o n s . ) 
I t does n o t seem t h e r e f o r e , as though the e a r l i e r nineteenth-century 
students o f Kant's f i r s t - C r i t i g t i e s p e c i a l l y associated the name of 
Coleridge w i t h t h e p u b l i c i s i n g of Kant's views. Part of the reason 
may have been tJiat they r e a l i s e d t h a t Coleridge tended to employ s u i t a b l e 
m a t e r i a l from Kant, and ignore wbat was unsuitable, r a t h e r t l i a n make 
i t h i s busuiess t o ti-ansmit and iTitei-pret Kant's philosophy as such. 
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Coleridge himself had so o f t e n emphasised h i s own opinion t h a t he 
had a r r i v e d a t t h e d i s t i n c t i v e philosophy he had, such as i t was, before 
he had read Kant's f i r s t C r i t i q u e - an amazing c l a i m , i f t r u e . He 
explained i n 1825 t h a t he valued Kant n o t as a metaphysiciani, but as 
a l o g i c i a n - an 'improvement on h i s e a r l y days of studying Kant, when 
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t h e l a t t e r ' s work seemed u n i n t e l l i g i b l e -• and s a i d t h a t he could not 
only honeeilSr.assert but s a t i s f a c t o r i l y prove t h a t a l l t h e elements of 
h i s present opinions had been formed before he had ever seen a book of 
German metaphysics. Sometimes he employed m a t e r i a l from Kant and d i d 
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n o t aclmowledge i t s source^ periiaps because as Beach suggested, he was 
i n a c c u r a t e , and r e l u c t a n t t o give c r e d i t f o r h i s ideas. He may have 
wanted t o disguise t h e degree t o which he was indebted t o Kant, as t o 
o t h e r Germans of h i s day. Those who d i d associate Coleridge's name w i t h 
Kant may have p r e f e r r e d t o f o r g e t t h e a s s o c i a t i o n , so i t could be a 
great hindrance i n f u r t h e r i n g t h e cause of -understanding the " c r i t i c a l " 
244 
Kant. Coleridge had been c a r i c a t u r e d i n Nightmare Abbey as a Kantian, 
and H a z l i t t , anonymously, had w r i t t e n as unpleasant a review of the 
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Bioerraphia as can be inagined, concentrating on Coleridge's attempt t o 
t r a n s m i t Kant: "As f o r t h e great German oracle Kant, we must take the 
l i b e r t y t o say, t h a t h i s system appears t o us the most w i l f u l and 
monstrous a b s u r d i t y t h a t ever was invented." H a z l i t t was p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i r r i t a t e d by one f e a t u r e of Kant's p o s i t i o n : 
T h i s transcendental philosopher i s ... pleased t o a f f i r m , i n so 
many words, , t h a t we have n e i t h e r any possible idea, nor any 
p o s s i b l e proof of the existence o f the Soul, God, or I m m o r t a l i t y , 
by means of the o r d i n a r y f a c u l t i e s o f sense, understanding or 
reason: and he t h e r e f o r e ( l i k e a man who had been employed -co 
construct a machine f o r some p a r t i c u l a r purpose), invents a new 
f a c u l t y , f o r the admission of these important t r u t h s , namely, the 
p r a c t i c a l reason; i n other words, the w i l l or determination t h a t 
these t h i n g s should be i n f i n i t e l y ti-ue because they are I n f i n i t e l y 
d e s i r a b l e t o t h e human mind - though he says i t i s impossible f o r 
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t h e human mind t o have any idea whatever pf these o b j e c t s , e i t h e r 
as t r u e or d e s i r a b l e . 
( c o l e r i d g e had c e r t a i n l y appreciated Kant's po i n t of view on the arguments 
246 • 247 f o r the existence o f God ) . H a z l i t t ' s f i n a l comment here was, 
"we t u r n g l a d l y f r o m a b s u r d i t i e s t h a t have not even t h e merit o f being 
amusing; and leave Mr. Coleridge t o the undisturbed adoration o f an 
i d o l who w i l l have few other-worshippers i n t h i s country." And h i s 
f i n a l comment on Coleridge h i m s e l f , was t h a t he had been "indfitiging 
h i s maudlin egotism and his mawkish spleen i n fulsome eulogies of h i s 
own v i r t u e s , and nauseous abuse of h i s . contemporaries - i n making 
excuses f o r doing n o t h i n g h i m s e l f , and assigning bad motives f o r what 
others have done. - T i l l he can do something b e t t e r , we would r a t h e r 
hear no more o f him." 
I n s o f a r as the o b j e c t of t h e i r a t t e n t i o n was the Kant of the f i r s t 
C r i t i q u e , anyone who knew Coleridge might also have discerrted t h a t h i s 
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r e a l t h e o l o g i c a l i n t e r e s t d i d not l i e i n i t s m a t e r i a l , although he 
appropriated from i t a means o f t a l k i n g about reason. "Kant ... enabled 
Coleridge t o give i n t e l l e c t u a l d e f i n i t i o n t o a view already emerging from 
h i s reading of t h e seventeenth century English P l a t o n i s t s and one which 
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remained fundamentally more P l a t o n i s t than Kantian i n i t s i n s p i r a t i o n . " 
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I n a general way he was g r e a t l y impressed by Kant's achievement, 
e s p e c i a l l y perhaps, i n the l i g h t of what he knew about Kant's behaviour 
when under pressure from t h e o f f i c i a l "censors": 
Questions wnich cannot be f u l l y answered without exposing t h e 
respondent t o personal danger, are n o t e n t i t l e d , t o a f a i r answer; 
and y e t t o say t h i s openly, would i n many cases f u r n i s h the very 
advantage which t h e adversary i s i n s i d i o u s l y seeking a f t e r . V e r a c i t y 
does n o t c o n s i s t i n saying, but i n the i n t e n t i o n of communicating, . 
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t r u t h ; and the philosopher who cannot u t t e r the whole t r u t h 
w i t h o u t conveying falsehood, and a t Uie same time, perhaps, 
e x c i t i n g the most malignant passions, i s constrained t o express 
h i m s e l f e i t h e r m y t h i c a l l y or e q u i v o c a l l y . 
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As t o the r e s u l t s of h i s study of Kant he produced h i s own statenent 
of wnat above a l l he valued: 
I n him i s contained a l l t h a t can be l e a r n t - & as t o the r e s u l t s , 
you have a f i r m f a i t h i n God, the responsible W i l l o f Man,and 
I m m o r t a l i t y - & Kant w i l l demonstrate t o you, t h a t t h i s F a i t h i s 
acquiesced i n , indeed, nay, confirmed by the Reason & Understanding, 
but grounded on Postulates authorized & substantiated s o l e l y by the 
Moral Being - These are l i k e w i s e mine; & whether the Ideas are 
r e g u l a t i v e o n l y , as A r i s t o t l e & Kant teach, or c o n s t i t u t i v e & 
a c t u a l as Pythagoras & P l a t o , i s of l i v i n g I n t e r e s t t o the Philosopher 
by Profession alone. Both systems are equally t r u e , i f only the 
former a b s t a i n from denying universalis" what i s denied i n d i v i d u a l l y . 
He f o r whom Ideas are c o n s t i t u t i v e , w i l l i n e f f e c t be a P l a t o n i s t ... 
I t i s a simple enough procedure t o look f o r evidence of Coleridge's 
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r e a d i n g o f the yermischte S c h r i f t e n (b e a r j j i g i n mind t h a t he may hiave 
been r e a d i n g i n the o r i g i n a l language work w i t h whicli he had already, i n 
some instances, been f a m i l i a r i s e d i n an English t r a n s l a t i o n ) . What i s 
more important i s t o pay a t t e n t i o n t o the v/ork t h a t mattered most t o him. 
I n t h e l i g h t of the above passage from h i s correspondence, one's a t t e n t i o n 
i s n a t u r a l l y d i r e c t e d t o t h e work Kant produced i n t h e 1780s, and t o 
Coleridge's p r e s e n t a t i o n of i t i n h i s r o l e as the nev/ "English meta-
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p h y s i c i a n " he seems to have believed himself t o be. But one r e c a l l s 
t h a t i n a note of 1810 he s a i d , "The Deity i s not a mere s o l u t i o n o f 
d i f f i c u l t i e s concerning o r i g i n a t i o n ; but a t r u t h which spreads l i g h t , 
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and Joy, & Hope, and C e r t i t u d e t h r o ' a l l things He could n o t 
f i n d such a s a t i s f a c t o r y concept of God i n Kant's work o f the post-
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c r i t i c a l p e r i o d . I n t h e f i r s t place, s t o i c i s m " was n o t f o r him. 
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both because Kant's God was merely " r e g u l a t i v e " and not " c o n s t i t u t i v e " , -
and c o u l d not be described as a "redeemer"* Coleridge wanted the n o t i o n 
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of t h e w i l l as t h e creator of value, , but seems t o have found t h a t 
the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t man was a f a l l e n creature was something bom out by 
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h i s own experience: " A f t e r t h e l o n g and agonizing years of s t r u g g l e 
w i t h opium, and what must have seemed t o him i r r a t i o n a l acts of many kinds, 
the concept of man as a f a l l e n creature w i t h a diseased w i l l i n need of 
d i v i n e grace was s u r e l y necessary t o h i s s e l f - r e s p e c t , perhaps even t o 
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h i s s a n i t y . " So, f o r example he wrote i n 1817: 
I f e e l convinced t h a t a great dtiange i s preparing f o r me - t o th e 
Grave, i s the most probable. But n e i t h e r i n body, mind, or estate 
can I remain such. Where, and as I am. The Almighty's v i s i t a t i o n s 
i n t h i s l i f e are always c a l l s . The cloud of g r i e f s t h a t have 
gathered of l a t e t h i c k e r and gloomier around me, and the pcSsoned 
arrows of voiprovoked m a l i g n i t y t h a t have been shot t h r o * i t - ai'e 
these urgencies t o some r e v o l u t i o n - t l i a t I should be en t i i ' e , 
d ecisive? ... 0 what a dead palsy i s Man imaided by Grace? The 
s a c r i f i c e o f h i s w i l l i s demanded, and t h a t n o t y i e l d e d , h i s very 
a f f e c t i o n s , h i s g r a t i t u d e , w i l l serve t h e same purposes as vi c e s : 
i f they cannot b l i n d , they w i l l entangle him! 
Though Coleridge had t o a c e r t a i n extent appreciated Kant's p o s i t i o n on 
theodicy, he could not make use of the l i m i t e d " s o l i i t i o n " Kant o f f e r e d , 
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though he had read h i s 1791 essay, and indeed he seems t o paraphrase 
some o f i t i n one o f h i s essays i n t h e F r i e n d . There he wrote of t h e 
f e a r - r i d d e n and angry b e l i e v e r s , who would do w e l l • 
t o re~peruse t h e book of Job, and observe the sentence passed 
by t h e a l l - j u s t oh the f r i e n d s of the s u f f e r e r , who had hoped, 
l i k e venal advocates, t o purchase the favour of d e i t y by u t t e r i n g 
t r u t h s of whidti i n t h e i r ovm hearts they had n e i t h e r c o n v i c t i o n 
nor comprehension. THE TliUTH FROM THE LIPS DID NOT ATONE FOR THE 
LIE IN THE HEART, while t h e raslmess of agony i n t l i e searching 
and bewildered complaint, was f o r g i v e n i n consideration of h i s 
s i n c e r i t y and i n t e g r i t y i n n o t d i s g u i s i n g the t r u e d i c t a t e s o f 
h i s Reason and Conscience, but avowing h i s i n c a p a b i l i t y of 
s o l v i n g a problem by h i s Reason, vftiich before the C h r i s t i a n 
dispensation t h e Almighty was pleased t o solve only by d e c l a r i n g 
i t t o be beyond t h e l i m i t s o f human Reason. 
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The d i f f e r e n c e i n Coleridge's version o f these p o i n t s , as compared 
w i t h Kant's, i s t h a t the l a t t e r d i d not propose t h a t t h e C l i r i s t i a n 
d ispensation solved the problem - f o r him, i t simply remained beyond 
the l i m i t s o f human reason, although there might be a way f o r the t r u l y 
moral man t o cope w i t h e v i l . 
I n t h e second place, q u i t e apart from h i s consciousness of needing 
a redeemer, and h i s a t t e n t i o n t o t r a d i t i o n a l theology i n consequence, • 
Coleridge could n o t understand why Kant had been so p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y 
cautious i n h i s a s c r i p t i o n of p e r f e c t i o n to God. He c l e a r l y admired 
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Kant's e a r l i e r r a t h e r than l a t e r worksj possibly because he spotted 
t h e i r coherence w i t h the work o f Lei b n i z he was concerned t u emulate. . 
. . •. • US • . . ' • 
So i n 1810 he noted: 
N.B. I miist b r i n g i n t o clea:iSfconceptions t h a t business of t h e 
nec e s s i t y which a t l e n g t h shews i t s e l f i n a l l t h e apparent f i n a l 
causes of Nature - the Land & Sea Breezes f o r instance, the great 
S p i r a c l e s made by earthquakes & volcanoes, (\'olcanos themselves 
v a s t Breathing^holes) which are then the great A n t i d o t e , 
Preventive ... o f t e n & always p a l l i a t i v e , of Earthquakes ~ see 
Kant's Himmels'System &.c - Now I must minutely compare t h i s w i t h 
t h e c o n v i c t i o n s forced on us by t h e r e c i p r o c i t y of end & means 
( i . e . every p a r t a mean t o every p a r t , ergo, an end) as i n t h e 
eye, 1. i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s , then the o p t i c nerve ... then t h e 
b r a i n , then l i f e , then understanding, then reason and then I 
s h a l l be able t o determine whether Reason does not command us t o 
judge of these astronomical & geophysical n e c e s s i t i e s by the 
contrivances o f t h e organized w o r l d , & not vic e versa. - T h i s 
would lead a t once t o the proper mode of s t a t i n g the problem of 
t h e Deity - v i z . t h e ground or p r i n c i p l e of the imiverse ... But 
what i f I supposed a supreme Reason as the groimd o f a l l t h i n g s , 
must not the mundus r a t i o n a t u s of necessity appear necessary - i s 
n o t t h i s necessity i d e n t i c a l w i t h s u p e r l a t i v e Wisdom of arrangement? 
- W e l l , but a f t e r a f a i r numeration of these mechanic, chemical, and 
mechanico-chemical ... Operations, compare them w i t h 1. t h e e f f e c t 
produced by L i f e as h i n t e d a t before i n the component parts of 
animals and vegetables - and then by I n s t i n c t - and l a t t e r l y by 
, reason, i n c l u d i n g a l l the a c t u a l and a l l the demonstrably possible 
& i f man be progressive, certaixi mutations of the globe then take 
t h i s globe i n a f a i r avera.ge o f Improvement, by a r a t i o - as t h e 
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Present t o the Past, (ex. Europe t o the same Latitudes i n N. and 
S. America), so the Future t o the present/yhich i s exceedingly 
modest - f o r blessed Heaven? Wlaat are 6000 years - & have not 
we proof, t l i a t t h e v e l o c i t y increases i n squares or cubes, n o t 
a r i t h m e t i c a l l y -' 6000 years t o the possible F u t t t r e / well? but t o 
make t h e conception p l a i n , accept t h i s average/ K then describe 
the ground of t h e Universe by a b s t r a c t i n g t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of the 
o p e r a t i n g powers - i . e . by a b s t r a c t i n g a l l the imperfections 
a r i s i n g from the f i n i t e n e s s - ex. gr. t h e imperfections of i n s t i n c t 
f o r n o t being a t t h e same time Reason - Reason f o r not being 
I n s t i n c t - &c - and what w i l l be t h e r e s u l t ? - I f I am h o t much 
mistaken, the Sum w i l l be something so very near our l o f t i e s t 
conceptions of God, t h a t no man i n his senses b e l i e v i n g t h e one 
woiad h e s i t a t e i n t a k i n g f o r granted the other *•/- T h i s a f t e r the 
proof from Conscience, ... i n i t s widest Sense - & the proof of 
t h e dependence of t h e speculative on the p r a c t i c a l Reason/. 
Apart from t h e use o f Kant's work of t h e 1750s, i t seems l i k e l y from 
t h i s note t h a t Coleridge had also found h i s work,The flnly Passible 
}!>emonstration ,of 1763^^^ extremely h e l p f u l t o him i n h i s search f o r a new 
and impressive theology. I n r e l y i n g on t h i s work of Kant's, he v/as doing 
no more than Eberhard had done, i n drawing a t t e n t i o n t o a p o s i t i o n of 
Kant's t h a t t h e l a t t e r had attempted t o repudiate, but which some of h i s 
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readers p r e f e r r e d . I n another note of 1804 he said t h a t he d i d not 
c l e a r l y see 
by what r i g h t Kant f o r b i d s us t o a t t r i b u t e t o God I n t e l l i g e n c e 
and W i l l , because we know by experience no I n t e l l i g e n c e or W i l l 
but t h e human Understanding ( ? ) , t h e human V o l i t i o n ( ? ) ; a n d these 
subsist under r e l a t i o n s (and l i m i t a t i o n s ) not a t t r i b u t a b l e t o 
God; w h i l e y e t he allows us t o a t t r i b u t e ( t o him) the n o t i o n o f 
Groua.d, tho'our experience f u r n i s h e s no instance of an i n f i n i t e 
Groimd, or an absolute Grotmd, more than of an I n f i n i t e imderstanding 
or of an absolute w i l l . 
And twenty years l a t e r , " I f e e l t h e l i v e l i e s t convict i o n sthat no r e l i g i o u s 
man could r e t a i n the d i s t i n c t i o n between the D i v i n e W i l l , and t h e 
unknown Something which i s t o answer t h e purpose of a W i l l - a non-
i n t e l l i g e n c e t h a t performs the f i u i c t i o n of an I n t e l l i g e n c e - nor do I 
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see wherein t h i s d i f i e r s from a moral arid modest Atheism." 
I t becomes apparent from a reading of the Biographia especially, 
that Coleridge found the work of 1763 the most helpful to him, although 
he wanted to take i t in a direction which Kant had refused to take. 
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After h i s summary of some of the material from the work of 1763, 
(and vrtiich he did not c i t e as a summary, but as h i s own r e f l e c t i o n s on 
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the central i s s u e s ) he led up to h i s ovoi translation of the passage 
where Kant began to explain what he meant by attributing "cbgaition and 
resolution" to the Deity. Coleridge then proceeded (and Kant had said 
what he meant by the dependence of the world on God making necessary 
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the a t t r i b u t i o n of "moral c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " to God) to write of his 
' 264 
conviction that one must have f a i t h in God not only as ground of . 
the u n i v e r s e "by h i s essence", but iJti him as maker and judge by wisdom 
and holy w i l l . The most useful passage he found in Kant, however, was 
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probably h i s statement of the divine a l l - s u f f i c i e n c y , precisely the 
statement with which Kant had come to terms in h i s f i r s t _Critique. 
Coleridge turned i t to s u i t h i s own purpose, as Kant had f i r s t proposed 
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i t . So in the Biographia he wrote: 
I f a man be asked how he knows that he i s ? he can only answer, 
sum quia sum. But i f (the absoluteness of t h i s certainty having 
been admitted) he be again asked, how he, the individual person, 
came to be, then in r e l a t i o n to the ground of h i s existence, not 
to the ground of h i s knowledge of that existence, he mi"ght"~reply, 
sum quia Deus est, or s t i l l more philosophically, sum quia in Deo 
sum. But i f we elevate our conception to the aosolute s e l f , the 
great eternal I AM, then the principle of being, and of knowledge, 
of idea, and of r e a l i t y ; the ground of existence, and the ground 
of the knowledge of existence, are absolutely i d e n t i c a l . Sum quia 
sum; I am because I affii*m myself to be; I affirm myself to be, 
because I am. 
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And h i s own fooUnote on t h i s ' asserted the di s t i n c t i o n between the 
"conditional f i n i t e " , the individual, and the absolute, and "likewise 
the dependence or rather, the inherence of the former in the l a t t e r ; 
i n whom »we l i v e , and move, and have, our being,' as St. I ^ u l divinely 
a s s e r t s , d i f f e r i n g wisely from the Theists of the mechanic school (ias 
S i r J . Newton, Locke, & c ) who must say from whom we had our being, and 
with i t l i f e and the powers of l i f e . " 
Coleridge developed in h i s own way the material he had derived 
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from Kant. He wrote to 1818, that "God alone i s a selfrcomprehending 
S p i r i t ; and i n t h i s incommunicable Adequate Idea of himself ... h i s 
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Personality i s contained". And l a t e r in the same year, " I adore 
the l i v i r i g aild personal God, whose Power indeed i s the Ground of a l l 
Being, even as h i s W i l l i s the e f f i c i e n t , h is Wisdom the instrumental, 
and h i s Love the f i n a l , Cause of a l l Existence; but who may not without 
f e a r f u l error be ident i f i e d with the universe, or the universe be 
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considered as an attribute of h i s Deity." As he put i t in Aids 
h i s "Idea" was the basis of re l i g i o n , commanded by the conscience, and 
required by morality, and seemed to rt-eeel . the attributes of holiness, 
providence love, j u s t i c e , mercy. " I t comprehends, moreover, the todependent 
(extra-mundane) existence and personality of the supreme CWE, as our 
Creator, Lord, and Judge." The root of the matter had become for him 
the contemplation of the deity in h i s personal attributes, without 
which thei'e was a necessary "Distaste to a l l the peculiar aSoctrines of 
the Christian F a i t h , the T r i i x i t y , the Incarnation of the Son of God, 
and Redemption." , 
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Coleridge attempted to pay attention to the '»peculiar Doctrtoes" 
at some very interesting points, one of which agaisi i l l u s t r a t e s the 
ktod of use he made of Kant*s work to serve his own purposes. For . 
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example, in the Friend he picked up one of the potots he had made 
In h i s r e f l e c t i o n on Kant*s work of 1755, which coheres with the work 
of 1763. "Look round you and you behold everywhere an adaptation of 
means to ends." His instructions proceeded as follows: 
Meditate on the nature of a Being whose ideas are creative, and 
consequently more r e a l ^ more substantial than the things that, at 
the height of the i r creaturely state, are but the i r dim reflexes; 
and the i n t u i t i v e conviction w i l l a r i s e that in such a Being there 
could e x i s t no motive to the creation of a machine for i t s own 
sake; that, thierefore, the material world miist have been made for. 
the sake of man, at once the high p r i e s t and representative of 
the Creator, as f a r as he partakes of that reason to which the 
essences of a l l thtogs co-exist to a l l the i r distinctions yet as 
one and i n d i v i s i b l e . But I speak of man to his idea, and as 
subsumed to the Divtoe humanity, to whom alone God loved the 
world. 
With regard to the f i r s t senteiice of t h i s paragraph of Coleridg-e Vs, one 
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should perhaps also r e c a l l a passage on the previous essay ' which 
c l e a r l y draws on some of the potots of the t h i r d of Kant's Critiques. 
F i r s t , . Coleridge has a passage which explatos the strength of desi.gn 
theology for him. Coleridge pototed out tliat to perception, "we at 
once identify our betog with that of the world without us, and yet 
place ourselves to contradisttoction to that world". We also believe 
•Hjhat the productive power, which i s in nature as nature, i s e s s e n t i a l l y 
one ( i . e . of one ktod) with the totelligence, which i s to the human mtod 
above nature". However one abjures the conviction, he said, language 
employs."terms and conjunctions that suppose i t s r e a l i t y , with a feeling 
very different from that which accompanies a figurative or metaphorical, 
use of words". And.when contemplattog a "whole", whether to i t s e l f or 
- 320 -
as part of another "whole",, we assume "an intention, as the i n i t i a t i v e , 
of wliich the end i s the c o r r e l a t i v e " . Then Coleridge distinguished 
between the assumption of " f i n a l " causes as "constitutive and 
explanatory", and the employment of the presumption, "as an a u x i l i a r y 
and regulative principle, by the enlightened n a t u r a l i s t " . The s c i e n t i s t ' s 
proper task i s to look for e f f i c i e n t causes, and distinguish them carer-
f u l l y from f i n a l causes, a l t h o u ^ the resolution of the e f f i c i e n t into 
the f i n a l may be the ultimate aim of "Philosophy". He further admitted 
that the most progress in science has been made when the confusion 
between the two '^as .been either precluded by the nature of the science 
i t s e l f , as i n pure mathematics, or avoided by the good sense of i t s 
c u l t i v a t o r " . But there was, nevertheless, a necessity to distinguish 
the agency of nature from "blind and l i f e l e s s mechanism", and to admit . 
the use and even necessity of a teleologieal ground in physics and 
physiology, as a regulative p r i n c i p l e , "as a fei'ound of anticipation', 
for the guidance of t h i s judgment, and for the direction of h i s observation 
and experiment". Without saying what he was doing, he proceeded to use 
material d i r e c t l y takaa from the "Introduction" to Kant»s "Critique of 
Teleological Judg-ement". One r e c a l l s that Kant had said; "So where 
the structure of a bird, for instance, the hollow formation of i t s bones, 
the position of i t s wings for producing motion and of i t s t a i l for 
steering, are c i t e d , we are t o l d that a l l t h i s i s in the highest degree 
contingent i f we sin?)ly look to the nexus effectl%Tis i n nature, and do 
not c a l l in a i d a special kind of causality, namely, that of ends 
(nexus f i n a l i s ) . " Coleridge's version reads: 'SVhen the n a t u r a l i s t 
contemplates the structure of a bird, for instance, the hollow cavity 
of the bones, the position of the wings for motion, and of the t a i l 
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for steertog i t s course, etc., he knows todeed that there must be a 
correspondent mechanism, as the nexus effectiyus." Kant's comment 
then was, 'This means that nature, regarded as mere mechanism, could 
have fashioned i t s e l f to a thousand other different ways without l i g ^ t t o g 
p r e c i s e l y on the unity based on a prtociple l i k e t h i s , and that, 
accordtogly, i t i s only outside the conception of nature, and not iJa i t , 
that we may hope to f tod some shadow of ground a p r i o r i for that unity". 
Coleridge*s version of t h i s read's: "But he" (the naturalist.) "knows," 
lik e w i s e , th^t t h i s w i l l no more explato the particular existence of 
the bijpd, than the prtociples of cohesion, etc., could toform him why 
of two buildtogs one i s a palace, and the other a church;" Coleridge 
commented that even the assumption of the nexus effe;ctivus origtoated 
to the mind, as one law under which the manifold can be reduced toto 
unity, and thus be contemplated as one thtog, and f t o a l l y returned to h i s 
potot about seetog thtogs as "wholes". This time, however, he referred 
to them as the r e s u l t s of self-organistog purpose, with parts as means 
to ends. Not only the paragraph specially quoted to f u l l , presumably 
Coleridge's own translation of Kant, but the whole of the sense of t h i s 
passage i s derived from the t h i r d Critique, and to Coleridge's own text, 
i s without ackn.owledgement as sucn. 
To return to the origtoal paragraph of the Friend under discussion, 
one notes there some features of a •'Leibnizian" theology, though with a 
Coleridgean "correction" - the rel a t i o n of t h i s theology to the doctrtoe 
of the Incarnation. One r e c a l l s that to his summary of the Theodicy . 
Leibniz had -tliere thought of the creation i n relation to the ijicarnation, 
for which he was at that potot p a r t i c u l a r l y , commended by Barth (and 
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there was a glance at the point in the body of thie Theodicy). I t would 
be tempting to suppose that Coleridge had picked t h i s point up from 
Leibniz ,§ixcept that i n the context i n which i t i s placed i n the Friend 
i t does not seem that Coleridge was concerned with any attempt to deal 
with the issue of evilyalthougji i t was raised in the t h i r d Critique. 
He i s j u s t as l i k e l y to have picked up the point from his reading of 
other theologians, as J . R. Barth indicates, so the comparison 
with Leibniz cannot be pressed. And the following paragraph in the 
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Friend ' reveals that the determining context was not "theodicy", bat 
. the kind of t h e s i s met with i n the Theory of L i f e ; 
I f then in a l l i n f e r i o r things from the grass on the house-top 
to the giant tree of the forest, to the eagle which builds i n 
i t s summit, and, the Oiephant which browses on i t s brandies, we 
behold - f i r s t , a subjection to universal laws, by which each 
thing belongs to the ViShole, as mterpenetrated by the powers 
of the Whole; and, secondly, the intervention of p a r t i c u l a r 
laws by which the lui i v e r s a l laws a,re suspended or tempered for the 
^veal and sustenance of each particular c l a s s , and by which each 
species, and each ind ividual of every species, becomes a system 
i n and for i t s e l f , a world of i t s own - i f we behold t h i s economj' 
everywhere in the i r r a t i o n a l creation, s h a l l we not hold i t 
probable that a s i m i l a r temperament of universal and general laws 
by an adequate intervention of appropriate agency, w i l l have been 
effected for the permanent interest of the creature destined to 
move progressively towards that Divine idea which we have learnt 
to contemplate as 4he f i n a l cause of a l l creation, and the centre 
i n which a l l i t s l i n e s converge? 
I t i s also of course necessary to remember tJiat Coleridge had temporarily 
placed an embargo on a discussion of the metaphysical origin of e v i l thus 
repudiating Leibniz' d i s t i n c t i v e attempt to cope|- and that he had found 
Kant's reaction in terms of "stoicism" unacceptable. He had learned 
from Kant to focus the issue of e v i l i n terms of man's moral being, 
rather than i n terms of nature, but as the passage from the Friend 
which r e f l e c t s the 1791 essay on theodicy showed,, he v/anted ±n effecyfc 
to correct Kant at t h i s point. He wanted to say that there was a 
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solution for "reason" to Christian theology. He liad to take incarnation 
and redemption seriously - perhaps another reason why he came to ftod 
the Theory of L i f e unsatisfactory. I f he were to relate redemption to 
nature he would perhaps have had to develop a "cosmic Christology", or 
as J.R. Barth put i t , an understandtog of "xhe doctrtoe of the 
Mystical Body of C h r i s t " , which seems to have become important to him 
i n the l a s t years of h i s l i f e . 
One may say to conclusion that Coleridge represeh-ced to h i s work, 
an ov e r a l l confidence to God, to h i s dealtogs with man to nature. His 
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words at h i s death-bed are reported to have been: 
And be thou sure in whatever may be published of my posthvimous 
works to remember that f i r s t of a l l i s the Absolute Good whose 
/self-affirmation i s the ' I am' , as the eternal r e a l i t y to i t s e l f , 
and the grouiid and source of a l l other rea.lity. And next, that 
to this, idea nevertheless a d i s t t o c t i v i t y i s to be carefully 
preserved, as manifested in the person of the Logos by whom 
that r e a l i t y i s communicated to a l l other betogs. 
He had found something important to h i s readtog of Leibniz and Kant. 
One r e c a l l s h i s comment on the Theodicy, that i t s doctrtoe was "Tjhat 
thei system of the Universe demanded not only the f u l l acquiescence of 
the Judgment to i t s perfection, but likewise the deepest devotion of Love 
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& Gratitude." The way in which he matotatoed an outlook which could 
be described as optimistic may have been important and useful to those 
who read him. 
As.we have seen, Coleridge did not attempt to transmit the work of 
the philosophers and theologians he read, to and for i t s e l f . He was not, 
a f t e r a l l , writing "history of philosophy". When he found what seemed 
to him to be an appropriate vocabulary and range of toterest, he used 
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the material a t certain points as though i t were in fact h i s . He may 
no longer have remembered that he had derived i t from another author, 
and i f he had an exceptional memory might well have assimilated material 
almost v/ithout knowing i t . Whatever the case, h i s contemporaries were 
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not charitable to him on t h i s score. As a I'esult of h i s reading, 
when one compares h i s w r i t i n g with that of Paley and Brougham, for 
example, h i s work c l e a r l y exhibits a considerable change from the 
character of t h e i r writing. He had a freedom and an o r i g i n a l i t y in 
h i s theological thinking which was not found in h i s immediate pi'edecessors, 
i f thpst mentioned are f a i r l y representative. Perhaps precisely because 
h i s writing was so "different", he was liess i n f l u e n t i a l than he might 
have been. To the extent that he was f a m i l i a r i s i n g English readers 
with Kant's kind of vocabulary and thinking, a l b e i t turned to h i s own 
purposes, aiid frequently unacknowledged as Kant's, one must c r e d i t him 
with an important influence In general, - even i f i t was not an 
influence which helped to change s i g n i f i c a n t l y the method of approach 
to the topic of theology derived from aaature. Even the fact that his 
prose writings were not on the whole w e l l received need not invalidate 
that judgement, since h i s correspondence and conversation employed h i s 
t y p i c a l theological stances. With t h i s in mind, i t may be illumijnating 
to note the remark of Edward Bulwer, l a t e r Lord Lytton, written in 
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1824, when he was twenty-one, i n h i s "History of the B r i t i s h Public". 
I f no Kants, Schellihgs, or Kegels, agitate the i n t e l l e c t of 
our U n i v e r s i t i e s , s t i l l the leading conceptions and most valuable 
propositions, even of these philosophers, are perhaps l e s s 
generally taken up into the actual l i f e and working intelligence 
of the ordinary German Public than into those of large numbers 
of Englishmen who, i n a l l probability, have never surmised the 
existence of t h e i r systems, or heard of t h e i r names. Through 
t h e i r influence upon the minds and works of the few English 
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writers who have taken them toto their own theories oi* sentiments 
about human desttoies or relat i o n s these ideas work in d i r e c t l y 
over a wider f i e l d of s o c i a l a c t i v i t y : and 1 have heard an English 
mechanic t a l k pure Kantian philosophy without the le a s t suspicion 
of the sources Avhence i t had flowed into h i s mtod. 
Of course, whatever the state of f a m i l i a r i t y with some of the termtoology 
of Kant, with or without the mediation of Coleridge, the issue rematos -
whether those who were to develop with supporttog "evidence" a new 
way of looking a t the natural order, would learn to time a Kantian 
detachment about what they had to say, such that the theological. 
problems involved could be handled with calm, i f not with ease. I t 
would seem that no one had time to learn Kant's particular nise for 
cop tog with theodicy, so that theodicy reinatoed, or was destroyed, on 
the basis of the Paleyan scheme, or some extrapolation of i t . On t h i s 
potot, Coleridge f a i l e d to offer guidance which was coherent and 
r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e , about what could be said about nature and a theodicy 
related to i t . 
F i n a l l y , one must observe that a f t e r the early attempts to ftod 
out what Kant had to say a serious toterest to Kant's work flagged, 
u n t i l attention was given once agato primarily to h i s f i r s t C ritique. 
Even then, the "philosophers" establishtog a new way of looktog at 
things either did not read that Critique, or did not see the potot of 
i t for t h e i r own a c t i v i t y . Attention may now be given to those who 
formed the new conception of thtogs, without the assistance of the 
great German philosophers. This conception was formed withto the 
t r a d i t i o n of the n a t u r a l i s t s who had assimilated Linnaeus' work for 
t h e i r own p r a c t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c purposes, without a concern for 
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other possible implications, as for example, Kant had seen them. Of 
more significance than anything written by Leibniz or Kant i n the 
public mind was Robert Chamber's Vestiges of Creation j j i the period 
leading up to the publication of the Origin. And yet, a f t e r 1859, 
TJ a . Huxley and J.S. M i l l in their different ways, reacting in part 
to t h e i r reading of Kant and Leibniz respectively, came to see that 
some fundamental thological problems including that of theodicy 
remained, whatever the pattern of explanation for the natural order 
that was adopted. . 
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142 Coleridge, Aids, p.257-8, note. 
143 Coleridge, Theory of L i f e , p.37. Griggs, Letters, V I , 595, and «f. 
Coleridge, Friend, I , 466. 
144 Coleridge, Theory of L i f e , p.37-8, note. Cf. Snyder, Method, p.22-3. 
145 Coleridge, Theory of L i f e , p.38. 
146 IbW., p.29. 
147 I b i d . , p.40, note, and c f . p.71. 
148 I b i d . , p.41, and cf. p..70. 
149 I b i d . , p.42, and p.44-5. 
150 . Coleridge, Biographia, I I , 230. Cf.Aids, p.158, on Leighton, who 
had employed himself i n making his readers feel that certain 
doctrines, " s c r i p t u r a l l y treated", could be taken "as co-organized 
parts of a great organic whole." 
151 Coleridge, Aids, p.121. Cf. p.347, and Friend. I , 459 on the law, 
"which i n i t s absolute perfection, is conceivable only of the 
Supreme Being whose creative IDEA not only appoints to each thing 
position, but i n that position, and i n consequence of that 
p o s i t i o n , gives i t i t s q u a l i t i e s , yea, gives i t i t s very existence, 
as that p a r t i c u l a r thing." 
152 Coleridge. Theory of L i f e , p.47. Cf. p.50-51. 
153 I b i d . , p.48. 
154 I b i d . , p.72. 
155 I b i d . , p.58. Cf. p.72. 
156 I b i d . , p.74. Cf. Aids, p.238, "But no sooner have we passed the 
borders, than endless variety of forms and the bold display of 
i n s t i n c t s announce, that Nature has succeeded." 
157 Coleridge, Theory of L i f e , p.50. Cf. Griggs, Letters, IV, 690. 
158 Coleridge, Theory of L i f e , p.51. 
159 I b i d . , p.70. 
160 I b i d . , p.80. 
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161 I b i d . , p.49, and cf. p.86"7, and Notebooks, I I I , 3941. 
162 Coleridge," Theory of L i f e , p.58, Cf. Aids, 347; Bre t t , Coleridge, 
p.2-3; and Snyder, Method, p.8-9, and i n particular the Tiraiaean". 
point that "there i s scarcely anjpne of the powers or faculties 
w i t h which the Divine Goodness has endowed his creatures, which 
may not i n i t s turn be a source of paramount benefit and usefulness; 
f o r every thing around us i s f u l l of blessing." 
163 Coleridge, Aids, 391. Cf. Leibniz, Theodicy, Farrer's "Introvduction", 
p.134. 
164 Coleridge, Theory of L i f e , p.68. 
165 Griggs, Lettersj IV, 773. Cf. Graig, W. M i l l e r , "Coleridge's Concept 
• of Nature", Journal of the History of Ideas, XXV, (1964), n~%, 
M.H. Abrams, "Coleridge and the Romantic Vision of the. world", 
i n Beer, Coleridge, p.130-131. on "symbol". 
166 Coleridge, Theory of L i f e , p.67. 
167 I b i d . , p.73. 
168 I b i d . , p.75. 
169 I b i d , , p,82-3. 
170 I b i d . , p.84. 
171 Coleridge, Aids, p.240-1. Cf. p.85 and p.93,and Notebooks, H I , 
3339. 
172 Coleridge, Aids, p.132; and 343-4. 
173 Coleridge, Theory of L i f e , p.85. 
174 I b i d . , p.87, 
175 Coleridge, P h i l . Lectures, p.273-5. Cf. Aids, p.343-44 
176 Griggs, l£.tters, V, 18. Cf. IV, 871: "Query. VJhether the book of 
Genesis from the creation to the Deluge does not permit, so far as 
not to preclude, the notion of the p o s s i b i l i t y , that the carnivorous 
animals were posterior to the Deluge? I confess, that the ape, cat, 
lupine t r i b e s , etc, have often appeared to me - a superaddition to 
the animal creation, destined only for a given period." 
177P.Haywood, An Analysis of Kant's C r i t i c k of Pure Reason, London: 
Pickering, 1844. 
178 I b i d . , p.179-185. 
179 I b i d . , p.179. 
- 339 -
180 Kant/N.K,S., Critique, p.548. Cf. A Cbmmeritary on Kaiit's C r i t i c k 
of Pure Reason, translated from the History of Modern Philosophy" 
by Kuno Fischer, trans. J.P. >Iahaffy, London: Longman, Green,1866. . 
(Mahaffy's own Introduction, p . i i i f , drew attention to Leibniz' 
discussion of a p r i o r i explanation and the discovery of Kant's 
work by M i l l , Mansel and Hamilton). P.270f of the actual 
commentary, is on the relevant section of Kant, and p.272f, has 
the concluding remark: " I f t h i s view of the world were a 
dogmatical one, and the system of our concepts and cognition were at 
the same time the system of things, or the objective constitution of 
the world, then the world would be a continuous gradation of 
things, summated i n the Deity as i t s highest and absolute unity; 
then everything would be an animated being, and the world a connected 
whole, w i t h God as i t s highest and f i r s t cause. Then would the 
psychological, cbsmological, and theological Ideas be objective, and 
Leibniz* view of the world be j u s t i f i e d . But i t i s simply a 
c r i t i c a l view. I t i s not the system of things, but of our cognitions. 
I t i s altogether subjective, yet not therefore a capricious, but a 
necessary maxim-..," And on p.273, Ideas are "the arms and models 
of our concepts", not concepts and patterns of things. 
181 Henry, Lord Brougham, Disserations on Subjects of Science connected 
with Natural Theology: Being the concluding volumes of the new. 
edi t i o n of Paley's work, London: Knight & Co., 1839. Cited as 
Brougham, Dissertations. 
182 See note 74 of the section on Hume. 
183 R. Morehead, Dialoguedon Natural and Revealed Religion, Edinburgh; 
Oliver & Boyd, 1830" 
184 Burton, Hume, 1, 331. 
185 Edinburgh Review, L I I , (1830-1831), 109-119. 
186 Brougham Dissertations, I , v i ~ v i i . 
187 I b i d . , p . v i i f . Cf. p.64 f , his discussion of i n s t i n c t , r e f e r r i n g to 
Newton's work on optics. 
188 I b i d . , 120f, referred to Darwin's Zoonomia. 
189 I b i d . , I I , 2. 
190 I b i d . , p.17 f . 
191 I b i d . , p.30. ' 
192 I b i d . , p.42. 
193 I b i d . , p.53. 
194 I b i d . , p.68. 
195 I b i d . , p.80, 
196 I b i d . , p.113. 
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197 Edinburgh Review. L X I I , (1835 - 1836),265-296, on various books 
on Cuvier. P.277 f , included the following comments: "Linnaeus 
was the f i r s t n a t u r a l i s t who applied the powers of a methodical 
and sagacious mind to the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of organic bodies; while 
Buffon at once threw around natural history the mantle of poetry 
and philosophy, and by his animated and picturesque descriptions, 
his bold and o r i g i n a l views , and his r i c h and powerful eloquence, 
intrenched i t i n popular estimation. There was a wide space, 
however, s t i l l l e f t between the orbits i n which these two 
na t u r a l i s t s moved, and a planet of transition was s t i l l wanting 
to occupy the void. Cuvier was the individual who f i l l e d up 
t h i s important blank. Uniting the patient t o i l , the minute 
accuracy, and the methodical habits of Linnaeus, ^d.th the l o f t y 
• views, and the gorgeous eloquence of Buffon; and adding to these 
resources the treasures of universal knowledge, he succeeded i n 
raising natural history to i t s true place among the sciences; i n 
a l l u r i n g to i t s c u l t i v a t i o n minds of the highest being; i n . . 
rendering i t accessible and instructive to every class of enquirers, 
and thus making i t the support and handmaid of natural r e l i g i o n . . . 
I n thus dec3?phering the handwriting of Nature on her tablets of 
stone, our author discovered the important f a c t , that a l l organised 
beings were hot created at the same period. I n the bountiful 
Commissariat of Providence the stores were provided before the 
marshalling of the host that was to devour them. Plants were 
created before animals; the molluscous fishes next appeared; then 
the r e p t i l e s ; and l a s t of a l l , the mammiferous animals completed 
the scale of l i v i n g wonders... Cuvier has shown, by unanswerable 
arguments, that the former could not have been the parent stocks 
of the present race of animals; and that these differences could 
not arise from a change of s o i l or climate, or any other accidental 
cause." 
198 Cassirer, Problem of Knowledge, p.134. Cuvier "rejected i n a most 
decided way a l l the notions that many naturalists had formed - he 
had i n mind p a r t i c u l a r l y Buffon, Bonnet, and Lamarck - of a gradation 
among l i v i n g forms that wotild permit their assembling i n one series. 
Such a sequence might be possible within one d e f i n i t e type, but 
there was no t r a n s i t i o n between the various related types. No 
matter how the vertebrates and invertebrates were arranged, i t would 
never be feasible to place at the end of the one series and the 
beginning of the other two animals similar enough to serve as a 
connecting l i n k between these two great classes." Coleridge, Friend, 
I , 475 note, seems to be aware that Cuvier's methodology and 
philosophy i s not that of France, but seems not to know that i t i s 
Kantian - any more than those who thought Cuvier's work gave support 
to certain kinds of theology, realised i t . Cf. Ms. Sarah Lee, 
Memoirs of Cuvier, London: Longmans, etc., 1833, f o r Cuvier's own 
comments on Linnaeus and Buffon, after the style of Kant, (Cuvier 
had spent the years 1784-88 i n Stuttgart learning German) p.135-8; 
and on the scale of being, again following Kant, whilst yet believing 
i n the harmony of the whole as the creation of a divine author, 
pp.143-151. Cuvier's work on the Animal Kingdom was f i r s t published 
i n Paris i n 1817, and an extensive translation and edition by Edward 
G r i f f i t h et a l . , London: Wliittaker, i n 16 vols, between 1827-1835. 
199 Brougham, Dissertation, I 194. 
,• - 341 ~ ; • • 
200 I b i d . , I I , 191, 193-5. 
201 I b i d . , p.202. 
202 I b i d . , p.208. 
203 J.W. Sample, trans.. Religion w i t h i n the Boundary of Pure Reason, 
Edinburgh: T. £ 1. Clark, 1838. Cited as Semple, Religion. 
204 I b i d . , p.ix-x. 
205 J. Mander, Our German Cousins, London:, J. Murray, 1974. 
206 I b i d . , p.32. Cf. a similar comiaent in D. Emmet, "Coleridge and 
Philosophy" i n Brett, Coleridge, p.203. 
207 F.A. Nitsch, A General and Introductory .View of Professor Kant's 
Principles concerning Man, the World and Deity, submitted to the 
consideration of the Learned, London: J. Downed, 1796, Cited as 
Nitsch, Kant. 
i208 A.F.M. W i l l i c h , Elements of the C r i t i c a l Philosophy, London: 
Longman, 1798. f .16 l i s t s the works published between 1755-1764; 
notes are provided on the works of the " c r i t i c a l " period; p. 136 
l i s t s the essays of 1777-1794, without notes or comments. 
209 D.M. Knight, Natural Science Books in English. 1600-1900, London: 
Batsford, 1972, p.75, though Knight"i"s mistaken i n describing i t 
as the f i r s t introductory work i n English. 
.210 Nitsch, Kant, p . 3 . 
211 I b i d . , p.48. 
212 Coleridge, Aids, p.243. 
213 Edinburgh Review, XXII, (1813 - 1 8 1 4 ) , 198-238. 
214 I b i d . , p.237. 
215 Edinburgh Review, XXXVI, (1821 - 1822), 247, reviewing Dugald 
Stewart's "Introduction" for the Encyclopedia Britannica. Cf. 
The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, ed. Sir William Hamilton, 
Edinburgh: Constable, 1854, I , e n t i t l e d Dissertation; exhibiting^ 
the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and P o l i t i c a l Philosophy 
"since the r e v i v a l of Letters i n Europe. The f i r s t part dated from 
1815, and the second part from 1821. Part I I , pp.252-286, i s 
concerned vrith a not wholly unsympathetic account of Leibniz' viev7s; 
pp.313-324 are on Bayle;f|i389-417arc an inadequate account of Kant's 
worki followed by three pages on Fichte and Schelling. 
216 J.W. Semple, trans.. The Metaphysic of Ethics, Edinburgh: T. Clark, 
1836 p.XX of his "Introduction'V^^nTthe Leibniz-Clarke discussion, 
the mbnadology, and the pre-established harmony; and p.xxi: "since 
a narrative of the revolutions i n philosophical opinion i s of value 
only i n so far as i t serves to explain the circtanstances from which 
the system of Kant took i t s r i s e , i t would be quite beside the 
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purpose to tarry, upon matters.! so antiquated and- exploded as the 
dreams of Leibnitz", - though Semple realised that the principle 
of s u f f i c i e n t reason was the groundwork of the main tenets of 
philosophy i n Germany. Cited as Semple, Metaphysics. Cf. 
however, William Hamilton, Discussions on Philosophy and Literature,. 
Education and University Reform, London: Longmans, 1852, p.82, 
asking the question, "What i r . fine,, i s the doctrine of the two 
most numerous schools of modern philosophy - the LEIBNITIAtT and 
KANTIAN?". 
217 G.W. von Leibniz, A System of Theology, trans. C.W.. Russell, 
D.D. (Professor of Ecclesiastical History i n St. Patrick's College, 
Maynooth), London: Burns and Lambert, 1850. The translation had 
been made i n 1841-(Tract XC had recently been published)-but the 
translator had since seen better editions of the o r i g i n a l on the 
continent - hence the delay whilst the translation was revised for 
publication. The "Preface", p . v i , dates, the finished revision on 
the Feast of the Assumption, 1850. the Systema Theologicum, had 
been published i n Paris i n 1819, then i n Mainz i n German translation. 
The work includes,, p . x l i x f , a long essay on Leibiz' l i f e . 
218 I b i d . , p . c x l i . 
219 I b i d . , p.ix f , discusses the "catholic" character of the work and 
hence the questions which had been raised about i t s authenticity. 
220 Nitsch, Kant, p.220. 
221 I b i d . , p.230, 
222 I b i d . , p.133. Gf. note 262 of t h i s section. I t i s clear that i t 
was Rant's "ethics" which were of primary interest to some of his 
translators. Sample's translation of the Metaphysics l i s t e d as 
crucial to the Kantian "system" the three Critiques and the 
Prolegomena; the Groundwork of 1785, the Metaphysical Elements of 
1786, and urged, p . v i i i , that the Religion of 1793 and the Conflict 
of Faculties of 1798 were also to be read " i n intimate connection"^ 
wi t h the system of the two l a t e r works, for they contained "the 
germ of RATIONALISM of Germany". I t i s also interesting to note 
that Semple V7as c e r t a i n l y aware (p . x x i i ) of the nature of Hume's 
challenge to Anglicanism, and the way i n which Kant's stance was 
developed i n the context of the attempt to reply to Hume i n Germany. 
223 Coleridge, Notebooks, I , Cobum's notes on 249, and e.g. B r i t i s h C r i t i c , 
V I I I , (1796)^136-150; The Monthly Review. XXII, (1797), 15-18 urged""an 
"attentive perusal" of Nitsch's work, though thought the l e t t e r ' s 
attachment to Kant, as that of a pupil to a master, might have biassed 
his judgement. 
224 Memoirs of the l a t e Thomas Beddoes, M.P. \ i n Reports, Papers and 
Catalogues of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Newcastle-on-
Tyne, (1807-8), IV. Cf. J.E. Stock, Memoirs of the L i f e of Thomas 
Beddoes, M.D., London : J. Murray, 1811. 
225 Humphrey Davy himself produced a book which was e n t i t l e d ^ Consolations 
i n Travel, or The Last Days of a Philosopher. 5th ed. ( f i r s t published 
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i n 1830), London: J. Murray, 1851 j which concl^^^^ p.294 with 
the remark, "And, being sure by revelation, that God i s omnipotent 
and owftipresent, i t appears to me no improper use of our f a c u l t i e s , 
to trace even i n the natural universe, the acts of his power and 
the results of his wisdom, and to draw parallels from the i n f i n i t e 
to the f i n i t e mind ..." For Davy's relationship with Coleridge, 
see K. Coburn, "Coleridge: A Eri.dge between Science and Poetry", 
pp.81-100, i n Beer, Coleridge. 
226 Humphrey Davy, Six Discourses Delivered before the Royal Society at 
t h e i r Anniversary Meetings, on^the Award of the Royal and Copley 
Medals; Preceded by an address to the Society, on the Progress and 
Prospects of Science, London: J. Murray, 1827, p.55, on the occasTon 
of an award to Buckland i n 1822. Davy remarked on "these graves of 
past generations, the marble or rocky tombs, as i t were, of a former 
animated world, new generations r i s i n g , and order and harmony 
established, and a system of l i f e and beauty produced, as i t were, 
out of chaos and death; proving the i n f i n i t e power, wisdom aiid goodness 
of the Great Cause of a l l beingi" And on a similar occasion i n 1824^ 
p.97: " A i l vague and superstitious notions banished from the mind, 
which, t r u s t i n g to i t s oxm powers and analogies, sees an immutable 
and eternal order i n the whole of the universe, intended, after the 
designs of the most perfect benefic^ence, to promote the happiness 
of m i l l i o n s of human beings, and where the whole of created nature 
offers i t s testimony to the existence of a Prime and Supreme 
inte l l i g e n c e . " 
227 Thomas Beddoes, Obser^vations on the nature of Demonstrative Evidence; 
w i t h an explanation of certain d i f f i c u l t i e s occurring i n the Elements 
of Geometry; and reflections on language, London: J. Johnson, 1793, 
p.89f, where Beddoes said he had intended to avoid the quotation and 
discussion of d i f f e r e n t opinions, but f e l t he must mention the work 
of Kant. "Mr. Kant has raised to himself throughout Germany, a 
reputation superior to that of Wolf, and at least equal to that of 
Leibnitz. Among his numerous followers he reckons men of eminence, 
who liaving v i o l e n t l y opposed his doctrines, have, by a t r a n s i t i o n 
not uncommon, become his zealous advocates: nor does that opposition 
which new opinions always have to encounter, seem to have served any 
other purpose than to diffuse those of Mr. Kant. They have already 
been publicly taught at Jena, and there i s reason to believe that 
they making t h e i r way to Gottingen. At a period when f u l l l i b e r t y 
of sentiment i s happily established throughout the republic of 
let t e r s , , speculations which have so powerfully influenced independent 
minds, are an object of ra t i o n a l curiosity; and an i n q u i s i t i v e 
person might wish, that an e x p l i c i t account of Mr. Kant's doctrines 
were published i n English, which the terminology would render a 
d i f f i c u l t undertaking." Beddoes discussed, a l b e i t b r i e f l y , with 
reference to the 1787 edition of the Critique |the difference betv/een 
a p r i o r i and a p o s t e r i o r i knowledge, and causality, mentioning i n a 
footnote on p.95 the comments of Reid on i t s importance for theology. 
For a review of Beddoes' book, cf. B r i t i s h C r i t i c , I I I ,(1794), 561-4. 
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228 T. .de.Quihcey, Works, London; A. t C. Black, 1897, .IV, 343 -
de Quincey had read some of the medical works at Beddoes, and 
i n a note said that Beddoes had read extensively i n German 
l i t e r a t u r e . Beddoes, he said, was an offset from the school 
"of the splendid Erasmus Darwin", of whom Kant had never heard. 
The note i s contained i n de Quincey's "The Last Days of Immanuel 
Kant", produced i n 1827, largely a translation of a work by 
Wasnianski. And p.324 i n a note, he remarked on the fact of 
Leibniz' having w r i t t e n i n French, and that up to Waterloo, few 
. i n England had read German, and those who did were not very l i k e l y 
to want to read Kant. Kant's German and Latin had begun to be 
translated i n t o English, but not such English as would commend 
i t s e l f . W.A. Dunn, Thomas de Quincey's Relation to German Literature, 
Strassburg: Hertz and MUndel, 1900, described de Quincey's own 
varying estimates of Kant, and showed, p.82-3 that de Quincey knew 
the work of Nitsch and W i l l i c h . Of the English c r i t i c s of Kant, 
de Quincey respected only Coleridge, but maintained that the l a t t e r 
was not an expositor of Kant as such - Coleridge's own mind modified 
a l l that went through i t . 
229 Dunn, op.cit., de Quincey had been reading Kant since 1805, and 
p.66f, Dunn l i s t e d de Quincey's translations of Kant from 1824 
onwards. These included the essays on "The Beautiful and the Sublime", 
Swedenborg, the "Idea f o r a Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Basis", 
"Perpetual Peace", and on the age of the earth, De Quincey was also 
acquainted w i t h a l l the most important of Kant's major works, and 
with the essay on the f a i l u r e of Theodicies. In view of the essays 
de Qiiincey chose to translate, i t i s interesting to note that a 
reviewer, Edinburgh Revievr, L I I I , (1831) discussing Williams Taylor 
of Norwich*s Historic Survey of German Poetry c r i t i c i z e d Taylor, 
p.167, f o r seeing Kant a^^'a sort of P o l i t i c a l Reformer." 
230 Coleridge, Notebooks, I I I , 4046. Cf. E.J. Morley, ed., Crabb Robinson 
i n Germany. 1800-1805: extracts from his correspondence, London: O.U.P., 
1929. Cf. Mander, Our German Cousins, p.60, on the connection bet^reen 
William Taylor and Robinson. 
231 Referred to throughout as Kant/Richardson, Essays. 
232 Kant, The Beautiful and Sublime, p.39-40 and G.M. Duncan, "English 
Translations of Kant^s Writings", Kant-Studien I I , (1899) 253-258. 
W i l l i c h may have produced a translation of the books on which he did 
not produce notes, cf. notes 208 and 234 of th i s section. 
233 Semple, Metaphysics, p . v i i , "The Essays are apparently rendered by a 
foreigner, and printed abroad, although graced with a London t i t l e -
page. The only copy of t h i s Miscellany I have been able to procure, 
i s the copy i n the Advocates' Library." Cf. the next note indicating 
that the translat*v- appreciated the importance of Hume for Kant. 
234 Vol. I (with a quotation from Hume before the "Preface") of the 
Kant/Richardson Essays, included the Essay on Enlightenment^ (1784); 
the Grpundxrork (1785); the False Subtlety (1762); This might be 
r i g h t i n theory (1793); I l l e g a l Reprinting (1785); Eternal Peace 
"n^gsTrConjectural beginning (1786);"Evidence of Principles (1764); 
Orj^entation (1786); Universal History (1784);""Vol. I I again refers 
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to Hume i n the "Preface", p.v., both his scepticism, and p . v i i , 
his discussion of the cause-effect problem, with reference to 
the Prol egomena. This volume included essays on the Beautiful 
and Sublime (1764); Influence of the Moon (1794); Earthquakes 
(1756) - mistakenly dated i n the t i t l " e as 1775; Volcanoes (1785); 
Gentle Ton (1796); Theodicy (1791); Only Possible Argument (1763); 
Religion (1793) End of a l l Things (1794). We may also note here 
the reviev7s of e.g. the essay on Perpetual Peace, i n the Monthly 
Review, XX, (1796), 486-490, a translation of which was announced 
i n Vol. XXII, (1797); On the Beautiful and the Sublime., XXV, (1798) 
584-585 - neither of these reviews commended Kant's philosophy. 
Notes on a col l e c t i o n of short essays ^  The End of A l l things. The 
Influence of the Moon, Right i n Theory,and on the Idea for a 
Universal History^appeared i n XXVI (1798) 560-561, Obviously there 
was a general in t e r e s t i n Kant for a few years, though he was rarely 
commended. 
235 Mander, Our German Cousins, p,132-3. 
236 I . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans/THaywood, London: William 
Pickering, 1838, p.v-vi, noted the writings of Nitsch, W i l l i c h and 
Beck, and an a r t i c l e i n the Encyclopedia Londinensis, by Wirgman. 
Cf. T. Wirgpian, Principles of the Kantesian or Transcendental 
Philosophy, by.the author of a r t i c l e s on Kant, Logic, Metaphysics, 
Moral Philosophy and Philosophy i n the Encyclopedia Londinenais, 
London: 1824, pp.151-158, i n The Pamphleteer, X X I I I , London: 1824. 
Haywood's second edition of his translation of 1848 included a 
comment, p . v i , that the VJirgman a r t i c l e was chi e f l y a translation 
of work by J.S. Beck. Thomas Brown, (Erasmus Darwin's reviewer) 
also had drawn attention to a French book on Kant, Edinburgh Review 
I , (1802-3) 453-280. Bro^m was himself unaquainted with the 
Critique, but provided further evidence of early interest i n 
Kant. 
237 I , Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn, London: 
Bohn, 1855. 
238 I b i d . , p . x i i i . 
239 I b i d . , p.xv. 
240 Edinburgh Review, I , (1802-3), 287-305, with no disagreement with 
Paley onHume's terms shown i n the review, 
241 Griggs, Letters, V, 421-2. Cf. I , 209, and 213, of 1796; Coleridge, 
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Section I I I : Darwin i n his pontexrfc , 
A» Chamljers to H i l l . 
This section i s intended to indicate some of the stages 
by which the notion of "transformism", rather than the " f i x i t y " 
of species, gradually gained ground i n England i n the 
nineteenth century, and how various theological options were 
t r i e d out alongside the examination of the alternatives. 
I t seems to have been taken f o r granted that statements 
about God could be made as a resul t of consideration of the 
natural order, and various analogies for God were employed i n 
that connection. There does not even seem to have been much 
thought given to the problem of the status of man's assertions 
about the natural order, though some attention was paid to the 
logic of the procedure to be followed i f one were to hold a 
s c i e n t i f i c statement as true. 
I n one sense the material i s easier to haiidle, i n that to 
i l l u s t r a t e what was moving people to defend t h e i r positions one need 
only draw on t h e i r published works, and various collections of 
the " l i f e and l e t t e r s " variety. The problem i s to see why there 
was so much heat generated over what may at f i r s t sight appear 
to be merely the substitution of one concept i n biology for 
another. I t has been supposed, f o r example, that what was at 
stake was the inerrancy of the b i b l i c a l texts on which people 
drew f o r t h e i r "science"; and the "dignity" of man. Undoubtedly 
there i s t r u t h i n both these suggestions. The contention i n t h i s 
chapter, however, i s that there was at least one other issue at 
stake, namely, the p o s s i b i l i t y of a theodicy. The analogies for 
God which were promoted i n r e l a t i o n to the notion of the f i x i t y of 
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species, or of the transformation of speciesj had to-be such as ; 
would serve f o r a theodicy. This was more or less possible 
when "evolution" could be interpreted to mean divinely intended 
progress and p e r f e c t i b i l i t y , and the notion of transfomism 
could be incorporated into thJs kind of scheme. Theodicy was less 
possible when "evolution" could be interpreted i n terms of such 
phrases as "natural selection" and "the survival of the f i t t e s t . " 
To serve the purposes of a theodicy, the natural order had to 
be interpreted i n an optimistic fashion, and some believers f e l t 
t h e ir f a i t h threatened when t h i s seemed to be manageable no 
longer. I t was not clear to them that there might be another 
source for their theology other than "nature". Nor did they raise 
the question of whether they were i n fact thinking theologically 
when they embarked on a theology derived from nature, or whether 
they were rather talking about nature and themselves. I t was to 
becoifte clear that the problem of physical e v i l i n relaition to a 
theodicy was i n no sense solved by an appeal to the order of nature, 
whether interpreted v i a the notion of f i x i t y of species or v i a 
transformation, but to arrive at that understanding took some time, 
since the issue was confused w i t h so many others. Robert Chambers^fo** *"*-y 
attempted to integrate the increasingly interesting information 
being provided by scientists with theology i n The Vestiges of the 
Natural History of Creation,^first published i n 1844. This book 
came to represent a challenge to an "orthodoxy" i n England and 
elsewhere, v;hich by 1844 included a s c i e n t i f i c and theological 
world-picture. I t i s important to realise that the opposition to 
Chambers' work came from scientists as well as from theologians, as 
indeed was the case w i t h the Origin i n i t s turn. The furore caused 
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by the publication of his book j u s t i f i e d Chambier's'cautipn iaver 
i t s preparation and p r i n t i n g , and i t also stimulated the awareness 
of the general public to the issues that had to be faced when 
Darwin produced the Origin. 
Robert Chambers and his brother^ had ah extraordinarily 
tough upbringing and yet together managed to turn themselves into 
prosperous and important citizens, their reputation outside 
Edinburgh resting upon their l i t e r a r y and educational publications. 
February, 1832 had seen the f i r s t number of their Edinburgh Journal, 
with i t s essentially p r a c t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c character. They had 
general education at heart - hence a prompt c r i t i c i s m that they 
paid l i t t l e or no attention to religious questions. Chambers' 
fascination w i t h the development of nineteenth-century science grew 
and grew. He joined the Edinburgh Royal Society i n 1841, and l a t e r , 
i n 1844,the Geological Society. I n 1841 he moved from Edinburgh to 
St. Andrew's where he f e l t he would have more time to get on with 
his book, which was both a synthesis of a great deal of s c i e n t i f i c 
information - and he made good many blunders, - together with an 
attempt to consider the meaning of the new perspective possibly 
implied by his synthesis. Unlike Darwin l a t e r , he was prepared to 
say i n p r i n t what he thought the relationship ought to be beh^een 
his way of looking at the natural order, and his theology, such as 
i t was. Evidently he realised how serious a matter i t was to attempt 
to challenge generally accepted opinion by w r i t i n g his book, but 
since he thought that what he had to say was of fundamental importance, 
found a way of getting his ideas into p r i n t without suffering too 
much for having done so. 
As he got his material ready, his wife transcribed i t so that 
there should be no r i s k of anyone recognising his handwriting at the 
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publishers, Churchill, of London. The manuscript was isent t e a ' 
f r i e n d , who re-packed i t to go to the publisher, who i n turn sent 
i t to the p r i n t e r . The proofs went back to the friend and on to 
Chambers i n fresh wrappings. A very few friends came to know of 
the author's i d e n t i t y , but i t was not confirmed i n p r i n t u n t i l 
fourteen years af t e r his death, and when both his brother and his 
wife were dead. Despite a l l the caution, rumour had i t that he 
vras the author and i t probably cost him the post of Provost of 
Edinburgh i n 1848. He withdrew his candidature for the post 
rather than acknowledge the book as his i n public. Some of the 
reviews may have been p a r t i c u l a r l y v i r u l e n t precisely because of the 
book's anonymity, though Chambers must s t i l l have come i n for severe 
c r i t i c i s m , and he had a l l the disadvantages of being a public figure 
i n a sense that was not to apply to Darwin. Bosanquet, a "minor 
theologian of no great power but of unimpeachably correct opinion," ^  
wrote of Vestiges that i t was a "romance of philosophy", displaying 
"the graces of the accomplished harlot"^. He continued: "Such i s 
philosophy without the maiden gem of trut h and singleness of purpose; 
divorced from the sacred ennobling rule and discipline of f a i t h . 
Without t h i s , philosophy i s a wanton and deformed adulteress." 
Vestiges* kind of philosophy was "the most subtle serpent that 
poisons and saps the s p i r i t u a l mind, and fascinates the conscience." ^ 
With such encouragement, i t i s hardly surprising that Chambers never 
f e l t he could admit to authorship. 
Before turning to the points madia by Bosanquet and others, which 
reveal t h e i r ovm theologies of creation, we may turn to the book 
i t s e l f to f i n d out what i t was about i t that engaged the minds of 
those who f i r s t read i t . For Chambers, the physical a f f a i r s of the-
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universe were under the;rule of law, a law being "an arrangement 
i n which v/e see invariable Uniformity and self-consistency"? fl< wc*»t 
We thus trace i n law. Intelligence -
often we can see that i t has a beneficial object, 
s t i l l more strongly speaking of mind as concerned 
i n i t . There cannot, however, be an inherent 
intelligence i n these laws; we cannot conceive of 
mind actually working i n the agglomeration of a 
dfew-drop or the o r b i t a l revolution of the moon. 
The intelligence appears external to the laws; 
something of which the laws are but as the 
expression of the .Will and Power. I f this be 
admitted, the laws cannot be regarded as primary 
or independent causes of the phenomena of the 
physical world. We come, i n short, to a Being 
beyond nature - i t s author, i t s God; i n f i n i t e -
inconceivable, i t may be, and yet one whom these 
very laws present to us with attributes showing 
that our nature i s i n some way a f a i n t and 
far-cast shadow of His, while a l l the gentlest 
and b e a u t i f u l l e s t of our emotions lead us to 
believe that we are as children i n his care, and 
as vessels i n his hand. 
He then directed his readers' attention most carefully to the 
point that "when we speak of natural law, we only speak of the 
mode i n which the Divine Power i s exercised. I t i s but another 
phrase for the action of the ever present and sustaining God." 
The pursuit of science was therefore to be understood as 
the seeking of a deeper acquaintance with God. " I n modesty and 
reverence, i n the s p i r i t of the love of t r u t h , and that craving of 
an innate helplessness which seems as i f i t could never be satisfied 
t i l l i t knew a l l , we may even inquire i f there be any trace of the 
o r i g i n of that arrangement of the universe which i s presented to 
8 « our notice." The real d i f f i c u l t y as he saw i t was the assumption 
that God created organisms by a special exercise of divine power. 
This "prejudice" as he described i t , has "that hold upon our minds 
which early impressions and long-continued habits tend to give to 
even the most unphilosophical convictions."^ Chambers wanted an 
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"explanation" both s c i e n t i f i c and theological, whiiih.would cop6 
with the production of physical and organic phenomena together, since 
as he pointed o u t l ^ ^ " l i f e , as i t were, pressed i n whenever and 
wherever there were suitable conditions and, once i t had commenced, 
the two classes of phenomena went on, hand i n hand together." 
I t seemed to him very unlikely that i n such a complex inass of 
phenomena, "there should have been two t o t a l l y d i s t i n c t modes of the eiwrn^ctfl:: 
•^divine power". Chambers therefore took the "character of the divine 
procedure i n the universe" to be the operation of law, leaving the 
"absolute f a c t " of the supremacy of God over nature, precisely V7here 
i t was. God conceived and sustained arrangements " f i t t e d to serve 
i n a general sufficiency f o r a l l contingencies", thus placing "the 
leading divine a t t r i b u t e of foresight i n a much more sublime 
position."^^ 
The s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis was clearly that of the development 
of the vegetable and animal kingdoms as a vast system i n which each 
12 
pa r t i c u l a r species had i t s shape and place. In the system man may 
aee the "shadings" of one species into another, and therefore the 
un i t y of the system. "Rudimentary organs, too, appear but as harmless 
p e c u l i a r i t i e s of developm.ent, and interesting evidences of the manner 
i n which the Divine Author has been pleased to work." I t i s the 
theory of "progressive development" not that of creative interference 
which provides us with a t r u l y exalted idea of the Deity. Nature's 
wonders may j u s t l y be regarded as the results of "the highest 
a t t r i b u t e s of foresight, s k i l l and goodness on the part of their 
Divine Author." ^3 
Chambers noted that those who had i n the past been inclined 
to support the notion of development as an explanation of the way 
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things had come to be, had thovight i n terms of the "chain of 
being", which he, (along w i t h Br<?ugham, for example) had learned 
to discard. There was a p l u r a l i t y of series side by side, but 
not one series of ascending forms, "which liad long been supposed 
to extend between the animalcule and the human being." One 
could not trace creatures i n a series i n such a way as to see a 
decrease or increase i n perfection i n passing from one species to 
another. Some classes of things had no cornnection with one another.!^ 
His view was that any explanatory principle including the maxim 
natura per saltum n i h i l agit,must do jus t i c e t o the facts,'''^e did 
not shrink from dealing with the question of man's r e l a t i o n to the 
animal kingdom, asking whether i t was degrading to man to think that 
the animal order was i n any way concerned with his o r i g i n . For his 
own part, "we might, expect a ra t i o n a l and well-ordered mind to 
receive the idea with submission, as a view of the manner i n which 
Divine Providence has been pleased i n th i s instance to work."''"^ Man 
should recognise not only his responsibility to creatures, but also 
his relationship with them. This need not lead to a view of man 
which did not do j u s t i c e to his d i s t i n c t i v e abilities:'''^"Amongst 
the arrangements of Providence i s one for the production of o r i g i n a l , 
inventive, and aspiring minds, which, when circumstances are not 
decidedly unfavourable, s t r i k e out new ideas for the benefit of their 
fellow-creatures, or put upo:i them a lasting impress of their own 
superior sentiments." 
Chambers launched into a p a r t i c u l a r l y sensitive area when he 
18 
went on to discuss theodicy. Some of his points vzere familiar from 
Hume's day. Chambers maintained^for example,that there was a general 
adaptation of the mental constitution of man to the circumstances 
i n which he l i v e s , as between a l l the part?; of nature to each other. 
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"The goods of the physical-world are only to be realised by 
ingenuity and industrious exertion; behold, accordingly, an i n t e l l e c t 
f u l l of device, and a fabric of the faculties which would go to 
pieces or destroy i t s e l f i f i t were not kept i n constant occupation." 
With Paley, he proposed that although the world i s also one of 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and p e r i l s , we could see "how a large, portion of our 
species are endowed with vigorous powers, which take a pleasure i n 
meeting and overcoming d i f f i c u l t y and danger."''"^But he went on to 
suggest that although God does not make a criminal^Quch a type of 
person "comes int o existence i n accordance with laws which the Deity 
has established", - not as the r e s u l t of "the f i r s t or general 
intention of those laws, but as "an exception from theiV ordinary 
or proper action". Moral l i k e physical e v i l , i s admitted into the 
overall pattern as an apparent exception within a. system which 
had generally good results. Of the fixed laws which form fae system 
he wrote: "Left to act independently of each other, each according 
to i t s separate coranission, and each with a wide range of p o t e n t i a l i t y 
to be modified by associated conditions, they can only have effects 
generally b e n e f i c i a l . " Even of war he could say that " i t i s , a f t e r 
a l l , but the exceptive case, a casual misdirection of properties and 
powers essentially good." Virtue forms no protection against the 
evils connected with physical laws, but on the other hand, "A man 
s k i l l e d i n , and attentive to these, but unrighteous and disregardful 
of his neighbour i s not protected by his attention to physical 
circumstances from the proper consequences of neglect or breach of the 
22 
moral laws." So he could propose that "we never see e v i l of any kind 
take place where there i s not some remedy or compensating pri n c i p l e 
ready to int e r f e r e f o r i t s a l l e v i a t i o n . And there can be no doubt 
2 that i n t h i s manner suffering of a l l kinds i s very much relieved." 
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Chambers clearly realised what kind of a deity he was 
describing, f o r he notec?1:hat his view was apt to appear "as a 
dreary view of the divine economy of the world, as i f i t placed 
God at an immeasurable distance from his creatures, and l e f t them 
without refuge from the numberless i l l s that 'flesh i s heir t o ' , and 
which no one can hope altogether to escape." But as the system 
Chambers described required a sustainer as well as an originator 
God must be present i n every part of i t , although he does not 
vary his operation of law. "Thus we may s t i l l feel that He i s 
the immediate breather of our l i f e and r u l e r of our s p i r i t s , that 
we may, by r i g h t l y directed thoughfe,come into communion with him, 
and f e e l that, even when his penal ordinances are enforced upon us, 
his hand and arm are closely about us. " ^ ^ T i i l s t man i s conmitted 
to take his chance i n "a natural system of undeviating operation", 
and i s l e f t "with apparent ruthlesishess to endure the consequences 
of every c o l l i s i o n " into which he knowingCy or "unknowingly comes 
w i t h each of i t s regulations' , he could be assured that "there i s 
a system of Mercy and Grace behind the screen of nature", which was 
capable of "compensating for a l l casualties endured here, and whose 
very largeness i s what makes theses casualties a matter of indifference 
to God." Chambers could not doubt that we are " i n the hands of One 
who i s both able and w i l l i n g to do us the most entire j u s t i c e . 
Surely i n such a f a i t h we may well rest at ease, even though l i f e 
should ha;ve been to us but a protracted malady, as though every 
hope V7e had b u i l t on the secular materials within our reach were 
f e l t to be melting from our grasp." 
To return to the reviewers, f/rii- of a l l one may say 
that not a l l were as simply nasty as Bosanquet. The main question 
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was Cliambers* own question, i n effect. They asked which of the 
alternatives ~ creation by interference or creation by law, were 
adequate to what people believed God to be, Thomas Monck Mason^^ 
asserted that, "The re g u l a r i t y observable i n the conditions of the 
c«lestiai creation i s not that regularity which we have a r i g h t 
to expect from the operation of i n f l e x i b l e causes, but may very 
well consist with the working of that Power which does nothing i n 
vain, and among the distinguishing characteristics of whose 
productions the extremes of uniformity and variety are equally 
prominently displayed.". I t did not seem to Mason that Vestiges 
had any explanation of why "the organic inhabitants of the present 
age" should not have subsisted "during any or a l l of the four 
preceding eras as i n that to which, they appropriately belong." 
28 
Mason went on to say that to have 
so constituted laws as to be productive of a l l the 
varied and wonderful consequences ascribed to them, 
(admitting t h i s to be possible, which, however, I 
shall hereafter take upon myself the responsibility 
of denying) may be regarded as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of 
Almightjipower, greater, i t may be than what would • 
accrue from the adoption of the theory of creation 
by special agency or decree. But i n regard to the 
a t t r i b u t e of 'foresight', - i t not only affords no 
evidence of i t , but absolutely removes the only 
grounds upon which such an at t r i b u t e could have 
been presumed. 
To Mason, i t was j u s t i f i a b l e to suppose tlmt i t was as "competent 
and reasonable" of God to have introduced the creatures which his 
purposes demanded "at the epoch of their respective necessities, as 
to have provided for their appearance by the additional qualifications 
of His laws especially conferred upon them at the or i g i n a l period of 
29 30 th e i r appointment." An anonymous reviewer x^ent so f a r as to urge 
that "we have no doubt that advancing knowledge w i l l establish our 
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proposition that the rocks of primitive granite, l i k e the bones ' 
of p r i m i t i v e man, were called into existence by the f i a t of 
creative agency." 
Another reviewer^law that one need not, i n f a c t , go i n 
f o r that particular kind of option, but t r i e d to re-state Chambers' 
kind of theology i n the l i g h t of his own reading of Paley. Recalling 
Paley's analogy of the watch with approval, he remarked^ihat i f 
one were to suppose a watch that could be made by the influence of 
steam on metal, for example, the production of the watch would 
s t i l l have to be a t t r i b u t e d to the work of an Organising genius. 
One might, moreover, think more of ah artisan who improved his 
instruments from time to time, than^ln artisan who constructed new 
onesj f o r the improvements would be adopted at various time for 
various circumstances. " I t has been said, that the examination of 
the eye alone ought to cure any person of atheism; would not the 
knowledge of the manner i n which heterogeneous matter had been 
arranged so that by being subjected to the action of one or more 
fixed.laws f o r an i n d e f i n i t e length of time, i t should undergo 
various modifications, and at length become an eye, have at least 
the same convincing effect?"^^ And a shrewd question he asked^^as, 
"Why should good men be less pleased to contemplate t h e i r Creator 
as the Author of Nature, than as one who does everything by special 
f i a t s . I s i t that they have not been hitherto accustomed to regard 
the power of their Creator and Nature as antagonistic? Or rather, 
have they not ... been wont to compare the power of the Deity 
w i t h that of man; and to look upon Nature as something that works as 
independently of His power as of man?" Surely such men should rejoice 
i n any science which showed God as the author of nature, "of that 
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very power which seemed to them so independent of Him?'! There 
seemed to this man at least no reason to accuse of propagating 
a theory leading to atheism, anyone who maintained ^ ^hat-the 
adaptations so conspicuous i n the eyes of dif f e r e n t animals are 
the result of an inherent impulse i n the forms of l i f e to modify 
or a l t e r t h e i r structure i n accordance with external circumstances." 
The greater " u t i l i t y of adaptation" ?tnd the more i t struck men as 
"resembling the consequences of an isolated act of creative power", 
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then, the more one must admire "the wisdom and foresight of .one 
who has been able to bring i t about by some general law or by some 
general system of laws." Continuing his development of Paley, this 
w r i t e r had a generally confident outlook. He saw "benevolent 
arrangeiment in. a l l the ... apparent e v i l s to which His creatures 
are subject". We could be sure that God " w i l l not allow us to be 
a f f l i c t e d with a greater meed of adversity of any sort, than i s 
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required for our chastisement and improvement". 
Probably the most i n f l u e n t i a l review, follovred up by a 
substantial work, was that of Adam Sedgwick. The review stated the 
41 
theological issue: "Does not our author see that he binds the 
p i v i n i t y (on his dismal material scheme) i n chains of fatalism as 
f irmly as the Homeric gods were bound i n the imagination of the old 
blin d poet?" Sedgwick denied that he saw any blemishes and blunders 
i n creation, "And were they there, and could wre scan them, what would 
i t matter to our conception of them, whether they sprang from dead 
material laws ordained by an all-powerful and all-seeing God,, or from 
an immediate defect i n an act of creative power?" Sedgwick 
acknowledged that he could not relate any particular creative law to 
the divine w i l l , and therefore worked on the understanding of a "personal 
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, and superintending God, who careth for his creatures." I f the 
choice was between such a God and materialism, he chose that 
conception of God which exalted the nature of man by teaching 
him about the personality of God i n whose image he had been made 
h i s also meant that man had moral destinies which hold no 
allegiance to the laws of "dead and inorganic matter". Both the 
science and the theology of Vestiges seemed to him to be d i r e c t l y 
at variance w i t h "the plainest acknowledged facts of nature. "^^ 
The reason f o r Sedgwick's influence was that i n 1818, at the 
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age of t h i r t y - t h r e e he had become Woodward Professor of Geology at 
Cambridge., To begin with, he knew absolutely nothing of a "science" 
of which at that time there was admittedly, r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e to 
know. But some cr u c i a l developments were prompted by the work of 
William Smith^^who had shown that a sequence of strata could be 
ascertained "by observation of the fo s s i l s characteristic of each", 
so that i t might be possible to arrive at an understanding of the 
composition of the crust of the earth. This mearflithat geologists 
leameinot to engage i n discussion of the forces by which the 
composition of the earth's crust had been moulded before they had . 45 some accurate observations to work on, 
Sedgwick's Discourse, originating as a sercusn on The Studies 
of the University i n 1832, had become by 1850 a considerable tome, 
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The o r i g i n a l sermon included i n i t s f i r s t section a review of the 
"laws of nature". Under th i s heading "natural science i s considered 
i n the l i g h t of the results to which a reverent study of i t ought 
to lead; and i t i s pointed out that i t s various branches. Astronomy, 
Anatomy, Geology, minister to natural r e l i g i o n , and teach us to see 
the finger of God i n a l l things aniiaate and inanimate." (In 1845, 
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Sedgwick had. a l e t t e r from an undergraduate saying of his geology 
lectures, "Truly you have led us to .contemplate the God of Nature -
His goodness - his omniscience - His omnipotence.''^^ Sedgwick's 
merit was i n not t r y i n g to take the f i r s t chapter of Genesis 
l i t e r a l l y , as authoritative for geological study, but believing 
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nevertheless that " t r u t h could not be opposed to i t s e l f , and 
the highest discoveries of science would ever be found i n perfect 
harmony and accordance with the language and meaning of revelation;" 
His review of Vestiges was to become over half of the Discourse 
by the time of i t s 1850 edition. The passionate loathing for 
Vestiges that Sedgv/ick showed i n a l e t t e r of^?845 to L y e l l inspired 
him f o r a long time; * 
The sober facts of geology shuffled, so as to play 
a rogue's game; phrenology (that sinkhole of human 
f o l l y and prating coxcombry); spontaneous generation; 
transmutation of species; and I know not what; a l l to 
be swallowed, without tasting or tr y i n g , l i k e so 
much horse-physic11 Gross credulity and rank 
i n f i d e l i t y joined i n unlawful marriage, and breeding 
a deformed progeny of unnatural conclusions ... VJhat 
can we think too i l l of the s i l l y philosophy of one 
who compares- the frosted vapour on our windows to 
the action of vegetable l i f e ? or the el e c t r i c brush 
to the organic energies which bring to maturity a 
forest tree? ... who breeds mites by e l e c t r i c i t y , 
and hatches rats out of a goose's egg? 
A book which proposed the " a f f i n i t y of organic types", or of 
"spontaneous generation and transmutation of species" was tr y i n g 
nature by an hypothesis, and not'^iypothesis by nature, as he wrote 
to Agassiz^^ "They shut out a l l argument from design and a l l notion 
of a Creative Providence, and i n so doing they appear to me to 
deprive physiology of i t s l i f e and strength, and language of i t s 
beauty and meaning." To t r y an hypothesis by nature, for Sedgxdck, 
was quite obviously to maintain a " t r a d i t i o n a l " view which allowed 
a s c i e n t i s t to go on doing his science and to ta l k of a personal God, 
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i n direct connection w i t h his s c i e n t i f i c study. 
Part of the reason for Sedgwick's rage was the author's 
silence about his i d e n t i t y . An anonymous t i t l e page i s a good 
as a wall of brass to any man who has taken up a rash hypothesis, 
and made up his mind to defend i t at a l l cost; and he may s h i f t 
his ground as often as he pleases, and change his colours as 
without blush, so long as he wears a mask." I f the author i s i n 
the r i g h t , "Man must be shorn of his highest attributes and his best 
hopes. The God of nature must lose his personality - He i s no longer 
i n any moral or Christian isense, our Father, but we must look for 
our paternity among chattering monkeys and old sea-monsters."^^In 
Vestiges the " F i r s t Cause" i s not allowed to exercise providential 
government, or to communicate with his " i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral 
creatures" except by means of "the material laws of dead nature". 
Rather, the ultimate guarantee of God's care i s the convicfciert 
t h a t , "before the creation of a l l worlds, there was an archetype 
of Nature (dead as well as l i v i n g , past as well as present) i n the 
prescient mind of God."^^Thus Sedgwick coped with Chambers' understanding 
of God's foresight, - and as i n his review denied the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
any blemish i n God's creatures - " i n the great archetype dwelling i n 
the mind of God, there i s no blemish"^^ He clearly showed that he 
thought l i t t l e of a theology which put God "far distant from us i n 
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the repose of a sublime pantheistic t r a n q u i l i t y " . 
The reviews, and Sedgwick's Discourse show a l l too clearly 
how a particular theological option was linked w i t h a particular 
s c i e n t i f i c option. Paley's God had become the God of Cuvier, as he 
was understood i n England. Following Cuvier, Sedgwick allowed^! kind 
of progressive development i n r e l a t i o n to a succession of geological 
epochs, given the inadequacy of the " s t a t i c " concept of the chain of 
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being, which Cuvier had exhibited. 
' I say we have successive forms of animal l i f e 
adapted to successive conditions (so f a r , proving 
design), and not derived i n natural succession i n 
the ordinary way of generation. But i f no single 
fact i n actual nature allows us to suppose that 
the new species and orders Were produced successively 
i n the natural way, how did they begin? I reply by 
a way out of and above common, known, material nature, 
and t h i s way I c a l l creation. Generation and creation 
are two d i s t i n c t ideas, and must be described by two 
d i s t i n c t words; unless we wish to introduce u t t e r 
confusion of thought and language. 
I t was with the name of Cuvier, therefore, that what has been 
described as "neopiatonic idealism i n biology"f^God creating 
i n the aftermath of catastrophe, and the f i x i t y of species, were 
i n the nineteenth century primarily associated, and i n the case 
of Sedgwick and others l i k e him brought into a strange amalgam 
with the "caring" God of Paley. The reviewer who t r i e d to produce 
an amalgam of Paley*s God with the s c i e n t i f i c option represented 
i n Chambers' work, and associated with the name of Lamarck, was a 
rare phenomenon. Any and every notion of "developmentV-.other than that 
understood i i i r e l a t i o n to creative intervention, was associated, 
r i g h t l y or wrongly, w i t h Lamarck and his successors. Lamarck was the 
heir of Buffon^^who had interpreted the principle of continuity i n 
such a way as to deny the existence of absolute barriers between 
species, except those between species i n certain phases of the i r 
. existence. As we have already noted he was concerned to emphasise 
the a f f i n i t y of groups of creatures, rather than i d e n t i f y species 
as " f i x e d " elements of the "world-machine". Groups of creatures 
could change with time; they were not for ever fixed i n an hierarchy 
which could be divided into species. I f continuity were interpreted 
not i n terms of hierarchy but i n terms of the p o s s i b i l i t y of progress 
and change, i t might also be possible to account fo r rudimentary 
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organs found i n creatures, and f o r "imperfection" i n creatures. 
Buffon lacked enough appropriate "evidence" to support his 
proposals, and i t f e l l to Lamarck, to present after 1793, an 
int e r p r e t a t i o n of " l a marche de l a nature" which attempted to do 
j u s t i c e to Buffon*s concept. Stafleu inaintained^?hat a lecture 
of 11th May,. 1800, was "the b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e of transfortnism". 
In. the lecture and l a t e r i n hi s books, Lamarck attempted to give 
•an outline of the order i n which nature seemed to have followed i n 
forming i t s animals. His main thesis was that organisms change 
w i t h time, and therefore that species were not constant. He had 
what Stafleu described as a poor theory of the mechanism by which 
change i n species came about - a point of which the reviewers of 
Vestiges were well aware, - though for Lamarck i t was "needs" 
rather than "desires" which provoked and i n some sense brought 
about change!'''' The implications of this general thesis for theology 
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were often regarded as unfortunate. As one reviewer remarked of t 
Vestiges man's love and veneration of his maker were scarcely i 
increased by the r e f l e c t i o n "that instead of being produced as a 
superior being by the di r e c t f i a t of an Omnipotent Creator, his i 
inittortal soul owes i t s o r i g i n to the corporeal functions of a tadpole." 
And Stafleu recorde^^Sainte-Beuve's comment on Lamarck'a God,- "A 
long b l i n d patience, such was his genius of the Universe." 
Cuvier had done his best to destroy the reputation of Lamarck, 
not simply by the immense success and prestige he himself enjoyed as 
a r e s u l t of his own magnificent work, but by his cpttic«.i and sarcastic 
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attack on Lamarck, nor read u n t i l after Cuvier's own death i n 1832. 
There consequently appeared to be s c i e n t i f i c as well as theological 
warrant for despising Lamarck's general thesis, and fo r preferring i 
that associated with the name of Cuvier. I t may be doubted, however, 
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whether theologically speaking, the view of the Creator preferred 
i n the name of "sound science" as well as "sound theology" was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a t t r a c t i v e or credible. As Lovejoy wrote:^^ 
I t was, and i s , possible, by making a s u f f i c i e n t 
number of supplementary suppositions, to give to 
the special-creation doctrine a form i n which i t 
i s neither e x p l i c i t l y self-contradictory nor 
e x p l i c i t l y contradictory of any fact established 
by dir e c t observation. But when thus f i t t e d out 
with the supplements required by the facts 
already known to the science of 1840, the doctrine 
certainly tiad a singularly odd appearance. I t 
implied that the Creator had produced the d i f f e r e n t 
types of organisms by f i t s and st a r t s , strewing 
them at irregular intervals along the vast reaches 
of geological time . 
The special creation doctrine was related to the supposition that 
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"the majority of species, however created, were "destined to be i n 
tu r n , destroyed - and destroyed by the operation of natural forces. 
The Great A r t i f i c e r could fashion, but he was either unable or 
unwill i n g to protect, the creatures his imagination liad devised. 
When ordinary physical processes were too much for them, sweeping 
them o f f by groups, or eveOj according to one variant of the theory, 
o b l i t e r a t i n g them altogether, he was obliged to s t a r t afresh ..." 
Moreover, "many pri m i t i v e and rather unsuccessful models continued 
to be repeated", though i t also appeared to be the case that the 
Creator tended to introduce more diverse and complicated models. 
Lovejoy continued i n Ilumaan fashion to comment that the Creator 
thus seemed to behave l i k e a lazy and incompetent architect, who 
could do nothing better than to make a fev7 alterations to a single 
conventionalized plan, - a mannerism which had the strange effect 
of reproducing i n some organisms, features which were useless, 
meaningless and even possibly diadvantageous. "F i n a l l y , the Creator 
was supposed to have implanted i n a l l organisms, the senseless habit 
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of mimicking, i n the early stages of the individual's development, 
the form of other and extinct organisms to which that individual 
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bore no r e l a t i o n of kinship". As Lovejoy suggested,the theory was 
extraordinarily i r r e l i g i o u s , i n that " no man outside of a madhouse 
ever behaved, i n such a manner as that in. which, by this hypothesis, 
the Creator of the universe was supposed to have behaved." And i n 
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another write r we may note a statement of a fundamental issue which 
has already been raised i n the course of th i s study; 
the i n d i r e c t and meandering course of evolution, 
as presented i n the f o s s i l record; the starting 
and stopping; the bizarre experimentation; the 
long periods i n which forms of l i f e predominated 
which proved to be f a r from the directions of 
advance; the preseirvation here and there of 
archaic species, above a l l , what must stri k e the 
t i d y mind as the intolerable wastage; none of 
these things could be reconciled with the 
delusion that the human mind can d i r e c t l y and 
f u l l y comprehend the plan of the divine mind 
i n the production of l i v i n g things. 
From the passion with which both proponents of the doctrine 
of special creation and those who supported some version of the 
thesis about transformism defended their theologies, both laying 
claim to a God whose character would have been recognised by Paley, 
i t i s clear enough that something of great importance to believers 
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was at stake. As Chambers asked - why should Sedgwick object to an 
"organic cosmogony" when he himself was prepared to offer a "physical 
cosmogony" d i f f e r e n t from that of Moses? He had offered an hypothesis, 
i n accordance he believed w i t h M i l l ' s proposals i n h i s Logic, to give 
a d i r e c t i o n to s c i e n t i f i c eiiquiry. One must ft»tc. , however,that 
whatever the status of his proposals in r e l a t i o n to s c i e n t i f i c 
enquiry thoseproposals could not be. treated as separable from theology 
either i n his mind or i n the minds of some of his contemporaries. 
Certainly the general public was fascinated by the book, and over 
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twenty-four thousand copies of i t were to be sold. The publication 
performed a great service, whatever -its errors about matters of 
f a c t , since as Exseley commented^the result was that the restric t e d 
professional worlds of science and theology both los t t h e i r a b i l i t y 
to suppress or intimidate public thinking upon the matter. Even the 
eleventh e d i t i o n , the l a s t produced i n Chambers' l i f e t i m e , was sold 
out, though ^fbi^ctA a f t e r the publication of the Origin. 
Chambers' general thesis about transformism or the evolution of 
one species from another received support from diverse sources. F i r s t 
of a l l , one may notice the part played by Herbert Spencer. Spencer 
published i n 1853 an important, though b r i e f essay e n t i t l e d "The 
Development Hypothesis"^'^in which, as he l a t e r maintainedJ^e 
set f o r t h the germ of his whole general system of thought. I n the 
essay, Spencer discussed the question of the conceivability of the 
alternatives of transformism and special creation. He could, he 
thought, show that modification of species, with the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
new species being thus formed was "countenanced by the habitudes 
72 
of every existing organism." Of the Sedgwicks of the world he 
required on the other hand some information about th e i r conception 
of the creation of even one species, l e t alone the m i l l i o n s that 
might have existed. He asked them to explain how a new species was 
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constructed, and how i t made i t s appearance. " I s i t thrown down from 
the clouds? or must we hold to the notion that i t struggles up out 
of the ground? Do i t s limbs and viseiera rush together from a l l the 
points of the compass? or must we receive the old Hebrew idea, that 
God takes clay and moulds a new creature?" Spencer could trace to no 
other source than the Mosaic account of the creation, the convictions 
7A 
of the geologists and physiologists who supported special creation. 
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He knew very well that people were hard put to i t to say why they 
f e l t they had to defend t h i s remnant of the Mosaic account, when 
they rejected other features of the story as absurd, fledawar noted^^ 
that i t i s not clear whether Spencer ever clearly made the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the development of an organism from i t s embryo, 
and "transformism" or "genetic evolution" but at least he also 
helped to get the public used to the idea of "development". He saw 
to i t that believers i n special creation need not be supposed to 
enjoy the whole t r u t h of the matter, and was lat e r to play a useful 
role i n helping Dan^in to ar t i c u l a t e his particular version of 
transformism. 
Secondly, Baden Powell, an Oxford Professor of Geometry wtjo 
was also a theologian, also threw his weight into the scales on 
Chambers' side, p r i n c i p a l l y i n his Essays on the S p i r i t Of the Inductive 
philosophy, the Unity of Worlds, and the Philosophy of Creation ^'^^ 
containing essays w r i t t e n between 1849 and 1855, Powell ably 
summarised some of the principa.1 features of the sciences of his day, 
care f u l l y i d e n t i f y i n g those i n which progress was being made.. The 
pr i n c i p l e of uniformity, an instance of Whewell's ^ thread for a str i n g 
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of pearls, could be viewed sin^jly as "the proper extension of 
inductive analogy and the law of continuity, even i f not yet 
s u f f i c i e n t l y substantiated i n d e t a i l i n each particular instance."''^ 
Powell proposed that "The principles of inductive science apply to 
a l l physical t r u t h and the investigation of a l l physical causes. The 
laws of order, uniformity, and continuity belong to a l l parts of the 
material world; and i n t h i s order and continuity animal l i f e i s 
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included." I t was obvious that i n the physiological sciences there 
were many instances of the adaptation of structure to the ends and 
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purposes of part i c u l a r organisms. I t was no less evident that 
such instances "force themselves on the mind with that peculiar, 
immediate, and i r r e s i s t i b l e kind of effect which i s j u s t l y dwelt 
82 
upon by most xnriters on the subject". For Powell, however, there 
was nothing "exclusive or peculiar i n the study of organised bodies; 
i t involves no essentially characteristic idea d i s t i n c t from other 
branches of physical investigation". Like the other sciences, i t 
tended to refer to "common and high principles of unity and harmony 
83 • 
of plan and design throughout nature". Hence his view of man was 
that i n so far as his animal nature, functions, and i n s t i n c t s were ; 
concernied, "they are linked i n the same chain of continuity with the 
•84- • • • • • J order of other material existences." Powell safeguarded himself from ! 
an obvious c r i t i c i s m by asserting that man's " s p i r i t u a l " nature was i 
wholly independent of material things, and therefore "relieved from 
a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of connexion or c o l l i s i o n , with any physical truths 
85 
or theories." At t h i s stage, having eiq>hasised his interest i n the ; 
unity of the sciences he could cautiously indicate as against S««)l^<>>«»C r ! 
that he thought St, Hilaire's principle of "unity of composition" | 
a "higher" p r i n c i p l e than the teleological principles of Cuvier. He 
was w e l l av7are of the part Cuvier had played i n his opposition to the 
86 
theses of Lamarck and his "school". 
. 8 7 
Powell had come down on Hume's side i n the l a t t e r ' s discussion 
of " e f f i c i e n t cause" as a useless explanatory p r i i i c i p l e yet denied i 
that what Hume had said touched upon the idea of "a supreme moral 
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cause". The t r u l y inductive philosopher recognised "presiding Mind, 
the supreme moral Cause of a l l things, everywhere revealed by the 
same outward manifestations of universal order and harmony; everywhere 
indicated by the same external a t t r i b u t e s , symiaetry, uniformity, 1 
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continuity; and attended by the same ministering agents, invariabla 
laws, and physical causes". He had not learned from Hume what 
90 91 
Newman had learned, f o r Powell c r i t i c i s e d Coleridge for denying the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of any natural theology, but thought he could do better 
than Paley by means of his own argument for there being "evidence 
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and outward manifestation of "INVISIBLE INTELLIGENCE". I n his 
second essay^however, he ruled out any development of that notion 
by means of "the introduction of a s t i l l more metaphysical kind of 
argument deduced from the 'archetype' considered as a revival of the 
Platonic idea of archetypes ex i s t i n g i n the Divine mind". An appeal 
to Cudworth and h i s concepts did not, for him, belong to the 
• •. • 93 , province of "physical philosophy". ' 
His analysis of various alternatives i n theological-cum-
s c i e n t i f i c w r i t i n g currently available, but d i f f e r i n g i n various 
respects from his oxra, inevitably brought him i n the t h i r d essay, to 
a discussion of the issues raised i n Vestiges, located against the 
-v.-..-i.<v.... 54 
background of the controversey between L y e l l and his f ellovT^geologists, 
and picking up his own e a r l i e r point about the value of St. Hilaire's 
principles. To propose a pattern of four great divisions of animal 
l i f e , each vrith a plan of i t s own, had been shown to be a demonstrable 
s c i e n t i f i c position. Attention should be given to a further proposal 
to the effect that w h i l s t adult forms were dissimilar, during fcht 
course of the development of those forms, there was a period during 
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which "an exact community of plan prevails". I t was therefore 
important to consider not only type but "descent", and from there to 
recognise that "within the bounds of observation of the existiiig order 
of things" the characteristics of any one species were not absolutely 
f i x e d , but might eveiv admit of such variatio n , continued for a 
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s u f f i c i e n t length of time, as to lead one to suppose that they 
• •. . • • . 97 
would constitute a new and permanent species. "And so f a r as 
any speculation can be carried on a subject so l i t t l e i understood, 
i t would seem most probable that wherever such permanency has been 
attained, there i s nlvrays some peculiar i t y i n external conditions 
which had been the determining cause for the perpetuation of such 
va r i e t y , j u s t as some other external .conditions of an opposite kind 
are i n other cases unfavourable, and cause i t s declension or 
98 
extinction." Powell repeatedly stressed however, that no-one was i n 
a position to be dogmatically f o r or against the concept of the 
immutability of species, though his own preference was clear. He 
made e x p l i c i t the connection of the theory of "unity of composition" 
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w i t h that of "transmutation" given enough time for change to take 
place, and working w i t h the general maxim that what we do not know 
must r e a l l y be as much under the dominion of law as what we do know. 
Powell's "great Moral Cause", jrhtr^^en , his "omnipresent 
Mind"jWas a theological counterpart of his view of science, that i n 
turn having "uniformity" and appropriate analogies and inductive 
arguments as i t s distinguishing characteristics. 
A r a t i o n a l physico-theology teaches that the 
succession of forms of organised l i f e on the 
globe, up to the f i r s t origination of a l l 
animated nature, were acts of the Divine w i l l , 
wisdom and power, i n precisely the same sense 
as the revolutions of the double stars and 
planets, the daily t i d e , the f a l l of r a i n , 
the ascent of vapour, the action of the sun's 
l i g h t and heat, and a l l other natural phenomena, 
regulated by similar recondite laws, are direct 
and immediate acts of the same Divine w i l l , 
wisdom and power. ^ 
As he was well aware, every step which brought "nature" under the 
domiimtion of "law" was stigmatised as setting up nature instead of 
God "as i f ws could trace Him except through Nature"; - and as 
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r e f e r r i n g everything to mechanical causes instead of the Divine 
w i l l - " as i f the recondite system "of physical causes were not 
103 
the very evidence of that W i l l and that Supreme Wisdom". 
An in t e r e s t i n g point about Povzell's work, apart from the 
calm sense with which he approached both Vestiges and i t s 
detractors, i s that his appreciation of "uniformitarianism" had 
brought about his acceptance of the p o s s i b i l i t y of the transformation 
of species much faster than L y e l l , the great theoretician of 
104 
uniformitarianisra, could be brought to accept i t . This perhaps .is 
not so surprising i n that the overall view of geological change 
which was associated with the l a t t e r ' s name could be associated with 
progressive development by creation as i n Sedgwi"ck's case, or with 
progressive development by transformation as a result of the action 
105 
of natural processes. As Huxley l a t e r remarked, Lyell's problem was 
that he was disposed to account for the origination of a l l past 
and present species of l i v i n g things by natural causes, but that 
"he would have l i k e d , at the same time, to keep the name of creation 
f o r a natural process which he imagined to be incomprehensible." 
And i n general one may say of Powell's ef f o r t s i n his Essays and 
other writings that they may well have helped with Vestiges, to 
f a m i l i a r i s e people with the concept of the transformation of species.^i^Jj 
may especially have helped people to see that i t was no more an 
" i r r e l i g i o u s " concept than that of the immutability of species, and 
indeed that neither were necessarily "religious" concepts. On the 
other hand,as a s c i e n t i s t he did not seem to see that the possible 
relationship between theology and science could be more complex 
than he supposed. He wrote with the assumption that he was required 
to construct a natural theology, and for him at least i t did not 
seem[ possible that there could be another way of contWi>u-t'i''^j 
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L y e l l had turned to geology whilst s t i l l a student at 
Oxford^j^and was at f i r s t taught by Bucklandl^''Strictly as an 
amateur, he was elected to the Geological Society of London i n 
108 
1819. His family's plan for him was that he should become a 
lawyer. But by 1825 he was almost f u l l y committed to geology, 
and one of his e a r l i e s t papers of 1826, included a statement of 
109. 
how he, as a geologist, viewed the "chain of being". I t seemed 
that successive races of d i s t i n c t plants and animals had inhabited 
the earth. Whilst many f o s s i l s vrere referable to species "now 
i n being with the exception of a fm imbedded i n the most recent 
s t r a t a , yet they a l l belong to genera, families, or orders 
established for the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of l i v i n g organic productions. 
They even supply l i n k s i n the chain, without which our knowledge 
of the existing systems would be comparatively imperfect. I t i s 
therefore clear to demonstration, that a l l , at whatever distance of 
time created, are parts of one connected plan." The gradation of 
of beings ascended i n a scale from lowest to highest, culminating 
i n the human frame. Butler's comment that the scheme of things 
was not a fixed but a progressive one could be supposed to mean that 
the succession of various groups of species was perhaps as natural 
as the succession of generations i n a l i v i n g species. Wilson 
110 
proposed that i t was i n Butler's Analogy that L y e l l found his own 
clue as to how to inter p r e t geological change. Uniformity and 
constancy were the fundamental characteristics of the order of 
nature man knew; and the analogy of changes in organic l i f e made 
probable a simular state of existence, i n the past as i n the present 
111 
and the future. 
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When he cams to ^Tirite h i s Principles L y e l l had to comment 
on the views of "catastrophists" such as Davy i n his Consolations 
112 
i n Travel which challenged the assertion of the uniformity of 
physical laws i n the past, as well as dispose of a "re l i g i o u s 
cosmogony". This was riot easy, i n view of the distinguished 
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support f o r the notion offered by Sedgwick, for one. The d i f f i c u l t y 
f o r L y e l l i n the 1830*s,working through his volunes of the Principles 
of Geology, was to assert uniformitarianism, as a s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e , 
but deny that status to the principles of progress, transformism, 
and special creation. He had no r e a l answer to the question of how 
new species came into being to f i l l i n the "gaps" l e f t by the 
ext i n c t i o n of old species, and could only use phrases such as species 
being "called i n t o existence" as an answer. In other resjpects, the 
114 
Principles established, as Wilson noted,'a picture of species, r e a l 
e n t i t i e s , j o s t l i n g one another f o r l i v i n g space on the earth's surface". 
The continued l i f e of a species depended not only on the s t a b i l i t y of 
a set of physical conditions but on a balance i n i t s i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s 
with neighbouring species. In the course of geological time the 
conditions for the maintenftHC-^ . of a species were not necessarily 
sustained, and so species were continually becoming extinct. 
L y e l l found i t necessary i n his early days as Professor of 
Geology at King's College, to do something to repudiate the charge 
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that h i s uniformitarianism tended towards atheism - there had been 
a certain amount of controversy over his appointment vrith the bishops 
responsible for i t . L y e l l argued f o r the independence of geology 
from theology as Henry Crabb Robinson recorded, but made certain that 
his audience understood that t h i s was not necessarily to repudiate 
natural theology.^^Also he made i t clear i n a l e t t e r to Sedgwiclc" i n 
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1838(that those of his .readers who chose to inte r p r e t the. Frinciples 
as suggesting that new species were "coming into being i n the modem 
period were r i g h t to think that t h e i r interpretation coincided with 
Lyell's o\m view — though he could not lay the doctrine down dog-
matically as capable of proof. As he commented to Sedgwick: "You 
w i l l I hope allow that to assume that there have been no nex? 
creations since man appeared i s a t least as 'rash and unphilosophical* 
as modestly to l i m i t the p o s s i b i l i t y of such occurrences, which i s a l l 
you w i l l f i n d I have done." I t was d i f f i c u l t for Sedgwick to i n s i s t 
on creation and progress but to refuse the p o s s i b i l i t y of mammals, 
for example, having been produced after man. 
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However, as Lyell's journals show us, i n private he was 
coming to have doubts about natural theology. One of the papers 
which was important to him here was by A.R. Wallace, "On the Law 
which has regulated the Intro duct j.on of new species", which Wallace 
published i n 1855. The f i r s t journal of 1855 r e f l e c t s Lyell's 
preoccupation with Wallace's statement that "every species has come 
i n t o existence coincident i n both space and time with a pre-existing 
closely a l l i e d species". His discussion of the s c i e n t i f i c problem 
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i s inseparable from his natural theology. So, for exati?)le, he wrote: 
Of innumerable ways i n which Omnipotence might 
f i t a new species to a l l present and future 
conditions of i t s existence, there may be one 
which i s preferable to a l l others, and i f so 
th i s w i l l cause the new species to be i n a l l 
p robability a l l i e d to the pre-existing and 
extinct... or with many co-existing species 
of the same genus. What i s called herie 
necessity may merely mean that i t pleases 
the Author of Nature not simply to ordain 
fi t n e s s , but the greatest fitness, how far 
consideration of mere beauty i n form, of 
endless variety for variety's own sake, may 
enter in t o these laws i s matter for speculation, 
but iiidependently even of such condit. there 
may be a propriety absolutely exceeding a l l other, 
& t h i s may always be chosen and may cause many 
a l l i e d species . 
-- 378 ~ 
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Then i n l a t e A p r i l , 1856, a meeting took place at Darwin's 
» 
home to discuss the species question. I t would seem that Darwin, 
already wcll-knoxm f o r his geological work and for his contributions 
to the bi o l o g i c a l sciences, had deliberately gathered together men 
such as Huxley and Hooker to t r y out his ideas. I n the entries for 
l a t e A p r i l , 1856, and subsequently, Lyell wrote about hi s new 
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perplexities over the "Natural Selection Theory". A conversation 
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with Huxley, Hooker, M i l l and others 5.n London led him to conclude 
"that the b e l i e f i n species as permanent, fixed & invariable, & as 
coTE^rehending individuals descending from single pairs or protplasts 
i n growing f a i n t e r no very clear creed to substitute,^ I n d e f i n i t e 
time & change may, according to Lamarckian views, work such 
alterations as w i l l end i n races, which are as fixed [asj the negro 
for example & unalterable f o r the period of human observat." as are 
any known species such as the I b i s cited Cuvier". 
An important and recurrent question was whether man was to be 
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included i n the same system of change. " I f we include him, the great 
book which the Geologist i s t r y i n g to decypher becomes at once 
i d e n t i f i e d with Natural Theology as well as with Natural History. 
Mind & the soul of ... Man w i l l be found to be a development of the 
i n s t i n c t of Animals? I f so, why deferred so long after the Quadrumana 
and the Elephantine mammalia flourished. Have we gained one step 
towards reconciling us to the alternative i n the l a s t 50 years. I s 
not the dilemma r e a l l y owing to the want of philosophy i n species-
making?" And, i n May of 185^ P"A law of progressive developm.*^ i s 
the only way of reconciling the successive appearance of higher and 
higher beings on the stage, but can any such law evolve the r a t i o n a l 
out of the i r r a t i o n a l . I t i s here tliat the analogy f a i l s . " He 
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commented further that "the i n t e l l e c t of Man 2000 years ago (Socrates, 
A r i s t o t l e , Plato) i s quite equal to that of the 19^^ century." And he 
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wrote out his own statement of a fundamental perplelxity: "The number 
of born i d i o t s , of children born dead, of insane* of the lowest & 
most animal-like of savage races, of infants cut o f f before their 
c a p ability equalled that of the i n s t i n c t of the Elephant or the Dog, 
has probably exceeded a l l the millions of the white races or Asiatics 
of the most c i v i l i z e d eras. The failures have been counted by Mi l l i o n s , 
so e n t i r e l y does Nature subject Man to general laws - Epidemics, 
Earthquakes, Pestilences, Wars are allowed their f u l l sway." Yet 
127 
l i k e Owen, he s t i l l found a t t r a c t i v e the notion of the foreknowledge 
• •. 128 
of the Deity expressed i n what he believed to be Platonic terms: "Our 
conception of the r e a l i t y of specific types may border on the eternity 
of the 'divine ideas' which at certain periods, formed & predetermined, 
became united xfith matter or incarnate, according to Plato." This 
129 
could suggest a more "worthy" concept of creation - God's making of 
"ail o r i g i n a l from which a l l the rest were to be followed and to be 
evolved." 
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By April,1857, he could w r i t e of natural theology that "the 
e f f o r t of the f i n i t e mind to comprehend the i n f i n i t e must give r i s e 
to as many theories or d i f f . * " opinions as d i f f . ^ r eligions. No two 
men, unless t h e i r f a c u l t i e s are equal, can entertain precisely the 
same estimate of the scheme of organic nature, actual & geological -
or no two having equal powers, i f they possess d i f f . * " amounts of 
knowledge of Nature." Perhaps p a r t i c u l a r l y interesting is his 
131 132 
quotation of a l e t t e r of Charlotte BrontS's on a work whi.ch maintained 
dis b e l i e f i n the existence of God and a future l i f e . She had w r i t t e n 
that "The strangest thing i s , that we are called upon to rejoice over 
- 380 -
th i s hopeless blank " to receive t h i s b i t t e r bereavement as great 
gain - to V7elcome t h i s unutterable die sol at ion ... as a state of 
pleasant freedom. Who could do t h i s , i f he would?" This l e t t e r 
included i n a journal discussing various s c i e n t i f i c problems, shows 
what men l i k e L y e l l feared i f they abandoned certain supposedly 
s c i e n t i f i c positions which at the same time proposed a theology to 
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them. L y e l l struggled on and wrote to himself that he ought to 
consider development as a mode of explaining creation, not of getting 
r i d of i t , though thought the writer of Vestiges mistaken i n supposing 
that the i n s t i t u t i o n of general laws was to save trouble and 
intervention. "Let any one be called upon to niake a species to l a s t 
• • - • * 
I a m i l l i o n of yrs, or a geological period & conceive the problem." 
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Aaei he could face the point that "We have never made a step yet without 
having to part with some cherished time-honoured dogmas, without many 
being unsettled & made unhappy, but there i s at least as much belief 
i n a superintending omnipotence & hope i n a future state & as much 
morality as before these new views. Where there i s the grossest 
superstition and ignorance, there i s less morality." 
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Not even Powell's theology enabled Lyell to cope with every 
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problem, however. "There are d i f f i c u l t i e s l i k e the o r i g i n of e v i l , 
mysteries l i k e the gradual passage from rational to i r r a t i o n a l 
surrounding us & ever near to which,- perhaps wisely, we habitually 
shut our eyes. We cannot grapple with them." But he repudiated 
altogether a theology which proposed that "abortion, i n f e r i o r , 
diseased, immoral, stupid, insane creatures are not the result of 
137 . 
laws but of special intervention". And further, " I f we c a l l i n a 
special act of the Creator i n the case of each individual of high 
taoral or i n t e l l e c t u a l endoment, we may find among the offspring of " 
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the same parents, an i d i o t , an insane, an ordinary or stupid individual -
& by t h i s device to take refuge i n some law, to escape a JIanicheistic 
• . 138. • •. theory". 
We may turn to Hooker to f i n d a less agonised approach to the 
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issues at stake. His views were essentially pragmatic. He would 
accept the o r i g i n of species i n variation,rather than the view that 
species were f i x e d , i f i t helped to explain the problems of botanical 
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a f f i n i t y and d i s t r i b u t i o n more successfully. I n 1857 he wrote to 
Asa Gray that "These parsons are so i n the habit of dealing with the 
abstractions of doctriiies as i f there were no d i f f i c u l t y about them 
whatever, so confident, from the practice of having the t a l k a l l to 
themselves f o r an hour at least every week with no one to gainsay a 
syllable they u t t e r , be i t ever so loose or bad, that they gallop 
over the course when t h e i r f i e l d i s Botany or Geology as i f we were 
i n the pews and they i n the p u l p i t . Witness the self-confident style 
of \^hewell and Baden Powell, Sedg^^ick and Buckland". The freedom of 
science from theology (without a serious concern for theology as a 
subject i n i t s own r i g h t ) was to be Hooker's concern f i r s t and foremost, 
and there could be no argument about this related to his a b i l i t i e s or 
his professional standing. His father, Professor of Botany at Glasgow 
i n 1820, had brought up his son to be a botaniist, and the younger 
Hooker had t r a v e l l e d widely. He had followed his father to Kew i n 1841, 
and become assistant Director of the establishment there i n 1855. His 
views of 1857 on natural theology were to be stated i n public when he 
became President of the B r i t i s h Association i n 1868. Natural theology, 
. . . 
he said, was the most dangerous of two-edged weapons - a science, 
f a l s e l y so called, when, not content with t r u s t f u l l y accepting truths 
h o s t i l e to any presmptious standard i t may set up, i t seeks to weijgh 
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the i n f i n i t e i n the balance of the f i n i t e , and s h i f t s i t s ground 
to meet the requirements of every new fact that science establishes, 
and every old error that science exposes. Thus pursued. Natural 
Theology i s to the s c i e n t i f i c man, a delusion, and to the religious 
man a share, leading too often to disordered i n t e l l e c t s and to 
atheism," 
However, there was s t i l l some way to go before Hooker could 
•state his views p u b l i c l y , as compared with the ISSO's. For example, 
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Powell knew and approved of Charles Kingsley's kind of theology. The 
l a t t e r , i n 1842, wrote^*"Study nature - not s c i e n t i f i c a l l y - that 
would take e t e r n i t y , to do i t so as to reap much moral good from i t . 
S uperficial physical science i s the devil's spade^ w i t h which he 
loosens the roots of the trees prepared for the burning. Dp not 
study matter f o r i t s own sake, but as the countenance of God ..." 
Then, i n 1854, one finds a statemeM:^that his theological creed had 
grown slowly and naturally out of his physical one, - " t i l l I have 
seen, and do believe more and more u t t e r l y , that the peculiar 
doctrines of Christianity (as they are i n the Bible, not as some 
preachers represent them from the p u l p i t ) coincide w i t h the l o f t i e s t 
and severest Science." Not surprisingly he could w r i t e i n 1871 that 
"We might accept what Mr. Darwin arid Professor Huxley have w r i t t e n on 
physical science, and yet preserve pur natural theology on exactly 
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the same basis as that i n which Butler and Paley l e f t i t " . That what 
people l i k e Darwin and Huxley i n particular had said could or should 
have made any difference to theological thinking,does not seem to have 
occurred to him, apart from the assistance they had given to the 
147 
elimination of the "master magician" image of God. 
Kingsley, for one, seems to have reli e d a great deal on 
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Tennyson's a r t i c u l a t i o n of f a i t h i n poetry, ~ Tennyson was regarded 
148 
as the champion of science by both Sedgwick and Owen, Whilst at 
Cambridge Tennyson had read something of Hume and Kant; he had 
debated topics such as the o r i g i n of e v i l , and had proposed a version 
149 
of "evolutionary" theory. There i s evidence enough of his interest 
i n science^^and of the part his poetry^played i n f a m i l i a r i s i n g a 
wide public with d i f f e r e n t area of iscientific speculation and 
a r t i c u l a t i n g his own response to i t . Yet as a representative of the 
152 
"Catabridge movement", as Nicolson vrrote, he had a particular 
theological concern* The members of the movement "desired to be 
153 
assured that a l l was r e a l l y f o r the best; they desired to discover 
some compromise which, w h i l s t not outraging t h e i r i n t e l l e c t and 
t h e i r reason, would none the less soothe their conscience and restore 
t h e i r f a i t h - i f not completely, at least s u f f i c i e n t l y to allow them 
to believe i n some ultimate purpose, and more in5)ortant s t i l l , i n l i f e 
a f t e r death". Tennyson oroduced one expression of f a i t h i n 1839, when 
154 
he wrote that "God cannot be cruel. I f He were, the heart could only 
f i n d r e l i e f i n the wildest blasphemies, which would cease to be 
blasphemies. God must be all-powerful, else the soul- could never 
deem him worthy of her highest worship. Let us therefore leave i t to 
God as to the wisest". However, unlike Kingsley. Tennyson did not 
propose a natural theology, f o r his view a natural theology could not 
155 
s a t i s f y man's deepest needs. So i n 1892 he wrote, "Yet God is_ love, 
transcendent, all-pervadingi We do not get t h i s f a i t h from Nature 
or the world. I f we look at Nature alone, f u l l of perfection and 
imperfection, she t e l l s us that God i s disease, murder and rapine. We 
get t h i s f a i t h from ourselves, from what i s highest x*ithin us, which 
recognises there i s not one f r u i t l e s s pang, j u s t as there i s not one' 
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l o s t good." And Jowett's recollections of him were that his 
157 
characteristics included "A strong desire to vindicate the ways of 
God to man, and, perhaps, to demonstrate a pertinaicity on the part 
of man i n demanding of God his r i g h t s " . 
158 
Tennyson could have looked at a copy of John Richardson's 
version i n three volumes (prepared i n 1819 but f i r s t published 
i n 1836), of Kant's Metaphysical Works. Richardson's collection was 
somewhat complicated, i n that i t included translations of Kant's 
Logic and of the Prolegomena i n the f i r s t two volumes, together with 
Richardson's own introductory material. The t h i r d volume contained 
not only Richardson's " C r i t i c a l and metaphysical" enquiry into the 
grounds of proof for the existence of God, ( i n v/hich he stressed his 
understanding of Kant's pr a c t i c a l reason) but also a translation of 
159 
the essay on theodicy. I t looks as though he used the translation 
of 1798 and altered i t s l i g h t l y . He also seems to have familiarised 
himself with the rest of the contents of that pair of volumes, so he 
could inform his readers of his reasons for including the essay on 
theodicy. The theodicy, 
fey a l l the f a i l u r e s of the philosophical essays on i t , 
s u f f i c i e n t l y convinces us, that man, when he attempts 
but to guess at the views of the Almighty i n the 
government of the World, i s i n the dark. He was not 
born to b u i l d everlasting habitations upon t h i s stage 
of vanity. His l i f e has a far nobler aim. How 
b e a u t i f u l l y do a l l devastations, such as those 
occasioned by the destructive effects of tempests, of 
volcanos and of earthquakes, harmonize with t h i s aim,' 
And not only these, but the inconstancy of the v^orld, 
even i n the things which seem to us to be the greatest 
and the niost important, may serve to put us i n mind, that 
the goods of the earth cannot satisfy our i n s t i n c t f o r 
happiness, and that t h i s l i f e , this mere infancy of our 
moral being, i s not the f i n a l issue of a l l our liopes 
and prospects. 
Going on to quote the l a s t sentences of the second book of the 
160 • 
Critique of Practical Reason ,he further commented that i t was upon 
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"the invincible p r a c t i c a l argument" especially .that the required • 
proof of God's existence was f i r m l y established. No obstinate 
i n f i d e l or i n f l e x i b l e sceptic need harbour doubts about the "moral 
existence" of God. God was to be held to be " u t t e r l y incomprehensible" 
ami "inscrutable Supreme Intelligence", who was not only "the Creator 
of the very matter i n i t s e l f , or of the i n t e l l i g i b l e elemental 
substance of nature, the F i r s t Causator and the Ruler of the Uni.verse, 
but the Author of the s p i r i t u a l world, consequently of a l l moral order 
and perfection." I f Tennyson wanted some kind of philosophical 
warrant for his thfeological views, he could have foimd them i n t h i s 
sort of material, though of course he could not derive from Kant any 
authority for demanding of God man's righ t s . 
Apart from Tennyson's possession of t h i s book, i t does not 
seem l i k e l y that many people reaid Kant at f i r s t hand for themselves i n 
the 1850's. Some introductions were available. A.G. Henderson's 1854 
161. 
translation of V. Cousin's work on the philosophy of Kant, included 
not only a good general account of Kant's works by the translator 
himself but clear indications of the contents of many of his essays, 
including the p r e - c r i t i c a l ones, with extensive quotation from them. 
162 
Henderson did not think much of Richardson's translation of the 
Prolegomena, whereas he could recommend Cousin's translation of Kant 
into French, and presumably therefore, his own translation of Cousin 
in t o English. But Henderson made an interesting s l i p when he came to 
163 
l i s t the 1791 essay on theodicy, which he cited as "on the Failure 
of a l l Philosophical Ideas on Theism" - a work i n which Kant "reiterates 
the insufficiency of the speculative proofs for the existence and 
att r i b u t e s of the Deity, contending that the one from morals alone i s 
v a l i d . " Henderson possibly became confused between Kant's actual essay 
386 
and Richardson's discussion of i t . 
To read Kant v i a Cousin, a disciple of Schelling was not be 
164 
illumined about Kant f i r s t and foremost, though a reviewer of some of 
Cousin's work of 1828 thought the l a t t e r ' s xrork was important i n so 
far as i t had re-established i n France some respect f o r religious 
conviclri'f n? . • I t was i i i fact somewhat d i f f i c u l t f o r the English to 
see Kant i n the perspective of European philosophy. For example, 
165 
Lewes' Biographical History of Philosophy of 1852^in one or other of 
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i t s versions.did indeed refer to Kant as to Bayle and others discussed 
i n t h i s study, but with an interest governed by Lewes' association of 
167 168 
logi c with psychology . So Hort suggested i n 1856, that i t was but 
recently, "thanks to Sir W. Hamilton and his friends", that "almost 
the clearest and coldest of i n t e l l e c t s has ceased to appear as an 
enthusiastic dreamer of gorgeous dreams, ignorant of severe logic, and 
despising physical science." Hort was commenting on the picture 
conveyed to the English by M. Cousin and his "English parasites". 
169 
(Sedgwick, f o r one, had been recommending the work of Cousin f o r 
170 
years). Hansel's 1856 lectures on Kant's philosophy were fa r from 
171 
being e n t i r e l y sympathetic to Kant, however. For Hansel* "Kant's 
heart and head led him i n tV7q opposite directions. He worshipped i n 
secret the i d o l which he openly overthrew, and gave but a hal f assent 
to the iconoclasm which he had himse;lf organised." Kant had l a i d 
the foundation f o r a"Philosophy of the Conditioned", but the "ghost 
of the unconditional s t i l l hovered about the spot" where the old 
172 
serpent of metaphysics lay not s l a i n but scotched. And Hansel parodied 
173 
Kant's preferred comfort to suffering v i r t u e : 
My virtuous f r i e n d , I confess that to a l l appearances 
you are very unhappy. But I have before t o l d you that 
you have two d i s t i n c t existences - a phenomenal 
existence, of which you are conscious, and a real 
existence of which you are not conscious. I n the l i f e 
- 387 -
of consciousness, I have already prbved by an 
elaborate argument that you are subject to the 
most r i g i d laws of causation, however much you 
may fancy yourself to be free; but I have also 
shown that the laws of jphenomena do not extend 
to r e a l i t i e s . Take comfort, then, and be 
. assured that though i n your phenomenal existence 
you are, Or fancy yourself to be, a f f l i c t e d with 
a l l the sufferings of Job; yet i n year other character, 
as r e a l i t y , (of which, however, you are never 
conscious, and never w i l l be,) you may, f o r anything 
that you or I know to the contrary, be the very 
happiest pf created beings. 
• 174 
Mansel especially showed i n his 1858 Bampton Lectures, that Butler, 
rather than Kant i n the f i r s t instance, was his philosopher,^ though 
he made some use of Kantian principles. Thus he affirmed a positive 
175 
view of God, seen " i n those relations i n which He has been pleased 
to manifest Himself to his creatures". Such a view would be content 
w i t h regulative ideas of the Deity", "which are s u f f i c i e n t to guide 
176 
our practice, but hot to sa t i s f y our i n t e l l e c t " . His position would 
require him to renounce a l l attempts "to construct a p r i o r i schemes 
of God's Providence as i t ought to be: i t does not seek to reconcile 
t h i s or that phenomenon, whether i n nature or i n revelation, with 
the absolute att r i b u t e s of Deity; but confines i t s e l f to the actual 
course of that Providence, as manifested i n the world; and seeks no 
higher in t e r n a l c r i t e r i o n of the t r u t h of a r e l i g i o n , than may be 
derived from i t s analogy to other parts of the Divine Government." 
177 
Tackling the question of why e v i l should exist at a l l , i n the 
context of a general discussion of Kant's moral and religious philosophy, 
178 
Mansel drew on Leibniz' Theodicy as a source of i l l u s t r a t i v e arguments. 
179 
His comment i n the text on what the notes reveal to be his reading of 
180 
Kant's 1791 essay was: "Against t h i s immovable barrier of the 
existence of e v i l , the waves of philosophy have dashed themselves 
unceasingly si.nce the birthday of human thought, and have r e t i r e d 
broken and powerless, without displacing the minutest fragment of the 
stubborn rock, without softening one feature of i t s dark and rugged 
- 388 
surface." 
Whatever Mansel and his fellow theologians were w r i t i n g and 
think i n g , especially i n th e i r warning not to t r y to reconcile 
natural phenomena with the a t t r i b u t e s of the deity, t h e i r work did 
not inform the minds of the philosophers of nature whose views were 
shortly to become so i n f l u e n t i a l . To take A.R. Wallace f i r s t , one 
181 
finds that he had read Malthus, presimiably the second version of his 
work, i n 1844, when he had j u s t turned twenty-one. Of Malthus he 
182 
wrote: " I t was the f i r s t work i had yet read treating of any of the 
problems of philosophical biology, and i t s main principles remained 
with ine as a permanent possession, and twenty years l a t e r gave the 
the long-sought clue to the effective agent i n the evolution of 
183 
organic species." H.W. Bates, the great entomologist, had encouraged 
Wallace, who had begun work as a surveyor, and was tr y i n g to get a 
post i n teaching, to continue his reading and his e f f o r t s at sel f -
education. I t was to Bates that Wallace confided his approval of . 
184 
the "ingenious hypothesis" propounded by Vestiges. I t was with Bates 
that he went to the Amazon i n 1848. That expedition l a i d the foundation 
185 
of h i s reputation as a s c i e n t i s t , such that when he met Huxley i n 1852 
the l a t t e r was impressed by Wallace's learning and the. b r i l l i a n c e of 
his l e c t u r i n g . 
His 1854 expedition to Halaya'taught him something not simply 
186 
about b u t t e r f l i e s but about man: "The more I see of uncivilised people, 
the better I think of human nature on the whole, and the essential 
differences between c i v i l i s e d and savage man seem to disappear." I t 
187 
was i n 1855, i n Sarawak, that he wrote the a r t i c l e which intrigued 
L y e l l , though i t seems to have made l i t t l e impression i n general. By 
1858 he had produced, quite independently of Darwin, his account of how. 
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the overall thesis of Vestiges was to be preferred to the thesis of 
188 
the special creationists. Wallace's paper which he sent to Darwin, 
"On the tendency of v a r i e t i e s to depart i n d e f i n i t e l y from the 
189 
o r i g i n a l type", included i n i t s earliest pages, the statement that 
"The l i f e of w i l d animals i s a struggle f o r existence. The f u l l 
exertion of a l l t h e i r f a c u l t i e s and a l l t h e i r energies i s required 
to preserve t h e i r own existence and provide for that of their 
•infant offspring. The p o s s i b i l i t y of procuring food during the 
least favourable seasons, and of escaping the attacks of their most 
dangerous enemies, are the primary conditions which determine the 
existence both of individuals and of entire species." The development 
190 
of his theme enabled him to propose that a variety could replace a 
species, "of which i t would be a more perfectly developed and more 
highly organized form." Moreover, " I t would be i n a l l respects 
better adapted to secure i t s safety, and to prolong i t s individual 
existence and that of the race. Such a variety could not return to 
the o r i g i n a l form, for that form i s an i n f e r i o r one, and could never 
compete with i t for existence." Certainly Lamarck was mistaken i n 
191 
his proposal that "progressive changes i n species have been produced 
by the attempts of animals to increase the development of their own 
organs, and thus modify t h e i r structure and habits". Wallace's 
hypothesis of uniformitarianism combined w i t h transformism, was that 
similar results must be produced "by the action of principles 
constantly at work i n nature." So, for example: "The powerful 
r e t r a c t i l e talons of the falcon and the cat tribes have not been 
produced or increased by the v o l i t i o n of these animals; but among 
the d i f f e r e n t v a r i e t i e s which occurred i n the earlier and less highly 
organized forms of these groups, those always survived longest which 
had the greater f a c i l i t i e s for seizing t h e i r prey." 
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192 I n his Darwinism of- 1889, Wallace showed that he f u l l y 
recognised the problem he had raised, however b r i e f l y , i n his 
description of the fundamental character of the natural order 
as he understood i t , although i t had been successful i n providing 
him w i t h his correction of Lamarck and his substantiation of 
193 
Vestiges. I n a section headed "The ethical aspect of the Struggle 
for Existence", he dited Winwood Reade's popular book The Martyrdom 
194 
of iVlan of 1872. Reade had tackled the question of the character 
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of the Creator. He re-stated the old problem, much as Bayle might ' 
have done. " I t i s said that the Creator i s omnipotent, and also that 
he i s benevolent. But one proposition contradicts the other. I t i s 
said that he i s perfect i n power, and that he i s also perfect i n 
p u r i t y . " Reade's parable ran : 
The conduct of a father towards his c h i l d appears 
to be cruel, but i t i s not cruel i n r e a l i t y . He 
beats the c h i l d , but he does i t for the child's own 
good; he i s not omnipotent; he i s therefore obliged 
to choose between two e v i l s . But the Creator i s 
omnipotent; he therefore chooses cruelty as a means 
of education or development; he therefore has a 
preference f o r cruelty or he would not choose i t ; 
he i s therefore fond of cruelty or he would not 
prefer i t ; he i s therefore cruel, which i s absurd. 
197 
The theory that God i s Love i s " i l l u s i v e " . And Reade found i t to be 
i l l u s i v e because of his reading of "the Book of Nature, that book 
inscribed i n blood and tears", - for " i t i s when we study the laws 
regulating l i f e , the laws productive of development" that we see' the 
f a l s i t y of the theory. " I n a l l things there i s cruel, p r o f l i g a t e and 
abandoned waste. Of a l l the animals that are born a few only can 
survive; and i t i s owing to t h i s law that development takes place. 
The law of Murder i s the law .of Growth, L i f e i s one long tragedy; 
198 
creation i s one great crime." And to come to the passage to which 
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Wallace was to address himself: 
Pain, g r i e f , disease and death, are these the 
inventions of a loving God? That ho animals 
shall r i s e to excellence except by being f a t a l 
to the l i f e of others, i s t h i s the law of a kind 
Creator? I t i s useless to say that pain has i t s 
benevolence, that massacre has i t s mercy. Why 
i s i t so ordained that bad should be the raw 
material of good? Pain i s not less pain because 
i t i s useful; murder i s not less murder because 
i t i s conducive to development. There i s blood 
upon the hand s t i l l , and a l l the perfumes of 
Arabia m i l not sweeten i t . 
Heade suggested an alternative to the "Deus Paleyensis" which i s not 
the concern here, and i n any case i t did not commend i t s e l f to 
Wallace. The l a t t e r held to an overall optimism expressed i n the 
199 
assertion that the struggle f o r existence did not e n t a i l misery 
and pain, but rather "the maximum of l i f e and of the enjoyment of 
l i f e w ith the minimum of suffering and pain." For him, i t was 
d i f f i c u l t "even to imagine a system by which a greater balance of 
happiness could have been secured." 
Wallace's optimism lead him to a religious position which was 
to be a considerable embarassment to his s c i e n t i f i c colleagues, as 
200 
to some of his fellow-believers. He embraced spiritualism because 
i t seemed to him to provide a " s c i e n t i f i c " , i.e. empirically based^ 
explanation of the development of man's moral nature, which could 
be taken in t o the uniform la\*-bound pattern of explanation which he had 
201 202 
adopted. As F.M. Turner wrote of Wallace's book. The World of L i f e 
of 1910, i t was a " s p i r i t u a l i s t theodicy", for i n i t , Wallace asserted 
that i t was through the medium of "lesser s p i r i t u a l intelligence* that 
the guiding mind of the universe employed the cruelty and pain of 
earthly existence i n the moral purpose of aiding man's evolution into 
a s p i r i t u a l creature." The notion of the world being a process f o r 
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promoting, the development of mind from matter had been employed 
before, but i t was the t h e i s t i c and ' ' s p i r i t u a l i s t i c " version of 
i t he developed which lead Wallace to part company with Darwin 
203 
and his friends a f t e r 1869. 
The question was whether natural selection could account 
fo r mian's moral and mental nature, or indeed for certain features 
of the human body. From v^hat Wallace supposed to be the implication 
204 
of s p i r i t u a l i s t phenomena, he invoked "an Overruling Intelligence" 
which had watched oyer the action of the laws directing variations, 
so determining the accumulations of certain variations, "as f i n a l l y 
to produce an organisation s u f f i c i e n t l y perfect to admit of, and even 
to aid i n , the i n d e f i n i t e advancement of our mental and moral nature." 
I t seemed to Wallace , 
i n the highest degree improbable that so many 
points of structure, a l l tending to favour his 
mental development, should concern man alone of 
a l l animals. I f the erect posture, the freedom 
of the anterior limbs from purposes of locomotion, 
the powerful and opposable thumb, the naked skin, 
the great symmetry of form, the perfect organ5 
of speech and, i n his mental fac u l t i e s , calculation 
of numbers, ideas of symmetry, of j u s t i c e , of 
abstract reasoning, of the i n f i n i t e , of a future 
state, and many others, cannot be shown to be each 
and a l l useful to man i n the very lowest state of 
c i v i l i z a t i o n ~ how are we to explain t h e i r 
co-existence i n him alone of the whole series of 
organized beings? 
These were Paley's questions re-phrased, which Darwin was hard put to 
i t to begin even to attempt to answer. Wallace's optimism was that 
of the w r i t e r of Vestiges, and a theism bolstered up by spiritualism, 
was to be an i n f u r i a t i n g exposition of "darwinism" to Darwin and his 
other supporters. • Wallace's exposition of Darwinism i n i t s e l f was 
invaluable, because of i t s c l a r i t y , and because, after a l l , he was oxie 
of the two o r i g i n a l propounders of i t i n a coherent and convi.ncing fornj. 
I t was the-refore to be a l l the more embarrassing that his "Concluding 
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205 Remarks" should include the statement that "we, who accept the 
existence of a s p i r i t u a l world, can look upon the universe as a 
grand consistent whole adapted i n a l l i t s parts to the development 
of s p i r i t u a l beings capable of in d e f i n i t e l i f e and p e r f e c t i b i l i t y " . 
He helped to oust special creation, and yet developed a theism 
which depended on the invocation of "an adequate cause" in'the 
206 
unseen universe pf S p i r i t " . However, the r i f t w i th Darwin on 
theology was some way away from the occasion on which Wallace's 
paper, and that of Darwin, were read at a meeting of the Linn««-n 
Society i n 1858.^ 
We may now consider how Darwin came to make a contribution 
at that meeting, and the reaction to the publication of' the Origin. 
207 
King-Helei has made out a convincing case that Charles Darwin's version 
of evolutionary theory was a family a f f a i r . ^\fhether Charles ever 
f u l l y gave the credit that was due to his grandfather Erasmus, is 
208 
somewhat debatable, but certainly the topics of the Zoohomia.reappear 
209 
i n the Origin. Charles Darwin had re-read the Zoohomia and made 
notes on i t i n 1837~8, after his return from his voyage on the 
210 
Beagle. An undistinguished career as an undergraduate at Cambridge, 
wit h Paley and Euclid as the most significant influences i n the 
211 
shaping of his mind had at least provided him x^ith some introduction 
212 
to natural science. As a r e s u l t he had begun to do some work with 
213 
Sedgwick, and then the greatest stroke of good fortune enabled him 
to j o i n the Beagle expedition, on which he took L y e l l ' ^ Prihciples 
of Geology to read. His record of what he saw included a few 
214 
interp r e t a t i v e comments. For example/'One day I observed a cormorant 
playing with a f i s h which i t had caught. Eight times successively the 
bi r d l e t i t s prey go, then dived after i t , and although i n deep water. 
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brought i t each time to the surface. In the Zoological Gardens 
I have seen the o t t e r t r e a t a f i s h i n the same manner, much as 
a cat does a mouse: I do not know of any other instance where 
dame Nature appears so w i l f u l l y cruel". This remark begiiis to 
reveal the difference between his view of nature and that of 
Wallace* Also, one may cotapare Wallace's view of "savages" 
215 
w i t h Darwin's view of the Fuegians. . ^ ' I could not have believed how 
wide was the difference between savage, and c i v i l i z e d man: i t i s 
greater than between a wild and domesticated animal, i n as much as 
i n man there i s a greater power of improvement". And, "One of our 
arms being bared, they expressed the l i v e l i e s t surprise and 
admiration at i t s whiteness, j u s t i n the same way i n which I have seen 
— 216 the ouran^utang do at the Zoological gardens." 
His voyage was invaluable to him. He wrote i n the conclusion 
217 
of his journal that i t appeared to him 
that nothing can be more improving to a young 
n a t u r a l i s t , than a journey i n distant countries. 
I t both sharpens, and p a r t l y allays that want and 
craving, which, as Sir J. Herschel remarks, a man 
experiences although every corporeal sense be 
f u l l y s a t i s f i e d . The excitement from the novelty 
of objects, and the chance of success, stimulate 
him to increased a c t i v i t y . Moreover, as a number 
of isolated facts soon become uninteresting, the 
habit of comparison leads to a generalization. 
On the other hand, as the t r a v e l l e r stays but a 
short time i n each place, his descriptions must 
generally consist of mere sketches, instead of 
detailed observations. Hence arises, as I have 
found to my cost, a constant tendency to f i l l up 
the wide gaps of knowledge, by - inaccurate and 
sup e r f i c i a l hypotheses . 
Darwin was notoinfluenced primarily by L y e l l , as his record of his 
218 
travels exhibits. Like L y e l l , he saw no need to adopt the hypothesis 
of transformism, though vague doubts about the permanence of species 
219 
occasionally f l i t t e d across his mina. "On my return home i n the autumn 
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of 1836, I immediately began to prepare liiy Journal f o r publication, 
and then saw how many facta indicated the common descent of species, 
so that i n July, 1837, I opened a note-book to record any facts 
which might bear on the question. But I did not become convinced 
that species were mutable u n t i l , I think, two or three years had 
elapsed". As i n the case of Wallace, a reading of Maithus helped 
220 221 him on his way. His 1842 sketch of the conclusions to which he 
came, and his essay of 1844, were re.garded by him as essential stages 
towards his eventual production of the Origin. He not only 
straightened out his own idea, but could then select, as he said, 
the most s t r i k i n g facts and i l l u s t r a t i o n s to suit i t . 
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At the end Of the 1842 sketch he could conclude that "specific 
forms are not immutable". Moreover, the " a f f i n i t y of d i f f e r e n t 
groups, the unity of types of structure, the representative forms 
through which foetus passes, the metamorphosis of organs, the abortion 
of others cease to be metaphorical expressions and become i n t e l l i g i b l e 
f a c t s . " The study of animal i n s t i n c t of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of animals, 
of geology, a l l gained i f the hypothesis of transformism, rather than 
that of special creation correlated with f i x i t y of species were assumed. 
Like Vestiges, Darwin supposed that " I t accords with what we know of 
the law impressed on matter by the Creator, that the creation and 
extinction of forms, l i k e the b i r t h and death of individuals should 
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be the effect of secondary ... means". Unlike Kingsley, who thought 
he discerned a supremely imaginative mind as the "cause" of polypes, 
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Darwin thought i t "derogatory that the Creator of countless systems 
of worlds should have created each of the myriads of creeping parasites 
and ... worms vrhich have swarmed each day of l i f e on lahd and water on 
... one globe". For Darwin, as for Vestiges, his thesis seemed to 
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226 ease the problem of physical pain: 
We cease being astonished, h9wever much we may 
deplore that a group of animais should have been 
d i r e c t l y created to lay t h e i r eggs i n bowels 
and flesh of other - that some organisms should 
delight i n cruelty - that other animals should be 
led away by false i n s t i n c t s - that annually there 
should be an incalculable waste of eggs and 
pollen. From death, famine, rapine, and the 
concealed war of nature we can see that the 
highest good, which we can conceive, the creation 
of the higher animals has d i r e c t l y come. 
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The conclusions of the second version of 1844, (the essay was nearly 
four times as long as the f i r s t sketch) included the same points. 
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Both outlines concluded with a version of the paragraph which was to 
end the Origin : , 
There i s a ... grandeur i n t h i s view of l i f e with 
i t s several: powers of growth, reproduction and of 
sensation having been o r i g i n a l l y breathed into 
matter under a few forms, perhaps int o only one, 
and that whilst t h i s planet has gone cycling 
onwards according to the fixed laws of gravity 
and whilst land and water have gone on.replacing 
each other - that from so simple an o r i g i n , through 
the selection of i n f i n i t e s i m a l v arieties, endless 
forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been 
evolved. 
The question was, could he bring himself to publish his ideas? 
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So i n a t e t t e r to Hooker i n 1853, he said^"Lamarck i s the only 
exception that I can think of, of an accurate describer of species, 
but he i n his absurd though clever work has done the subject harm, 
as has Mr. Vestiges, and, as (some future loose naturalist attempting 
the same speculation w i l l perhaps say) has Mr. D...." The immediate 
prodding came with the a r r i v a l of Wallace's essay, vrhich shook him 
in t o the r e a l i s a t i o n that unless he published his work f a i r l y quickly, 
230 
his labours would be f r u i t l e s s . L y e l l and Hooker betvreen them thought 
up an acceptable way of allowing both men to receive the credit they 
deserved fo r t h e i r work, and both papers were read at a meeting of tjie 
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Linnean Society i n July 1858. Darwin'a paper was but half the 
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length of Wallace's, but i t s t i t l e was sign i f i c a n t . "On the 
va r i a t i o n of organic beings i n a state of nature. On the natural 
means of selection; on the comparison of domestic races and true 
species." His opening sentence declared i n defiance of Paley that 
" a l l nature i s at war, one organism vjith another, or with external 
nature. Seeing the contented face of nature, t h i s may at f i r s t 
w e l l be doubted; but r e f l e c t i o n w i l l inevitably prove i t to be true. 
The war, however, i s not constant, but recurrent i n a s l i g h t degree 
at short periods, and more severely at occasional most (distant 
periods; and hence i t s effects are easily overlooked; I t i s the 
doctrine of Malthus applied i n most cases with tenfold force." 
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"Natural selection" was an analogy taken from the domestic breeding 
of animals and plants and meant simply the preservation of those 
individuals, "whether i n t h e i r egg, or l a r v a l , or mature state, which 
are best adapted to the place they f i l l i n nature." 
Odd as i t now seems, there was l i t t l e discussion of the papers 
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at the meeting i t s e l f , p a r t l y because there were other papers to 
read, and p a r t l y because the president of the meeting was hostile 
to the suggestions made i n the papers. Darwin himself was now i i i a 
strange position. I n a Paleyan Ctod he could no longer believe. Yet 
he had Once had, what one might describe as a "religious" view of l i f e 
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as expressed i n his 183? notebook. " I f we choose to l e t conjectures 
run w i l d , then animals, our fellow brethren i n pain, disease, death, 
suffering and faimine - our slaves i n the most laborious works, our 
companions i n our amusements - they may partake ... our o r i g i n i n 
one common ancestor — we may be a l l melted together." But belief for 
him as for Reade came to be v i r t u a l l y impossible because of his view of 
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235 what nature was l i k e . "What a book a devil's chaplain might write 
on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering^ low, and hor r i b l y cruel works 
of natureI"Darwin's c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r tackling theological questions 
could be summed up i n his own words. " I am i n thick mud; the 
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orthodox would say i n f e t i d , abominable mud." Yet he had to complete 
the "conversion" of L y c l l to his own oddly t h e i s t i c hypothesis. 
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Lyell's capitulatibn took some time. In 1860 he reflected that i f one 
ascribes progress to Natural Selection, 
we simply defy that Power & i t no longer bears any 
true analogy to the selection which the Breeder 
exercises i n choosing or rejecting varieties offered 
to him by Nature or by the variety - creating Power. 
I t becomes the union of a secondary Law with the 
divine F i r s t Cause - by which that law has been 
i n s t i t u t e d . I t i s to confound the working of a 
secondary cause, the operation of which we can 
analyse and observe, with phenomena, which We can only 
refer to the divine F i r s t Cause by which the Universe 
. was made. 
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L y e l l had a point i n his remarks about the " d e i f i c a t i o n of Natural 
Selection, and would not have his divine architect "confounded i n 
his functions w i t h ... the humble of f i c e of the most sagacious of 
breeders." And quite r i g h t l y , L y e l l saw that the question of the 
existence of e v i l , and "of the power as the Manicheans have i t , of 
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another Cause capable of marring the creation", remained a d i f f i c u l t y 
f o r believers i n progressive development as for the non-believers. 
Eventually L y e l l came round only because he came to think that Darwin's 
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hypothesis was the more "probable" of the alternative philosophies of 
nature. 
Darwin was well served by his friends, especially by Wallace, 
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who consistently gave Darwin the credit f o r his book. Herbert Spencer 
also threw his weight into the scales by providing the phrase "the 
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survival of the f i t t e s t " as an explanatory alternative to "natural 
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selection". I n essence, the phrase the survival of the f i t t e s t 
need have meant no more than what .survived, though i t x*as easily 
mis-read to mean that what survived, survived because i t was 
f i t t e s t to f u l f i l a good purpose; i t survived because i t was best 
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adapted to a good end. The ambiguity of the langiiage and indeed 
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of the f u l l t i t l e of the Origin, which was not about the o r i g i n of species 
precisely i f " o r i g i n " meant "creation", but about t h e i r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
and development, exhibited Darwin's theological problem. I n his 
t i t l e , the words "the o r i g i n of species" lay i n r e l a t i o n to "by 
means of natural selection or the preservation of favoured races 
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i n the struggle for l i f e . " So Darwin described selection as "unconscious", 
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as a "predominant Power"; a power moreover, "incessantly ready for 
action," and as immeasurably superior to man's feeble efforts "as 
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the works of Nature are to those of Art". 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s , one may consider the classic example 
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from Paley which he chose to tackle - that of the" eye: " I remember 
w e l l the time when the thought of the eye made me cold a l l over, but 
I have got over t h i s stage of the complaint, and now small t r i f l i n g 
p a r ticulars of structure often make me very uncomfortable. The sight 
of a feather i n a peacock's t a i l , whenever I gaze at i t , makes me 
s i c k l " Darwin had coped with the i n i t i a l stage of shuddering over 
the problem, but a revealing passage i n the Origin shows only too 
c l e a r l y that God had become a divine stockbreeder, and that Darwin 
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could not quite shake himself free of design theology: 
I t i s scarcely possible to avoid comparing the 
eye v/ith a telescope. We know that t h i s 
instrument has been perfected by the long-continued 
e f f o r t s of the highest human i n t e l l e c t s ; and we 
naturally infer that the eye has been formed by a 
somewhat analogous process. But may not t h i s 
inference be presumptous? Have we any r i g h t to 
assume that the Creator works by i n t e l l e c t u a l 
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powers l i k e those of man? I f we must compare 
the eye to an optical instruioaent, we ought i n 
imagination to take a thick layetf of transparent 
tissue, with spaces f i l l e d with f l u i d , and with 
a nerve sensitive to l i g h t beneath, and then 
suppose every part of t h i s layer to be continually 
changing slowly i n density, so as to separate into 
layers of d i f f e r e n t densities arid thicknesses, 
placed at d i f f e r e n t distances from each other, and 
with the surface of each layer slox^ly changing i n 
form. Further we must suppose that there i s a 
power represented by natural selection or the 
survival of the f i t t e s t , always i n t e n t l y watching 
each s l i g h t a l t e r a t i o n i n the transparent layers; 
and car e f u l l y preserving each which, under varied 
circumstances, i n any way or i n any degree, teiids 
to produce a d i s t i n c t e r image. We must suppose 
each new state of the instrument to be multiplied 
by the m i l l i o n ; each to be preserved u n t i l a 
better one i s produced, and then the old ones to 
be destroyed. In l i v i n g bodies variation w i l l 
cause the s l i g h t alterations, generation w i l l 
multiply them almost i n f i n i t e l y , and natural , 
selection w i l l pick out w i t h unerring s k i l l each 
improvement. Let t h i s process go on f o r millions 
of years; and during each year on millions of 
individuals of many kinds; and may we not believe 
that a l i v i n g o p t i c a l instrument might then be 
formed as superior to one of glass as the works of " 
the Creator are to those of man? 
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What Willey has described as Darwin's "metaphysical unawareness" led 
him to make t h i s sort of blunder without noticing what he was doing. 
He wanted "naturalism" but could not cope with his habits of t h e i s t i c 
thinking nor employ them as Wallace employed them. 
Darwin was soon able to i d e n t i f y his s c i e n t i f i c and theological 
enemies. As expected, there was Sedgwick, ^ ^^ ^ laughed at parts of 
the Origin " t i l l my sides were almost sore", but also found parts of 
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i t "grievously mischievous", by which he meant that i t was "the 
system of the author of the Vestiges stripped of his ignorant 
absurdities. I t repudiates a l l reasoning from f i n a l causes; and seems 
to shut the door upon any view (however feeble) of the God of Nature 
as manifested i n His works. From f i r s t to last i t i s a dish of rank 
materialism cleverly cooked and served up." Sedgwick, i n his seventies, 
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was far less dangerous,- however, than Ox^ ren, who not only:wrote a 
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clever and damaging review of the Origin, but also primed 
Wiiberforce f o r his appearance at the meeting of the B r i t i s h 
Association at Oxford i n 1860. I t i s Wilberforce's attack on Darwin 
which exemplifies the kind of passionate discussion which could 
s t i l l take place, i n public, on a debateable issue. The attack 
also perhaps helps to explain Darwin's much c r i t i c i s e d reluctance 
to draw too much attention to his predecessors, especially to his 
own grandfather's work. 
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The Quarterly Review printed Wilberforce's analysis of 
the Origin and what he took to be i t s implications. "To f i n d that 
mosses, grasses, turnips, oaks, worms and f l i e s , mites and elephants, 
infusoria and whales, tadpoles and men, are a l l equally the l i n e a l 
descendants of the same aboriginal common ancestor, perhaps of the 
nucleated c e l l of some primaeval fungus, which alone possessed the 
distinguishing honour of being the 'one primordial form into which 
l i f e was f i r s t breathed by the Creator' - t h i s , to say the least of i t , 
i s no common discovery - no very expected conclusion."^^^ Charles 
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was d i r e c t l y compared ' w ith his grandfather, who had, according 
to Wiiberforce, treated the subject with more wit than his grandson 
i n the Botanic Garden : Upon the Darwin family's view of things i t 
would appear probable that 
the f i r s t e f f o r t s of Nature terminated i n the 
production of vegetables, and that these, being 
abandoned to t h e i r oxm energies ... by degrees 
detached themselves from the surface of the 
earth, and supplied themselves with v/ings and 
feet, according as th e i r d i f f e r e n t propensities 
determined them i n favour of aerial and t e r r -
e s t r i a l existence; and thus, by an inherent 
disposition to society and c i v i l i s a t i o n , and by 
a stronger e f f o r t of v o l i t i o n , became men. 
These i n the xrorld r e s t r i c t thetaselves to the 
use of th e i r hind feet : their t a i l s would 
402 -
.gradually rub o f f .by s i t t i n g i n their.caves . 
and huts as soon as they arrived at a 
domesticated state. 
Wilberforce had not seen the point of what Darwin had said about 
natural selection, but was r i g h t to think that Darwin's views 
tended "to banish from the mind most of the peculiar attributes 
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of the Almighty", since f o r Wilberforcc, as for Sedgwick and 
Owen, creation was that "tran s c r i p t i n matter" of ideas eternally 
existing i n God's miiid. 
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Wilberforce's lead was to be followed for years to come, 
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though not by a l l theologians, many of whom vrere i n any case 
absorbed by the controversy caused by the publication of Essays 
and Reviews. Chambers might well f i n d i t a cause for laughter 
that "the layman had universally treated the controversy on the 
Essays and Reviews as a merely professional subject, and had not 
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joined i n i t but had l e f t i t to the clergy." Vestiges and the 
Origin both captured the imagination and interest of the public 
at large. But the Origin needed a champion, and the author, 
a i l i n g and l i v i n g i n seclusion could not play the r o l e . I t f e l l 
to T.H. Huxley to j o i n b a t t l e on Darwin's behalf. 
Huxley had begun his i n t e l l e c t u a l adventures whilst s t i l l a 
c h i l d , a f t e r a b r i e f period of schooling. He read Hutton's work 
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on geology, William Hamilton on l o g i c , Hume on history. "Law, 
D i v i n i t y , Physic, and P o l i t i c s being i n a state of chaotic vibration 
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between u t t e r humbug and utter scepticism" science i n general, and 
medicine and anatomy i n p a r t i c u l a r , alone gave him scope for his 
energies and a b i l i t i e s . His own opportunity came with the voyage of 
Rattlesnake, immediately after the publication of the Vestiges. 
(For him, as for Hooker, his expeditions did not provoke him to 
wr i t e a new philosophy of nature.) On his own admission , he wrote 
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on his return a needlessly savage review^^'^ of the Vestiges?^^ 
"Wliat then i s the real proposition of the 'Vestiges'? I t i s 
simply, exhibited i n a l l i t s naked crudeness, the beli e f that 
a law i s an e n t i t y - a Logos intermediate between the Creator 
and his works - which i s entertained by the Vestigian i n common 
with the great mass of those who, l i k e himself, indulge i n science 
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at second-hand and dispense t o t a l l y with logic." One finds i n 
the review an indication that there might be some fundamental 
principles of thought of which one should take account i n the 
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discussion of nature. Huxley continued to point out that 
"creation i n the manner of law"' was not i n any circumstances to 
be confused with the principles of Lyell's uniformitarianism. I f 
we do admit Lyell's p r i n c i p l e s , he wrote, "we do not render those 
changes either more or less wonderful than they were before - nor 
do we i n any way account f o r them - we merely state them i n a readily 
conceivable way." The phrase "natural laws" was to be understood 
simply as "an epitome of the observed history of the phenomena of 
the universe". Huxley shared Powell's opinion, f o r "to assert that 
the Creator, from whom these phenomena proceeded, xjorked i n the manner 
of natural law and th a t , therefore, there i s no scope for wonder, i s 
as i f one should say that, i n ancient Greece, he worked i n the 
manner of Grote's History, and th a t , therefore, there i s nothing 
remarkable i n Greek c i v i l i z a t i o n - that i s to say the phrase i s 
simply ridiculous and unmeaning." 
In the early 1850's Huxley did not see that "progress" had 
any foundation i n the facts of palaeontology, and i n an essay of 
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1856^"On Natural History as Knowledge, Discipline and Power" he 
could both advocate science, and write of i t i n r e l a t i o n to theology 
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i n a manner which was not unlike Sedgwick's. "The value of any 
pursuit depends upon the extent to which i t f u l f i l s one or a l l of 
three conditions. Either i t enlarges our experience; or i t 
increases our strenght; or i t diminishes the obstacles i n the way 
of our acquiring experience a;nd strength. Wliatever neither teaches, 
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nor strengthens, nor helps us, i s either useless or mischievous." 
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And with attention to natural history as knowledge he commented: 
"Thus i n t r a v e l l i n g from one end to the other of the scale of l i f e , 
we are taught one lesson, that l i v i n g nature i s not a mechanism but 
a poem; not a mere rough engine-hbuse for the due keeping of pleasure 
and pain machines, but a palace whose foundations, indeed, are l a i d 
on the s t r i c t e s t and safest mechanical principles, but whose 
superstructure i s a manifestation of the highest and noblest a r t . " 
This, Huxley said was "the p l a i n teaching of Nature." He believed 
we had a r i g h t to "conclude from the marks of benevolent design" 
that there existed an " i n f i n i t e I n t e l l e c t and Benevolence, i n some 
sort similar to our.own". He f e l t similalrly bound to conclude that 
"the aesthetic f a c u l t i e s of the human soul have also been foreshadowed 
i n the I n f i n i t e Mind." 
Huxley's s e n s i t i v i t y to r e l i g i o n , never l e f t him, but i t 
developed alongside his c r i t i c a l a b i l i t i e s , so that he never f e l t 
the bafflement and bewilderment of Darwin wiien t r y i n g to tackle a 
r e l i g i o u s issue. Huxley was well aware of the contribution made by 
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Leibniz - to the development of modern science, but i t was not i n 
Leibniz, but i n the v/ritings of Kant, that he seems to have found a 
way of thinking i n a re l i g i o u s vein about nature, even though he 
repudiated the confusion of s c i e n t i f i c and theological principles 
which he saw exhibited i n Vestiges. Huxley had one priceless advantage 
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over most of h i s contemporaries when tackling Kant, i n that 
he could read the l a t t e r ' s work i n the o r i g i n a l . He was probably 
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the f i r s t English s c i e n t i s t who could read and understand Kant's 
Universal Natural History without benefit of a translation. An 
essay of 1887 records his reflections on t h i s essay and exhibits 
Huxley's a b i l i t y to appreciate a.religious viewpoint. Kant seemed 
to him to have a depth and profundity of mind fa r superior to that 
offered by the supposed defenders of r e l i g i o n i n the controversy 
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over the Origin. So Huxley wrote that 
i f imagination i s used wi t h i n the l i m i t s l a i d 
down by science disorder i s unimaginable. I f 
a being endowed with perfect i n t e l l e c t u a l and 
aesthetic f a c u l t i e s , but devoid of the capacity . 
for suffering pain, either physical or moral, 
were to devote his utmost powers to the 
investigation of naiture, the universe would seem 
to him to be a sort of kaleidoscope, i n which, 
at every successive moment of time, a new 
arrangement of parts of exquisite beauty and 
symmetry would present i t s e l f ; and each of them 
wovild show i t s e l f to be the logical consequence 
of the preceding arrangement, under the 
conditions we c a l l the laws of nature. Such a 
spectator might well be f i l l e d with that Amor 
i n t e l l e c t u a l i s Dei, the b e a t i f i c vision of the 
v i t a contemplativft, which some of the greatest 
thinkers of a l l ages, A r i s t o t l e , Aquinas, Spinoza, 
have regarded as the only conceivable eternal 
f e l i c i t y ; and the vision of i l l i m i t a b l e sufferings, 
as i f sensitive beings were unregarded animalcules 
which had got between the b i t s of glass of the 
kaleidoscope, which mars the prospect to us poor 
mortals, i n no wise alters the fact that order i s 
lord of a l l , and disorder only a name for that part 
of the order which gives us pain. 
I t does not seem that Huxley realised that Kant was r e f l e c t i n g 
i n his turn on Leibniz' work put at least such a passage shows that he 
was not a dogmatic hater of r e l i g i o n and of religious b e l i e f s , merely 
because he had the good sense to oppose Wiiberforce and anyone else 
who refused to discuss the issues raised by the publications of the 
Origin with a perceptive attentiveness, and i n a s p i r i t of r a t i o n a l 
consideration. " I f I am doing my best to rouse my countrymen out 
406 -
of t h e i r dogmatic slumbers, i t i s not that they may be amused.by 
seeing who gets the best of i t i n a contest betv^een a 'sci e n t i s t ' 
and a theologian. The serious question i s whether theological 
men of science, or theological special pleaders are to have the 
confidence of the general public".^'^^ Obviously, Huxley himself 
may be seen as a theologically minded man of science, which i s not 
to say that he confused his theology with his science proper. The 
other philosopher important to him was Hume. He thought for years of 
publishing a book about him, and managed to produce i t for 1879. 
The book was not a t r i v i a l exercise to display Huxley's range of 
a b i l i t i e s to the general public. I t was i n part his statement of, 
why he had fought for Darwin i n par t i c u l a r , and for l i b e r t y of 
discussion i n general. I t may be read as an exposition of the 
reasons why Hooker was r i g h t to i n s i s t that science as such should 
be kept free from control by theology, though unlilcc Hooker, Huxley 
wanted to take genuine theology seriously, as seriously as he took 
good science. 
I n Hume, Huxley tackliad a. range of philosophical and theological 
questions, but one should look to his chapter on "The object and 
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scope of philosophy" f o r information about his philosophical.stance 
i n r e l a t i o n to the practice of science. He opened his chapter v^ith ' 
Kant's three questions, "What can I know? What ought I to do? and For 
what may I hope?" The three resolved themselves into the f i r s t . "For 
ra t i o n a l expectation and moral action are alik e based upon b e l i e f s ; and 
a be l i e f i s void of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , unless i t s subject matter l i e s 
w i t h i n the boundaries of possible knowledge, and unless i t s evidence 
s a t i s f i e s the conditions which experience imposes as the guarantee of 
c r e d i b i l i t y . " A study of Hume's work, followed by that of Kant's f i r s t 
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c r i t i q u e , d i f f e r e n t though t h e i r respective criticisms were ^ 
i n d e t a i l , coincided i n t h e i r main r-esult^ "which i s the l i m i t a t i o n 
of a l l knowledge of r e a l i t y to the world of phenomena revealed to 
us by experience." Huxley regarded these two philosophers, though 
especially Hume, as exhibiting.his own stance, which he described 
as "agnosticism". The agnostic professed "an incapacity to discover 
the indispensable conditions of either positive or negative knowledge, 
i n many propositions, respecting which, not only the vulgar, but 
philosophers of the more sanguine sort, revel i n the luxury of 
unqualified assurance." Moreover, agnosticism was not merely a "creed" 
but a method, the operation of a principle i n t e l l i g e n t l y adopted and 
conscientiously practiced. Expressed positively, as he wrote i n an 
277 
essay of 1889 on the subject, i t read, " I n matters of the i n t e l l e c t , 
follow your reason as far as i t w i l l take you, without regard to any 
other consideration." And negatively, " I n matters of the i n t e l l e c t 
do not pretend that conclusions are certain that are not demonstratexi 
or demonstrable." This Huxley took to be "the agnostic f a i t h , which 
i f a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not be ashamed to look 
the universe i n the face, whatever the future may have i n store for 
him." 
However, Huxley's appreciation of vrhat Hume had to say about 
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kLet'siu had not destroyed his sympathy with, and generosity towards, 
the re l i g i o u s and theological mind at i t s best. I t is true that for 
him as for some of his contemporaries, the principal description of 
279 280 the deity had become "Unknown and Unknowable". So Huxley vjrote, 
f o r example, of " t h i s sadness, t h i s consciousness of the l i m i t a t i o n 
of man, t h i s sense of an open secret which he cannot penetrate" i n 
which " l i e s the essence of a l l r e l i g i o n ; and the attempt to embody i t 
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i n the forms furnished by the i n t e l l e c t i s the o r i g i n of the higher 
theologies." (One notes also that i n 1859 he had read Mansei's 
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Bampton Lectures and greatly admired them. ) And further. 
The question of questions for mankind -
the problem which underlies a l l others, and 
i s more deeply interesting than any other -
is the ascertainment of the place which Man 
occupies i n nature and of his relations to 
the universe of things ... Most of us, 
shrinking from the d i f f i c u l t i e s and dangers 
which beset the seeker after o r i g i n a l 
answers to these r i d d l e s , are contented to 
ignore them altogether, or to smother the 
investigating s p i r i t under the featherbed of 
respected and respectable t r a d i t i o n . But, 
i n every age, one or two restless s p i r i t s , 
blessed with that constructive genius, which 
can only b u i l d on a secure foundation, or 
cursed with the mere s p i r i t of scepticism, 
are unable to follow i n the well-worn and 
comfortable track of their.forefathers and 
contemporaries, and unmindful of a thousand 
stumbling blocks,, s t r i k e out into paths of 
their own. The sceptics end i n the i n f i d e l i t y 
which asserts the problem to be insoluble, or 
i n the atheism which denies the existence of 
any orderly progress and governance of things: 
the men of genius propound solutions which grow 
into systems of Theology or Philosophy, or 
veiled i n musical language which suggestsmore 
than i t asserts, takes the shape of the poetry 
of an epoch. 282 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s material we may now consider Huxley's 
reasons for supporting Darwin whilst maintaining his awareness of 
the theological issues at stake. He would not have attended the 1860 
meeting of the B r i t i s h Association i n Oxford had i t not been f o r a 
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chance meeting with Chambers, to whom he remarked that he "did 
not see the good of giving up peace and quietness to be episcopally 
pounded." Chambers, however, pleaded with him not to desert Darwin's 
friends at the meeting, so along Huxley went, and found his opportunity 
provided by Wilberforce's misrepresentation of what was at issuer 
Apart from the fact of Huxley's having asserted, i n reply to the bishop, 
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that he was not ashamed to have a monkey for his ancestor, he had 
some v a l i d pointa to put which were re l i a b l y reported i n the 
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Athenaeum. Darwin's theory was an explanation of phenomena i n 
Natural History, as the undulatory theory was of the phenomena of 
l i g h t . No one objected to that theory because an undulation of 
l i g h t had never been arrested and measured. Darwin's theory was 
an explanation of facts, and his book was f u l l of new fac t s , a l l 
.bearing on his theory. Without asserting.that every part of that 
theory had been confirmed, he maintained that i t was the best 
explanation of the o r i g i n of species which had yet been offered. With 
regard to the psychological d i s t i n c t i o n between men and animals, 
man himself was once a monad - a mere atom, and nobody could say 
at what moment i n the history of his development he became 
consciously i n t e l l i g e n t . The question was not so much one of a 
transmutation or t r a n s i t i o n of species, as of the production of 
forms which had become permanent. 
Knowing that Huxley continued to read a great deal of philosophy 
throughout the early 1860's i t may well be that he could adopt such 
a dispassionate view of Dairwin's book because of his comprehension 
of the problems involved i n discussing nature. This i n i t s e l f gave 
him an advantage over those vzho f e l t they had either a s c i e n t i f i c or 
a theological position to defend at a l l costs. His own particular 
. contribution to the debate was represented especially by Man's place 
i n Nature of 1863, as well -as by his reviews of the Origin 
and his many lectures and public discussions of the issues. I f one 
takes some of his remarks i n those reviews to begin with, one can 
see his temper, and his w i t , brought to bear on the problem. He 
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raised the question' of "what is^ a species?" For, as he remarked. 
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"Even i n the calm region of entomology, where, i f anywhere i n this 
s i n f u l world, passion and prejudice should f a i l to s t i r the mind, 
one learned coleopterist w i l l f i l l ten a t t r a c t i v e volumes with 
descriptions of species of beetles, nine-tenths of which are immediately 
declared by his brother beetle-mongers to be no species at a l l . " 
I n t r y i n g to sort species out, the investigator probably started 
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w i t h but one clear conviction i n mind, namely, "that every part 
of a l i v i n g creature i s cunningly adapted to some special use i n i t s 
l i f e . Has not his Paley t o l d him that that seemingly useless organ, 
the spleen," i s b e a u t i f u l l y adjusted as so much packing between the 
other organs?" This conviction, however, does not account f o r many of 
his findings. "A man i n his development runs for a l i t t l e while 
p a r a l l e l with, though never passing through, the form of the meanest 
worm, then travels f o r a space beside the f i s h , then journeys along 
wi t h the b i r d and the r e p t i l e for his fellow t r a v e l l e r s ; and only at 
l e s t , a f t e r a b r i e f con^janionship with the highest of the four-footed 
and four-handed world, rises into the dignity of pure manhood/' 
And i t was important to be clear about the connection frequently made 
between holding the notion of the f i x i t y of species and special 
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creation. "The second position i s obviously incapable of proof 
or disproof, the d i r e c t operations of the Creator not being subjects 
of science; and i t must therefore be regarded as a corollary from the 
f i r s t , the t r u t h or falsehood of V7hich i s a matter of evidence." I t 
was to these questions that Darwin had turned his attention, and since 
trhat he offered was not a repetition, of the nonsense of either Lamarck 
or the Vestiges, and because Darwin himself was modest i n his claims, 
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but supported them with the results of twenty years of investigations, 
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he deserved a f a i r hearing. Huxley made i t absolutely clear that 
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to give Darwin's book the consideration due to i t was not to "a f f i r m 
either the t r u t h or falsehood of Mr. Darwin's views at the present 
stage of the inquiry." Only years of work would enable naturalists 
to say "whether the modifying causes and the selective power," 
which Darwin had shown existed i n nature, were competent to produce 
a l l the effects ascribed to them, or whether Darwin had been led 
to overestimate "the value of his principle of natural selection, as 
greatly as Lamarck over-estimated his vera' causa of modification by 
exercise." 
. 292 Another review, much of. which was a lecture given before 
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the publication of the Origin, made a comiaent which was i n fact 
a warning to a number of scientists : "Geologists and palaeontologists 
w r i t e about the 'beginning of life'.and the 'first-created forms of 
l i v i n g beings,' as i f they were the most familiar things i n the world; 
and even cautious w r i t e r s seem to be on quite f r i e n d l y terms with 
the 'archetype' whereby the Creator was guided 'amidst the crash of 
f a l l i n g worlds'". To rule out that particular kind of "explanation" 
was not necessarily to divest oneself of a l l religious language. I t 
i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note one passage which reveals Huxley's own 
fascination with theology, when discussing the development 
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of a plant or animal from i t s embryo, as an example of one of 
nature's "perennial miracles*" The changes undergone by the "plastic 
matter" of an egg are rapid, yet steady and purposelike, so that 
one can only compare them to those operated by 
a s k i l l e d modeller upon a formless lump of clay. 
As with an i n v i s i b l e trowel, the mass i s divided 
and subdivided into smaller and sinaller portions, 
u n t i l i t i s reduced to an aggregation of granules 
not too large to build withal the finest fabrics 
of the nascent organism. And, then, i t i s a.s i f a 
delicate finger traced out the l i n e to be occupiexi 
by the spinal column, and moulded the contour of 
the body; pinching up the head at one end, the t a i l 
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at the other, and fashioning flank and limb 
int o due salamandrine proportions, i n so 
a r t i s t i c a way, tha t , after watching the 
• process hour by hour, one i s almost inv o l -
u n t a r i l y possessed by the notion, that some 
more subtle aid to v i s i o n than an achroiaatic, 
would show the hidden a r t i s t , with his plan 
before him, s t r i v i n g with s k i l f u l manipulation 
to perfect his work. 
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Huxley knew, he said, that the phenomena of v i t a l i t y were one 
with other physical phenomena, "and matter and force are the two 
.names of the oiie a r t i s t who fashions the l i v i n g as well as the 
l i f e l e s s . " Huxley noted that philosophically speaking, what Darwin 
had said was i n accordance with M i l l ' s principles of s c i e n t i f i c 
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method. Darwin had employed observation and experiment, risaeoned 
from the data with which he had furnished himself, and tested the 
v a l i d i t y of his reasoning by "comparing his deductions ivith the 
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observed facts of Nature." But the value of the book did not depend 
on "the ultimate j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the theoretical views i t contains". 
Even i f they were to be immediately disproved, i t would s t i l l be the 
best compendium of w e l l - s i f t e d facts available. And i n an essay of 
1864, dealing with a whole series of criticisms of the Origin, one 
finds Huxley d i r e c t l y tackling an example proposed by Paley. Just 
as Darwin had tackled Paley's i l l u s t r a t i o n of the eye, Huxley tackled 
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the i l l u s t r a t i o n of the watch. Suppose, said Huxley, that someone 
had' been able to show "that the watch had not been made d i r e c t l y by 
any person, but thafc i t was the result of the modification of another 
watch which kept time but poorly; and that t h i s again had proceeded 
from a structure which could hardly be called a watch at a l l - seeing 
that i t had no figures on the d i a l and the hands were rudimentary; 
and that going back and back i n time we came at l a s t to a revolving 
b a r r e l as the e a r l i e s t traceable rudiment of the whole fab r i c . " I f 
. • . - A13 ~ , ... . 
i t were then possible to imagine that these changes had resulted 
from a tendency of the structure to vary i n d e f i n i t e l y , and 
that there was something " i n the surrounding world which helped 
a l l variations i i i the direction of an accurate time-keeper, and 
checked a l l those i n other directions", then (as She pointed out) 
the force of Paley's argument would be gone. The point of Huxley's 
suggestion was indicated i n the following sentence, i n his assertion 
that what naturalists were out to do was to show how an organism 
adapted to a pa r t i c u l a r purpose might be the r e s u l t of "a method of 
t r i a l and error worked by unintelligent agents, as well as of the 
di r e c t application of the means appropriate to that end, by an 
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i n t e l l i g e n t agent." So as he said, a few paragraphs l a t e r , 
despite i t s mistaken approach, the problem of teleology had nevertheless 
kept the r e a l i t y of adaptation before men's minds "without being 
false t o the fundamental principles of a s c i e n t i f i c conception of 
the universe." 
To t u r n now to Huxley's work, one recalls that one of the 
paragraphs from Man's place i n Nature has already been cited. 
Huxley also made an important point which attempted an answer to 
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Wallace, (and which one also finds i n effect i n the \?riting of Medawar ) . 
Huxley asked the questions which puzzled and worried many, and which 
had to be answered before people could accept the implications of 
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Darwin's thesis f o r themselves. "Is i t , indeed, true, that the 
Poet, or the Philosopher, or the A r t i s t whose genius i s the glory of 
his age, i s degraded from his high estate by the undoubted h i s t o r i c a l 
p r o b a b i l i t y , not to say certainty, that he i s the direct descendant 
of some naked and b e s t i a l savage?" Or was "the philanthropist or 
the saint to give up his endeavours to lead a noble l i f e , because the 
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simplest study of nan's nature reveals, at i t s foundations, a l l the 
s e l f i s h passions and fie r c e appetites of the merest quadruped? Is 
mother-love v i l e because a hen shows i t , or f i d e l i t y base because 
dogs possess i t ? " Man, after a l l , was now "transfigured from his 
grosser: nature by reflecting,^ here and there, a ray from the i n f i n i t e 
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source of t r u t h . " 
I n connection Huxley's theology, given his view of Kant's 
Universal Natural History one also notes the way i n which he could 
believe^^lhough no f a c i l e optimist, since he was w r i t i n g after the 
death of one of his children, that "the Divine Government ( i f we 
may use such a phrase to express the sum of the 'customs of matter') 
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i s wholly j u s t . " Another way of putting t h i s was to say that 
"the ledger of the Almighty i s s t r i c t l y kept, and every one of us 
has the balance of his operations paid over to him at the end of 
every minute of his existence." But man's relationship to God was 
problematic, to say the least. Huxley also held a view of the 
universe which was that i t was " l i k e to a great game being played 
out," and "we poor mortals are allowied to take a hand. By great good 
fortune the wiser among us have made out some few of the rules of the 
game, as at present played. We c a l l them 'Laws of Nature', and 
honour them because we f i n d that i f we obey them we win something for 
our pains. The cards are our theories and hypotheses, the t r i c k s our 
experimental v e r i f i c a t i o n s " . The metaphysicians seemed to be t r y i n g 
to f i n d out whether the cards were made of pasteboard or gold~leaf -
hardly a sane a c t i v i t y i n Huxley's opinion, "gi.ven the rules of the game 
and the winnings". His metaphor of the game with the unknomi player, 
w i t h human beings searching for a comprehension of some of the rules, 
i s yet another way of indicating his caution i n his appraisal of 
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r e l i g i o u s argument, fo r a l l that he had h i t upon the model of God 
as " a r t i s t " and could employ i t s k i l f u l l y . 
His caution i s evident p a r t i c u l a r l y when he came to tackle 
the problem of physical e v i l . He \*rote to Darwin i n 1876:°^ " I f 
we are to assume that anybody has designedly set t h i s wonderful 
universe going, i t i s perfectly clear to me that he i s no more 
entirfely benevolent and j u s t i n any i n t e l l i g i b l e sense of the words, 
that he i s malevolent and unjust. I n f i n i t e benevolence need not have 
invented pain and sorrow and a l l - i n f i n i t e malevolence xjould very 
easily have deprived us of the large measure of content and happiness 
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that f a l l s to our l o t . " This i s his Humean position i n regard to 
the investigation of nature, carried over into his consideration of 
natural theology. On the other hand l i f e properly li v e d was worth 
l i v i n g , " ^ ^ ^ "and would be even i f a malevolent fate had decreed that we 
should suffer, say, the pangs of toothache two hours out of every 
twenty-four." To such a position he held, despite also being able to 
w r i t e bUi^^^^ " I f our ears were sharp enough to hear a l l the cries of 
pain that are uttered i n the earth by man and beasts, we should be 
deafened by one continuous scream." Yet, as he continued, "the wealth 
of superfluous loveliness i n the world condemns pessimism. I t i s a 
hopeless r i d d l e . " 
Therefore, whilst i t was on some sense true that evolution 
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accounted for morality, he could not urge that the p r i n c i p l e of 
natural selection, or the survival of the f i t t e s t , should be adopted 
as an ethical p r i n c i p l e : "The f a i t h which i s born of knowledge", he 
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wrote i n his Evolution and Ethics, "finds i t s object i n an eternal 
order, bringing f o r t h ceaseless change, through endless time, i n 
endless space; the manifestations of the cosaiic energy alternating 
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between phases of p o t e n t i a l i t y and phases of explication. I t may , 
be t h a t , as Kant suggests, every cosmic magma predestined to evolve 
into a new world, has been the no less predestined end of a vanished 
predecessor." But when Huxley came to view the biological process 
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^ i n t h i s particular world, he found himself obliged to contrast 
the state of nature and the state of art - "aft" was not exemplified 
i n a garden produced by human intelligence and eniergy. He found that 
such a state of a r t could be maintained only by^ ''"^  "the constant 
counteraction of the h o s t i l e influences of the state of nature." 
Consequently, theodicies were an "ingenious and plausible form of 
pleading", though he did not indicate that he knew of Leibniz* e f f o r t , 
or of Kant's c r i t i q u e of theodicy. He could have picked up the 
references fromMansel's Bampton lectures, but even without reading 
the classical discussions, the incongruity of the propositions 
expressing the problem of physical e v i l i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i s t i c propositions 
was obvious enough, or seemed so to him. "Before the grim r e a l i t i e s 
of p r a c t i c a l l i f e the pleasant f i c t i o n s of optimism vanished. I f t h i s 
were the beist of a l l possible worlds, i t nevertheless proved i t s e l f 
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a very inconvenient habitation f o r the ideal sage." F i n a l l y , 
Cinderella is t o l d that she i s devoted to low and material interests, 
but 
'she sees the order which pervades the seeming 
disorder of the world; the great drama of 
evolution, with i t s f u l l share of p i t y and 
t e r r o r , but also with abundant goodtiess and 
beauty unrolls i t s e l f before her eyes; and she 
learns, i n her heart of hearts, the lesson, 
that the foundation of morality i s to have done, 
once and for a l l w ith l y i n g ; to give up pretending 
to believe that for which there i s no evidence, 
and repeating u n i n t e l l i g i b l e propositions about 
things beyond the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of knowledge . 
Huxley had learned something important from Kant, and l i k e him could 
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hot altogether reconcile that he believed to be the nature of the 
cosmic process with his own moral confidence, dependent as he was 
on his apprehension aiid i n terpretation of natural phenomena. 
Nevertheless, he shared with Kant an appreciation of a fundamental 
point of morality, which was as applicable to his approach to science 
as i t was to his approach to theodicy. 
We may now look at the f i n a l example chosen for t h i s study, and 
at h i s comments on some aspects of the theology of his day. With 
M i l l , one finds oneself i n a sense having turned f u l l c i r c l e , despite 
the vast difference that existed between a man such as Bayle, i n his 
society, and M i l l , i n his. I f , f o r ex«imple, one takes the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of some form of persecution f o r views thought to be ho s t i l e or 
c r i t i c a l o f received opinion one finds M i l l well aware of i t as were 
Chambers and Darwin. His work On Liberty published i n the same year 
as the Origin was a suitable touchstone f o r the treatment of Darwin's 
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irork, with i t s ple^ for i n t e l l e c t u a l freedom. The waning of the 
period when such a plea was necessary may be taken to have been 
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marked by Lecky, remarking that i t was during the second half of the 
nineteenth century that there was a conspicious change i n English 
l i f e i n "the great enlargement of the range of permissible opinions 
on re l i g i o u s subjects". This, he thought, had been p a r t i c u l a r l y 
furthered by the habit which sprang up about 1865, of signing a r t i c l e s 
i n periodicals, and of the editors of those periodicals allowing a 
v a r i e t y of opinion to be ejcpressed. 
Also, i f one takes Bayle'spre-occupation with what could be 
meant by the goodness of God, t h i s i s certainly to be found i n M i l l , 
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notoriously i n his comments on Mansel's Bampton lectures: 
" I f i n ascribing goodness to God I do not mean what I mean by goodness; 
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i f I do not mean the goodness of which I have some knowledge, but 
an incomprehensible a t t r i b i i t c of an incomprehensible substance, 
which f o r aught I know may be a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t q.uality from that 
xehich I love and venerate what do I mean by c a l l i n g i t goodness? 
and what reason have I for venerating i t ? I f I know nothing about 
what the a t t r i b u t e i s , I cannot t e l l that i t i s a proper object of. 
veneration." M i l l j i i k e Huxley, held that " to assert i n words 
what we do not think i n meaning, i s as suitable a d e f i n i t i o n as can 
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be given of a moral falsehood." And as he emphasised, "the doubt 
whether words applied to God have th e i r human s i g n i f i c a t i o n , i s only 
f e l t when the words rel a t e to his moral attributes; i t i s never heard 
of i n regard to his power. We are never t o l d that God's omnipotence 
must not be supposed to mean an i n f i n i t e degree of the power we know 
i n man and nature". The problem i n the interpretation of the divine 
goodness arose because i t appeared to be necessary to teach doctrines 
respecting God which " c o n f l i c t irreconcilably with a l l goodness that 
we can conceive." 
I n these remarks M i l l already indicated the view of theism 
which he had already worked out i n part, before the publication of 
his book on Hamilton's philosophy. Like Hume before him, whose 
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position he well comprehended, his essays on theism and r e l i g i o n 
were not published as and when they were written. The f i r s t two were 
inr i t t e n i n the mid e i g h t e e n - f i f t i e s , though according to Harriet 
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Taylor, he had intended to publish at least the essay on "Nature", 
vrhen he had completed that on "Theism" i n 1873. Although there had been 
a considerable lapse of time between the vnriting of the essays, they 
were fundamentally consistent one with another. I t V7ill be useful to 
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consider the f i r s t two essays, at least, as documents of the 1850's 
rather than of the 1870's when t r y i n g to assess th e i r arguments, 
and especially when t r y i n g to see whether the new views of nature 
being brought to the fore and widely popularised had any effect on 
the presentation of the arguments. Leaving these essays for later 
consideration, one finds also that M i l l ' s Logic, together with his 
comments on Mansel, provides another clue as to his approach. The 
f i r s t e d i t i o n of the work, published i n 1843, had taken him thirteen 
years to w r i t e , and had a number of aims, one of which was to provide 
a c r i t i q u e of "rationalism" i n a l l i t s manifestations, including the 
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rationalism of Kant. I t was the last section of the work, "On 
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the Logic of the Moral Sciences", which some have found disappointing. 
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Packe said of i t that i t claimed for reason more than i t could 
achieve. Whereas that might have been expected i n the f i r s t e d i t i o n , 
perhaps i t would have been not unreasonable to have expected 
some awareness of the new picture of nature and of man's relationship 
to i t informing that, section of the work at least i n i t s Tater 
editions. " I t was to nature f i r s t , and not to human nature 
that he should have directed observation." I t i s possible that M i l l 
did not wish to become embroiled i n the controversy about theism that 
such observation would have involved, assuming that he had the 
competence to master the necessary material. He was too well aware 
of the problems of the exercise to make the mistake of embarking on 
a study i n which he could not succeed, given the l i t t l e time he would 
have had available f o r i t i n the l i g h t of a l l his other pursuits. 
Although, as already noticed, he was acquainted with some of the most 
i n f l u e n t i a l group of scientists involved i n promoting the new view 
of nature he may well have f e l t i t wise to leave t h e i r theorising to 
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them, provided that i t accorded with what seemed to be the r i g h t -
kind of l o g i c a l procedures. However, perhaps one could have 
expected a re-phrasing of the material on c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n the 
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Logic, where a discussion which embraces A r i s t o t l e at the one 
end of the spectrum goes only as f a r as Cuvier at the other, with 
no more than a comment on c l a s s i f i c a t i o n being made "by Nature" and i 
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"by us for our convenience". One might have expected more from 
him, given that he had been so i n f l u e n t i a l i n providing a l o g i c a l and 
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philosophical support f o r Darwin's thesis. Ke did no more than ' 
add a note i n the f i f t h edition of 1862 of which Huxley no doubt 
3?* 
knew, on the status of Darwin's approach i n the l i g h t of his own principles, ' j 
Mr. Darwin's remarkable speculation on the ; 
Origin of Species i s another unimpeachable. 1 
example of a legitimate hypothesis. What he 
terms 'natural selection' i s not only a vera 
causa, but one proved to be dapable of • \ 
producing effects of the same kind w i t h those 
which the hypothesis ascribes to i t : the 
question of p o s s i b i l i t y i s enti r e l y one of 
degree. I t i s unreasonable to accuse Mr. Darwin 
(as has been done) of v i o l a t i n g the rulers of f 
Induction. The rules of Induction are 
concerned with the conditions of Proof. 
Mr, Darwin has never pretended that his doctine ! 
was proved. He was not bound by the rules of 
Induction but by those of Hypothesis. And these 1 
l a s t have seldom been more completely f u l f i l l e d . 
He has opened a path of inquiry f u l l of promise, 
the results of which none can foresee. And i s 
i t not a wonderful feat of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge 
and ingenuity to have rendered so bold a suggestion, 
which the f i r s t impulse of every one was to 
rejec t at once, admissible and discussable, even 
as conjecture? 
I t may be that on the matter of the logic of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n M i l l may 
have f e l t that however species came into being^ supposing that Darwi-n's 
ideas could be j u s t i f i e d , the logic of the discussion of species would 
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remain the same. Darwin was delighted" to receive the news of M i l l ' s 
approbation of his work, even before that approbation appeared i n p r i n t , j 
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f o r as he said, he had begun to think that he d i d not know how to 
reason s c i e n t i f i c a l l y . 
M i l l ' s s e n s i t i v i t y to the problems of society made him a 
determi.ned opponent of anyone who wanted to promulgate a harsh 
and uncaring a t t i t u d e towards the less fortunate, p a r t i c u l a r l y when that 
a t t i t u d e was bolstered up by "dan^inism". His comments now reveal 
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his own indictment of the deity. For exanqjle, i n his U t i l i t a r i a n i s m 
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of 1863, he wrote that i n a ^Torld i n which there i s so much to 
i n t e r e s t , so much to enjoy, and so much a l s o to correct and improve, 
every one who had a moderate endowment of moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l 
requisites could enjoy an existence which could be called enviable. 
No-one should be denied the use of the sources of happiness by bad 
laws or subjection to the w i l l of others, and given that l i b e r t y , 
a person would then have; only to escape "the indigence, disease, 
. and the unkindness, worthlessness or premature loss of objects of 
af f e c t i o n " . The main stress of the problem lay " i n the contest with 
these calamities, from which i t i s a rare good fortune e n t i r e l y to 
escape: which as things are now, cannot be obviated, and often cannot 
be i n any material degree mitigated". M i l l thought that many even of 
these positive e v i l s might be removable by man, or at any rate confined 
w i t h i n narrow l i m i t s . "Even that most intractable of enemies, disease, 
may be i n d e f i n i t e l y reduced i n dimensions by good physical and moral 
education, and proper control of noxious influences; while the progress 
of science holds out a promise f o r the future of s t i l l more direc t 
conquests over t h i s detestable foe". One might say that M i l l , l i k e 
Bayle, f e l t the g r i e f that came from r e f l e c t i o n that suffering of one 
kind or another, seervsed to have been woven into the very st u f f of l i f e . 
Human care and e f f o r t was required, and though the removal of the causes 
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of human suffering might be slow, "though a long succession of 
generations w i l l perish i n the breach before the conquest i s 
completed, and t h i s world becomes a l l that, i f w i l l and knowledge 
were not wanting, i t might easily be made - yet every mind 
s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e l l i g e n t and generous to bear a part, however a 
small and inconspicious, i n the endeavour, w i l l draw a noble 
enjoyment from the contest i t s e l f , which he would not for any 
bribe j.n the form of s e l f i s h indulgence consent to be without". 
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Wallace was at a dinner party with M i l l i n 1870 and t r i e d 
to tackle the l a t t e r on his view of God and the world, since Wallace 
was pursuing his optimistic view of nature i n r e l a t i o n to human 
society, wiiich he believed benefited from the greatest, possible 
va r i e t y of character, arising from the immense variety of beings i n 
the natural order. When confronted by Grote with the "ordinary 
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idea" of an eternal, omniscient and benevolent deity, '^because 
anything else was almost unthinkable", M i l l replied "that whoever 
considered the f o l l y , misery, and badness of the bulk of mankind" 
found the b e l i e f unthinkable. I t would imply "that God could have 
made man good and happy, have abolished e v i l , and has not done so". 
M i l l dogmatically repeated that "an omnipotent God might have made 
man wise, good, and happy, and as He had not chosen to do so i t was 
absurd fo r us to believe i n such a being and c a l l Him almighty and good". 
I t was clear that M i l l could not discuss the subject i n any other 
terms. Again, thus f a r . M i l l ' s problem i s l i k e Bayle's problem. But 
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M i l l found that whilst not wanting to undermine theism, and revering 
Christ, he could not get much beyond the position of asserting "that 
the world was made, i n whole or i n part by a powerful Being who cared 
f o r man". This appeared to him, though not proved, as a very probable • 
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hypothesis. ; Bayle's God meant more to him than that. 
I f one now turns to the three essays on r e l i g i o n , bearing 
i n mind that those on "Nature" and on the " U t i l i t y of Religion" 
were w r i t t e n i n the 1850's, one finds,, i n the f i r s t case. M i l l 
336 337 w r i t i n g the obituary of a concept. He proposed to inquire 
" i n t o the t r u t h of the doctrines which make Nature a test of r i g h t 
and wrong, good and e v i l , or which i n any mode or degree attach 
merit or approval to following, i m i t a t i n g , or obeying Nature." 
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Every approved triumph of "Art" over "Nature" i s i n i t s e l f an 
acknowledgement that "the ways of Nature are to be conquered, not 
obeyed: that her powers are often towards man i n the position of 
enemies, from whom he must wrest, by force and ingenuity, what l i t t l e 
he can f o r his own use, and deserves to be applauded when that 
l i t t l e i s rather more than might be expected from his physical weakness 
i n comparison to those gigantic powers." One possible comparison with 
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Huxley's views i s obvious. Religious persons ought to face the fac t , 
"that the order of nature, i n so f a r as unmodified by man, i s such as 
no being whose attri b u t e s are j u s t i c e and benevolence, would have made, 
with the intention that his r a t i o n a l creatures should follow i t as an 
example." Nor was M i l l impressed by the experience of awe at the sight 
of natural phenomena. "Those i n whom awe produces admiration may be 
aesthetically developed, but they are morally uncultivated".^^"^ Awe involves the experience of a feeling "closely bordering on pain"; i t i s 
related to a conception of pox^er, even when that power may be such as to 
make us conscious of i t s a b i l i t y to i n f l i c t e v i l . And M i l l could provide 
ample i l l u s t r a t i o n pf the p o i n t t h a t the physical government of the 
world was f u l l of things "which when done by men are deemed the greatest 
enormities". Nature could not by analogy setve as a guide f o r our actions. 
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Nor could M i l l accept the superstition that pain ennobles, 
and he thought l i t t l e of those "whoJiave deemed themselves qualified 
to 'vindicate the ways of God to Man'" and who have hardened th e i r 
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hearts and denied that misery i s an e v i l . Accordingly, the only 
admissible moral theory of creation^^^ i s "that the Principle of Good 
cannot at once and altogether subdue the powers of e v i l , either physical 
or moral; could not place mankind i n a world free from the necessity 
of aii incessant struggle with the maleficient powers, or make them 
always victorious i n that struggle, but could and did make them capable 
of carrying on the f i g h t w ith vigour and vjith progressively increasing 
success." One returns yet again to Bayle's setting of the alternatives. 
HoM/ever, M i l l ' s " s o l u t i o n " somehow enabled him t.o r e t a i n some meaning 
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for the XTOrd "Providence", now understood as "the sympathizing 
support of a powerful and good Governor of the world" when man's role 
i s that of "a not ineffectual a u x i l i a r y " . People who have believed 
i n providential support have never r e a l l y believed God to be omnipotent. 
"They have believed that he could do any one thing, but not any 
combination of things." I t i s at t h i s stage that Leibniz' Theodicy 
returns to the scene, so to speak. I t may be, given his knowledge oj- (v-£««i* , 
that M i l l had taken Leibniz seriously enough to have read his work for 
himself and i n t h i s respect, he i s a rare phenomenon i n the mid-
nineteenth century. M i l l ruthlessly drew out the possible implications 
of what Leibniz had said about God i n order to deny the c r e d i b i l i t y 
of a classical theodicy i n terms of a calculation of the operation of 
the divine perfections i n creation. Leibniz' work, he vir^te,^^^ was 
"so strangely mistaken for a system of optimism, and, as such satirized 
by Voltaire on grounds which do not even touch the author's argument. 
Leibniz does not maintain that t h i s world i s the best of a l l imaginable. 
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but only of a l l possible worlds; which, 
inasmuch as God, who i s absolute goodness, has chosen i t and not 
another." The f i r s t point i s that M i l l had h i t on an essential difference 
between Voltaire and Leibniz; the second, that he proceeded to comment 
on the notion of the "region of the eternal v e r i t i e s " , which was a 
problematic feature of the Theodicy. Leibniz, he wrote, i n every 
page, " t a c i t l y assumes an abstract p o s s i b i l i t y and impossibility, 
.i.ndependent of the divine power". His pious feelings made Leibniz 
continue to designate t h a t power by the word "omnipotence", but given 
the context for God's operation, the term could only mean "power extending i 
to a l l that i s w i t h i n the l i m i t s of that abstract p o s s i b i l i t y . " i 
The power of M i l l ' s deity was l i m i t e d , not by abstract p o s s i b i l i t y , but | 
by the r e a l i t i e s of physical and moral e v i l . Further, making his i 
347 
remarks appropriate to design-theology s p e c i f i c a l l y . M i l l reminded 
the advocates of "special design i n creation" that "one of the things 
most evidently designed i s that a large proportion of a l l animals 
should pass th e i r existence i n tormenting and devouring other animals. 
They have been l a v i s h l y f i t t e d out with the instruments necessary 
for that purpose; t h e i r strongest instincts impel them to i t , and many 
of them seem to have been constructed incapable of supporting themse.lves 
by any other food." From material provided by the bi.ologists enough 
examples could be found to "blacken the character of the Creator", 
even more than Hume had done. 
I n the second essay, on the " U t i l i t y of Religion" M i l l had to 
face the point that the Christ whom he revered was purported to be 
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id e n t i c a l with the author of nature. For a l l his knovjledge of Coleridge, 
he had not found a way of reading scripture such as to f i n d i n i t a ! 
source of theology, though i t was a possible source of moral principles. { 
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He compared and contrasted the author of nature with the author-
•349 • 
of the sermon oil the mount. As he had shoi'Jn when commenting 
on Mans el,: M i l l would not worship mere power, and i t i s with 
power that the t r a d i t i o n a l understanding of God leaves us i f vze 
cannot make sense of God's goodness and j u s t i c e . The only 
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possible alternative theoiry of the o r i g i n and government of 
the universe which stood wholly clear "both of i n t e l l e c t u a l 
contradiction and of moral o b l i q u i t y " , seemed to be some version 
of the theory of the Manicheans which involved placing a l i m i t a t i o n 
on the deity's power. M i l l had already said something about that 
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proposal. Man would then he called to worship that being "to 
whom we owe a l l the benevolent contrivance we behold i n Nature", -
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there could be some minimal value to be found i n Paley a f t e r a l l . 
That worship would include becoming one of God's fellow-combatants. 
I n the f i n a l essay one finds M i l l thinking of his deity, 
especially i n the l i g h t of what he had comprehended of the results 
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of the geological and biological sciences of his day. This time 
he proposed to examine the question of theism as though i t were 
i t s e l f a matter of s c i e n t i f i c e n q u i r y . H e allowed that the 
phenomena of nature took place according to general lax^s, and that 
these might be the r e s u l t of the exercise of a sovereign w i l l . So he 
embarked on an examination of the classical arguments f o r God's 
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existence. Here M i l l showed what he had learned from Kant, "the 
most discriminating of the a p r i o r i metaphysicians". Kant had kept 
the two questions of the o r i g i n and composition of our ideas, and the 
r e a l i t y of the objects which might be supposed to correspond to them, 
perfectly d i s t i n c t , Kant's deity was necessary, not by a l o g i c a l , but 
by a pr a c t i c a l necessity, imposed by the moral law. As M i l l commenfed. 
353 ^.„„ } 
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" i t i s not perfectly clear whether Kant's meaning i s that convittion 
of a law includes conviction o f a lawgiver, or only that a Being 
of whose w i l l the law i s and expression, i s eminently desirable." 
To r e j e c t Leibniz, was not, a f t e r a l l , necessarily to follow Kant. 
God might or might not be necessary to morality, even when morality. 
included " f e e l i n g " , but i n any case, feeling understood as the , 
desire f o r God did not necessarily imply the t r u t h of God's existence. 
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As M i l l had already shown, Leibniz' optimism, an expression of a 
desire to believe i n the goodness of God, had not proved to be a 
satisfactory ground f o r a r a t i o n a l l y determined b e l i e f . Kant 
apparently had nothing helpful to o f f e r , 
> 
M i l l ' s " s c i e n t i f i c " investigation proceeded to compare 
Paley's argument with that of Darwin, taking the example of the eye, 
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as Darwin had taken i t , for discussion. He considered the eye i n 
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i t s connection with isight i n r e l a t i o n to two possible " l i n k s " . 
One the one hand he suggested "Creative foisthought", and on the other, 
the p r i n c i p l e of the survival of the f i t t e s t . The l a t t e r had resulted 
i n a somewhat s t a r t l i n g and improbable hypothetical history of nature 
(as Kant had feared). That history of nature could be supposed to be 
not inconsistent with creation, but " i t must be acknowledged that i t 
would greatly attenuate the evidence for i t . " Although M i l l did not 
spell h i s meaning of "creation" he did say that the adaptations i n 
A 
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nature afforded a large balance of probability i n favour of 
creation by intelligence. He was s t i l l some way from the confidence of . 
Powell's assertions. I n other words, he could admit the uninformative 
conclusion of Hume's Dialogues and no more. M i l l , l i k e Hume, did not 
f i n d that the Manichean hypothesis made sense unless re-phrased as he 
suggested, but nor could he make comprehensible to himself the attributes 
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360 o€ God as t r a d i t i o n a l l y defined, i n r e l a t i o n to his view of things. 
261' • Even contrivance could be seen as a mode of overcoming d i f f i c u l t i e s , 
(a point which Paley had noticed and with which he had attempted to deal). 
The only factor of which M i l l seemed to be certain i n respect of God's 
government of the world was that eithisr God could not, or would not, 
give men everything they wanted. 
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So M i l l came to propose i n effect, his own image as an 
appropriate image of a poseible deity. Just as he himself hoped that 
men i n society would eventually overcome the causes of human suffering, 
so he hoped that there could be some meaning i n a promise of "the very 
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distant but not uncertain f i n a l victory of Good." However, making 
. > . • • 
sense of God's goodness by l i m i t i n g his power, h-e inevitably 
att&nti^A,U^ wh-at he could say about an ultimate v i c t o r y of those values 
i n which he believed, as he had attenu.&{'<<5' the meaning of Providence. 
There was no guarantee that God was more effective than men were 
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themselves. Bain might well question whether, " a f t e r painting the 
world i n such gloomy hues, he could set up a Deity, that would replace, 
i n the hearts of men, the one that he undertook to destroy." 
One might think that i t was better to admit bafflement, with 
Darwin, and reliance on one's own resources, with Huxley, than to 
prefer such a deity. And Chamber's law-gives; or Powell's presiding 
mind,would be preferable to M i l l ' s gloomy r e f l e c t i o n . He could af t e r 
a l l , have picked up from Leibniz, as Huxley had from Kant, some 
appreciation of the world's splendour, which might have made him think 
somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y . Huxley could perhaps have been prodded to commit 
365 
himself to the enquiry which M.B, Foster proposed, about what theology 
his philosophy of nature implied or whether i t implied one. Only i n 
366 
that way, perhaps, having found a way of correlating the phenomena. 
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of the organic world by means of the hypothesis of evolution i n 
Darwin's interpretation of i t , (although that needed substantiation) , 
could he and others have prote ted the status of t h e i r " r e l i g i o u s " 
experience, i f that was what they were attempting to do by means of 
t h e i r theological r e f l e c t i o n . 
One concludes that whatever the theologians vrere saying at 
the time does not seem to have impinged on the "philosophers" of 
.nature to whom atte n t i o n has been drawn The work of Leibniz, Kant 
and Coleridge, when known to them, was not understood, or not 
appreciated i n a way \*hich could have proved helpful to them. 
Certainly the nineteenth century "philosophers of nature" are a 
long way, even the most optimistic of them, from the production of 
an a f f i r t i a t i o n of f a i t h which could begin to resemble a twentieth-
, 368 century example: 
We a f f i r m the power of God. We are not able to 
trace out i n d e t a i l the workings of the power he 
exerts; and there are mnifestations of power i n 
the universe which appear to suggest that a l l is^ '' 
not under his control. But we know something of 
God's power at i t s source; f o r we know Christ, 
the Son of the Father who sustains the physical 
world and makes i t serve his purposes, the Son 
wbose l i f e was strong enough to overcome human 
death, from whom xre receive the Holy S p i r i t with 
his transforming power. Power in God i s the 
exercise of his authority, which i s sovereign 
over a l l creatures. By his power he can create 
and sustain, he can save and could damn. I n every 
use of his power God remains time to himself and 
to what he has revealed that he i s . To separate 
his power from his wisdom, his love and his 
serenity would be to undo the meaning of the 
name God. His power is neither magical nor 
capricious. I t expresses God's freedom to make 
his v/isdom and love e f f e c t i v e . Within the l i m i t s 
of his o\m consistency the freedom is absolute, 
for there i s no power outside himself by which God 
could be coerced. From l i v e s already being transformed 
by the power of God i n Christ we a f f i r m that the Lord 
whom we worship i s God, almighty i n his wisdom and 
love and serenity." . 
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However, i f Christian doctrine were to be the c r i t e r i o n , perhaps only 
Coleridge could have survived scrutiny, of a l l those whose work has 
been looked at during the course of this study. 
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B« Conclusion. 
The search for a theodicy i s a search for j U i t e l l i g i b i l i t y - On 
the one hand, there i s the problem of the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the 
natural order, and on the other, the problem of the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y 
of God. Leibnis& hoped to see the world as God saw i t , attempting to 
correlate the divine object of h i s contemplation with the order of 
nature as he \mderstood i t . He displayed an immatched confidence in 
huinan reason i n i t s considera-cion of the divine being, and maintained 
a view of creatures in t h e i r relation to God which made i t impossible 
for man to be pessimistic. The analogy of God as "architect" vhich 
Leibixiz employed, indicating a "fi n i s h e d " creation, was to be developed 
in theological thinking to promote a picttire of creatures disposed in 
t h e i r " s p a t i a l " relationships to one another, as a permanent and stable 
expression of the diviae creator«s a c t i v i t y . Associated with -chis 
s p a t i a l disposition were the notions of hierarchy, and continuity. 
Attention to d e t a i l s pro video further "evidence" of the creator's s k i l l 
and care, evoking a gratitude which prompted morality. An appreciation 
of the •'whole" as the sum of inexhaustible variety was found to be a 
further source of rational s a t i s f a c t i o n , and helped to maintain 
confidence in God when attention to detail, seemed to threaten that 
confidence. 
However, there were those who insisted on the necessarily problematic 
charaoter of man's knowledge of creatures i n their r e l a t i o n to God. 
And insistence on human misery, i f a prior guarantee of God*s goodness 
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could not be allowed to weigh i n the discussion, seemed to require 
a suspension of judgment on theological issues. Suspension of 
judgment appeared to be a more reasonable stance, i f the alternative 
were an unthinking f a i t h . The problem of language became increasingly 
important. Different i n t e r e s t s were at stake, each requiring the 
service of appropriate expression. An "operational" language which 
•would allow experimeaital s c i e n t i f i c enquiry to proceed was to be 
distinguished from an analogical language suitable for theology, . 
Kant, witn an incurable concern for theology, appreciated the 
seriousness of the problem. A transcendent deity, "beyond the reach 
of human contemplartion, required an understanding of the world 
characterised by s t a b i l i t y manifested in "law". Sense could be made 
of an ultimately inscrutable natural order given iinan*s a b i l i t y to 
structure h i s apprehension of i t . God was not to be invoked as 
"explanation", and t r u s t i n him was expressed not by means of 
I n t e l l e c t u a l speculation, but as a resul t of refl e c t i o n on nan's moral 
and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
A willingness i n the nineteenth century to take extended temporal 
sequ^ce seriously provoked a re-thinking of the notion of the "forms" 
of species. S c i e n t i s t s s t i l l deeply affected by t h e i r theological 
convictions found, i t d i f f i c u l t to think about the relationship of 
creatures to one another without a t h e i s t i c reference, Reference to 
God both h€ped and hindered variv/US kinds of s c i e n t i f i c enfeavour. 
Concepts with a long and distinguished history, such as the continuity 
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of beings, guaranteed by the arrangement of archetypes in the mind of 
the creator, were to be weighed anew for the i r s e r v i c e a b i l i t y . 
S c i e n t i s t s and theologians came to see that they were not looking at 
the natural order as had t h e i r predecessors. The environment changed, 
and creatures,mter-dependent with i t , chafl<ji<ihabitat and form. A 
theodicy dependent upon a cbmniitment to a view of nature which could 
no longer be sustained, would require •re-writIng. 
I t became clear that the relationship between "science" and "theology" 
was more complex than had been supposed. Theology could not be derived 
from a description of nature which would suit an experimental s c i e n t i s t . 
Theologians might well take notice of what s c i e n t i s t s were saying 
without expecting them to provide substaace for theological conviction. 
However, theologians ought to be sensitive to the s c i e n t i s t ' s under-
standing of man's inter-relationship with a l l other creatures i n the 
biological "skin" of the world, especially i f they wanted to make an 
appeal to C3iristology i n the course of re-thinking theodicy . 
The r a r i t y of twentieth-century theodlcles i s a measure of the 
d i f f i c i J i l t i e a which seem to oe involved, as though i t i s not clear where 
one ought to find the ground on which to stand i n order to make a 
beginning. I t may be no accident that one of the most distinguished 
recent attempts at theodicy, that of Austin Farrer, was produced by 
him in r e l a t i o n to h i s edition of Leibn i z ' Theodicy. Attention to 
the great philosophical theologians, to what they had to say about 
creation, grace, an<i providence, might provide hints of how to proceed. 
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Gifford lectures, the epistemology of Lonergan, and the work of 
systematic theologians, might also be importaxAt. I t i s not that 
God needs a defence, but i i i a t we need a theology of creation of which 
a theodicy should be a feiature. The construction of a theodicy may 
be no more d i f f i c u l t than that of constructing i n t e l l i g i b l e 
esq^ressions of areas of Christian doctrine, and imy be as indispensable. 
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